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 Abstract 
 
The long statehood history of Ethiopia is known for its decentralized 
governance system with many autonomous regions and principals ruled 
by hereditary regional chiefs under various titles, but accountable to King 
of Kings at the centre. The autonomous regions were not only paying 
annual tribute to the king of kings, but also had to cooperate with the 
centre. Powers of the regional chiefs started to diminish at the turn of 
the nineteen century and had been completely abolished in the early 
twentieth century. The century old exclusive, suppressive and highly 
centralized governance system came to end in 1991 and a multi-ethnic 
federal arrangement has been adopted. 
The Federal Constitution of 1995 guarantees the right of self- 
determination of Nations, Nationalities and People (NNP) up to 
secession. Considerable political and administrative powers have been 
devolved to the states. Constitutionally speaking assignment of 
responsibilities to the states makes Ethiopia one of the most 
decentralized federations. The states have also access to a range of tax 
bases, except the custom duties related taxes. They have power to 
determine tax base, tax rate and administer. They have legislative power 
to levy and administer jointly over concurrent taxes. The Constitution 
also guarantees borrowing right of the states. The devolutions of all 
these powers to the States are political preferences of the ethnic-based 
political forces for having strong states. 
This dissertation examines the constitutional setting of the political 
decentralization, the devolution of assignment of responsibilities, 
taxation powers, the vertical intergovernmental transfer system and 
borrowing autonomy of the States as well as the Wereda (district) level 
decentralization vis-á-vis the practices at ground. The study finds that (i) 
the decentralization processes have been guided by specific 
circumstances of political, economic and historical realities of the 
country; (ii) The Federal Constitution aims at creating strong states. In 
practice, however, the political decentralization is not only more visible 
than the taxation and borrowing powers but also there are gaps between 
the de jure and de facto; (iii) the states hardly exercise their 
constitutional taxation powers. The uniformity of ‘choices’ has 
jeopardized the state’s tax autonomy; (iv) there is little relation between 
 the degree of decentralization and the states’ borrowing autonomy. 
Generally speaking, the two decades of fiscal decentralization practices 
show that the intention of the Federal arrangement to have strong states 
has less congruence with the de jure.  
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Glossary 
 
Ethiopian 
Calendar 
Ethiopia uses its own calendar which starts from 
Meskerm1 (September 11) having 12 months with 
30 days each plus 5 or 6 days of Pagume. Ethiopian 
year calendar lags by 7 years from September 11 to 
January1, and 8 years from January1 to September 
10 from the European calendar. 
Ethiopian  
Fiscal Year 
 
runs from July 8 to next July 7 
 
 
 
 
  
 States and Zones of Ethiopia 
 
 
 
  
 Box 1.1. Chronology of (de) centralization Governance system 
Period Major events 
100BC 
to 
1137AD 
Era of Axumite dynasty. The dynasty constituted many autonomous regions and 
principalities. 
1137-
1270 
Era of the Zagwe Dynasty. It handed over its political power to the Amhara (Solomonic) 
dynasty through negotiation. 
1270-
1769 
The era of Amhara (Solomonic) dynasty. The dynasty continued when Menelik II came to 
power but abolished in 1975  
1769-
1855 
Known as Zemene Mesafint (Era of the Princes). The Yejju Oromo emerged as political 
contestant with the traditional Tigrians, Amhara, and Agew ruling classes and became among 
central political power players throughout the Zemene Mesafint. 
1855-
1869 
Tewodros II united the ancient core of Ethiopian Empire by bringing together Gonder, 
Gojjam, Tigrai, Wollo and Shewa. He intended to build a strong central government. 
1872-
1898 
Yohannes IV pursued a de facto federal system by recognizing traditional authority to 
regional Chiefs. 
1898-
1913 
Menelik II completed the second phase of unification by incorporating new autonomous 
territories south, east and west of Shewa and crystallized the present political map of 
Ethiopia. 
1917-
1935 
Ras Tefferi, who became an emperor with crown name of Haile Selassie I in 1930, took 
consecutive political, administrative and fiscal reforms. 
1935-
1941 
Italy occupied Ethiopia and established an ‘Africa Orientale Italiana’ by merging the Ethiopian 
Empire with the former Italian colonies(Eritrea and Somalia) into five regions based on 
various criteria such as ethnic, history, politics, etc  
1942 The Imperial Government of Ethiopia reorganized the administration in to five administrative layers. 
1945 Municipal governance system was introduced. Some urban centres were given municipal status. 
1947 Local Education Board was issued with the objective to expand primary school (grade 1-6) by 
mobilizing education tax. 
1966 Local-self Administration Order was issued with the intention to decentralize some public 
services to Awraja (County) administration layer.  
1975-
1991 
Era of Military (Dergue) regime. It perpetuated centralized state building strategy. 
1976 Kebele Administrations were established in rural and urban areas with the objective to bring 
government closer to the people. 
1987 By Proclamation No. 14 of 1987, the First Republic (Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) was 
created. 
1991 EPRDF assumed power. It organized a Conference on Peace and democracy in May 1991. Political 
organizations ratified a Charter of the Transitional Government. 
1992-
1994 
The administration structure was reorganized into 14 Killils (Regions) mainly along ethnic lines. 
Significant political, fiscal and administrative powers were devolved to the Regions. 
1995 The Constitutional Assembly ratified the Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 
December 1994 and came into force in August 1995. 
2002 Wereda (district) level decentralization, the second generation of decentralization, came into 
force.  
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1.1 Statement of Research Problem 
 
Fiscal federalism deals with separation of assignment of 
responsibilities and taxation powers among different levels of 
governments, why and how intergovernmental transfers are designed 
and distributed as well as the right of sub national governments to 
borrow from financial institutions. Art.51 and Art.52 of the Ethiopian 
Federal Constitution defines powers and functions of the Federal 
Government and the States respectively. The separation of power 
enables the Federal Government and the States to make decisions 
independently on their domain areas. But, it is by no means to say that 
the assignments of responsibilities are strictly exclusive of each other. 
Rather there are numerous shared functions which call for co operations 
and negotiations between the two levels of government. The residual 
power vests in favour of the States (Federal Constitution, 1995 Art. 
52(1)). This has been made by design not only to empower the states but 
also to avoid any ambiguity and vagueness that might arise any claims of 
power that are not explicitly stated in the Federal Constitution.  
In terms of tax assignment, the Federal Constitution categorizes the 
taxation powers into those of the Federal Government (Art.96), the 
States (Art.97) and concurrent taxation between the Federal 
Government and the States (Article 98). The Federal Constitution 
stipulates that both the Federal Government and the States jointly levy 
taxes and administer concurrent revenue sources. The adverb “jointly”, 
however, is not clear whether it implies all states together deal with the 
Federal Government as a group or each State should reach to consensus 
with the Federal Government to jointly determine related to tax base, tax 
rate and tax administration.  
Constitutionally speaking, the tax assignment between the Federal 
Government and the states gives the latter access to various revenue 
sources. In terms of tax type, it is only the import-export duties 
exclusively assigned to the Federal Government. Paradoxically, the 
Federal Government collects about 81 percent of the national tax 
revenues. Fiscal capacity of the states is weak and they cover below 30 
percent of their expenditure needs from their own revenue sources (see 
MoFED Annual Financial Reports). One may ask why the Ethiopian fiscal 
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relation is characterized by such a wide vertical fiscal gap, while the 
states have access to various revenue sources. Many factors have 
contributed to this. The existing taxation structure is the main reason. 
Custom tax (import related duties), which is a taxation power of the 
Federal Government, overwhelms the national tax structure. Sources of 
direct taxes are at a low level. Weak institutional capacity of the states to 
efficiently administer tax system is another factor. Third, the distribution 
of concurrent revenues between the Federal Government and the States 
favours the former. Fourth, because of the legacy of the previous 
socialist economy, the ownership of revenue source criterion of tax 
separation between the Federal Government and the States has made 
the former to control over lucrative sources of revenues such as the 
financial sector (Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Business and Construction 
Bank, Ethiopian Insurance Corporation), telecommunication, the 
Ethiopian airline, sugar corporation, cement plants, etc. 
Wide horizontal fiscal disparity is also a visible problem. Uneven 
distribution of economic bases, disparity in infrastructure development, 
and low tax efforts of the States are major factors for the existing wide 
horizontal fiscal disparity across the States. 
The House of Federation (HoF) designs the distribution of federal 
subsidies to the States (Federal Constitution, Art.62 (7)). The Article is 
vague as to whether the power includes determining conditional grants 
or not, although the practice is limited to unconditional grant. The 
unconditional grant is a major revenue source of the State. This has two 
conflicting impacts on the States. On the one hand, it gives to the States 
more discretion to set their priority expenditure packages between 
capital and recurrent budgets as well as among various sectors. On the 
other, it has developed dependency behaviour on federal transfers. The 
grant system is equity-oriented and it gives little weight to efficiency. The 
Constitution neither identifies the source(s) of the Federal grant nor set a 
federal grant floor. States’ grant entitlement depends on the decision of 
the Federal Government.  
Sub national government’s borrowing power to determine the 
purpose, the sources and the limit manifest the degree of fiscal 
decentralization. Article 51(7)) of the Federal Constitution enshrines that 
the States can borrow from domestic financial institutions. Yet, the 
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legislative body has not yet enacted specific laws on the conditions and 
terms under which the States can borrow money from internal sources. 
In practice, however, states’ borrowing is exceptional rather than the 
rule. 
The Federal Constitution does not recognize local governments (LGs). 
Rather, they are creatures of the States. Such arrangement allows the 
states to structure their LGs in a way that fits their specific 
circumstances. LGs are major providers of public services. But they have 
little discretion over capital expenditure as the States determine what, 
where and when capital investments should be carried out. Moreover, 
they have no taxation power except over municipal revenues. State 
politicians are reluctant to devolve taxation powers on the pretext of 
managerial incapacity of the LGs. 
In Ethiopia, the prescriptions of the first generation of fiscal 
federalism have little influence in designing the assignments of 
responsibilities and the revenue assignments between the Federal 
Government and the States. In addition to the economic principles, 
distinctive circumstances of the country have necessitated to take into 
account non-economic variables. It is with this understanding this 
dissertation attempts to critically assess the practice of fiscal federalism 
visa-á-vis the provisions of the Federal Constitution as well as the States’ 
Constitutions and laws. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives 
 
The general objective of the study is to critically assess the de-jure 
framework in comparison with the practice of fiscal federalism in 
Ethiopia over the last two decades. 
The specific objectives are: 
1. To examine the discretionary authority of the States and local 
governments in relation to their de-jure powers and the de-facto? 
2. To explore the economic and non-economic principles those have 
been applied in setting the assignment of responsibilities between 
the Federal Government and the states. 
3. To explore the unique principles of tax assignment those have been 
applied in the Ethiopian fiscal relations. 
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4. To investigate if the revenue assignments between the Federal 
Government and the States attest tax autonomy of the states. 
5. To assess the rationales and features of the intergovernmental 
transfer system. 
6. To examine the practice of state borrowing in Ethiopia, and 
7. To examine if the ‘revisited golden rule’ of borrowing is respected in 
financing long term investments. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
The Federal Constitution ensures considerable political, fiscal, and 
administrative powers to the States so that they would be able to 
determine their affairs, to have discretionary authority in allocating their 
budget that reflects local preferences. Therefore, the research questions 
of the study are: 
1. To what extent is the Ethiopian fiscal federalism decentralized in 
terms of de-jure and de facto? 
2. What principles govern the separations of assignments of 
responsibilities between the Federal Government and the States? 
3. What principles govern the separation of taxation powers between 
the Federal Government and the States? 
4. To what extent do the States enjoy tax autonomy? 
5. What are the objectives and characteristics of the Ethiopian 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers?  
6. Does the states’ borrowing practice attest strong states? 
7. Is the ‘revisited golden rule’ respected? 
 
1.4 Research Methodology and Source of data 
 
This dissertation is explorative and descriptive analytical research. It 
examines the practice of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia from an institutional 
approach. The assessment considers all the states and the two city 
governments. In addition, all capital cities of the States were purposely 
selected to examine the practice of the Wereda (district) level 
decentralization program launched in 2002. 
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The research uses secondary and primary data. Libraries; archive 
sources; federal, State and local governments’ official reports; minutes; 
proclamations and regulations…etc, were the main source of secondary 
data. Primary data were created through carrying out in-depth 
discussions with key informants by designing semi-structured 
questionnaires. Knowledgeable key informants were drawn from 
politicians at Federal, Regional and Wereda levels of government and 
experts on the basis of their professional capacity and/or political 
assignments. Accordingly, discussions were made with Chief Regional 
Administrators; Heads of Bureaus/ Offices of Finance and Economic 
Development, Education and Health, Water supply, and Road authorities. 
In addition, in order to solicit a wide variety of information, discussions 
were also held with members of Finance and Budget Committees of the 
HoPR, HoF, Council’s of the States and Heads of the selected urban LG. 
Field observations were also used as part of primary information source. 
 
1.5 Relevance of the study 
 
The highly centralized state-building strategy and assimilationist 
policy during the past century had failed to bring political stability, 
democratization and economic prosperity in Ethiopia. As a response to 
the assimilationist policy that ignored and/or concealed the existence of 
ethnic, cultural and language pluralism, the multicultural federal system 
affirms equality and rights of the NNP to Self-determination including 
secession. Such a bold federal experiment is believed to have some 
relevance for the multiethnic African countries in general and to the 
emerging decentralized/federal system in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, 
Somali, Sudan, South Sudan Republic, Eritrea etc) in particular. If the 
experience of Ethiopian fiscal federalism is associated with equal access 
to public services of citizens irrespective of their state residence, political 
stability, accommodation of diversity, individual and collective rights, 
democracy, budget autonomy and states’ tax sovereignty etc, then it will 
be an important reference to any comparative study of a multicultural 
federal system in Africa. An examination of its drawbacks may also 
provide a good lesson to African brothers and sisters not to repeat similar 
mistake(s). 
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The practice of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia from the political 
economy perspective has been barely researched, although there are 
numerous studies on the constitutional and administrative aspects of the 
Ethiopian federalism.1 Hence, this dissertation will also contribute to the 
global experiences of fiscal federalism. Finally, it may encourage other 
scholars to carry out further research on the subject matter. 
 
1.6 Time period considered 
 
It has been about two decades since Ethiopia has adapted a 
decentralized system. A de-facto federal structure had been instituted in 
the country during the Transitional Period of 1991-1994. After the end of 
the Transition, the FDRE Constitution entrenched a federal structure in 
the country. Therefore, the dissertation covers the periods of 1991/2 to 
2011/12. 
 
1.7 Organisation of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is organized into ten chapters. The first chapter is an 
introductory section that describes statement of research problem, 
research objectives, research questions, research methodology including 
sources of data, scope of the research, significance of the study, and 
organization of the study. Chapter 2 gives brief historical overview of the 
(de)centralization governance system in pre-1991 with the objective to 
familiarize the readers with the relationship between the centre and the 
constituent provinces and the state building strategies that have been 
pursued since 1855. Emphasis was given to the Emperor Haile Slassie and 
                                                 
1 Solomon Negussie (2006) did his PhD entitled “Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian 
Ethnic-based Federal System”, Utrechts Instituut, Netherlands. It emphasizes on the 
legal aspect of fiscal relations between the Federal Government and the States. 
Pawlos’ (2007) dissertation entitled “What One Hand Giveth, the Other Hand Taketh 
Away: Ethiopia’s Post 1991 decentralization reform under patrimonialism” the ISS, 
Netherlands, examinesthe practice of decentralization froma public Administration 
Perspective.  
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the Dergue regimes as their centralized and assimilitionist policies had 
instigated nationality question and has been led to the present 
multiethnic federal arrangement. Chapter 3 discusses the constitutional 
context, uniqueness of the Federal constitution, institutional 
arrangements and the making and remaking of the States and local 
governments in the 1990s. Chapter 4 reviews the economic and non-
economic principles of assignments of responsibilities to different levels 
of government with the objective to give theoretical background to the 
readers. Chapter 5 examines the practice of assignment of 
responsibilities among different levels of government in Ethiopia and 
examines how the practices are coherent with the theories of fiscal 
federalism and/or how the practice enriches the theories. Chapter 6 is 
about the general principles of revenue assignment and discusses from 
the first and second theories of fiscal federalism. Chapter 7 assesses the 
separation of taxation powers between the Federal Government and the 
States as well as between the State of Tigrai and respective urban local 
governments. The next Chapter discusses the rationale of transfers, legal 
framework and principles of transfers, and assesses the practice of 
intergovernmental transfers in Ethiopia. Chapter 9 gives some conceptual 
background and rationale of borrowing. It also briefly describes the legal 
framework and examines the practice of borrowing in Ethiopia. The last 
chapter provides a summary of the main findings and suggests some 
policy recommendations. 
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periods, the constituent provinces used to enjoy self-rule with a wide range 
of political, judicial, military and taxation powers. The second section deals 
with the (de)centralized empire and state building strategies that took place 
from the period of unification (1855) to 1991. This section emphasizes the 
political, tax and administration reforms that had been undertaken under 
various regimes. It also discusses how the century-old centralized and 
exclusive political systems of the Emperor Haile Selassie and the Dergue 
regimes had induced ethnic-based movements which paved the way to the 
supremacy of multi-ethnic politics since 1991. 
Therefore, the purpose of the historical narration is not as such to 
describe what and when events had happened but to briefly sketch the 
evolution of (de)centralized governance systems in the Ethiopian empire and 
how the highly centralized and exclusive political system of the 20th century 
has influenced the shaping of the present multiethnic federal arrangement. 
 
2.1 Governance System during the Ancient and Medieval 
Periods 
 
Ethiopia is the home of human origin and the cradle of civilization 
with city states like Yeha, Keskese etc since the 5thcentury B.C. (Sergew, 
1972). A well organized state emerged around the first millennium BC at 
Axum, the present-day Tigrai State (Fattovich, 2000:13; Munro-Hay, 
1991).The remnants of pre-Axumite city states, the longest monolithic 
obelisks in the World standing in Axum, the Sabean and Geez scripts, the 
golden Axumite coins, the fine and extensive Palaces, the metal works in 
silver and bronze are some living testimonies of the glory of past Axumite 
kingdom. 
The political system of the Axumite kingdom was characterized by 
“...a loose federation” comprising many autonomous states and 
principalities accountable to the king of kings at the centre (Munro-Hay, 
1991:134). The decentralized system enabled the Axumite emperors to 
maintain their hegemony over their subjects by recognizing the 
hereditary local autonomy. It also seemed to contribute to effectively 
administer and to promote political stability. 
The Axumite kingdom started to decline in the eighth century and 
came to an end in the early 12th century for various external and internal 
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factors.3 The invasion of the Agew (Zagwe) against the Axumite kingdom 
caused to shift the centre of political gravity from Axum and Axumites to 
Lasta and Agew, who established the Zagwe dynasty (1137-1270) in 
North Wello, Amhara State.  
Like the Axumite, the Zagwe dynasty was a hereditary monarchical 
system where the emperors placed themselves at the centre having 
many kings and chiefs with substantial autonomy at regional and local 
levels. Urbanization and urban cultures (such as architectural skill, 
ecclesiastical matters4) also characterized the Zagwe dynasty (Tekeste, 
2006:131). The Zagwe dynasty lasted only for two centuries because, the 
Amhara strongly resisted both in peaceful and armed means by claiming 
they were direct descendants and sole heir of the Axumite kingdom 
(Munro-Hay, 1991:23). As an effect, the Zagwe dynasty’s came to an end 
by abdicating its power to the ‘Solomonic ‘dynasty through negotiation 
(Alemaheyu, 2003 EG: 44). 
The Amhara controlled political power until 19745 by creating the so 
called “Solomonic dynasty”6, which served as an effective political 
ideology for gaining royal legitimacy and hereditary power right. Like the 
previous dynasties, until the second half of the 19th century, the 
Solomonic dynasty political structure was characterized by “a loose 
confederations of regional princedoms” (Tekeste, 2006:133, cited from 
Tadesse, 1972:95). 
During the Medieval periods, the empire faced a “series of threats 
from Islam...” (Tekeste, 2006:135). The long war between the Christian 
Empire and the Islamic state (1524-1543) diminished political and 
economic powers of the Ethiopian empire, destroyed its social capital, 
                                                 3 The invasion of Arabs from the Red sea cut-off the Axumits from their former external 
trade partners (Trimingham, 1952:46), Roland and Page, 1970:92). The uprising of the 
Beja against the Axumite (Buxton, 1970:43) was among the factors for the decline of 
the kingdom. 
4 The dynasty has left the monolith rock-hewn churches of Lalibela, which is one of the 
World’s wonders. 5  With the exception of the Zemene-Mesafint (Era of the Princes) which took place from  
1769 to 1855 and the periods of Emperor Tewodros II( 1855-1869 ) as well as  emperor 
Yohannes IV( 1872-1889). 
6  The Amhara rulers linked their roots to the King Solomon of Israel through Menelik I, 
who is believed, at least by the majority of Ethiopians, to be the son of King Solomon 
and Queen Sheba of the Axunmite kingdom. 
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and resulted in the expansion of the Oromo all corners of the Empire7. 
The “Solomonic” dynasty was also divided into the Gondorian line and 
the Shewa line (Jones and Monroe, 1970, Lapiso, 1982:236 and 243). The 
former line established a permanent political and administrative centre 
at Gondar and controlled the political power until it was thrown out by 
the Yejju Oromo in mid 19th century. The latter line made its centre in the 
present north Shewa. It maintained its autonomy but used to pay annual 
tributes to the Emperors in Gondar. It also expanded its empire 
southwards to control resources including the slave trade route.  
The ancient and medieval histories of Ethiopia were characterized by 
a loose federation governance system, although during the 15th and 16th 
centuries, there were attempts of centralization of power8. During the 
‘Zemene-Mesafint’, emperors at the centre had very weak power. 
Gonder, Gojjam, Tigrai, including Bahire-Negash, the present highland of 
Eritrea, Wello, Yejju, Lasta and Shewa and others were semi–
independent regions with strong standing armies, revenues and judicial 
powers. Vertical relations between the Centre and the Regional lords 
were not stable and institutionalized, rather they were volatile 
depending on their military strength, economic base and the marriage 
                                                 7 Yejju Oromo emerged as a competing ethnic group for power in the Gonder Palace with 
the coming of emperor Bakaffa to the throne in 1721 until Tewodros II  brought to an 
end the political upper hand of Yejju Oromo dynasty in the Gonder Court (Molla, 
1994:197-198). 
 8 Historical documents reveal that there were trends of centralization–decentralization 
cycles as a means of empire building strategy. For example, Emperor Zera Yakob 
(r1434-1468) instituted a strong central government at the cost of the provincial 
autonomy. The emperor used the Ethiopian Orthodox church as an instrument to 
monopolize power and to impose values, custom and religious doctrine of the ruling 
class on the other peoples, although he faced strong resistance that caused gross 
massacre, and blood shade in the entire empire(Alemaheyu, 2003:71:77, see also 
Getachew,2003EC). Understanding the cost of power centralization and religion 
hegemonic policy of his father, Emperor BeEde Mariam (1468-1478), persuaded a 
decentralized governance system by reinstating autonomy of the provinces under a 
loose federation. He also relaxed his father’s fundamentalist Orthodox Church policy 
and guaranteed local people to exercise their traditional custom and values. The 
federal politics of BeEdemariam served as an effective instrument to restabilize his 
empire and to bring secessionist territories peacefully under his empire (Alemaheyu, 
2003: 86-89and 148). In contrast, Emperor Sertse-Dingle (r1563-1597) had pursued a 
centralized empire building strategy to restrain the desire of Felash’ (Ethiopian Jew) to 
secede from the Empire (Alemayehu, 2003:158). 
13 
 
relations they had with each other. Reciprocal recognition between the 
centre and the regions was necessary to promote stability and 
cooperation of each other. Regions were supposed to submit annual 
tributes, to supply warriors and other logistical support, to collaborate 
and to participate, on demand, when the Emperors carry out military 
campaigns. In return, the Emperor had to recognize and respect the 
sovereignty of the regional hereditary lordships and their titles and 
privileges. But mutual reciprocal recognition was not always a rule of the 
political game. 
It is also worth noting that the provinces which had constituted the 
de facto federal empire were not enjoying symmetric powers and title. 
For instance, Shewa, Tigrai, Gojjam, Begemedir and Lasta (Zagwe) were 
enjoying first class rank and were granted to wear a golden crown, while 
territories south of Abay river (towards Awash river) were entitled to 
wear a copper crown and the rest territories had granted to put on silver 
crown (Alemaheyu, 2003 EC:148). 
 
2.2 Unification of Ethiopia: (De) Centralized State Building 
Strategies 
2.2.1 Emperor Tewodros II Reign (r1855-1868) 
 
Unification of Ethiopia started at roughly same period when the Meiji 
Restoration of Japan started. Throughout the periods of Tewodros II to 
Menelik II, the unification process and the state–building strategies of 
Ethiopia took place in two interrelated phases. Phase I refers to the 
unification of the ancient Abyssinian territories of the north. Emperor 
Tewodros II, a pioneer of modernization and a symbol of Ethiopian unity, 
ended the Zemene-Mesafint by unifying the semi-independent regions of 
Abyssinia, namely Gonder, Gojjam, Tigrai, Lasta, Yejju (Wello) and Shewa. 
The Emperor pursued a centralized state building strategy. As part of his 
political and administrative reforms, the Emperor reduced the status of 
the regional governorship to Meslane (representatives/ agents of the 
centre) with the objective to break down the traditional powers of the 
regional lords by appointing loyal indigenous aristocrats to rule their local 
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areas9. The Meslanes had little military and fiscal powers. Their prime 
responsibilities included, among others, to maintain local law and order, 
to provide justice and to collect tithes and taxes on behalf of the Central 
Government (Jones and Monroe, 1970:131; and Shifereaw, 1990:303). 
The Emperor attempted to abolish the military powers of the 
regional lords by establishing a salaried national army. As part of his 
economic and social reforms, the Emperor introduced land reforms to 
mobilize resources for his army, limited church lands and the number of 
clergy for a church to liberate the peasantry from the exploitation of the 
Coptic church; introduced salaried public officials; established a 
territorial police forces to ensure peace and order; and attempted to 
built an ammunition plant by employing foreigners at Gaffat, north 
Wello, declared anti slavery (Asmelash,1987:27, Keller, 1981:527 and 
Keller, 2005:94; Zenebe, 1902 EC; Welde Mariam, 1902EC). 
Couple of things seemed to motivate emperor Tewodros II for a 
strong central government: (i) to protect the sovereignty of the empire 
from the imminent and long standing expansionist policy threat of the 
Ottoman/Egyptian’s to control the source of Blue Nile, and ii) to see a 
stable and modern Ethiopia by abolishing the dark age of Zemene-
Mesafint characterized by civil wars among the regional lords and 
backwardness (Tekletsadik, 1981 EC, Zenebe, 1902; Weldemariam,1902; 
and unknown writer,1902 in Tesfaye, 2004 EC). 
The Emperor had a noble vision to see a united, militarily strong and 
progressive Ethiopia. However, many of his political, economic and social 
reforms did not endure, due to the strong resistance of regional 
nobilities, conspiracy of the Coptic Church, brutal gross measures against 
the peasantry and the British military campaign in 1868 against the 
Emperor (Zenebe, 1902 EC; Welde Mariam, 1902EC; unknown author, 
1902EC; Tekle Tsadik, 1981EC)). And, therefore, all his modernization 
initiatives and endeavours remained futile (Keller, 2005:94). Shiferaw 
(1990:304) questions the feasibility and desirability of Tewodrose`s 
excessive power centralization as an empire building strategy. 
 
                                                 9  In the revolting  and unstable regions, the Emperor used to appoint among his 
strong commanders as Meslen 
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2.2.2 Yohannes IV Reign (r1871-1889) 
 
Yohannes IV continued the empire building imitated by Tewodros II 
but with a different approach. Understanding the strong resistance and 
rebel of the regional nobilities against the power centralization of 
Tewodros II, and realizing the hereditary regional power based political 
history of Ethiopia; Yohannes IV pursued a federalist approach or a de 
facto federalism as his state building strategy (Crummey, 1971:115; 
Shiferaw, 1990:306, Assefa 2007:21). Emperor Yohannes IV was sensitive 
to the historical autonomy of the regions. He recognized and respected 
hereditary powers of the regional lords who remained loyal to him and 
granted the title of King to Menelik of Shewa and Tekle Haimanot of 
Gojjam; the title of ‘Ras’ to Micael of Wollo and Wag ‘Shum’ 10 Teferi of 
Lasta, by making himself a king of kings of Ethiopia. In the absence of 
bureaucratic institutions and a constitution, one cannot envisage legally 
defined power division between the centre and regional lords. 
Nevertheless, there were clear de facto power separations. The Emperor 
was responsible mainly for defending the sovereignty of the empire from 
external aggression; carrying out foreign relations and seating in imperial 
chilot (Justice) including appeals from regions, while the regional lords 
had full-flagged authorities in military, judicial, and levying taxes in their 
jurisdictions (Shiferaw, 1990:306, Bahru, 2001:60). They had obligation to 
pay annual tributes to the centre to supply fighting forces to the centre 
when asked and to defend the empire under the leadership of the 
emperor against foreign invasions. Yohannes tried to manage internal 
conflicts by granting genuine internal autonomy to the regional lords, 
although there were instances of non-co operation from Menelik II, a 
major power rival of Yohannes IV. 
 
2.2.3 Menelik II Reign (r 1889-1913) 
 
The second phase of empire building strategy refers to the 
completion of the making of the modern Ethiopian Empire to its present-
                                                 10 Ras (literally Duke), Dejazmach and Shum are traditional titles. 
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day. Menelik II incorporated the autonomous territories of South, West, 
and East of Shewa with the core ancient Ethiopian Empire from late 
1880s to early1900s (Asres 1958). The present-day political map of 
Ethiopia is a product of Menelik II’s military campaigns to the south of 
Shewa as well as the various border agreements made between Ethiopia 
on the one hand, and Italy, British and France, which colonized Eritrea 
and Somalia Mogadishu; Kenya, the Sudan and Somaliland, and Djibouti 
respectively on the other hand (Tekletzadik, 1983; Bahru, 2001; Teshale, 
1995). 
In terms of governance, Menelik II pursued pragmatic centralized and 
decentralized governance policies-. On the one hand, he abolished 
sovereignty of the conquered territories of the south, south west and 
east of Shewa and instituted a ‘Neftegna system’11by appointing 
                                                 
11 Meneliks`s military campaigns to the south, east and west of Shewa was beyond the 
traditional raiding and counter-raiding military campaignsof his ancestors periods. 
Instead, he established permanent settlements in the newly annexed territories and 
instituted a ‘Neftegna’ system or ‘Gebar’ system by appointing governors from 
Shewa and “balabats (local chiefs) who acted as appendages of the centre. Menelik 
II’s military campaigns to these territories are the most contested events in the 
modern political history of Ethiopia. Three narrations are advanced by Ethiopian 
historians and politicians. The Amhara thesis, views the move as a restoration of the 
Ethiopian empire by bringing back ‘‘the lost provinces subsequent to Gran’s 
invasion’’ in the 16th century (Asres 1958 :34,Mesfin,1996:96-99). It is viewed as an 
outstanding missions of ‘hager maknat’ (literally meaning empire-building) process, 
and plausibly argue that it was similar to what had been done inGermany by 
Bismarck and in Italy by Garivaldi in 1871.  A related narration to this, Assefa 
(2012)contest that “ Ethiopian history of migration,conquest,subjugation and 
hegemony was fully bidirectional.The so called “abyssinians’from the north and 
Oromos from the south have competed for supremacy over central and southern 
Ethiopia prior to Minelik’s national consolidation of the state.” 
A diametrically opposite to the Amhara thesis is the colonial antithesis,which 
equates Menelik II’s move as part of the European scramblefor Africa project in the 
19th century to control and exploit the resources of the autonomous territories. The 
colonial antithesis demands for full independence from the ‘Abyssinian colonialism’ 
(Assefa, 1993:52-53). This antithesis is subscribed by OLF, SLF, WSLF and ONLF and 
their supporters. 
The third view is the EPRDF synthesis. It argues that Menelik’s moves had made the 
conquered people landless as agricultural lands in the newly annexed territories 
were granted to the newly appointed Shewan governors, soldiers, and officials; 
Moreover, it argues that MenelikII and his successors established political, economic 
and social hegemony of the Amhara over the others and resulted in 
national/nationality oppression (see also Merara,2003:4-6). The EPRDF synthesis 
advances self-determination of Nations,Nationalities andPeople (NNP) undera 
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governors, judges and tax collectors from the centre. According to 
Guluma (2002:51), the appointed officials had, at least, dual objectives: 
‘‘to suppress any resistance and ensure imperial control’’ and to facilitate 
‘‘the transfer of resources to the imperial centre.’’ It is worth noting that 
some of the newly incorporated territories such as Jimma, Welega-
Lekemt, Welega-kellem, Benshangul, Awsa (Afar) and Goba had retained 
their internal autonomy as a reward for their peaceful submission to 
Menelik’s army (Asmelash, 1987:30). On the other, Menelik II recognized 
and maintained the traditional right to self-rule of the north provinces of 
Shewa namely; Tigrai, Gojjam, Gonder, Wello, Lasta. However, Menelik’s 
appointment of two appellate judges and three court recorders from the 
centre to each region was interpreted as a ‘‘further move towards a 
centralization of judicial authority in Ethiopia, and accordingly diminished 
the jurisdiction power of the provincial authorities’’ (Marcus, 1970:573). 
Menelik II introduced European institutions by customizing to the 
Ethiopian context. He established European style Ministerial Council in 
1907 with the objective to ensure smooth power succession, and to 
avoid battling among the strong nobilities for power (Marcus, 1975:227-
228). He also introduced new tax base (for example tobacco and post 
stamp) as revenue sources to finance government expenditures. Menelik 
II was also known for his keen interest to transfer European technologies 
to Ethiopia. Accordingly, he established Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, 
introduced telephone, telegraph and postal services in the emerging 
towns of the time. Moreover, Ethiopia joined the World Postal and 
telecommunication organizations. He opened modern education and 
hospital, the Bank of Abyssinia and issued coins and one Birr note to 
introduce monetary economy, established a Ministerial Council 
(Alemayehu, 2003; TekleTsadik, 1982). 
 
2.2.4 Haile Selassie I Reign (r 1930-1974) 
In the 1920s and mid-1930s, Ras Teferi, who later became Haile 
Sellasie I (HSI), introduced new administrative, fiscal and military 
                                                                                                               
democratic Ethiopian as a solution . In line with this synthesis the Charter of the TGE 
and in the FDRE’s Constitution of the 1995 recognize the right of NNP to self-
determination up to, and including, secession to address the national question.  
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institutions in a piecemeal manner. In the early 1930s, the empire was 
restructured into thirty two administrative divisions, which enabled the 
emperor to assign Regional Governors from the centre (Asmelash, 
1987:35).The administrative reform brought about an end to the 
traditional semi-autonomy of Jimma (Guluma, 2002:530) and Gojjam 
(Imru, 2001) by appointing governors from the centre. He also took 
measures to replace the traditional regional army by a National Army. 
More importantly, the Emperor enacted a monarchical constitution to 
consolidate power12 and to constitutionalize the perpetually attachment 
of the Imperial dignity to the line of the Haile Selassie I (Imperial 
Constitution of 1931 Art.2 and the Revised Constitution of the 1955). The 
political and administrative reforms were supported by a fiscal one. 
‘Kurt-Gibir’ 13(Fixed tax) and ‘gebar’ tax on agricultural land, 
entertainment tax, income tax, and excise and consumption taxes were 
introduced and managed centrally. Custom duties became entirely 
imperial taxation power (Bahru, 2008:107,114 and 115). The 
centralization of revenue had a political and economy impact. In political 
terms, the fiscal reforms intended to weaken the regional lords by 
diminishing their economic powers. In economic terms, it increased 
central government’s revenue. The cash payment had also laid down a 
cornerstone for setting up monetary economy. Nevertheless, the 
centralization process was interrupted by the Italy’s invasion in 1935 and 
the subsequent occupation, which lasted until March 1941. 
                                                 
12 The 1931 Constitution installed an absolute autocracy system. Article5 of the 
Constitution says ``By virtue of His Imperial Blood, as well as by the anointing which 
He has received, the person of the Emperor is sacred, His dignity is inviolable and His 
power indisputable. He is, consequently, entitled to all the honors due to Him in 
accordance with tradition and the present Constitution. Any one so bold as to seek 
to injure the honor of the Emperor will be punished.’’ Article 4 of the Revised 
Constitution of 1955 also takes this article as it is. 
13 Generally speaking two modalities of agricultural land taxes were in practice. ‘Kurt 
Gibr’ was applied in Tigrai, Gojjam, Begemidir and Shewa, while in the newly 
incorporated territories ‘gebar’ tax was in operation.The agricultural tax policy 
discouraged agricultural production as heavy taxes were imposed on cultivated lands 
whereas uncultivated lands were immune from any tax. Besides annual tributory 
payments, ‘gebars’(tenants) were obliged to provide wide-ranging services- free 
labour and periodic presentations like grain, honey, animals, …etc (Guluma, 2002: 
51-52;) 
19 
 
Italy established an ‘Africa Orientale Italiana’ (A colony of Italy in the 
Horn of Africa) by aggregating the Ethiopian Empire with its former 
colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, which comprised six 
autonomous jurisdictions.14 The Regions were demarcated primarily on 
political criteria. By and large, people of the same linguistic practices 
were put together. In addition, geographical factors, traditional laws, 
customs, religions and languages were used as criteria for the 
demarcation between the regions and local governments (Sbacchi, 1985; 
Bahru, 2008:380). 
The Italian colonial Administration took some accommodative 
measures- language and, religion diversities that characterize   Ethiopia 
by introducing new language and religion policies. Amharic was 
purposely ceased to be an official language and each “Governor” adapted 
local language in public and in schools.15 Orthodox Christianity was 
separated from the state. These policies however, are viewed cynically.  
Aleme, (2003) considered the Italian policies as tribalism and argued that 
they were designed to divide-and-rule Ethiopians and to gain political 
support from the majority of non-Amhara and non-Orthodox Ethiopians.  
 
Centralization as ‘modernization’ and assimilation policy 
instrument (1941-1974) 
 
Immediately after the restoration of the independence of Ethiopia in 
March 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie came to power and once again took 
a series of centralization measures. His first move was restructuring the 
                                                 14   The Regions were:-Eritrea (consisting Eritrea, Tigrai, Afar, Wag and Lasta); Amhara 
(Gondor, Gojjam, Wollo, North Shewa); Harar (Arisi, North Bale, Dire Dawa, Jijiga); 
Galla [Oromo]-Sidamo [Sidama] (including large part of present West Shewa, 
Wellega, Illubabour, Borena, the present Regions of SNNP, Benshagul-Gumz and 
Gambela), Somalia (made up by annexing the Ethiopian Somali Region proper and 
Italian Somaliland), and AddisAbaba, a seat of the General ‘Governatore’ of the 
occupation force). Each ‘Governo’ had been structured in three tiers of lower 
government: ‘Commissariato’, Rezidenza’, and ‘Vice-Residenza’ (Aleme, 2003). 
15 Tigringa in Eritrea, Amharic in Amhara and in Addis Ababa, Offan Oromo in Oromia-
Sidama, Arabic in Harari and Somalinga in Somalia region were used as working 
languages. 
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administrative divisions into 12‘Awrajas’ (counties),16 60 ‘Weredas’ 
(districts),339 ‘Meslenes’ (sub-district) and 1176 ‘Miktil Meslene’ 
(communes)17. The public administration reform drastically removed 
traditional regional lords from power because the Awraja governorship 
fell into the hands of three strongmen-a Governor-General, a Director, 
and a Secretary, who had been appointed by the centre (Asmelash 
1987:40; IGE, Decree No.1 of 1942). It laid down a consolidated and 
centralized administrative system in the entire country. In many 
instances, physiographic features (mountains, gorges and rivers) served 
as boundaries between administrative units. Economic viability, 
administrative convenience, and settlement pattern criteria were hardly 
considered in the demarcation of the Provinces. In rare cases ethnicity 
criterion was applied in creating local administrative units.  
Assimilation policy was the guiding principle in the restructuring of 
the administrative divisions. Teklay-Gizats, Awrajas and Weredas were 
carved by bringing two or more ethnic groups together. Blending feuding 
ethnic groups was viewed as a resolution mechanism of ethnic conflicts 
at local levels. Weakening ethnic groups which were perceived as real or 
potential political threats to the regime by partitioning the ethnic group 
in two Teklay-Gizat Administrations were also policies of the regime. The 
Raya community was a case in point18 (Asmelash, 1987: 41).  
                                                 
16 Later the number of Teklay Ghizates increased to 14, following the split of Bale from 
Hararghe province and the liquidation of the Ethio-Eritrea federation that led to a 
complete unification of Eritrea with Ethiopia as the 14th province in 1961. The 
justification for the split of Bale from Harerge province was inconveinient to 
administer due to its enormous geographical size, lack of modern institutions and 
absence of road network (Asmelash,1987:.40).   
17 Four years later, a new government tier known as ‘Teklay Gizat’ (Province) was 
created next to the centre. As a result, the ‘Awraja Ghzats’ were elevated to ‘Teklay 
Ghizat’; ‘Wereda Ghizat’ to ‘Awraja Ghizat’; and ‘Meslenes Ghizat’ to ‘Wereda 
Ghizat. By this Decree, ‘Mikitil Mislene’ was replaced by a new lower government 
level known as ‘Meketel Wereda.’ Note that the Mikitle WeredaGizat was abolished 
in 1960 to bring bureaucratic efficiency (Asmelash,1987:41).  
18 The Raya community, which was historically part of Tigrai, had revolted against the 
central government in 1920s and in 1943. As a reaction, Raya was broken up into 
two smaller Weredas: Raya Azebo and Raya Kobo. Surprisingly the latter was taken 
away from Tigrai Province, a historical power rival to theShewan Amhara, and 
incorporated with Wello provincein 1949 Ethiopian Calendar.  
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The emperor also established a professional national army with the 
objective not only to protect the sovereignty of country but also to make 
regional armies non-functional. The establishment of the national army, 
once-for-all had eliminated the potential power rivals who used to claim 
the crown.  
Modernizing the taxation reform was another decisive reform area in 
the 1940s. The Emperor restructured the archaic fiscal system by 
introducing a new monetary taxation and public expenditure system 
under the Ministry of Finance. Salaried tax officers were appointed from 
the centre to all levels of Administration. All collected taxes had to be 
transferred to the central treasury, leaving nothing to the provinces. The 
tax reform also curtained the privileges of the regional nobilities to levy 
and collect taxes (Keller, 1981:533 and Keller, 2005:94). 
As far as decentralization is concerned, during the emperor’s forty 
years tenure, he made three attempts of power devolution. The first one 
was related to municipal governance. Mayorship system which includes 
Municipal Council and municipal management under a ‘Kentiba’ (Mayor) 
or Town Officer was introduced in 1945. Municipalities’ competences 
included the following functions: provision of public health and hygiene 
services, water supply and sewerage, electricity and street lighting, 
registration services of properties(land, building, weapons) and civil 
status, provision of public amenities; construction of intra-town roads, 
bridges and squares; slaughter houses; supervision of animal and vehicle 
traffic; issue of driving and small business licenses; demarcation of 
market and cemetery areas; management of fire brigades; provision of 
welfare services like poor relief, hospitals, asylums, and schools; and 
approval of plans for private constructions (IGE,1954(a) and IGE,1954(b)). 
With regard to revenue power, municipalities were entitled to fix 
local rates on fares for taxis, carts, and saddle; and on all immovable 
properties;19 to assess and collect charge fees for water supply, and for 
municipal public services such as licenses on trade and professions, use 
of market place, vehicles and driving license, slaughtering and meat 
delivery fees, sanitary charges, land survey and registration fees, 
                                                 
19 Property taxes on land and buildings were assessed by area or calculated as a 
percentage of the rental value of the Property (IGE,1954a). 
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advertising, cattle registration, and to collect rental income tax, as well as 
health tax (IGE, 1954a).In addition, Addis Ababa was given the right to 
borrow for investment purposes by issuing bonds (IGE,1954a) and to 
impose 1 percent custom duties on the value of export goods leaving the 
city and 2 percent on the values of imported goods entering to the city 
(IGE,1954b). Pursuant to the introduction of fuel tax, all municipalities 
were entitled to share revenues from excise tax on petroleum and 
lubrication products on origin basis. 
Considering the possible institutional and manpower constraints in 
the 1940 and 1950s, the move was a positive measure as the 
assignments of responsibilities and revenues to the municipalities were 
of interest to local people. However, looking more closely, the devolution 
of power remained static throughout the regime. The municipality 
governance hardly promoted accountability and local participation for a 
couple of reasons. First, residents had no full power to elect or to 
demote local officials from power. Mayors/Town Officers were 
appointees of the Emperor. Second, the requirement to own immovable 
property to run for Municipal Council had also made the governance 
system undemocratic. Third, in practice, municipal governance remained 
centralized. The Municipal Councils had no power to determine 
municipal budget, local tax rates, and municipal fees but merely to 
propose to a higher authority and wait for decision from the then 
Ministry of Interior or from respective Governor-General. Intervention 
from Governor-Generals and the Ministry of Interior in administrative 
affairs of the municipalities was also a common practice (Asmelash 
1987:41-42). Moreover, the municipalities had little fiscal power and 
were unable to carry out municipality functions. 
The second area of decentralization was the establishment of the 
Local Education Board (LEB) at provincial level with the objective to 
expand education and to promote local participation in the provision of 
elementary education (IGE, Proclamation 94 of 1947).20 The 
                                                 
20 The Board was established at province leve consisting of five members drawn from: (i) 
one member from each municipal Councile in the Province, (ii) one member from each 
wereda of the province, (iii) Head Master of the Principal school in capital of the 
province and a senior education Officier in the province, and (iv) General-Governor of 
the province (IGE, Proclamation 94 of 1947). Members from (i) and (ii) were elected by 
secret ballot, while (iii) and (iv) were ex-officio members. 
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Proclamation empowers the Board (i) to make recommendations and 
suggestions concerning the expansion of education to the MoE, and (ii) 
to oversee the MoE if all Educational Tax21 collected in the provinces was 
allocated for the expansion of elementary education in respective 
province (IGE, Proclamation No 94/1947). In practice, however, there 
was no legal mechanism that enabled the Board to compel and supervise 
the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to allocate the Education tax collected only 
for the purpose of expanding elementary education in respective 
province. For instance, in 1950, the MoF deducted 34 percent of the 
Education tax collected in Tigrai from its education budget and 
channelled it to the Orthodox Church of the Awraja (see Tigre Awraja 
Education Office, LEB Minute, 1943EC). Moreover, contrary to the very 
spirit of the Proclamation 94 of 1947, the Imperial Government degraded 
considerable elementary schools to traditional Orthodox Church schools 
in Tigrai, Gojjam and Semen & Begemedir [Gondor] with the pretext that 
these provinces are the home of Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity. As an 
effect, 35 of the then 39 elementary schools of Tigrai, which were 
providing modern education for about 3000 pupils by 73 teachers, were 
reduced to traditional church education centres (see Tigre Awraja 
Education Office LEB Minute, 1940 EC). 
In spite of the fact that a relative expansion of education had been 
witnessed during the Imperial regime in 1961, gross participation rate 
remained only 3.8 percent and 0.5 percent for primary and secondary 
education respectively, far below as compared to greater than 40 
percent primary and 3.5 percent secondary education achievements in 
the rest of Africa (Balsvik, 2005:5). National average gross primary 
enrolment rate increased to 16percent in 1974 (MoE, 1976), but still the 
lowest rate by the standard of Sub Sahara countries. 
The third attempt of decentralization refers to the Local Self- 
Administration (LSA).The Emperor issued Order No 43 of 1966 to set up 
Awraja self-administration in seventeen selected ‘Barajas’ across the 
country with the objective to encompass gradually all Barajas. Each pilot 
‘Awraja’ was to have a Council elected from all rural ‘Weredas’ and from 
                                                 
21 The education tax rate was uniform and was set centrally. 
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small ‘Wereda’ towns within respective ‘Awraja’. LSAs were to be 
subordinates of their respective province. 
According to the Order, each LSA was to have competences in the 
fields of: education (to build, maintain and administer elementary 
schools(1-6 grade));health (to construct clinics and health centres, equip 
with necessary equipments and administer them); road (construction 
and maintenances of rural roads and small bridges); agriculture and 
Community Development (construction of small dams, irrigation canals, 
and wells, as well as distributing water supply); and trade and commerce 
(construction of market places and promoting local marketing) (IGE, 
Order No.43/1966; Kifle,1965:51EC, Asmelash 1987; and Tegegn, 1998). 
A draft Proclamation on Revenue assignment for the LSA was also 
prepared by the then Ministry of Interior. According to the draft 
proclamation, the LSAs were to have the following revenue sources: (a) 
Land and cattle taxes; (b) education and health taxes; (c)property tax 
related to urban land and buildings; (d) revenue from licenses for trade, 
professional and vocational activities; (e) charge fees payable for 
surveying, and registration of real property; (f) charge fees for 
considering and approving construction plans, and (g) revenues from fees 
chargeable in respect of other services rendered by the LSA including 
water rate. (h) Grants-in–aid from the centre (on the recommendations 
of the Ministry of interior), (i) borrowing (on the approval of the Ministry 
or respective General-Governorate) and (j) community contributions. 
Note that the draft Proclamation was designed to grant LSAs the 
authority to assess taxes listed on (a) and (b) of the Order22.LSA Council 
could set property tax rate and license fees without exceeding the 
maximum limit determined by the Parliament. LSA Councils could 
determine user fees but it was subject to the approval of the Ministry of 
Interior (Bekele, 1999:85-87; Kifle, 1965:50-56). The draft Proclamation 
never became a law, however, because the joint meeting of the 
Chambers of Deputies and Senate suspended the draft,23 showing lack of 
                                                 
22 According to the draft, taxes listed as (a) and (b) were to be collected by a 
government body (likely branch Office of Ministry of Finance) on behalf of the LSA. 
23 Initially the draft proclamation received acceptance with some amendments  from the 
Chamber of Deputy(Lower House), while the Senate(Upper House) failed to pass the 
bill (Kifle,1965:49) 
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political commitment of the Emperor to devolve certain power 
downward (Kifle, 1965:49). 
There is a tendency to equate Haile Selalsies’s centralization policy 
on the slogan of ‘modernization` with the Meiji restoration of Japan. 
True, Ethiopian intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s were inspired by the 
Meiji Restoration and used to advise the Emperor to pursue the Japanese 
development model in the Ethiopian context with a vision to see Ethiopia 
‘the Japan of Africa’ (Bahru, 2002; Ghebrehiwet,1912; Gorfu,1952EC:76 
and 88-95). However, the centralization and ‘modernization’ neither 
brought in significant economic progress and social changes in the 
country nor it was  accompanied by a political liberalization. Unlike the 
experiences of the European and the Japanese monarchical 
constitutions, the Ethiopian monarchical constitutions of the 1931 and 
the 1955 had failed to promote checks and balances (separation of 
powers) among the legislative, executive and judiciary bodies. The 
emperor remained an absolute autocrat. HSI’s state building strategy 
neither recognized the right of self-rule nor attempted to accommodate 
diversity. He failed to ensure political stability, to reform the backward 
land tenure system and to transform the political system in general and 
the economy of the country in particular.24 The wide range of visible 
diversity in language, culture, and ethnicity had been purposely 
concealed. Rather, “One People and one language”, and assimilation was 
a governing policy of the time.25 
The Emperor had implemented perhaps the most ambitious 
centralization agenda than any of his predecessors. The subsequent 
political, administrative, and fiscal reforms had been undertaken to 
concentrate power at the centre at the cost of the regions. Centralization 
was perceived as a necessary condition for national unity and 
modernization. 
In the centralization process throughout the 1900 – 1974, the 
influence of Europeans and American advisors to emulate the western 
                                                 24  John Spencer, who served as a political advisor to the Emperor for about forty years,   
states the “Emperor’s objective was not liberalization but centralization” (Spencer, 
1987:131). 25   Imposition of Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity, and political marriage had 
been uall along sed to bring non-Amhara elites to the centre. 
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style ‘modernization’ strategy was visible26 (Mannford, 1947, Bauru, 
2005). 
Transforming the archaic, fragmented and isolated traditional 
administration system by modern administration institutions was a 
necessary and desirable measure to carry out efficient public 
administration. Similarly, the establishment of a modern army, the 
introduction of new taxation system and new legal institutions were 
necessary tools and methods for socio-economic advancement and 
modernization of the country. However, sweeping away all political and 
administrative powers of the regions; and drying up all regional/ local 
taxes were not compatible with the decentralized political history of the 
country. Neither the assimilation policy nor abolishing the historical right 
to self-rule owns region was a prudent public policy. The selective 
reforms that aimed at concentration of power at the hands of the 
Emperor hardly resulted in visible political and social changes. It failed to 
guarantee basic human and democratic rights and thus the Japanese 
development style in Ethiopia ended up with a failure. 
 
The Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia 
 
Large parts of the present-day Eritrea (particularly the highlands and 
the coastal areas) were core domains of the Daamatise state and the 
Axumite kingdom (Sergew, 1972:22-23, and Lapiso, 1982:68), although 
the lowlands and the Red Sea coastal areas had fallen under the Ottoman 
Empire rule and latter under Egypt from the second half of the sixteen 
century to the 1880s. The Christian highlands of Eritrea were known as 
‘Mereb-Milash’ (referring to north of the Mereb River territory) remained 
an integral part of the Tigrai-Tigrigni region under the Ethiopian Empire 
(Tewelde, 1990:170). However, the advent of Italian colony in Eritrea in 
1890 resulted in not only the partition of the Tigrai-Tigrigni, the Afar and 
                                                 26 Eroupeans and American embassies and appointed advisors to the Emperor, Ministers 
and Directors were instrumental to install unitary, and centralized European style 
constitutional monarchicial system. Wheareas, the second generation prominent 
western educated Ethiopians such as Ghebrehiwet Baykedagn, Negadras 
Teklehawaryat, Hakim Werkineh, Hiruy, etc were adherent  to the Japanese style of  
modernization  in the Ethiopian context for rapidly transformation (see Bahru, 2005).  
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the Kunama people into two but also denied Ethiopia’s historical access 
to the Red Sea. 
Following Italy’s defeat by the British Army and the Ethiopian patriots 
in the Horn of Africa in 1941, the future status of Eritrea became a UN 
issue. The UN Security Council established a UN Commission for Eritrea, 
consisting of five member states, namely;, Burma, Guatemala, Pakistan, 
Norway and Union of South Africa to assess the will of the people of 
Eritrea. The UN Commission consulted various Eritrean political parties, 
community representatives, and the public at large. Eritreans expressed 
their diverse wishes through gatherings, pleas, slogans and 
demonstrations. A political party known by Mahber Fikri Hager/Mahber 
Hibret demanded unconditional union of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Moslem 
League, at the outset, campaigned for union with the Sudan and later 
subscribed for independence of Eritrea. The Liberal Progressive Party, 
also swang from establishing an autonomous Tigrai-Tigringi (Greater 
Tigrai) State under the Ethiopian empire state27 to an independent 
Eritrea after ten years of British trustship Administration. Pro-Italy Party 
advanced the return of Eritrea to Italian rule (Trevaskis, 1960:65, Tekeste, 
1997:45, Habtu, 1993: 62-65; Zewde, 1998:82 and 86, Alemseged, 2001, 
Abbay, 2001). 
Member states of the Commission did not reach a consensus on the 
future fate of Eritrea and they submitted three proposals to the UN 
security. Burma and Union of South Africa proposed a federation solution 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia to answer twin objectives: “(a) the wishes 
and welfare of the people of Eritrea, and (b) the maintenance of peace 
and security in East Africa“(Habitué, 1993:143). Norway recommended a 
complete reunion of Eritrea with Ethiopia and declared “... the claims for 
independence has to be dismissed, We [Norway Delegation] consider the 
                                                 27 The Tigrai-Tigringi project was promoted by ‘immenent’ Eritrean highland politicians 
led by Ras Tesema. Welde Ab WeldeMaria (1946:4), who was among the prominent 
promoters of this project, boldly stated, 'I have no desire to separate Eritreans from 
Tigrayans and Eritrea from Tigray. I am sincerely struggling for the two not to drift 
apart. And when I speak about Eritrea and Tigray, it is certain that I am speaking about 
the whole of Ethiopia'. The Tigrai-Tigringi state was to comprise the so called “Bihere- 
Agazi” [Nation of Free]  which includes the entire Eritrea and the Tigrai region which 
extends upto Alweha Milash, the historical southern boundry to Wello (Abbay, 
2001:474). under the leadership of Ras Syum Mengesha (TesefaTsion, 1986). 
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reintegration of Eritrea into Ethiopia as the only rational and satisfactory 
solution....”(Habtu, 1993:150). In contrary, Pakistan and Guatemala 
recommended independence of Eritrea after ten years of UN trusteeship 
(Habtu, 1991:161; Zewde, 295-296). Ethiopia had also consistently 
claimed to the restoration of her historic right of access to the Red Sea28 
(Habtu, 1993:42).  
The British policy on future of Eritrea used to swing from time to 
time. It chased two proposals. In the early 1940s, it supported the project 
of establishing the Tigrai-Tigrigni state. When this project failed, it 
pursued the partition of Eritrea into two parts: (i) joining the western 
lowlands to the Sudan, and (ii) bringing the highlands and the eastern 
low lands including Massawa and Afar land to Ethiopia (TesfaTsion, 1985, 
Zewde,1998; Alemseged,2001).  
Finally, the USA promoted the Ethio-Eritrea federal project, which 
was proposed by Burma and the Union of South Africa, as a ‘compromise 
formula’. The British and France supported the American initiation 
(Zewde, 1998; Alemseged, 2001). The UN Security Council ratified the 
compromise formula under the UN Resolution 390(V) in 1950 by taking 
the following factors into account: (a) “The wishes and welfare of the 
inhabitants of Eritrea, including the views of the various racial, religious 
and political groups of the provinces of the territory and  the capacity of 
the people for self-government”, (b) “the interest of peace and security 
in East Africa”, and (c) “the rights and claims of Ethiopia based on 
geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons, including in 
particular Ethiopia’s legitimate need for adequate access to the sea”(UN 
Resolution 390 (V) in Habtu,1993, and Tekeste, 1997). 
According to the UN 390(V) Resolution, the UN Commission to 
Eritrea, in consultation with the stakeholders,29prepared a draft of the 
Eritrean Constitution and submitted it to the Eritrean Assembly for 
ratification. The Eritrean Assembly ratified the Constitution after it made 
due examination and deliberations on each Article. The 1952 Eritrean 
Constitution grants considerable political, fiscal and administrative 
powers to Eritrea. It assigns responsibilities of foreign affairs, national 
                                                 
28 Note that Egypt also had claimed Massawa (Habtu, 1993-58). 29  Include the Biritish Administration in Eritrea, the Ethiopian Government and the   
inhabitants of Eritrea. 
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defence, currency and finance, international trade, inter-state 
commerce, external and inter-state communications including postal 
service, highways, airports, ports, and railway to the Central 
Government. (UN Resolution 390(V) and Eritrean Constitution, Art. 5). 
Powers not vested in the Centre remained residual powers of the 
Eritrean Government including, but not limited to, “laws (criminal laws, 
civil law and commercial law), maintain internal police, health, education, 
public assistance and social security, protection of labour, exploitation of 
natural resources, regulation of industry, internal commerce, trade and 
professions, agriculture, internal communication, public utility services 
which are peculiar to Eritrea, [adopting]the Eritrean budget “(Eritrean 
Constitution of 1952 , Article 5). 
In terms of fiscal, the tax assignment to the Government of Eritrean 
was based on the principle “...to meet the expenses of Eritrean public 
function and services“(Eritrean Constitution Art.5 (L). The taxation power 
of the Eritrean Government included “...the customs duties on goods 
entering or leaving the Federation which have their final destination or 
origin in Eritrea”30. (UN Resolution 390 A (V) Paragraphs 4, and the 
Eritrean Constitution Art.6). 
Furthermore, the UN Resolution 390 (v) and the Eritrean 
Constitution: (i) entrust the Eritrean Government with the power to 
assess and levy federal taxes31 generated in Eritrea, (ii) stipulate the 
establishment of a Federal Council composed of equal numbers of 
Ethiopian and Eritrean representatives to advise upon the common 
affairs of the Federation, 32 (iii) respect Eritreans’ right to shared-rule in 
the Federal Executive, Judicial and Legislative 33branches. 
                                                 30 Custom duties collected on goods entering or leaving the Empire of Ethiopia which 
have their origin of final destination in Eritrea were to be paid (transferred) to the 
Eritrean Government through the MoF (IGE, Proclamation No.126 of 1952). 
31 The documents do not specify what the federal taxes include. The IGE unilaterally 
determined and imposed:(i) “federal excise tax on goods imported and on goods 
manufactured within the empire whose title is transferred to other person either by 
sale or otherwise”; (Decree No.16 of 1956), and (ii) “Federal Transaction tax on goods 
imported or exported, and on goods manufactured locally” (IGE, Decree No.17 of 
1956).  32 The Federal Council was established consisting of ten members, five each appointed 
representatives from the Eritrea and the Imperial Government (IGE, Order No. 8 of 
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The documents, however, are silent how the delegated federal 
functions should be financed although the Eritrean Government had to 
“bear it’s just and equitable share of the expenses of the Federal 
functions and services” as a contribution of Eritrea to the Federal 
expenses (The Eritrean Constitution Art.6 (2); UN Resolution 390 (V)). 
Article 83 of the Eritrean Constitution recognizes the appointment of 
village and tribal community leaders from respective community 
members. Furthermore, unlike the 1955 Revised Imperial Constitution, 
the Eritrean Constitution guarantees the municipalities to manage their 
own affairs. 
The Eritrean Constitution was designed in line to the western 
democracy style. It incorporates basic principle of human and political 
rights. It guarantees basic human and democratic rights (Art.22-33). It 
recognizes language and religion diversities and denounces any 
discrimination against any religion practiced in Eritrea (Eritrean 
Constitution, Art.27) as compared to the Imperial Revised Constitution 
(Art.126) that stipulates, “the Ethiopian Orthodox church is a state 
church.” The Eritrean Constitution ensures the right to use spoken and 
written local languages, “…in dealing with the public authority as well as 
for religious or educational purposes and for all forms of expression of 
ideas” (Eritrean Constitution, Art.38), whereas the Imperial Revised 
Constitution (Art.125) notes “The official language of the Imperial is 
Amharic” and does not recognize the use of local language in public. The 
Chief Executive of Eritrea was elected from the Assembly (Art.65 and 
Art.68), with limited powers and was “…accountable for any act 
performed by him in the course of his duties…” (Art.75), while the 
Revised Constitution of 1995 grants absolute powers to the Emperor.34 
                                                                                                               
1952) butin practice the Council had never set a session and remained in paper 
(Alemseged, 2005). 33 Eritrea had three and five seats in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies respectively 
(see IGE Order No. 9 of 1952 and Proclamation No.125 of 1952). 34 The following Articles substantiate the argument. “The sovereignty of the Empire is 
vested in the Emperor”(Art.26). “The Emperor is anointed…”(Art.4) and ”No one shall 
have the right to bring suit against the Emperor”(Art.62(1). Furthermore, “The 
Emperor determines the organization, powers and duties of all Ministries, Executive 
departments,…”(Art.27 and Auditor General was appointee of the Emperor(Art.121). 
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Furthermore, the Eritrean constitution recognizes the political parties, 
while these were taboo in the Imperial constitution.   
The Eritrean Constitution enshrines considerable political, fiscal, 
administrative autonomies and human and political rights. 
Unfortunately, the Ethio-Eritrea federal was short-lived and it is one of 
the failed federal arrangements in Africa because the Emperor 
undermined the Eritrean Constitution. For instance, the Central 
Government paralyzed the federal system. It contained transfers justly 
and periodically to the Eritrea Government which were being generated 
from custom duties on goods entering to or leaving from Eritrea as per 
the in Article 6(3) of the Eritrean Constitution (Alemseged 2005; Tekeste, 
1997).35 The federal delegated functions were unfunded. Article 7 of the 
Eritrean Constitution that provides the establishment of Imperial Federal 
Council (consisting of equal Members from the Imperial Government and 
the Eritrean Government) remained on paper. Moreover, Emperor Haile 
Selassie took consecutive measures against the spirit of the UN 
Resolution of 390 A (V) and the Eritrean Constitution.36 The Imperial 
Government considered Eritrea not as a full-fledged political entity with 
state status, but as an “incorporation and inclusion of the territory of 
Eritrea within the Empire “(IGE, Order No.6 of 1952). Finally The Emperor 
dissolved the Ethio-Eritrea Federation in 1962 and Eritrea became the 
14th Ethiopian province. 
                                                 35   This was a grave concern of the Eritrean Assemblyand it was one of the issues that 
had created mistrust and conflicts between the Eritrean Assembely and the Ethiopian 
Government. It contributed to budget deficit of the Eritrean Government and 
negativey impacted the Government to provide public functions and services 
(Tekeste, 1997; Alemseged, 2005). 
36 The Imperial Government of Ethiopia used to interfere in the Eritrean internal affairs 
since the early federation years. For instance, Biteweded Endarkachew, the Imperial 
representative in Eritrea, boldly declared in his opening speech of the Eritrean 
Assembly in 1955 ”there is no internal or external affairs as far as the office of His 
Imperial Majesty’s Representative is concerned and there will be none in the future. 
The affairs of Eritrea concerns Ethiopia as a whole and the Emperor” (Greenfield, 
1965: 232). As an effect, series centralization measures were taken. By 1958, the 
Eritrean flag was banned and only the Ethiopian flag was hoisting. By 1960, the 
designation of the “Government of Eritrea” and its Head ‘Chief of Government of 
Eritrea’ were reduced to “Eritrean Administration” and ‘Administration of Eritrea’. By 
same year, Tigringa and Arabic, the official languages of Eritrea and medium of 
instructions in Eritrean schools, were replaced by Amharic, official language in 
Ethiopia (Abrha, 2014:647). 
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The Emperor had no political willingness to uphold and protect the 
Federal Act (Elazar, 1987:244; and Assefa, 2007:32). One possible 
hypothesis could be a fear not to inspire other provinces for autonomy, 
which Eritrea was enjoying of. Tigrai would be among the front line 
provinces to demand for autonomy as the failed First Weyane 
(Revolution) of Tigrai in 1942-3 against the Central government for self-
rule was a fresh memory among the public. Resistances from Gojjam 
province, which had its own king and demonstrated its resentment 
against the appointment of officials from Shewa, and the self-
determination banner from the Ethiopian Somali and Oromo, as 
evidenced in 1960s to 1990s, seemed to be possible sources of fear of 
the Emperor.  
Many politicians and scholars agree that the dissolution of the Ethio-
Eritrea Federationwas the beginning of the separation of Eritrea from 
Ethiopia.Eritrean nationalists raised armed struggle for self-
determination of Eritrea as “a direct reaction to Ethiopia’s abrogation of 
the federation in 1962” (Abay, 2001:460) by subscribing a ‘colonial 
question’ thesis.37 Maintaining the federation would have been an 
effective mechanism not only in democratizing and economic betterment 
of Ethiopia and Eritrea but also in ensuring security in the Horn of Africa.  
 
2.2.5 The Military (Degrue) Regime (1974-1991) 
 
The spontaneous popular movements against the Emperor’s regime 
had brought the military to power in1974, known as ‘Dergue’ regime.38 
The regime completely restructured the political and economic systems 
of the country in line with the socialist ideology. In its 17 years of rule, 
the ‘Dergue’ regime made three reforms related to decentralization. 
(i), Kebele Peasant Associations (KPAs) were organized in the rural 
areas. Likewise, urban centres with a population of 2,000 or more were 
                                                 37  Whether the question of Eritrea was a colonia or national remain controvertial among 
politicians. Nevertheless, considerable politicians and scholars question the colonial 
thesis as large part of the present Eritrea was not only a core part of the Axumit 
civilization but had remained part of the Abyssynian Empire until 1890. 38 The Dergue regime ruled Ethiopia for 17 years under the Provisional Military 
Administration Council, PMAC, (1974-1987) and under the Peoples Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (1987-1991). 
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structured in Kebele Urban Dwellers Associations (KUDAs). One of the 
objectives of the KPA was to empower local people by bringing the 
administrative units closer to the people. KPAs’ major responsibilities 
were land redistribution, construction of primary schools, rural roads, 
and clinics; establishing cooperative shops and distribution of some 
consumable goods at reasonable price; administrating local security and 
providing social tribune service (PMAC, 1975a). KUDAs had similar 
objectives and responsibilities except land redistribution. In addition, 
KUDAs were engaged in administration of public houses, collecting house 
rent, and establishing and administering recreation centres (PMAC, 
1975b). In practice, however, little effort had been devoted to empower 
local people. Both associations were purely policy implementers of the 
Central Government. They served the regime as political instruments by 
controlling day-to-day life of residents and conscripting the youth. The 
Kebeles and other local administration levels had no revenue raising 
power, but limited to levy municipal fees. 
(ii), The ‘Dergue’ regime issued the New Democratic Revolution 
Program in 1976 with the objective  to address the long standing national 
question. In principle, the program recognized the right of nationalities to 
self-determination. The Program recognized the right to self-
administration in local affairs and to excercise cultural autonomy (PMAC, 
1976). However, in practice, as Brietzke (1995:209) noted “apart from 
celebrations of local music and dance” the program did not result in 
tangible power devolution or meaningful cultural autonomy. 
(iii), the regime recognized regional autonomy as a practical policy to 
address the national question. In line with this, the administrative 
structure of the country was reorganized into five Autonomous Regions 
and 24 Administrative Regions ( see the 1987 Constitution of the Peoples 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). Demarcation of the regions took into 
account the following criteria: (i) ethnicity (distribution and settlement, 
historical relations of nationalities, language proximity of nationalities, 
cultural similarities); (ii) economic and geographic factors (population 
size and resource endowment); (iii) physical and social infrastructural 
developments; (iv) development centers (urbanization,  state farms); and 
(v) administration of efficiency and periphery politics (ISEN,1976 EC). As 
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an effect, many of the regions were created  by blending many ethnic 
groups under a dominant ethnic group. 
Competences of the autonomous regions were not designed in a way 
to bring about meaningful political, fiscal and administrative devolution 
of power. Autonomous Regions and the Administrative Regions hardly 
had legislative power to tax and to spend. They were mainly supposed to 
ensure implementation of laws, decisions and directives of the centre. 
Economic and social development plans, and budget allocations of the 
Autonomous regions had to get the approval of the National “Shengo” 
(literally meaning Assembly). 
‘Shengos’ of the Autonomous Regions were subordinate bodies of 
the National Shengo. In other words, the Autonomous Regions were 
merely agents of the Central Government. Likewise, the Administration 
Regions were accountable to their next higher level of administration 
(Ghebrehiwet, 2002:37). Except municipal fees, all sources of revenue 
were apportioned to the Central Government, leaving nothing to the 
revenue generating jurisdiction. 
The Dergue regime failed to show political commitment to devolve 
meaningful power. The 1987 Constitution that granted the Autonomous 
regions status to the politically sensitive provinces did not satisfy the 
Liberation Fronts such as Tigrai Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and Afar 
Liberation Front (A.L.F), which were waging armed struggles against the 
Dergue regime for genuine regional autonomy, let alone for the Eritrean, 
Oromo and Somali movements, which were demanding full 
independence from the “Abyssinian colonialism.” 
 
2.2.6 The Emerging of Ethnic-Based Movements 
 
With the exception of the region-wide sporadic rural militants of 
Tigrai, Bale and Gojjam against the Imperial agricultural tax, and land 
policies (Gebru, 1991), organized multi-ethnic political movements 
preceded the ethnic-based ones. The Ethiopian Students Movement 
(ESM), which emerged as a nucleus political force at the Haile Selassie I 
University (currently Addis Ababa University) in the 1960s had rallied 
Ethiopian students of all ethnic groups for democracy and equality under 
the visionary slogans of “Land to the tiller’’, “equality of Nationalities’’ 
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and ‘’social justice’’ (Balsvik,2005, Hiwot,2012). Many of the 1960s and 
1970s multi-national and ethnic-based political organizations (like EPRP, 
MEISON, MALERID, Wez League, TPLF, and OLF) are direct off-springs of 
the ESM. Nevertheless all the political forces did not have similar political 
stand on the need for ethnic-based movements as a political mobilization 
strategy for equality, democracy and development. In spite of the fact 
that nationality question had became among a debate agenda of the 
ESM in late 1960s, EPRP, the then influential political organization and 
claimed itself as a vanguard of the oppressed Ethiopians in general and 
the proletarian class in particular strongly objected ethnic-based 
movements against national oppression39. It strongly argued that ethinic-
based movements would weaken the class struggle and the Ethiopian 
revolution and put class oppression first40. MEISON and TPLF plausibly 
argue that ethnic-based liberation movements and class struggle can be 
carried out simultaneously for the same end. As far as prioritizing is 
concerned, they believe the root cause of the political, economic and 
social contradictions in the country is national oppression and subscribed 
the right of Nationalities to self determination up to secession as a 
solution to national oppression and injustice.  
The Tigrians, the Oromo and other minority ethnic groups from the 
newly incorporated regions view the years between the reign of Menelik 
II and the Dergue regime as periods of peripherization, manifested in 
political oppression, economic exploitation and cultural suppression. 
They also considered the Dergue regime as a continuation of the Amhara 
domination over the others. As an effect, ethnic-based rebels 
mushroomed against the centre chiefly from the Tigrians, Oromos, Ethio-
Somalis, Afar, Sidamas, Gambelas, and Benshanguls. 
The political agenda of the ethnic-based militant movements can be 
clustered into two: national question and colonial question: Members of 
EPRDF and ALF subscribe guaranteeing self-determination of 
Nations/Nationalities and establishing unity of people on free will under 
                                                 39  So did the leftist political organizations like MALERID, WEZ LEAGUE and SEDED 
shared the EPRP stand.   40  EPRP recognized the right of self determination  in principle, but unity of 
Ethiopian nationalities under socialist Ethiopia ( Tadess , the Generation Part 
I) 
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a democratic Ethiopia. The ‘colonial question’ thesis, which is advanced 
by OLF, OLNF and WSLF, demands full independence from the ‘yoke of 
Abyssinian colonialism’. The ethnic-based movements waged rural-based 
armed struggles and mobilized their fellow people for ensuring the right 
of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination. TPLF/EPRDF 
played a decisive role to end the 17 years of Dergue regime in May 1991 
and has laid down a corner stone for a new political system. 
For various reasons, the multi-ethnic political forces failed to 
effectively lead to and mobilize the Ethiopian Peoples against the regime 
and therefore their role in overthrowing the Dergue regime was 
insignificant except the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement 
(EPDM), a coalition of EPRDF. 
The failure of the Dergue regime to accommodate diversity, its 
exclusive politics and economic marginalization had intensified the civil 
war against the central government which finally caused it to its collapse. 
The independence of Eritrea became clear following EPLF’s control over 
Asmara in May 1991. The separation of Eritrea was formalized through 
“referendum” when the overwhelming Eritreans voted for full 
independence in 1993.41 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
Ethiopia has a long history of statehood. From the time of the 
Axumite Kingdom to the turn of the 19th century, the core Abyssinian 
Empire witnessed highly decentralized governance system, if not a loose 
confederation, although trends of centralization-decentralization cycle 
governance were observed.   The traditional ‘Niguse Negest’ (King of 
Kings) title of the emperors referred to the existence of many hereditary 
local kings, chiefs, sultanates and Amires with considerable self-rule 
                                                 
41 Many scholars and politicians question the fairness and transparency of the 1993 
Eritrean referendum process. The referendum failed to accommodate  various 
options to Eritreans such as, Federation, Confederation with Ethiopia, full 
independence etc, as it was the understanding between the EPLF and the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia. The voting optionwas only “YES for independenceor NO”. 
True, the referendum process would have been democratic, had various choices were 
offered to Eritrean voters. However, as long as the militantly victorious EPLF has 
advanced for an independent Eritrea, whatever options were offered, voting for 
independence was inevitable. 
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autonomy but accountable to the centre. Given the vast geographical 
domain of the Ethiopian empire, with absence of bureaucracy and the 
poor transportation facilities of those periods, it would have been 
formidable to effectively administer the remote regions from the centre 
without permitting a considerable decentralized system (Tekeste, 
2006:136). 
Governance systems are causes to and effects of new political 
developments, social and economic changes. Since the beginning of the 
unification in 1855, a cycle of centralization and decentralization state 
empire/building strategies have been adopted. With the exception of 
Yohannes IV reign, the periods of 1855 to 1991 witnessed a centralized 
state-building strategy. Tewodros opted for a strong centralized 
government partly to deter the imminent danger of the Egypt’s desire to 
control the Blue Nile and the Red Sea and partly to end the ugly face of 
civil wars among the nobilities as well as between the nobility and the 
centre to control power and resources. Yohannes’ decentralized state 
building strategy was the result of centrifugal pressures of regional 
nobilities. Menelik II adapted dual governance system: a decentralized 
system in the core of Abyssinian Empire and in the newly incorporated 
territories which cooperated to and took part in his military campaigns 
and a centralized one in those regions which resisted his military 
movements. Emperor Haile Selassie I took a series of centralization 
measures to weaken the traditional powers of regional nobilities. The 
frequent restructuring of administration did not aim at how best public 
services would be delivered to the local people. Rather, government 
institutions were far away from access to the people. For instance, only 
police, court and finance government agencies were operating at Wereda 
Gizat. Other functions of education, health care and rural roads had been 
deconcentrated at Awraja Administration level. In fact, the ‘Dergue’ 
regime attempted to bring the administrative structure closer to the 
people by instituting Kebele administrations although they served to 
control the daily life of residents rather than empowering citizens in 
decision making. 
The highly centralized and unitary state building strategy in Ethiopia 
was a failed story not only because it was not accommodative to the 
diversities of language, ethnicity, culture, history and religion of 
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Ethiopians, but also to bring about liberal politics and/or economic 
development. Rather, it was characterized by political exclusiveness, 
poverty, backwardness, and social injustice. The Imperial regime also 
systematically undermined the Ethio-Eritrea federation and finally 
terminated it, because the regime, from the outset, conceived the 
federal arrangement not as a contract between two equal constituent 
unities but a federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of 
the Ethiopian crown. 
We may draw a couple of lessons from the experience of the Ethio-
Etritrea federation (i) a federal system allows constituent members to 
avoid security risks, to reap benefits from economies of scale and bigger 
market potential by remaining united as well as to take advantage from 
being a small jurisdiction to provide local demand driven public services, 
and (ii) the cost of any constitutional breach is extremely expensive and 
may lead to disintegration. 
The national and class oppressions had instigated oppressed elites to 
raise rural based arm struggle by organizing themselves in ethnic-based 
liberation fronts for genuine autonomy or full independence. Thus, 
ethnic-based movements mushroomed in reaction to the political, 
economic and social exclusiveness of the previous regimes. The advent of 
the Ethiopia Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to power 
in May 1991 ended the century-old highly centralized governance system 
and has pursued a multiethnic federal arrangement on the principle of 
unity-in-diversity. 
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However, the first wave of decentralization was confined to the state 
(Kilils) until the States further devolved some functions and powers to 
the Weredas in 2002, known as the Wereda (district) Level 
Decentralization (WLD), was introduced. 
This chapter has three sections. The first section gives a bird’s eye 
view of the Federal Constitution. It also examines the impact of the 
federal subsidy distribution on the states and the jointly session of the 
HoF and HoPR on the determination of concurrent revenues in the 
environment of unequal representation of the states in the HoF. The 
second section, explores how historical, political, language and cultural 
variables have been employed in the crafting of the existing States and 
LGs. There is no consensus among the political elites on the EPRDF’s 
multiethnic federal arrangement as well as on the principles and 
expected outcomes of the system. The third section therefore discusses 
the existing debates among political and intellectual forces on the impact 
of the multiethnic federal arrangement on national unity, conflict 
management, and democracy. 
 
3.1 The Federal Constitutional Setting 
 
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was 
ratified by the Constituent Assembly45on 8thDecember 1994, but came 
into force in 21stAugust 1995. The Ethiopian federal arrangement is 
unique in Africa for its bold recognition of ethnicity (Andréas, 
2003:142).The major features of the Federal Constitution are outlined 
below. 
 The Ethiopian federation is a federation of NNP, because “All 
sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
of Ethiopia” (Federal Constitution, 1995:Art.8 (1), not in the 
constituent member States as it is the case in the other 
federations. The Preamble of the Federal Constitution begins 
with “We the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia...”). 
                                                 
45 Some opposition parties strongly criticized the process of drafting the  Constitution 
was symbolic than real and genuine as many of the political forces who participated in 
the Peace, Democracy and Reconciliation Conference of May 1991and other 
oppositions did not participate in the process of drafting the Federal Constitution. 
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 The Constitution grants unconditional right to self-
determination, including secession of Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples (NNP).46Every NNP has the right to speak, to write and to 
develop its own language and to promote its own history and 
culture. Moreover, Every NNP has the full right to establish its 
own self-government in the territory it inhabits (Federal 
Constitution, 1995: Art.39 sub Articles 1-3). 
 
 Article 43.2 of the Constitution affirms the rights of citizens to 
participate in national development and to be consulted on 
policies and projects affecting them. 
 
 The rights of States to choose their working language, and to 
have own constitution are respected. The Constitution enshrines 
symmetric powers and rights to on the States (Art 47(4)). 
 
 Type and number of local governments to be established are left 
to the judgement of the States (Art. 50(4)). Depending on the 
level of ethnic diversity, geographical size, and population, the 
States have the liberty to establish different local government 
(LGs) tiers.47 Relatively homogeneous States have established 
Wereda and Kebele governments, while the heterogeneous 
States, in addition to Wereda and Kebele governments, have 
established ethnic-based Zonal and Special Wereda Governments 
to ensure the rights of minorities to self-government. Powers and 
functions of LGs are derived from the States. 
                                                 
46 For the purpose of this study, the definition of ‘Nations, Nationaliteis and Peoples’ is 
taken from the Federal Constitution, which defines it as “a group of people who have 
or share large measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of 
language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, 
and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.” (Federal 
Constitution, Art 39(5)). 
47 In this study, LGs include all levels of government which are structured below the 
State Government such as constitutional Zones/Special Weredas, Weredas (urban 
and rural), and kebeles. Note also Zones and Special Weredas in the SNNP have same 
powers and duties. 
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 Articles 51 and 52 of the Federal Constitution define powers and 
functions of the Federal Government and the States respectively. 
Moreover, residual powers are reserved for the States (Federal 
Constitution, Art.52 (1)). Taxation powers are classified into 
federal, state and concurrent categories (Arts. 96, 97 and 
98).States’ right to borrow from domestic sources is also ensured 
(Art.51 (7)). 
 
 Undesignated tax powers can be assigned to the Federal 
Government or to the State or to both by a joint session of the 
HoF and HoPR with two- third majority of votes (Art.99). 
 
 The Federal Constitution confers separation of powers among 
the three branches: the legislature, executive and judiciary 
(Art.50 (2)). The Legislative branch is the highest decision making 
body.48 Head of the Executive (Prime Minister at Federal level) is 
elected among the legislators. Executive members and Federal 
Judges are also appointed by the legislative body upon the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister. 
The Constitution ensures the independence of the judiciary 
branch (Art 50.7 and 78.2). Similarly, the States and LGs have 
Council (legislative), Executive and judicial bodies. With regard to 
urban local governments (ULGs), they have a governance system 
which consists of the City Council, the Mayor, the Mayors’ 
Committee, the City Manager and other Executive bodies and the 
City Court. Speakers and Heads of Administrations are elected 
from the Councillors (see the Revised States’ Constitutions). 
 
                                                 
48 Governance of the Legislative body is undertaken by a Spokesperson, a Deputy 
Spokesperson and a Secretariat, who are elected among the Council members. Note 
that until 2003, there was no separation of power between the Legislative and the 
Executive bodies. State Chief Administrators used to chair both the Council and the 
Executive Committee. Under such conditions, the Council hardly had the ability to 
control the Executive body. 
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 The Federal Legislative body is bicameral. The House of 
Federation (HoF) and the House of Peoples Representatives 
(HoPR) (Art.53). The HoF represents all NNP. There are two 
possibilities for electing members of the HoF. Either State 
Councils elect representatives of HoF among themselves or they 
are directly elected by the People (Art.61. (3)). Members of HoPR 
are directly elected by the people on the principle of 
proportionality. The Constitution protects the right of minority 
ethnic groups to be represented in the HoPR by reserving a 
minimum of 20 seats out of the maximum 550 seats (Art.54 (3)), 
although the minorities are not identified in the Constitution or 
in any Federal Law. 
 
 The Federal Constitution adheres to Party pluralism. A political 
party alone or coalitions of parties which win simple majority 
seats in the HoPR can form a government (Art.56). 
 
 People’s self-rule at all levels is confirmed (Art.88 (1)). Identities 
of NNP are respected. Therefore, Government has to promote 
equality, unity and fraternity of NNP (Art.88 (2)). 
 
 Any Federal Constitutional amendment is possible through the 
following procedure: 
 
(i) Any initiation of Constitutional amendment has to receive support 
from the HoPR with a two-third majority vote, or the HoF with a two-
third majority vote, or one-third of the State Councils, by a majority 
vote within each Council (Federal Constitution, 1995, Art. 104). 
 
(ii) All the democratic and human rights specified in Chapter three and 
in Art.104 of the Federal Constitution can be amended through: (a) 
“when all State Councils, by majority vote, approve the proposed 
amendment”; (b) “when the HoPR, by a two-thirds majority vote, 
approves the proposed amendment” and; (c) “when the HoF, by two-
thirds majority vote, approves the proposed amendment” (Art. 105). 
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(iii) Amendment of all provisions other than Art.105(1) of the Federal 
Constitution is possible: (a) when the two Houses ,in their joint session, 
“approve a proposed amendment by a two-thirds majority vote”; and 
(b) “When two-thirds of the Councils of the member States of the 
Federation approve the proposed amendment by the majority vote” 
(Federal Constitution, Art.105). 
From legal terms, such a stringent procedure of constitutional 
amendment is supposed to deter any desire of centralization of power by 
the Federal Government. 
 
The Setting of the HoF 
 
One may identify, at least, three distinct features of the HoF:  
(i)Unlike in the other federations where representation of states is on 
equal bases49 State’s representation in the HoF of Ethiopia is based on 
principles of equality and proportionality. Representation of the States in 
the HoF is a function of two variables- number of indigenous NNP and 
the population size of a State. The HoF is labelled as a House of NNP 
because each and every NNP is supposed to be represented in the House. 
If two States have equal population size but differ in composition of 
indigenous ethnic groups, the one with more diverse indigenous ethnic 
composition has more representation in the HoF. Tigrai and Somali are 
cases in point. Both States have similar population size but differ in the 
composition of ethnic groups. The former State comprises three ethnic 
groups (Tigraway, Irob and Kunama), while the latter is a homogeneous 
ethnic state. Tigrai has two more representatives in the HoF as compared 
to the Somali simply because of its ethnic composition. Similarly, 
Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambela are small, and less populated states 
with less than half a million each but they have five and four seats in the 
HoF respectively due to the number of indigenous ethnic groups that 
constitute the states. The ethnic composition factor guarantees the SNNP 
                                                 
49 Germany is exceptional. Each Lander has a minimal of three and a maximum of six 
votes in the Bundestag, the Upper House, depending on the population size of the 
Landers. Each member votes in block in the interest of his/her state, not in his/her 
personal capacity. 
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to have a lion’s share of representation in the HoF. Its ethnic composition 
explains 55 representatives out of its 66 seats. 
Population size of a state also determines number of representations 
of a state in the HoF. The States have one representative for every one 
million population more. The population factor makes the state of 
Roomier to have 25 seats out of its 26 total seats followed by the State of 
Amhara. The population sizes of ethnic groups in the SNNP have 
generated six representations in the HoF out of the 61 representations it 
has. 
The SNNP dominates the HoF. Currently, it constitutes 45.5 percent 
of the total 134 seats. This enables the SNNP to easily win simple 
majority votes (50+1) by forming a coalition either with Oromia or with 
Amhara or with combination of either any of Somali/Benshangul-
Gumz/Gambel/Tigrai. That is, legally speaking, , by design, the setting of 
the HoF and the simple majority rule empowers the SNNP, Oromia and 
Amhara to influence decisions on the distribution of federal subsidy, 
concurrent revenues among the States and resolutions of the Inquiry 
Commission in their favour or to reject, if they think the outcome of the 
decision will negatively affect them. Thus, the setting of the HoF has 
made the three big states “more equal States than the equals” as they 
are strongly represented in both Houses. Legally speaking, the remaining 
minority States have little influence in decision making of the HoF. 
(ii), The HoF in Ethiopia is not a formal law making body. Unlike in 
other bicameral Houses, it does not have the power to approve or reject 
a law ratified by the lower chamber. Nevertheless, it has equivalent 
legislative power to interpret the Constitution through the Council of 
Constitutional Inquiry, to determine issues on identity, claims and right 
to secession, to resolve disputes between States, to design formulae for 
distribution of federal subsidy to the States and concurrent tax revenue 
of the Federal Government and the States (Federal Constitution, 1995 
Art.62). All these legal acts are binding on all the States.  
(iii) The HoF and the HoPR jointly determine undesignated taxation 
powers (Federal Constitution, 1995 Art.99). In reality, however, the HoF 
has no deterrence role in the joint session with the HoPR as it constitutes 
only 134 (19.7 percent) of the total 681 joint session seat. The HoPR can 
pass any resolution without the voting support of the HoF in the joint 
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session. Put it differently, the setting of the HoF fall the minority States at 
the mercy of Oromia, Amhara and the SNNP, because their 
representation in the HoF and in the HoPR give them to easily meet the 
simple majority by forming coalition each other.  
 
Table 3 1. States' Representation in the HoF and HoPR 
 
States and  
City Governments 
No.of 
ethnic 
groups in 
each State 
HoF HoPR 
Seats  Share  
in % 
Seats Share in 
% 
Tigrai 3 7 5.2 23 4.20 
Afar 1 2 1.5 8 1.46 
Amhara 4 23 17.2 138 25.23 
Oromia 1 26 19.4 178 32.54 
Somali 1 5 3.7 23 4.20 
Benshagul-Gumuz 5 5 3.7 9 1.65 
SNNP 55 61 45.5 138 25.23 
Gambela 4 4 3.0 3 0.55 
Harari 1 1 0.75 2 0.37 
Addis Ababa  - - - 23 4.20 
Dire Dawa  - - - 2 0.37 
Total 75 134 100 547 100 
 
Source: HoF, and HoPR documents, 2010 .Shares of the Houses 
computed by the author 
 
 
The HoPR 
 
Like other parliaments, representation of the Ethiopian States at the 
HoPR is based on the principle of proportionality of Population. A 
populous State has more representation at the HoPR. Out of the total 
547 parliamentary seats, Oromia constitutes 32.54 percent. The State of 
Oromia constitutes a lion’s share followed by Amhara and the SNNP, 
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where both States have 24.23 percent each. Oromia can win a simple 
majority vote in the HoPR sessions by forming a coalition with Amhara or 
with SNNP or with the remaining States together. 
 
3.2 Creation of the States (Kilils) and Local Governments 
3.2.1 The Making of the Kilils (1992-1994) 
 
International experiences of federations reveal that there is no ‘one-
size-fit-all’ process of demarcating a jurisdiction. For instance, in large 
part of the USA50 and in Germany, States/Landers and local governments 
are mapped on territorial basis, while Regions in Belgium and the 
province of Quebec in Canada are demarcated on ethnic base for 
historical and political considerations. In Russia and to a large extent in 
India and Nigeria, identity interest is well applied (Elazar, 1987:244-45). 
In Spain too, the reorganization of Catalonia, Basque country, Galicia 
Autonomous Communities were made on identity basis (Laborda and 
Escudero, 2007:423-424). Given that Ethiopia is a home for about 86 
ethnic groups, and Nation/nationality question has been a critical 
political issue, the territorial demarcation has been made predominantly 
on ethnic-basis. 
The making of the Regions in Ethiopia has taken place in two periods. 
In 1992, fourteen Kilils (Regions) 51 were crafted out of the pre-existing 
provinces mainly on ethnic lines. As overwhelming of the ethnic groups 
have less than a million population, all ethnic groups cannot enjoy Kilil 
status and therefore several small ethnic groups with similar cultures and 
languages were put together to form one bigger Kilil. 
There were claims and counterclaims for territorial domains among 
political organizations. Harari, Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Wollo 
Province were among the most controversial ones as OLF, an influential 
opposition group in the HoPR during the TGE, claimed that all these 
                                                 
50 Note that the eastern states were created by colonial settlements in part religious. 
 
51 The Proclamation lists the following Kilils (Regions): Kilil-1(Tigrai), Kilil-2(Afar),Kilil-3(Amhara), Kilil-4 (Oromia), Kilil-
5 (Somali),Kilil-6(Benshangul-Gumz), Kilil-7 (Gurage, Hadiya,Kembata,andAlaba,Tembaro,andYem), Kilil-8 
(Sidama, Gedeo,Burji, Amaro,and Gicho), Kilil 9 (Wolaita, Dauro,Konta, Aydi,Gamo,...), Kilil10 
(Baskito,Murssi,Ari,Hamer,...), Kilil11 (Kefficho,Dizo,Surna Bench, Sheko....), Kilil 12 
(Gambela), Kilil13 (Harari) and Kilil14 (Addis Ababa). 
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territories belong to Oromo land. OLF proposed the Cities of Addis 
Ababa, Harari, and Dire Dawa to be autonomous city governments within 
the sovereignty of Oromia kilil, and for the establishment of a Wollo 
Oromo Kilil. The Somali Fronts, Harari League and EPDM strongly 
opposed the OLF’s claims on Dire Dawa and Harari and the establishment 
of Wollo Oromo kilil respectively. OLF’s claim over Addis Ababa was also 
rejected by all Members of the Council of Representatives (CoR) of the 
TGE. As an effect, the House passed a resolution that Addis Ababa City 
should stand on its own Kilil (Region) and Wello province to be 
incorporated within Kilil 3(Amhara Region) by guaranteeing the rights of 
the Wollo Oromos for self-government within the Kilil (TGE, CoR Minutes, 
1984 E.C). 
The issue of Harari was more contested. On the one hand, the Harari 
League Party (HLP) strongly demanded the restoration of the past 
Harare’s territories which has been occupied by Oromo. On the other 
hand, OLF strongly claimed the City as part of Oromo land. Withdrawal of 
OLF from the Transitional Government in 1992 had created new 
opportunity to peacefully resolve the Harari case. The HPL and Oromo 
People Democratic Organization (OPDO) discussed on the issue and 
reached a consensus that: (i) Harari is a state of its own but its territory 
shall be limited to the Hundie Wereda only and, (ii) the Oromos within 
the State shall have representations in the Council of the Harari State. 
Each political organization presented this compromise formula to their 
respective constituencies and organized a joint conference for final 
ratification 52(TGE, CoR Minute, 1984 E, C). Thus, Harare has become a 
state which has been created through genuine consultation and 
dialogues between political parties and local people. 
With regard to Dire Dawa, both the states of Oromia and Somali 
claimed the city of Dire Dawa. The CoR decided that Dire Dawa shall be 
                                                 
52 HNL and OPDO jointly organized People to people conference, where 170 
representatives,(85 from each ethnic group) and six observers attended to decide on 
the fate of Harari. The Parties presented their joint proposal to the participants of the 
conference that recognized the creation of Harari as a killil which include the Jegol 
Wall, the city of Harar and the Hundie Wereda. The decision was ratified by the 
representatives of Harari and Oromo. Lastly, the decision was reported to the CoR 
and it accepted the wishes of the people (CoR Munit,55th Regular Meeting, page 
00128-129). 
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accountable to the Central government as a “Provisional Dire Dawa 
Administration” until the problem gets permanent solution (CoR 
Minutes, 55th Regular Meeting). 
 
3.2.2 Remaking of the States of the Federation (1994) 
 
The Federal Constitution has redefined the States. It reduced the 
fourteen Kilils (Regions) of the TGE to nine States (Regions) by merging 
five kilils to create a giant State known as the SNNP.53 Besides, the 
Federal Constitution recognizes the City Government of Addis Ababa as a 
seat of the Federal Government and accountable to the centre (Federal 
Constitution, 1995, Art.49 (3)). Dire Dawa has not been mentioned in the 
Constitution but remains accountable to the Federal government.  
The territorial mapping of the States has ethnic as well as territorial 
features. The States are demarcated on the basis of settlement patterns, 
language, identity and consent of the people concerned (Federal 
Constitution, 1995, Art.46). The federal arrangement places ‘ethnicity’ at 
the centre54 (EPRDF, 1991:26)55. It would be, however, wrong to 
                                                 
53 Kilil-7(Guragie,Hadiya,Alaba,Timbaro,andYem); Kilil-8 (Sidama,Gedeo,Burgi,and 
Amaro/ Koyra); Kilil-9 (Welayta,Dawro,Konta,etc) ,Kilil 10(Biskito,Mursi, Hamer,…etc), 
and Kill-11(Kaffico,Surna, Shekocho, and etc) were merged together to form the SNNP 
State. 
 54 In this dissertation, multiethnic federalism is used to describe the nature of the 
creation of the constituent members of the Federation instead of using the phrase 
‘ethnic-based federalism’ for couple of reasons: first, all States are not created along 
ethnicity lines. Second, the ethnic-based federalism phrase belittles or undermines 
the spirit of the federal system. 
55    TPLF/EPRDF is the architect of the multiethnic federalism in Ethiopia. Since its birth 
in 1975 T.P.L.F has been adherent to the right of Nations and Nationalities to self-
determination up to and including secession (see TPLF’s political Programs). 
However, Untill January 199, TPLF/EPRDF did not explicitly articulate what political 
system it would institute ( a unitary or federation) after the fall of the Derg regime. 
the Official documents including the political programs of the Fronts implicitly reveal  
the choice of some kind of association of nations and nationalities on free will in the 
form of federation or regional autonomy under “scientific socialism” with a Marxist 
Leninist party leadership. TPLF/EPRDF’s proposal for a federationl or confederation,  
under a democratic united Ethiopia, was declared for the first time at the First 
EPRDF’s Organizational Conference, held in Tigrai, January 1991, just four months 
before it assumed power. The Conference passed a resolution that the provinces 
shall be restructured along the settlement of nations/nationalities on their free will 
and choice (EPRDF 1991:26). 
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generalize the reorganization of the states and local governments have 
been done only along ethnic lines. No uniform criteria was applied either 
in the creation of the States or in the establishment of local 
governments. Rather, two pragmatic approaches have been applied. In 
the states where there is a majority ethnic group among others, ethnicity 
is used as a prime criterion. For instance, the relatively homogeneous 
states of Tigrai, Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somali are formed mainly 
along ethnic lines, although there are minority ethnic groups within the 
states. In contrast, in the SNNP, Benshangul-Gumuz, and Gambela states, 
where numerous-ethnic groups exist but no one is  dominant, a mix of 
factors like politics, economic, settlement pattern, culture and language 
similarity have been taken into consideration. Therefore, these States are 
formed through union of many ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups.56 
The formation of SNNP is viewed differently by different political 
elites. On the one hand, the Southern Peoples Democratic Forces (SPDF), 
an opposition regional party in the SNNP, has strongly criticized the 
merging of the five states. It argues that the merging is not only 
undemocratic as the stakeholders were not consulted but also  
contradicts with the principles of the Federal Constitution as it denies the 
right of the merged kilils to form their own state.57 It also challenges the 
merging policy that the five kilils are no less entitled to form own state 
than the Hareri people, who has secured recognition of state with less 
population size and economically not better than any of the merged 
Kilils. On the other hand, the South Peoples Democratic Union (SPDU) 
currently named as South Ethiopia Peoples Democratic Movement 
(SEPDM), a member of EPRDF, lauds the creation of the SNNP. 
The creation of a giant State of SNNP might be seen from economic 
and political perspectives, although the political factor seems more 
critical. Given the ethnic groups which were incorporated into the SNNP 
are small in population size; it could be argued that forming many small 
                                                 
56 The Preamble of the Constitutions of the SNNP, Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumz   
identify and recognize the indigeneous Nations, Nationalities and Peoples who 
constitute respective Stats, while the Preamble of the remaining state constitutions 
name only the dominant ethnic group. For instance, the Preamble of the Oromia 
State begins with “ We, the Oromo People…” 
57 Among others, the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) demands for a statehood 
status. 
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states along ethnic lines would not be economically viable58. One may 
argue that the amalgamation of the small five Kilils would allow yielding 
benefits from economies of scale in providing public services and to 
minimize negative spill over effects. The economic argument alone may 
not fully explain the reality, unless the political factor is ignored. True, 
the States of Gambela, Benshangule-Gumuz and Harari, which enjoy 
state status, are neither in a better economic position nor they have 
higher population size than each kilil which were merged to constitute 
the SNNP. SPDFU’s critics on the merging of the five kilils might be 
persuasive if the political factor is ignored. The political factor seems to 
have more weight than the economic ones for a couple of reasons: 
(i), the idea of merging is likely an outcome of the formation of the 
SPDFU and SPDF, contending regional political forces in the south. These 
political forces were umbrella of various ethnic-based political 
organizations. They formed a Union or a Front to win a regional election 
by jointly mobilizing their resources and promoting similar political 
agendas in their respective domain areas; and 
(ii), the idea of merging the five Kilils seems to have a political 
objective to deter OLF’s long standing hegemonic political agenda over 
the small and weak States of the south by creating a giant counter 
balance State in the south.59 Likewise, the small States of Gambela and 
Benshangul-Gumuz have been retained to abort OLF’s hegemonic 
                                                 
58 According to the population census of 2007, out of the 56 ethnic groups, 11(18%) 
have less than 5,000 people,34 (56percent) between 5,000-100,000 people, and 
5(8percent) between half a million and one million. Only Sidama, Welayta, Gurage, 
Hadiya and Gamo ethnic groups have population size between a million and 1.5 
million each. 
59 OLF and other secessionist Oromo political elites advance the North versus-South, the 
Orthodox Christian versus non-Orthodox, and the Cushitic versus Semitic (Habesha) 
dichotomy labeling the North, the Orthodox and the Semetic (Tigrai and Amhara) as 
colonizers and the south, the non-orthodox and the Cushitic as colonized people since 
the turn of the 19th century . OLF political program perceives Oromia land to  include 
all lands where oromos inhabit and ”the joining of other nationality groups [non-
semetic, except Harari and guragie]” (Lema 1997:97-98). OLF also claims more areas 
from the present Sidama, Kembata, Gurage lands, Wello and south Tigrai (see CoR 
minutes,1984; modern Oromo map in Assefa; 1993:6; Holcomb and Ibssa,1990:71-74, 
and OLF’s Oromia map, www.oromo liberationfront.org, visited March 2008). Thus, the  
creation of  SNNP state in the south as well as Gambela and Benshangul in the west 
seem to abort the OLF’s hegemonic political agenda.  
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political goal over these tiny nationalities because OLF considers the 
western tiny minority ethnic groups which have constituted the states of 
Gambela and in Genshangul-Gumuz as ‘black Oromo’ (Young, 1999). 
Any reform on territorial mapping should be made on thorough 
consultations with stakeholders-residents, political parties, local officials, 
intellectuals, etc., albeit it consumes time and money. Unless it is argued 
that residents from the merged five Kilils (Regions) were represented at 
the Constitutional Assembly Conference, no referendum was conducted 
whether the residents of the merged Kilils (Regions) would like to form a 
giant state by merging together or to remain being a small state of their 
own. Failure to conduct referendum or ignoring the wishes and desires of 
the stakeholders in the process of making the giant state of the SNNP has 
caused the regional ruling party to unnecessarily pay a dear political 
price. In reaction to the merging measure, political entrepreneurs in the 
merged Region have rallied their ethnic groups behind them to strive for 
a higher status. They created grave instability in the SNNP which forced 
the regional ruling party to restructure the types and numbers of 
government tiers (Zones, Special weredas and weredas). 
 
3.2.3 Redemarcation of the Local Governments (1995) 
 
Local governments are creatures of their respective States. Again, 
two pragmatic approaches have been applied in the redemarcation of 
local governments (the Zones, Special Zones, Special Weredas, and 
Wereds). Zonal Governments and Special Wereda Governments comprise 
several rural and urban Woreda Governments. In the heterogeneous 
states of SNNP, Benshagul-Gumuz and Gambela, Zonal and Special 
Wereda Governments are mainly established along ethnic lines 
regardless of their economic viability. In the SNNP, Zonal Governments 
(ZGs) and Special Wereda Governments (SWGs) are formed by breaking 
up heterogeneous Zone/Wereda Administrations. When a single ethnic 
group is found very tiny, two or more ethnic groups were brought 
together to form a ZG or SWG, often based on cultural and language 
similarities. Each ethnic group is fairly represented in the Council of ZG or 
SWG or WA. In Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambela, each founding 
nationality/ People is organized at Zone Government level. In contrast, in 
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the relatively homogeneous States of Tigrai, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, and 
Somali, the creation of LGs (Weredas and Kebeles) took into account 
administrative convenience, population size, and settlement pattern. 
Some minority ethnic groups within Tigrai, Amhara and Afar are 
exceptionally established on ethnic basis at Zone or Special Wereda or 
Kebele level. For instance, in Amhara, four minority nationalities, namely, 
Awi, Wag-Hamra, Oromia and Argoba have formed their own 
government at Zone level (The Revised Constitutions of Amhara, 2001). 
Minority ethnic groups in Tigrai, namely Irob and Kunama are structured 
at Wereda and at Special tabia (Kebele) level respectively. Similarly, the 
Argoba people in Afar exercise their self-rule right by forming a Special 
Wereda. 
It is worth noting here the distinction between the Nationality-based 
Zonal Governments and the functional Zonal Administrations (FZA). The 
former are constitutional self-government entities. They are established 
on ethnic basis to guarantee the rights of minorities to self-government. 
They have elected Councils, Executive and Judiciary bodies. They have 
representation at the State level (see the Revised Constitutions of 
Amhara, SNNP, Benshangule-Gumuz, and Gambela). In contrast, the 
relatively homogeneous States of Tigrai, Oromia, Somali, and Afar have 
FZA. For instance, in addition to Nationality Administration, the state of 
Amhara has seven FZAs. They do not have Council and Judiciary bodies. 
Executives are appointed by and answerable to respective State Councils. 
They are established to serve as administrative links between the State 
bureaus and Wereda Governments. 
Next to the Zone or special Wereda government unit, a Wereda 
(district) comes as a third government tier. Wereda Government can be 
rural or urban. Wereda Governments are recognized in the States’ 
Constitutions. They have Council (legislative), executive and judiciary 
bodies. Kebele (commune) is the lowest administration unit and closest 
to the people. Both rural and urban kebeles have Council, executive and 
social court (judiciary) organs. The outreach of a government to the 
people would serve as an instrument to promote grass root participation 
in decision making, mobilization of resources for enhancing local social 
and economic developments. 
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It should be noted that the organization of government units of the 
States and the City Governments is not uniform across the States. 
Neither the City Governments have same governmental units. 
Constitutional Zone /Special Wereda Governments are peculiar to the 
heterogeneous States. Harari and the City Governments of Addis Ababa 
and Dire Dawa have structured their government units quit differently. 
The City Government of Addis Ababa is recently reorganized into 10 sub-
Cities and 116 Wereda Governments. Kebeles are omitted to reduce 
administrative costs. Because of the smallness of their geographical size, 
Councils of Harari and Dire Dawa have omitted a wereda government tier 
believing they can easily reach their constituencies through the kebeles. 
In summing up, the federal Government of Ethiopia has five levels of 
government, namely; the Federal, States, Zone/Special Wereda 
Government, Wereda Government and Kebele in descending order. The 
last three constitute a local government. All States do not have uniform 
LG tiers. They are established in a way to fit with their specific state 
circumstances. For instance, the States of Amhara, SNNP, Gambela, and 
Benshangul-Gumuz are structured into three vertical government levels, 
while Tigrai, Afar, Oromia, and Somali have two levels of local 
government. Harari and Dire Dawa are of one local government tier. 
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Chart 3.1. Federal-Regional-Local Government Structures, 2010 
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Table 3.2. Local Government Structure, 2011 
 Tigrai Afar Amhara Oromia Somali B-G 
SNNP 
** 
Gambela Harari AA DD total 
No. of 
constitutional 
ZAs 
SW 
None None 3 none none 3 13  3  none none N 23 
 
1 
1 3 
1 
none none 2 8  1  none none None 12 
No. of FZAs 6 5 7 18 9 none none none- none 10 None 55 
No. of RWGs  37 31 129 265 53 19 134 12 none - - 80 
No. of RKAs  NA NA NA- 6,342 NA- NA- 3,714 - 17 - - 15,000 
No of sub cities o NA None NA NA none none NA none none 10 None 10 
No. of WULGs  1  12 3 29 39 1 2 22*   1    none 116 NA 226 
No of UKAs   NA NA 482 NA NA 211* NA       2 NA NA  
Source: CSA 2007 Census Report, Central Statistics Agency,  
* Oromia National Regional State (2008)Socio-economic profile, BoFED, , wwwpcdp.gov.et/Or 
** SNNP, Proclamation No. 103/2006,  The Revised Proclamation for the Establishment, Organization and Definition of Powers and Duties of 
Urban Centres of the SNNP 
B-G= Benshangul- Gumuz, AA =Addis Ababa; DD=Dire Dawa; NA= data not available;  RWGs= Rural wereda Governments 
UWLGs=  Urban Wereda local governments;    RKAs= Rural Kebeles   Administration;   UKAs= Urban Kebeles  Administration 
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Fragmentation of the Local Government 
 
The Federal Constitution recognizes Federal-States intergovernmental 
relations only, leaving the establishment of local governments to the 
judgment of the States. In Ethiopia, the wereda local government (WLG) 
organization makes distinction between Urban Local Government (ULG) and 
Rural Local Government (RLG).60 Two points justify such a distinction. One 
thing is that the Ethiopian economy is characterized by a mainly agrarian 
economy. Another is that there are marked differences in the local 
preference for public services between the urban and rural areas. 
Delimitation of sub national governments should be stable. If redrawing 
of the existing boundary deems to be necessary, it should be based on 
research and be evaluated against the long term political implications, 
economic and administration feasibilities (UN, 2000). Looking through the 
Ethiopian local governments, this is not the case. Over the past two 
decades, there is a trend towards frequent reorganization and 
fragmentation process of local governments. Many factors explain this. 
                                                 
60  Naming and grade of the ULGs  vary from  a State to  state. For instance, the SNNP 
categorizes urban centers into two: Town administration and municipalities. The former, 
in turn, is sub divided into four ranks: Leading City, Second level Towns, Medium Level 
Towns and Lower Level Towns (SNNP, Proclamation, No. 103/2006). In Oromia, urban 
centers are categorized in four grades (Grade 1, 2, 3 and 4) solely based on population 
size of the urban centers (Oromia, Proclamation No.116/2006). The Amhara State 
classifies urban centers into City Administration, Municipal Towns and Emerging towns, 
in which City Administration takes the form of (a) City Administration,(b) Amalgamated 
City Administration ,and (c) Metropolitan City Administration ,while Municipality towns 
are sub divided into Lead Municipality and  Sub-municipalities or Infant towns(Amhara, 
Proclamation No.91/2003). The State of Tigrai categorizes urban centers into 
Metropolitan Municipal Cities, Municipal Towns and Emerging (Infant) towns( Tigrai, 
Proclamation No.107/1998. Emerging towns in Tigrai and Amhara, Grade 4 Towns in 
Oromia and Municipalities in the SNNP are transitional settlements from rural to urban. 
InTigrai, urban LG classification consider mix of criteria: population size, territorial size of 
the urban centre, economic base, annual revenue capacity and residents’ per capita 
income. An Emerging Town should host a minimum of 2,000 inhabitants engaged 
predominantly in petty trade and agricultural activities. Towns are urban centers with 
more than 20,000 dwellers and their economic base is mainly non-agricultural activities. 
Metropolitans are urban centers which comprises two or more town administrations. 
Metropolitan and Towns are independent legal entities. They have City Councils, and 
defined assignment of responsibilities. For purely economic efficiency reasons, however, 
Emerging Towns are not autonomous government units, rather they are integral parts of 
respective rural WAs (Tigrai, Proclamation No. 107/1998). 
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Restructuring of local governments without detailed studies and its long-
term impact is not an uncommon practice in Ethiopia. Altering or modifying 
or creating a new LG should be legitimatized through referendum. In 
Ethiopia, however, this is an exceptional practice rather than a normal 
process.61 Reorganization and delimitation of local governments are vested 
in the State’s power. As illustrated in Chart 3.1 and Table 3.2 above, the 
heterogeneous states have established Zone/ Special Wereda immediately 
next to the Regional States, while the relatively   homogeneous states have 
set wereda Governments.62 Each Zone/ Special Wereda or Wereda 
Government comprises many weredas. Again each Wereda has many 
Kebeles.  
In 1996, amalgamation of Weredas took place in the four relatively 
advanced states (Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP) to cut down the total 
number of their Weredas by half. Two entire or partial neighbouring 
Weredas were merged to form a ‘bigger’ Wereda63 without consulting 
respective residents. The objective of the amalgamation was to make use of 
the available scarce public resources by minimizing administrative costs. 
The amalgamation of Weredas was not found popular mainly having a 
higher government tier is strongly associated with large amount of 
federal/state transfers, better public service delivery and better access to 
powers and privileges for local politicians. As a response to the reaction of 
the merging policy, the states were forced to revisit their policy. By 2010, 
                                                 
61 There is a strong emerging demand for a higher government tier in the SNNP. So far 
Silte zone is the only successful outcome of a referendum. It was formed by splitting 
from Gurarge Zone via referendum in 2004.Budget issue may preclude executing 
referendum for each and every public demand. Lack of political willingness to exercise 
participatory democracy at local level is also a serious attitude problem; although 
sometimes limited consultations with local people have taken place in the process of 
forming new LGs. There is a strong emerging demand for a higher government tier in 
the SNNP. 62 Note that in the Revised Constitution of Oromia, Zonal Administrations are recognized 
but they do not have a legislative body. Like in the other homogeneous states, Zones 
are agents of the state. 
63 Tigrai claims the use of combinations of various criteria like population size, agro-
ecology (homogeneity is required), administrationsuitability, ethnicity, settlement 
pattern, accessto road and geographical factors, economicpotential (capacity), and 
consent of inhabitants (Tigrai, Proclamation No. 99/1998 E.C). In practice, however, 
consent of people and administrativeconvenience received less consideration. 
Population size and ethnicity were major criteria in forming the Weredas. 
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the numbers of ZAs /SWAs and rural WAs increased to 35 and 774 
respectively as compared to 13 Constitutional ZAs/ SWAs and 552 WAs in 
the entire country in 2002. The SNNP, a home land for 56 ethnic groups, is a 
major contributor to such a sharp increase of the ZA/SW64. Oromia leads 
the multiplication of Weredas from 180 WAs in 2002 to 304 in 2010(see 
Table 3.2). 
 
3.3 Debates on the feasibility of the federal arrangement 
 
The Ethiopian federal arrangement takes “settlement pattern, identity 
and consent of people concerned” (Federal Constitution, Art.46), as main 
criteria in creating the states. However, there is no consensus among the 
ethnic-based and ‘multi ethnic’ political parties and intellectuals on the 
principle, nature and possible outcome of the EPRDF’s multiethnic federal 
arrangement. It is praised by some and criticized by others. The debates for 
and against the EPRDF’s multiethnic federal arrangement revolve around 
non-economic and economic issues. The non-economic arguments include 
the issues of national unity, administrative feasibility, democracy and 
human rights, while economic arguments emphasize on economic 
disparities, and mobility of labour, capital and trade. All these debates are 
discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Non-Economic Arguments 
 
National Unity and multiethnic federal arrangement 
 
The opponents of the multiethnic federal arrangement equate the 
system to tribalism. Aleme (2003) interprets the federal arrangement as a 
‘system of apartheid’. Daniel (2002) views it as a ‘divide and rule tactics’ 
                                                 
64 Populous ethnic groups such as Gurage, Haiya, Sidama, Gedeo, Silte, Welayta 
and Dawro constitute own ZAs, whereas tiny ethnic groups form ZAs 
bymerging two or more ethnic groups. For example, Kembata-Timaro, South 
Omo, Keffa, Bench Maji and Gamo-Gofa Zones comprise various ethnic groups. 
The Special Weredas are often homogenous ethnic groups except Derashe, 
which encompasses Derashe, Debase, Kusumie and Mossiye ethnic groups. 
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aimed at fulfilling the aspirations of Tigrian hegemony over the others.65 
Tronvoll (2000:20); Aalen (2002:45); Aleme (2003); and Berhanu (2008:2) 
are of the same opinion. The opponents of the multiethnic federal 
arrangement strongly oppose institutionalizing ethnicity and guaranteeing 
the right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination up to 
and including secession. They view it as a risky business. It will destroy the 
collective identity, and the social glue of tolerance and harmony that have 
kept Ethiopians united for centuries, destroy and ultimately will lead the 
country to disintegration (Ottaway, 1995:244; Alemante, 2003; Sisay, 
2004:82; Mesfin, 1996:96; Lidetu, 2002:320; Assefa ,2012). They argue that 
Article 39 of the Federal Constitution is an open-ended clause to easily 
manipulate ethnicity for controlling power and resource or to whip up 
secessionism by inventing pretexts. According to them, what guarantees a 
democratic united Ethiopia is respecting individual rights on the principles 
of liberal democracy not guaranteeing the right to self-determination 
including secession (Sisay, 2004; CUD, 2005; Lidetu, 2002 E.C). The Thesis 
does not recognize or gives less emphasis to collective rights of NNP. 
With regard to what form of government would be feasible for 
Ethiopia, the opponents promote various political programs however. For 
example, AAPO and MOA-ANBESA adhere to a constitutional monarchy. 
Semayawi Party, Unity for democracy and Justice and All Ethiopia 
Democratic Organization are adherent to a unitary system. EDP promotes 
the USA style territorial (geographical) federalism and urges for de-
ethnicization of the States and redrawing of the existing ’ethnic-based’ 
states taking in to account a mix of both economic and non-economic 
criteria such as geography, population size, cultural and historical ties of 
communities, language, national identity, administrative efficiency, 
economic viability, settlement pattern, population mix, people’s will, and 
other essential factors (UEDP, EDP-MEDHIN,2009: Agenda12; 
Berhanu,2008:20; CUD Manifesto, 2005:89). Daniel (2003) also denounces 
the present federal system and suggests a territorial federalism by 
reinstating the previous ‘historic provinces’ of Ethiopia. 
                                                 
65 Many of the ‘multi-national’ political parties like EDP, ANDINET, AEDP, EPRP 
Ginbot 7 and Semayawi Party whose social base are predominantly Amhara 
ethnic group reject themultiethnic federal arrangement. 
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Ethnic-based political parties, who felt they were peripheral and were 
being treated as subjects, not as equal citizens in the past regimes, have 
welcomed the EPRDF’s multiethnic federal arrangement. The lefts political 
forces also share the principles of EPRDF federal arrangement. For instance, 
Samarta (2004:1150) notes: 
“[R]edrawing the administrative regions of Ethiopia along ethnic lines 
had some immediate and apparent benefits for communities who 
were previously marginalized, demonized, or whose existence was 
denied ….One of the major benefits of the new order was the 
establishment of script for many languages and their use as medium 
of instruction in regional primary schools….It also demystified cultural 
basis of   political domination. Recognizing this type of cultural 
diversity was a vital step in disconnecting political ethnicity from 
cultural identity and was therefore an essential step towards the 
creation of civic order.” 
Others also consider the multiethnic federalism as an instrument for 
safeguarding the minority rights and an effective means of resolving ethnic 
conflicts. For instance, Kidane (1997) lauds the federal system as “a new 
approach to state building in Africa and noble ethnic policy,” whereas Keller 
and Smith (2005:265) note that the Ethiopian federal arrangement 
“...represents a novel approach to power sharing.” Furthermore, Assefa 
(2007:341-2) also argues: “[T]he delineation on ethnic-base has something 
to do with safeguarding those citizens who find themselves a minority 
within a sub national territorial unity….It could be wise to adopt ethnic line 
demarcation at local level to avoid inter ethnic tensions (in the choice of 
language) when there are several ethnic groups living together in a state 
and when none seems to be clearly dominant.” 
One of the pillar principles of the Ethiopian multiethnic federal 
arrangement is unity-in-diversity. EPRDF and other ethnic–based political 
forces argue that recognition of the rights of NNP to self-determination 
including secession, and guaranteeing rights to self-rule and shared-rule is 
an instrument to resolve the long standing nationality question in Ethiopia. 
The federal setting has not only uprooted the main threat for national unity 
but has also saved the country from the verge of disintegration. From mid 
1970s to early 1991, the country was engulfed with civil wars between 
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political forces which were waging armed struggles for democracy and 
genuine autonomy or full independence against the central government. 
Insurgencies had reached at zenith in early 1991. Large parts of Eritrea were 
under EPLF since 1988 and it managed to create a de facto independent 
Eritrea in May 1991. TPLF had liberated the entire Tigrai from the control of 
the central government and had established a de facto government during 
1989 to 1991. More than five Oromo liberation Fronts and the Ethiopian 
Somali Fronts were waging for full independence from ‘Abyssinian 
colonialism.’ Afar liberation Front (ALF), Afar Nation Democratic 
Organization (ANDO), Gambela People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), 
Benshangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), and Sidama Liberation 
Front (SLF) were waging armed struggles for autonomy. There were more 
than a dozen armed political forces against the central government. All 
these had made Ethiopia at the verge of disintegration in early 1991. 
Nevertheless, the compromise deal among various political forces to 
devolve power to the Regions and affirmation of unconditional right of 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self- determination including 
secession and respecting universal human rights in the Charter of the 1991, 
which later became part of the Federal Constitution, are believed to have 
defused substantially the ethnic entrepreneurs not to be inspired by 
secession of Eritrea.66 
However, the multi-ethnic federal system has neither completely 
avoided ethnic-based insurgency nor has ended up inter-ethnic conflicts as 
it was hoped in the early 1990s. OLF, WSLF and ONLF, which had endorsed 
the Charter and joined the Transitional Government of Ethiopia in 1991, 
have resumed insurgency against the Federal Government demanding for 
                                                 
66 The reconsideration of some ethnic–based fronts and top political figures against 
secession form Ethiopia could demonstrate the potential of the multiethnic federal 
arrangement in solving conflicts. Founder and Former Deputy Secretary General of OLF, 
Leencho Letta and other top former political figures of the Front have reconsidered the 
option for an “independent Oromia”(Leench, 2004). Political reconciliations between 
the Federal Government and the factions of OLF in 2008, as well as WSLFand ONLF in 
2011 are cases in point. Furthermore, factional forces of the WSLF and the ONLF have 
declared the termination of insurgency for secession of Somali from Ethiopia and they 
have announced to work for the development of the Somali state in cooperation with 
the regional ruling party and the federal government(the Ethiopian Reporter, 2011). All 
these new developments have diminished, but have not eliminated, the threat of 
secession. The sustainability of the Peace deal is to be seen in the future, however. 
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full independence. To make the matter worse, other new ‘liberation 
movements’ have also emerged. Small scale sporadic insurgency in the 
north, south-west and south-east of the country are still issues of grave 
concerns67. 
Why the federal system has not ended up the ethnic–based 
insurgencies and inter-ethnic conflicts? There are internal and external 
factors for the insurgencies spawn against the Central Government. One 
driving force for the sporadic insurgencies is the competition between 
ethnic groups to control political power at state/Zone/Special Wereda 
levels. Lack of good governance is another internal factor. The unstable and 
volatile politics in the Horn of Africa has also produced negative spill over 
effect on Ethiopia. The current ‘no peace, no war’ situation between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea and the crises in Somalia have created safe haven for 
insurgent groups in Eritrea and in Somalia against the Central Government. 
The Government of Eritrea hosts, trains and arms anti-government forces. 
Egypt also plays active role in destabilizing Ethiopia to weaken its strategic 
“rival” over the Nile River. Some political forces like OLF and Ginbot 7 also 
accuse the ruling party for narrowing the political space to struggle 
peacefully. The ability of the Ethiopian federal arrangement to completely 
preclude opposition forces from opting for insurgency, therefore, depends 
on the commitment of all political forces to protect and implement the 
Federal Constitution. 
With regard to the debate on the making of the states, there is no 
golden rule as to how political mapping of states and local governments 
should be demarcated in a federal system. It should be pragmatically 
adapted on the basis of specific condition of a country in question. 
Therefore, the proponents of the multiethnic federal arrangement argue 
that neither de-ethnicization of the existing states as EDP and others argue, 
nor the restoration of the ‘historic provinces’ as Daniel (2003) recommends 
is a panacea to avoid the risk of secession in the country, because:  
                                                 
67    Although animal raiding and counter raiding between pastoralist communities as well as 
inter-ethnic conflicts to control resources (grazing land and water points) have long 
history in Ethiopia, they have increased since 1991. Inter-ethnic conflicts are more 
serious in SNNP, Benshangul-Gumz, Gambela; between Oromo and Somali, Afar and 
Issa (Somali), Oromo and Berta (Benshangul-Gumz), Afar and Kereyu (Oromo). 
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(i) Whether using mix of criteria in redrawing the boundary of the 
existing state as suggested by the pro-territorial federalists above will 
address the right for self-determination of the NNP is doubtful. The ethnic-
based political forces put first nation/nationality question to rectify the past 
core and periphery relationship between the oppressor and oppressed 
NNP. They also believe that reorganizing the States by blending various 
ethnic groups into one “optimal jurisdiction size” does not allow the NNP to 
preserve and develop their history, language, and culture to protect 
minorities;  
(ii) In many instances, the demarcation took into account past and 
existing historical and political realities of the country. Before the complete 
unification of the country by Menelik II, the current States and the 
Nations/Nationalities were either enjoying wide autonomy under the 
central government or were independent territories;  
(iii), a territorial demarcation of states does not necessarily ensure 
national unity.68 The demarcation of the five Autonomous Regions and 24 
Administrative Regions in the 1987 People’s Republic of Ethiopia took into 
account a mix of variables, but did not satisfy the ethnic based political 
organizations of the time. 
It should be also noted that ethnic politics in Ethiopia is not EPRDF’s 
creation. It has been part of political game to control power since long 
time.69 As Messay (2006) boldly notes, “Ethnicity in Ethiopia is a reality that 
needs recognition”. The multiethnic federalism seems irreversible and de-
legitimating the system would be costly political business, because “once 
ethicized politics is born, it will not go away for the simple reason that it 
                                                 
68  The former United Sudan is a typical example. States in the Sudan were created based on 
mix of economic and non-economic factors. But the territorial demarcation neither saved 
the Sudan from the separation of the South Sudan nor has brought political stability in 
Darfur and Easter Sudan (Beja State). 
69 Ethnic politics implies using ethnic identity as an instrument for political mobilization in 
order to win political and economic powers over competing ethnic elites. In the political 
history of Ethiopia, ethnic politics is neither a new phenomenon nor an invention of 
EPRDF. What EPRDF has done is legalizing ethnicity. In Ethiopia, ethnic based power 
struggle can be dated to the Amhara revolt against the Zagwe dynasity in early 13th 
century. The Zemene-Mesafint was also characterized by ethnic-based politics. The 
powerful political actors of the time (Tigrian; Amhara, Agew and Yejju Oromo nobilities) 
used ethnicity  as an instrument to control the Gondorian Palace. It is undeniable that 
the struggle for controlling central power among the regional nobilities from the fourth 
quarter of the 19th century to present–day revolves around ethnic politics.  
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mobilizes strong emotional forces. Instead of confrontation, I maintain that 
it should be used to activate democratization and economic progress, the 
only way by which the emotional competent can be neutralized.” (Messay, 
2006).  One has also to think the forceful remaking of the states on mix of 
criteria instead of ethnicity. Will the NNP be willing to lose the political, 
fiscal, administrative powers and cultural autonomy that the Constitution 
enshrines to them by reducing themselves to a lower status or by blending 
themselves with others? Will they satisfy with less political, fiscal and 
cultural autonomies? It is doubtful. Thus the best option seems to make use 
of ethnicity as an instrument of modernization, political equality and social 
change in a civilized way by promoting simultaneously supra Ethiopian 
nationalism and appreciating ethnic identity rather than de-legitimating or 
concealing ethnicity.  This is by no mean to say that the making of states on 
ethnic –base is immune from risks.  
 
Administrative feasibility 
 
Some scholars criticize the rationality of ethnicity in the making of the 
State from the perspectives of history and administrative feasibility. Bahru 
(2008:354) argues that reorganization of the States of the SNNP, Amhara 
and Oromia have been neither associated with history nor administration 
convenience. He notes, “The kind of self-rule right granted to them 
[SNNP]... does not represent the history or language any of the constituent 
nationalities” (Bahru, 2008:354). He also questions the designation of the 
Amhara state that has never been a region named by the name Amhara 
except the short lived one in the medieval period in the area of present 
South Wello and North Shewa70. He argues that the historic provinces of 
Amhara have been Gondor, Gojjam, Wollo, Shewa, etc. Nor there has been 
                                                 
70 Professor Bahru’s argument on the administrative inconvenience is well taken. But with 
due respect his historical argument that denounces the designation of the state of 
Amhara needs correction as there were provinces designated Northern Amhara and 
Central Amhara and Selale provinces during the first administrative restructure in the 
early 1930s (Asmelash, 1987:35). During the Italian invasion too, all Amharic speaking 
regions were structured under Amhara Region. Moreover, the existence of Amhara ethnic 
group is undeniable. The Amharic speaking ethnic groups proudly identify themselves as 
Amhara. For instance, Ras Imru , an eminent patriot and statesman during the first half of 
the twentieth century, claimed his identity to be an Amhara noting “from my father and 
mother side my local home is Shewa part of Amhara” (imru, 2001:1). 
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a centralized Oromo land. The Oromo regions71 were Arisi, Bale, Leqa, 
Jimma, etc As far as administrative feasibility is concerned, Bahru 
(2008:355) argues. “…From the point of view of administrative convenience, 
too, it does not make sense to include within one unit the Amhara stretching 
from Ankober (in north eastern Shewa) to Armacheho(in north western 
Gondor) or the Oromo from Ginir(south eastern Bale) to Gidami (south 
western Wellega)”. 
Bekure (2007:74) also notes that the existing Zonal Administrations 
(constitutional or otherwise) are superior in creating better administrative 
convenience and in narrowing population and geographical size polarization 
to the present States. He suggests crafting out new states from the existing 
Zonal Administrations with some modifications by dividing the giant states 
and by amalgamation of the small States (Bekure; 2007:74). 
True, the making of the States have not taken administrative 
convenience factor in to account. Citizens are forced to travel close to 1015 
km from Kibish Wereda town of Surma, Bench Maji Zone, SNNP to Hawassa, 
Regional city; or to travel 1250 km passing through west Gojjam and West 
Welega from Pawe town, Metekel Zone to Asossa, Benshagule-Gumuz; or 
to spend days travelling by bus from Bereket Wereda(north eastern Shewa), 
Amhara state, to Bahir Dar; or from Gidami (south west Welega) to Addis 
Ababa, or from Somali Moyale, Liben Zone, to Jijiga for seeking public 
services which are provided at state level like referral hospital service, or 
appealing for Higher Court services, and business license permissions (say 
mining and investment related),or to attend region- wide meetings and 
training programs. 
The proposals for breaking up the overstretched states of Amhara, 
Oromia, SNNP, and Somali into new smaller states either for the purpose of 
administrative efficiency as mentioned by Assefa (2007:266-7)  or to avoid, 
if not to reduce political asymmetry in the HoPR, to narrow the existing 
population and geographical polarization among the states as suggested by 
Bekure (2007:83), or to avoid secession risk as argued by Lidetu (2002:303) 
would make sense. But, a word of caution is important here. The proposal 
to break up the vast states of Oromia, Amhara, Somali, and the SNNP or any 
                                                 
71 True, there was no aunified Oromo state in history. But it must be noted that the creation 
of Oromia State has aimed to accommodate the strong demand of Oromo nationalists for 
the right of self-rule and maintaining cultural autonomy. 
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other States would be workable if and only if it receives strong support 
from respective actors and gets significant majority vote through 
referendum. It should be noted that imposition from the above likely to 
breed political instability. Policy makers must be certain that the intention 
of splitting the existing overstretched states into smaller states for any 
reason does not repeat in one way or the other the mistake that led to the 
dissolution of the Ethio-Eritrea federation in 196272. 
 
Issues of Democracy and Human Rights 
 
The Preamble of the Federal Constitution declares that “guaranteeing 
democratic order” (Federal Constitution, 1995 Preamble) by ensuring both 
collective rights and individual rights is one of the foundations of the 
multiethnic federal system. In line with this, the Federal Constitution 
enshrines extensive human and democratic rights of individuals73 which are 
consistent with the UN Human Rights (Federal Constitution, Articles 14-44). 
Right to hold opinion, freedom of expression, and freedom of press are 
constitutionally guaranteed (Federal Constitution, Art.29 subarticle1-3). 
As discusses above, the Federal Constitution guarantees the right of 
NNP to self-determination up to and including secession. NNP have the 
right to develop their own language, to express and promote their own 
culture, and preserve their history. They have the right to establish self-
government within a particular territory they inhabit, and to have 
proportional representation at the State and Federal levels of government 
(Federal Constitution, art. 39 sub articles (2) and (3)). All these rights adhere 
to collective (group) rights and guarantee minority rights. Tronvoll, 
                                                 
72 There are lessons that we should draw from the experiences of the Ethio-Eritrea 
federation (1952-1962) and the Biafra of Nigeria. Emperor Haile Selassie abolished the 
Ethio-Eritrea federation because he and some extreme Eritrean Unionists perceived the 
Federal Act as a stumbling block for a national unity of Ethiopia(Zewde, 1998 and 
Tekeste, 1997). Such a centralist mentality not only caused Ethiopia to pay dear price but 
also has led to loss Eritrea in the 1993 referendum. The Biafra declaration for 
independence was also a reaction to the decision of the Federal Government of Nigeria 
to split the East Region into three states (Aleman and Treisman, 2005:148). So, the 
proposals to break up the big States for any reason without the consent of considerable 
majority people’s vote likely lead to high political and economic costs. 
73 Out of the total 106 articles of the Federal Constitution, thirty-two of them deal with 
fundamental rights (see The Federal Constitution Articles 14 to 44). 
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(2000:20) levels the Federal Constitution as “one of the most minority-
friendly constitution in Africa, or even globally” for being a NNP-centred. 
In spite of the fact that all the human right bills and collective rights of 
the Federal Constitution are new chapters in the modern political history of 
Ethiopia, there is no consensus among Ethiopian Political forces on the 
essence and interpretation of democracy. The debates on democracy 
revolve around liberal democracy versus ‘revolutionary democracy’ and 
collective right versus individual rights. The rightists conceive democracy in 
the classic way of the western principles and values which include but not 
limited to: ensuring individual rights to assemble, to express ideas freely 
and the right to be heard, holding accountability of politicians, rotation of 
party power on competitive election basis, policy debates among parties 
etc. For the proponents of neo liberalism, putting first individual rights 
ensures collective rights, but the reverse is not true (Sisay, 2004:83; CUD, 
20005, Ledetu, 2002). 
For EPRDF and overwhelmed ethnic-based political forces, the question 
of democracy is beyond the version of liberal democracy. They associate it 
with collective rights of NNP to self-determination, to self-rule and shared 
rule through both elected representatives and through their direct 
participation, as well as to equitable distribution of national wealth. EPRDF 
and its partners plausibly argue that liberal democracy does not harmonize 
with the principles of collective rights. EPRDF is adherent to ‘revolutionary 
democracy’ ideology, although different definitions have been given to it at 
different periods. Initially (at end of the 1980s), it was associated with the 
Leninist concept of National Democratic Revolution or the Maoist New 
Democratic Revolution. It was conceived as an ideological instrument of 
transforming a pre-capitalist society to socialism by bypassing the 
conventional capitalist mode of production but developing a guided (state) 
capitalist system for a short duration of time with the intention to fulfil the 
material conditions that lead to socialism. It meant ensuring unrestricted all 
democratic political rights to all oppressed classes but discriminate the 
bourgeois and feudal classes. It presupposes proletarian/working party 
leadership (see various issues of Revolutionary Democracy Organ in 1989 
and 1990; Daniel, 2003:261-262; ERPDF, 2002). After the 1991, 
revolutionary democracy was redefined referring to ensuring accelerated 
and radical political, economic and social transformations that would 
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benefit all citizens, promoting active participation of nationals in the 
decision making process; and building new democratic institutions by 
dismantling the old one (see EPRDF, 2002; MoI, 1994 E.C). 
Opposition political elites accuse EPRDF for not upholding the 
Constitution (Merara, quoted in Aalen 2002). Leencho (1999; 66:7) also 
argues “....[The]formal process of democratization in Ethiopia, as it was 
conceived in 1991 and carried out in the following years was thus a failure”, 
while Paulos (2006:1) concludes that democracy is not EPRDF’s agenda, 
“except for employing the term as a palliative for the West’s aid package 
...”. Furthermore, Merara (2003) agrues that what EPRDF utters is a pseudo 
democracy not a genuine one. 
The Federal Constitution does not see collective rights and individual 
rights in isolation and they do not contradict each other. As mentioned 
above, the right to establish self-government within a particular territory 
they inhabit, and guaranteeing the right of NNP to have proportional 
representation in various government units are basic principles of the 
Federal Constitution. In line with these principles, the States of Amhara, 
Tigrai, and Afar have ensured the rights of minority ethnic groups by 
establishing self-government at Zonal, at Wereda and Tabia/Kebele and at 
Special Wereda level respectively. The Revised State Constitution of 
Gambela (Art.46 (3)) also recognizes the rights of ‘non-indigenous’ peoples 
who are territorially inhabited to self–government at Kebele level, and to 
have direct representations at Zonal and State government levels. Likewise, 
the Revised Constitution of Benshangule-Gumuz affirms, “Representation of 
other People [non-indigenous] who reside in the Region shall be treated on 
specific case” (The Revised Benshangul-Gumuz Constitution, Art.48, 
1995E.C). The Afar state also grants Special Wereda status to Argoba People 
to exercise their self-rule and shared rule rights. 
Paradoxically, the Constitutions of Oromia, the SNNP, and Somali are 
silent about the collective rights of the ‘non-indigenous’ or minority ethnic 
groups who reside in defined geographical territories for generations 
collectively. They have not guaranteed the right to self-government of the 
minority in any level of government. 
The States/Zones put indigenous language proficiency criterion as a 
requirement to run for Wereda /Zone/ State Council. The language 
proficiency requirement is justified to promote cultural autonomy and to 
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protect the minority ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups not to be overwhelmed by 
mass settlers or ‘non-indigenous’ communities. The denial of rights to the 
non-indigenous minority ethnic groups, however, has generated 
unintended majority tyranny over the minorities as well as, in some cases, 
minority tyranny over majorities. The minority ethnic groups of Geode, 
Somali, and Berta, to mention some, who are demarcated within the 
Oromia state have fallen under the Oromo majority tyranny as they are 
denied their self-rule and shared rule rights. Likewise, minority Oromos in 
the SNNP and Somali are denied their rights to self-government and do not 
have representation at any level of government. It is absurd to exclude the 
Gedeo and Berta communities in Oromia, or the Oromo who reside in the 
continuum between the Sidama Zone and Gedeo Zones by labelling 
‘indigenous’ versus ‘non-indigenous’ communities. Many of the minority 
ethnic groups who reside in the dominant ethnic group State have been 
there in a defined territory for generations. They are incorporated into the 
dominant ethnic group States not on their will but dictated by the 50+1 
formula74.Collective rights are legitimated by a democratic process, which 
in principle runs on the basis of majority decision. Minority rights will 
remain suppressed, unless the ethnic groups who collectively reside in 
defined geographical areas are allowed to institutionalize in special wereda 
or special Kebele level of government, depending on their population size. 
Taking the political reality of Ethiopia, both collective and individual 
rights are inseparable, and one cannot stand exclusively. Thus, the question 
is not a choice for individual rights by favouring for collective rights at the 
cost of individual rights. It is equally true that individual rights need not 
discard collective rights. Ignoring either would not democratize Ethiopia. 
Nor, it serves as a tool for holding together the constituent States of the 
federation. 
                                                 
74  In the process of creating the killils in 1992, weredas were incorporated to a certain kilil 
on the simple majority (50+1) rule based on the result of of 1984 Wereda population 
Census. That is, if the 1984 population census result showed that Wereda-X comprised 
three ethnic groups, say, A, B and C with 51 percent, 35 percent and 14 percent 
respectively, then the entire wereda was incorporated with a state that belongs to 
ethnic group A. That is, based on the simple majority rule, ethnic groups B and C of the 
Wereda X has been structured within a Killil (Region) that belongs to ethnic group A, 
even if there is a neighboring killil which belongs to the ethnic group of B or C. 
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Party pluralism is ensured in the Federal Constitution (Federal 
Constitution, Art.56). In the contemporary political thinking, fair and free 
elections, dialogue and consultation between ruling party and oppositions, 
existence of strong opposition party, critical media and independent civic 
societies are taken as core manifestations of democracy. These values have 
not yet get rooted as ought to be, even though it is understandable that 
democracy is a process. 
For internal and external factors, strong opposition parties have not yet 
come out to the forefront. Large numbers of the relatively influential 
opposition political forces tend to be rejectionist and promote hatred 
politics. At the same time the ruling party has exhibited exclusiveness 
tendency. Dialogue and consultation on national issues between the 
dominant ruling party and the opposition groups are not common practices, 
but an exception. Such a political culture is a stumbling block to build a 
consensus-based governance system. A democratic federal system can be 
installed on durable foundation if a political culture for negotiation in ‘give-
and-take’ political game between the ruling party and the opposition 
groups in general and with those which opts peaceful power competition in 
particular is in place. The ruling party is expected to take the initiative for 
political bargaining and dialogue with the opposition groups. Moreover, the 
political commitment of EPRDF to see a prosperous, united and democratic 
Ethiopia has to be evaluated against creating enabling conditions for 
coming out strong opposition party (ies) adherent to the federal 
arrangement as well as building a national consensus among the political 
forces on national agendas. 
 
3.3.2 Economic Arguments 
 
Economic disparity across the States 
 
Abu (2003), and Alemante (2003) contest that the Ethiopian 
multicultural federal arrangement hinders national economic development 
and polarizing economic disparity among the states.  For instance, Abu 
(Abu, 2003:14) notes the federal arrangement hiders not to meet “…a full 
realization of the economic and political potentials of the country” and it 
embodies high economic development risks. Although there is no study 
72 
 
about the impact of the federal arrangements on economic performance of 
the country, the economic performance records of 1992-2012 do not 
support the critics. Rather, the experience is quite the opposite. During 
1992-2012, Ethiopia registered, on average, a 7 percent GDP growth per 
annum and an average of 11.5 percent annual GDP growth from 2004 to 
2011, which has made the country one of the fastest growing non-oil 
economies (MoFED, 2012), as compared to 4 percent and 2 percent 
economic growth during the imperial era (1940-1974) and the Dergue 
regime (1974-1991) respectively (EEA, 2005).75 
In terms of access to public services, the current regime inherited the 
lowest level of public goods and services delivery by the standards of the 
SSA countries. For example, primary education and secondary education 
gross enrolment rates were 19 percent and 9 percent respectively in 1991 
against the 94.5 percent for primary and  
45 percent gross enrolment for secondary school education in 2012 (MoE, 
2012). Access to Primary health care was about 19 percent in 1991 and 
clean water supply for about 10 percent in early 1990s as compared to 90 
percent and 61.5 percent respectively in 2010 (MoH, 2010 and MoWRD, 
2010). There are remarkable achievements in improving access to rural 
road, and power too. Convergence trend in the distribution of public 
services is visible not only across the States, but also among urban and rural 
areas (Ghebrehiwet, 2010). New industrial zones, business and tourism 
centres have also flourished outside the traditional Addis Ababa-Adama, 
and Dire Dawa-Harar manufacturing and business corridors. 
Assefa (2012:115) recognizes the the overall social and economic 
developments but notes “ Development in Ethiopia over the last two 
decades indicate that the positive gains of ethnic-based divisive hegemony 
are outweighted by their negative impacts” Alemante (2003:81) plausibly 
argues that the federal arrangement has created skewed distribution of 
economic base (labour, infrastructural development and natural resources) 
among the States. The critics implies a wide economic disparity among the 
States would create only a few wealthy states but also develops a sense of 
economic chauvinism and an attitude of “We are subsidizing the ‘poor 
                                                 
75 Examining the link between the fiscal federalism and economic growth is not the 
focus of this study. 
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states’” among ethnic entrepreneurs of the wealthy state(s). This would 
eventually breed secessionist tendency to fully control over economic 
resources (Alemante, 2003:89). 
As far as economic capacity of the states is concerned, the multiethnic 
federal arrangements have created three categories of States. Category A 
includes the relatively advanced States of Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia, and 
SNNP. Category B encompasses the development lagging States or 
Emerging States of Afar, Somali, Benshangul-Gumuz, and Gambela. 
Category C refers to the small City State of Harari, the City Government of 
Addis Ababa and the Dire Dawa Administrative Council. There are visible 
disparities in population and geographical sizes as well as in economic base 
among the States (see Table 3.3 below). The States of Category A comprise 
86 percent of the total population and 65 percent of the total territorial 
area of the country. The asymmetries are glaring when State-by State 
comparisons are made. For instance, Oromia comprises 37 percent and 31 
percent of the total population size and geographic area respectively. In 
contrast, Harari’s share is 0.03 percent in population and in total area size. 
Economic bases of the States also significantly vary. Among the nine states, 
five of them have population size ranging from 183,000 (Harari) to 1.4 
million (Afar) (CSA, Population Census, 2007). 
Taking gross value added production and investment as indicators of 
economic base, Oromia stands next to Addis Ababa City Government. It 
hosts about 27 percent of the country’s total number of the manufacturing 
firms (Oromia, 2010).By 2009/2010 fiscal year, Oromia attracted about 22 
percent of the total national domestic and foreign investments (MoFED, 
2009/10b). Its geographical position, natural resource potential, skewed 
public investments76 are believed to contribute to such a relatively better 
economic base. 
                                                 
76 Since the 1950s, central government’s public investment on mining, agricultural 
development, physical infrastructures, military training centers, state farms, higher 
education colleges etc have been concentrated in Oromia, although the Oromos were 
not direct benefitiaries of the projects in the previous regimes. The Federal Government 
perpetuates similar public investment policy. It allocates huge capital investments on 
sugar plantations, engineeringand chemical plants, large scale irrigation schemes, 
express highways and road transport networks, industrial zones, inland ports, etc in 
oromia. 
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The City Government of Addis Ababa and the relatively advanced States 
have better revenue potential than the relatively development lagging 
States. Institutional and managerial capacities to design and 
implementation of plans among the States vary also widely. The Category A 
and Category C states have relatively developed institutions, with better 
trained manpower and infrastructure, while States of Category B suffer 
from weak institutional and managerial capacities partly because they were 
historically marginalized and have started from scratch and partly because 
their social formations are dominated by traditional life style. The small 
states are more vulnerable to spill over effects and reap less from 
economies of scale than the relatively big states. 
Although, economic disparity among the States is a reality, there is a 
stereo typed perception among the public and politicians about the 
economic resource potential of the States in general and the Emerging 
States (Category B) in particular. Preliminary natural resource inventories of 
the Category B States do not demonstrate their poorness in natural 
resources. They have vast arable lands, accompanied by international rivers 
crossing them, potential for mechanized agriculture development.  
Benshangul-Gumuz has huge bamboo, gum and incense resources. In terms 
of mineral resource, the state is endowed with gold and marble deposits. 
The Afar State, the home of Lucy, has huge tourist attraction potential. It is 
also known for its salt and potash minerals. Recent geological surveys 
indicate great mineral potentials in Somali, Gambela, and Afar (Solomon, 
2009: 256-280). The geographical proximity of Afar and Somali to the Red 
Sea coast gives them a comparative advantage to become future business 
and industrial Zone areas. Likewise, Gambela and Benshangul-Gumuz have 
potential to be gate ways not only to the South Sudan, the youngest African 
state and emerging oil producing economy, but also connecting Ethiopia 
with the central and western parts of Africa in the future. Therefore, if the 
backlog infrastructural developments are addressed, the States have 
potential to attract both domestic investments and foreign direct 
investment. 
A federal system has potential to exacerbate horizontal economic 
asymmetry because it leaves member states with different degrees of fiscal 
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capacity. All federations encompass rich and poor States, small and big 
jurisdictions, and large and small populations77.  
With regard to the relation between economic chauvinism78 and 
secession in a federal system, global experiences are mixed. In many 
federations, economic asymmetry among states is not associated 
necessarily with secessionism; rather the rich states look for a bigger 
market and collective security issues. For instance, in Canada the threat for 
secession neither comes up from Alberta, the richest oil-producing 
province, nor from Ontario province, the second highest in terms of per 
capita GDP with nearly 38 percent of the population and a GDP little more 
than 41 percent of all provinces (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004:1897 and 
1898), but from Quebec mainly associated with history, language and 
cultural reasons. Neither California State, the richest State in the USA, nor 
Zurich Canton, the financial centre in Switzerland has evidenced politics of 
secession. In contrast, the balkanization of the former Yugoslavia was 
mainly instigated by the economically developed regions of Slovenia and 
Croatia which used to subsidize the poor regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro by transferring to the federal fund 
and to the federal budgetary grant. The rich regions felt that they would be 
better-off on their own than keeping on subsidizing the poor regions 79 
(Aleman and Treisman, 2005: 151). 
No doubt, the wide asymmetry in economic base together with elites’ 
perceived “most endowed in natural resource/ economic base” has created 
economic chauvinism in Ethiopia. The claim of Eritrean nationalists, Oromo 
and Somali liberation movements for full independence had been 
associated partly with this perceived economic chauvinism. As far as Eritrea 
is concerned, Eritrea had possessed relatively better infrastructural 
                                                 
77   For instance, the states of California and Wyoming in the USA; the Landers of Northrhin-
Westphalia and Bremen in Germany; Swiss Cantons of Zurich and Appenzell Inner-
Rhodes; and the States of Uttar Pradesh and Sikkim, India, are cases of illustration 
(Boadway, 2007:100; Feld and Von Hagen, 2007:126; Rao, 2007:154; Kirchgassner, 
2007:519 and Fax, 2007:345). 
78 Here, economic hegemonism (chauvinism) is defined as concentration of economic 
bases and natural resources within a single state or in a few states and associated with 
the mentality of ‘we are economically supreme’ among political elites’. 
79 Besides the economic factor, there were also problems of religion between Islam and 
Orthodox christanity, and language identities, for example the Albanian community 
(Albania, Kosovo and the Macedonian part of Greece). 
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development, urbanization growth, and manufacturing base in the 1940s to 
mid-1970s as compared to the remaining Ethiopian provinces partly 
because of   the Italian legacy and partly due to better central government 
budget allocation in line with the appeasement policy of the Emperor. In 
1960s-1990s, Eritrean liberation Fronts pronounced that Eritrean socio-
economic base was by far advanced than the ’colonizer’s economy 
[Ethiopia]80 and imagined an ‘independent economically viable Eritrea’. 
Eritrean intellectuals also echoed that an independent Eritrea would be 
economically viable (Araia, 1981). Berhe, (1993:42-43) claims Eritrea has 
“sizable skilled manpower” that will make it a production hub, distribution 
hub, corporate HQ and technical service hub in the Region81. In addition to 
                                                 
80  Italian colony made immense investments on infrastructure (railway, sea port, road,   
buildings, rope way, etc,) on small and medium scale mechanized agriculture, on 
establishments of small and medium manufucturings as well as on urban 
development (Tsegai, 1981). True, all these had laid down necessary conditions for 
emergence of a capitalist mode of production in Eritrea, which hardly existed in the 
remaining Ethiopian provinces. It is worthnoting that the ‘Eritrean modernization’ has 
not brought about visible social changes or structural transformation. The Eritrean 
economy still relies on subsistence agriculture. 
81. Eritrean nationalists used colonial experience and exposure to Italian technology “as the 
basis of imaging a modernity, ‘developed Eritrea’” (Abbay, 2001:479) and “Eritrean 
identity distinct from that of their kin to the south of the Mareb” (Abbay, 2001: 490). 
In terms of economic progress, the 1960s-to mid 1974 years were a golden period as 
Eritrea was investment preference area for Italians investors, Yemeni and Indian traders. 
The Emperor’s appeasement policy towards Eritrea as compensation to the unilateral 
dissolution of the Federal Act, also contributed to channel relatively higher public budget 
in the province. The arguments of economic viability of an independent Eritrea has 
remained controversial. At least, the experiences of the past two decades do not support 
the economic viability argument or a ‘Singapor Eritrea’. It is worth noting that one of the 
justifications for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia was that the Eritrean economy 
cannot survive alone (see UN Resolution 390 A (V)), and Abay (2001). Unlike the 
1960s- 1990s Eritrean nationalists, the political elites of the 1940s and 1950s were 
sceptical about the economic viability of Eritrea. For instance, Walde-Gabriel Dabassai 
(1947) expressed his grave concern on the revenue capacity of Eritrea saying that, “The 
idea [of independence] looks good. But, if [Eritrea] becomes independent, how will it be 
administered . . . Does it have revenue deposits or is there any one out there to lend it 
money to manage its hospitals, courts, schools, agriculture and industries ... Yes, it is 
good to yearn for [our] own government, but [we] have to have confidence in our 
revenues and the wealth of [our] country. I think, our land is the poorest, the most 
barren [in the world] ... and [it] can not support itself”.  (Walde-Gabriel Dabassai,1947).   
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the political factors (dissolution of the federation), these imaginations 
seemed to seal the eyes of Eritrean nationalists not to see for a genuine 
autonomy, or federation or confederation arrangement under a united 
democratic Ethiopia. Eritrean elites and the fronts perceived Eritrea will be 
better-off alone and staying with Ethiopia would slow the progress of 
Eritrea (Sewed, 1998). They think only Ethiopia needs Eritrea for its port 
services, although the post- independence period does not attest an 
economically advanced Eritrea and a backward Ethiopia82.  
There is also a widely spread imagination among ardent Oromo 
nationalists that “Ethiopia mainly depends on Oromo economic and labor 
resources” (Asefa, 1997: ix) and pronounces “Oromia’s resources are 
siphoned by the Federal Government” (Assefa, 1997: 16). Marera, 
(2003:175) also claims that Oromia generates coffee which contributes 60 
percent of the country’s hard courrency but “receives disproportionately 
[federal subsidy] the least from the national treasury,” With regard to the 
Ethiopian Somali nationalists,  the oil and natural gas resources potential in 
the Ogaden have allured the secessionist groups to claim for full 
independence.83 
Economic chauvinist (hegemonic) mentality is a serious potential threat 
to the national unity of Ethiopia. The OLF and Ethiopian Somali secessionist 
groups are not receptive to unity under a democratic Ethiopia on free will of 
peoples rather they are inspired by Eritrean nationalist. For instance, Asefa 
(1993:181) notes,” The EPLF demands for a referendum to determine 
Eritrean political destiny was recognized while that of Oromo suppressed.” 
But this is by no means to diffuse the arguments of Berhanu, (2008), UEDP-
MEDHIN, (2009: Agenda 12) and Lidetu, (2002: 306) that propose for 
replacing the multiethnic federal arrangement by a territorial-federalism to 
                                                 82 The reality is that Ethiopia and Eritrea need each other for the prosperity of their citizens, 
economic development and regional security issues. Eritrea needs large marker to sale 
for her products at lowest transport cost nearby. It also needs Ethiopia to supply her 
hydroelectric power and raw materials for its manufacturing sector, as well as 
consumable agricultural products. Equally, Ethiopia needs Eritrea for its short distance 
port services, market and to have a dependable regional security partnership.  
 83  The marginalized policy of the past regimes, the ‘Greater Somalia’ project of 
the Somalia Republic (until 1991) had also contributed to develop 
secessionist mentality. 
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curb the threat. The danger of economic hegemony could be neutralized by 
pursuing an effective and balanced regional economic development policy, 
designing fiscal equalization and by integrating the States’ economy with 
each other. Promoting horizontal co operation among the states and 
building solidarity spirit among the peoples and the states would also serve 
as effective instruments.  
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Table 3.3.Some Indicators of Asymmetries among States in Ethiopia 
Indicators Tigrai Afar Amhara Oromia Somali SNNP B-G Gambela Harari AA DD 
Population size, ‘000 2007 
census a 
4,314 
(5.8%) 
1,41 
(2%) 
17,214 
(23%) 
27,158 
(37%) 
4,439 
(6%) 
15,043 
(20%) 
671. 
(1%) 
307 
(0.4%) 
183 
(0.3%) 
2,738 
(4%) 
343 
(0.5%) 
Area size 
In Km2   b 
50,078 
(4.4%) 
96,707 
(8.5%) 
156,960 
(13.8%) 
353,632 
(31%) 
279,252 
(24.6% ) 
112,343 
(9.9%) 
50,248 
(4.4%) 
25,802 
(2.3%) 
374 
(0.03%) 
530 
(0.05%) 
11,733 
(1%) 
Real state GDP per capita 
at constant price, in Birr 
834c1 
(1998/9) 
6,149c2 
(2011) 
689c3 
(1998/9) 
1323c4 
(2008/9) 
NA NA NA NA NA 3,479c5 
(1994/5) 
 
 
Financing recurrent 
expenditure from own 
revenue in %2007/8  d 
32.3 13.7 16.4 18.8 13.6 17.6 24.9 10.4 32 NA 41.2 
Private capital investment 
in million Birr, approved 
projects 2008/09 e 
10,919 4,880 12,208 63,598 56 4,510 644 704 NA 120,543 8,079 
Source: a National population Census 2007 Report, Central Statistical Agency, Addis Ababa,  
b=CSA Oromia National Regional State, Regional Economic Accounts Statistics 1882-2002 EFY Estimates, Part IV, Bureau of Finance and 
Economic Development, 2011  
C1Tigrai National Regional state (1999) Estimates of Regional income Accounts for Tigrai Region (1994/5-1997/98, Final Report, BoPED 
C2Afar National Regional state, 2013, BoFED Regional Domestic Product Estimation, 2004EFY 
C3 Amhara National Regional state, (2001) Estimation of Regional Gross Domestic Product of ANRS ((1993/4-1998/99), Bureau of Planning and Economic Development,  
C4 the National Regional States of Oromia, Regional Economic Accounts Statistics Part-III www.bofed.oromia.org, visited on March 2009 
C5 Addis Ababa City Administration, A GDP study of Addis Ababa, Estimation for 1986 &1987 EFY Economic Account Team, 1998 
D FDRE, MoFED data baseE FDRE, MoFED2008/9 Annual Report on Macroeconomic Development 
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Mobility of People and Capital 
 
Alemante (2003:89), Sissay (2004:82) and Daniel, (2002) are of the 
opinion that the federal arrangement impedes inter-regional competition 
and limits the ability of the national government to create a common 
economic sphere. The criticisms presuppose that the multiethnic federal 
arrangement is a stumbling block for free mobility of labour, capital and 
trade across the states. The next sub sections investigate if the federal 
arrangement has hindered inter-state mobility of productive resources 
(labour and capital) by examining the push and pull factors of migration 
under different regimes. 
 
Mobility of People 
 
According to Todaro’s (1994 :265) theory of migration, people leave 
their areas of residence to a jurisdiction where they think their expected 
income from migration is better than the current earnings. Boadway 
(2005:30) also notes that in a federal system, difference in net fiscal 
benefit (NFB)84 causes mobility of productive resources, because 
federalism leaves sub national governments with different degrees of 
fiscal capacity to raise revenues and variations in cost of public services 
delivery. In other words, people migrate if they believe the gains of 
public services from migration overweigh their tax burden. These 
theories of mobility are more relevant in a homogeneous society and/or 
in advanced countries than heterogeneous societies and in developing 
countries. As labour mobility is more influenced by social factors, in 
societies where diversity in ethnicity, culture, language, religion are 
visible like in Ethiopia, fiscally induced inter-regional migration is 
expected to be low. 
There is a wide spread perception among the public and intellectuals 
that the multiethnic federal arrangement has impeded mobility of people 
and capital across the States. To evaluate the relevance of this criticism, 
one needs to examine the pull and push factors, and compare the trends 
                                                 
84 Net fiscal benefit (NFB) is defined as difference between citizens’ tax burden and the 
public services they receive in return. 
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of inter-state mobility under the previous regimes to the current federal 
arrangements. According to the 1984 Population Census report, during 
the Imperial regime (1974), inter-regional labour mobility constituted 
only 9.7 percent (2,716, 243) of the total population, of which 3.3 
percent was inter-provincial migrants (CSA, 1991:276). During the Dergue 
period (1974-1984), mobility of people comprised 16.4 percent of total 
population, of which only 5.1 percent was inter-provincial migration 
(CSA, 1991:246), showing a higher level of labour mobility than the 
previous regime. There is no precise data on inter-state migration for 
post-1991 period85. However, 16.6 percent over-all migration rate was 
registered at the country level, (CSA, 2007:355); almost the same rate 
with that of the 1984 Population Census Report, although the current 
mobility rate presumably is dominated by intra-state migration. 
During the imperial period, the major pull factors for the very low 
level of labour migration included low developmental level of modern 
economic sectors (industrialization and mechanized agriculture) and 
urbanization,86 low level of educational attainment at national level 
(literacy rate was less than 10 percent) and the high migration cost 
associated with social affection to local area, to mention few. Frequent 
local and provincial level droughts (1957, 1973-74), and the land tenure 
system were among the push factors for migration. 
The relatively higher labour mobility rate during the Dergue regime 
was mainly contributed by (i) the large size of armed force deployment 
from different parts of the country to the turmoil areas of north and east 
provinces, civil service job transfers into the various state farms(mainly 
south, south west), and mass displacements due to the civil war between 
the central government and guerrilla fighters in Eritrea and Tigrai, and (ii) 
the forced resettlement program of the 1984/5 that dislocated about 
600,000 people from the drought-prone provinces of Tigrai and Wollo, as 
well as the densely populated areas of Kembata and Hadiya, Shewa 
                                                 
85 The 1984, 1994 and 2007 population censuses inquire informants where they have 
been living before 10 years. Nevertheless, the Central Statistics has not released 
theinter state movements of people to the public. 
86   In 1974, out of the estimated total 27,800.8 million, the urban population constituted 
only 10.9% (CSA,1975, Statistical Abstract). 
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provinces. Migration to urban centres seeking for higher education and 
jobs were also among the push factors. 
The requirement to have a pass permit from respective kebele 
Administration to move from residential area to other places the chronic 
shortage of housing in the urban areas and the land policy that had 
granted the ‘gebar’ (tenant) were pull factors. (Mberu, 2006:513) argued 
that the right to use land had served as a pull factor to keep people in 
their local areas too. Moreover, social cost is expected to be a more 
pressing factor as people are traditionally rooted to their local areas for 
language, culture and social attachment reason. Even before the 
introduction of the multiethnic federalism, data reveal that inter-regional 
migration tended to a province of the same ethnic group (CSA, 
1991:261), where migrants do not feel social shock due to differences in 
language, culture and/or religion87 
The impact of the multiethnic federal arrangement on labour 
mobility has a mixed effect. In line with the Peace and Reconciliation 
Charter of the 1991 and later in the spirit of the Federal Constitution, the 
States have adapted local language proficiency as requirement for civil 
service recruitments and for political appointments. The states of Tigrai, 
Oromia, Harari, and Somali have introduced own local language as office 
language and medium of instruction in schools. Public services are also 
provided in local languages. Even though the SNNP, Benshangule-Gumuz, 
Gambela, and Afar have adopted Amharic as working language, as long 
as indigenous skilled labour supply is available, they give employment 
opportunity priority in the civil service to the ‘son-of-the-soil’. The states 
recruit ‘non-indigenous’ when they do not find indigenous skilled 
manpower in the labour market. All these have contributed to the 
existing low level of inter-states labour mobility. 
But, this is by no mean to say there is no inter-state labour mobility 
at all. Addis Ababa has continued to be a destination city for 
professionals, businessmen and labourers as it has better job and 
                                                 
87 For example, Tigrians used to make Eritrea their first choice of migration for seeking 
jobs, not only for proximity reason but also they share same language and culture. 
Similarly, Tigrai was also a second destination province, next to Addis, for Eritreans. 
Likewise Gonder province was first destination  for Gojjameis (CSA, 1991:261),who 
belong to the same ethnic group. 
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business opportunities and ethnic identity is not an official requirement 
for getting a government employment. Urban settlements in Afar, 
Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumuz are dominated by migrants from 
Amhara, Tigrai, Oromo, Guragie, kembata, and Hadia (CSA, 2007 census). 
Professional occupations (like teaching, health, engineering, accounting, 
etc) and office clerk positions also are carried out by migrants.88More 
over the urban centres in the Emerging States are overwhelmed by 
migrants, called as highlanders or Habesha. For instance, in Afar, among 
the total urban dwellers of 185,135, the Afar constitute only 5 percent 
the Amhara dominant followed by Tigrians, Oromo, Welayta and Hadiya 
in descending order (CSA, 2007 Census).Moreover, the federal mega 
projects such as sugar development, constructions of power plants, 
irrigation dams, road and rail way constructions, etc have also created 
temporary large inter-state labour movements from north to south89. 
Apart from military deployment, there is hardly movement of labour 
from south to north. 
The EPRDF land tenure policy has made the rural population to stick 
around his/her farm lands. Because maintaining land use right or 
transferring the land use right in the form of inheritance or donation 
from parents or close relatives require permanent residence in a rural 
kebele where the farm land is located. A land use right holder who left 
his/her residence kebele for longer than a year loses his/her use right of 
agricultural land (Getnet and Mehrab, 2010). 
Positive interventions of the Federal and States Governments in 
enhancing access to public service at local level are also believed to 
contribute to the existing low inter-state mobility. That is, unlike the 
past, migration to neighbouring state(s) for seeking education 
opportunity is no longer a cause for inter-state mobility. Currently there 
are public universities and many state and private colleges in each states. 
The states receive federal transfers to provide minimum national 
standard public services. The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), 
                                                 
88 The dominance of migrants in the civil service in the Emerging states does notseem 
last long. For instance, the introduction of Afar language as an official language of the 
state and using as a medium of instruction in primary schools systematically aside the 
migrants from the civil service sector. 
89  For instance, the Grand Rennaisense Dam has created about 85,000 job 
opportunities; almost all employees are migrants from other state. 
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which contributes in reducing household vulnerability and food insecurity 
in the rural areas, has also served as pulling factor to the needy people to 
stay around home area. 
The Federal Constitution guarantees the liberty of Ethiopians to 
choose their residence (Federal Constitution, Art.32 (1). In practice, 
however, this is not fully respected. Neither spontaneous inter-state rural 
migration nor inter-state resettlement is welcomed by the states. 
States/Zonal politicians are reluctant to accommodate inter-state 
migrants in rural areas for fear of competition over resources and not to 
control their political power in the future90. On the one hand, local 
language proficiency is a requirement to running for state/and wereda 
Council. The politics of discouraging spontaneous inter-state mass 
migration and/or inter-state resettlement is strongly associated with the 
fear of indigenous minority ethnic groups not to be demographically 
overwhelmed by the “non-indigenous” migrants. From this perspective, 
the fear of the indigenous minority has rationality91. 
In other words, there is link between language policy and mobility of 
productive forces. The state’s language policy to use in offices and 
schools has pulled out non-natives and hinders labour and capital 
mobility. There are political and economic rationales to promote inter-
                                                 
90 From my field trip, I observed that many of the migrants (often called highlanders or 
Habesha) in Afar, Gambela, Benshangul-Gumz, and SNNP do not feel secure. There is 
a sentiment among the indigeneous peoples that the highlanders exploit their 
resources. There are many instances where the properties of migrants have been 
confiscated with out any compensation. Gurafarda Weredais a point of illustration. 
Amhara origins, who migrated from Wello, Gojjam North Shewa, (Amhara State), had 
engaged in agricultural activities at Gurafarda Wereda, Bench Majji Zone, SNNP,were 
forced to leave the area by the order of the State and local officials.The President 
Office on an official letter datedSene 30, 2001 (July 7, 2008) dispatched to the Bench 
Majji Zone Administration, ordered to secure residency right for the migrants who 
have settled in the area before Nehassie 30, 1999 (September 06, 2006) and to be 
granted two hectares of land for agricultural activities as a means of their livelihood 
and 1000m2 for housing and side farm activities. But those who settled at the Wereda 
after Nehassie 30, 1999 were considered as ‘illegal settlers’. As an effect to this 
decision  they were ordered to leave the area. The displaced people accused the 
officialsfor forcing them to leave the area without any compensation for their 
immobile properties (built in and perennial trees on the land) (The Reporter,2004EC). 
There are similar cases in Benshangul-Gumz and Afar. 
91    Currently, in Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumz, the migrants are already more than 
the indigeneous people. 
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state mobility: Labour movement from the densely populated States to 
the scatter settlement states not opens employment opportunity. It is 
also critical to the hosting states in enhancing entrepreneurship skills, 
promoting local economic development and technological transfer. At 
national level, it promotes social integration and tolerance as well as 
minimizes separation sentiments of political entrepreneurs. These 
arguments need caution, however. The southward mass migration must 
not threaten the political, economic and cultural autonomy of the 
indigenous minority ethnic groups. 
Balancing these contending interests of liberties of Ethiopians to 
choose their residence (Federal Constitution, Art.32 (1) and reaping the 
benefits of labour mobility on the one hand and protecting the right of 
self-rule as well as self determination of the indigenous minority ethnic 
groups are real challenges of the multiethnic federal arrangement. 
From the above discussion, one might infer that the federal 
arrangement has contributed to the existing low inter-state labour 
movement, but it is not the only factor. In addition to the language policy 
and preferential privileges to the ‘son-of the-soil’ in the public services 
other factors such as land tenure policy, welfare policy and social factors 
are strong pulling factors that has kept citizens in their local areas. 
 
Mobility of Capital  
 
Investors consider many variables before they make choice of 
location for investment. Market size, transportation facilities and cost, 
supply of inputs including managerial competence, tax policy and rule of 
law are among the criteria for choosing investment location. Prior to 
1974, capital and trade movements were concentrated in Addis Ababa, 
East Shewa, Eritrea and Hararge provinces for their relatively better 
infrastructural development and urbanization levels.92The 1965-1974 
period has witnessed relatively better capital mobility outside the urban 
centres mainly because of the establishments of new agricultural 
developments such as cotton plantations along Awash valley, sesame in 
Humera (west Tigray), coffee plantations in Jima, Illubabour, Sidama, 
                                                 
92 Bahir-Dar, Gonder, Jimma, Dessie, Combolicha had one or two establishments each. 
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Harer, etc., During the Dergue regime, private capital mobility was 
almost none owing to the then socialist economic and trade policies.93 
When EPRDF assumed power in 1991, as a component of its 
economic and trade reforms, it has lifted up capital ceilings and 
restrictions of business registration. EPRDF also encourages a 
decentralized industrialization policy and free movement of capital 
across the states. In practice, however, private investment flow is 
‘mother-state’ oriented. For example, large amount of domestic 
investments in the States of Amhara, Tigrai have been made mainly by 
the “son-of-the-soil” investors. Though, investments by non indigenous 
and FDI are visible in SNNP and Oromia, considerable investments derive 
from the son-of–the-soil94. Investors often opt to invest in their mother-
state partly because of nationalism element and partly there is wide 
spread perception among non-indigenous investors that state 
bureaucrats practice open and systematic favouritism to the son-of-soil 
investors (Daniel, 2003 EC: 211). 
The situation in Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz Gambela and Somali is 
quite different. With the exception of a few FDI and domestic 
investment, private investments are characterized by small and medium 
business activities. The Emerging States have not yet built–up the ‘son-
of–the soil’ investors. The clan-based social structure with pastoral or 
semi-pastoral economic base and past marginalized development policies 
are major factor. It should be emphasized that Somali and Afar have 
attracted least large scale private investment. Security problem is a 
prime reason for Somali state. Afar has failed to attract the hearts and 
minds of long-term private investment, because non-indigenous 
investors do not feel secure to make big investment as rule of law is less 
respected and ethnic favouritism is more open. For instance, in mid 
1990s and early 2000s, significant investment had been made along the 
Awash Valley, however, the failure of the State to respect rule of law in 
relation to land use right and the requirement of clan leaders to have 
                                                 
93  Maximum private capital Investment was restricted to Birr 500,000 equivalent to 
(USD 241,545) only. Issuance of business licenses was highly centralized and it was 
on quota basis. The Central Government was not only the sole investor but also 
wholesale trader as well as major retailer. 
94  Both proximity to the centre and availability of better infrastructural development 
factors have granted Oromia a comparative advantage for investment. 
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free equity right in the investment and the meddling in the decision 
making have caused many investors to leave the State.95 
The establishments of big Sh.Cos and PLCs tend to take ethnic lines. 
The private Banks, private colleges/university Colleges, real estate 
development companies, agro-industry processing plants, and trans-state 
transportation companies, to mention few, are formed mainly along 
ethnic lines. Such a trend is likely to open for ethnic favouritism.96 It likely 
opens a flood gate to ethnic entrepreneurs to defame their market rivals 
owned by other ethnic groups within a state. Consumers would also 
likely tend to favour companies owned by same ethnic group. Moreover, 
private companies established on ethnic-line systematically favour in 
hiring towards own ethnic group. All these likely impede healthy 
competition, free movement of trade and capital across the states in the 
future.  
                                                 
95 My Informants conversation with officials, non-indigenous residents and civil 
servants in Afar and Somali states revealed that rural landsand sub-urban lands are 
completely controlled by clan leaders. Investors who want land for investment have 
to first deal with a local clan leaders on the land size, land lease payment and terms 
of payment. Rates vary  from one area to another depending on location, proximity 
to water resource, infrastructural development, negotiation skill of the clan leader 
and investor as well as personal relation between a clan leader and the investor. The 
role of the States or LGs is to legalize the result of the negotiation, issuing license, 
approve working plans, and collection of taxes. Clan leaders are governed by 
community practices and hardly respect Federal and State laws. Relations between 
clan leaders and investors are too personalized and often lead to misunderstandings 
and irregularities. When disputes arise between a clan leader and investors, a clan 
leader may order its fellowmen to destroy the harvest by letting their livestock into 
the fields. Al –Mesh Company was a typical example. 
96  Businesse establishment along ethnic line envolves risk as It likely hinders business 
competition. Ethnic entrepreneurs can easily spread animosity against those 
establishments owned by non-son-of-the-soil’ investors, who  they thing compete 
market in their State. politicians may also use for their election campain. The 
blackmailing against theEndowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigrai (EFFORT), 
strongly associated with TPLF, could be a practical example. In the 2005 National 
election, some opposition parties had made EFFORT as election campaign 
mobilization instrument. Rumors were widely spread out that the products of 
Mesobo cement and Addis Pharmaceutics, subsidiaries of EFFORT, were 
substandard.Such rumors had made EFFORT difficult to enter into the national 
market. Aftermath of the 2005 national election, CUD, an opposition coalition, 
officially called its supporters to boycott consuming the products of EFFORT and 
MEDROC-Ethiopia (see Menelik, Ethiopis, Hadar, etc News papers). As long as 
establishments of big Sh.Cos are kept along ethnic line, there is no guarantee that 
such animosity against potential competitor (rival) will not happen in the future. 
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Despite the states have power to set tax rate, the most powerful 
instrument to influence investors’ choice of investment location; they 
apply uniform tax rates. Alternatively, they use land lease fee and 
modality of payment, agricultural income tax and non-monetary 
instruments to influence investment flow to their state. The Addis Ababa 
Surrounding Special Zone of Oromia is a typical example (see more 
discussion in 7.4.2 of this dissertation). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
EPRDF is the architect of the multicultural federalism in Ethiopia. The 
constituent member States of the Federation are created mainly on 
ethnic-lines, although other variables are also considered. The feasibility 
of the Multicultural federal system in Ethiopia is a debatable one. Ethnic-
based political forces are in favour of the federal arrangement, while 
multinational political forces strongly reject the EPRDF Thesis and its 
federal arrangements. Both sides have arguments for and against the 
federal system. For the proponents, ensuring self-rule and shared- rule 
responsibilities as well as guaranteeing the right of self-determination up 
to and including secession are durable foundations to promote unity-in 
diversity. In contrast, the opponents of the system believe that the ethnic 
politics exacerbates ethnic conflicts, violates individual rights, arrests the 
economic progress, and may lead to the disintegration of the country. 
In the context of Ethiopian reality, federalism is a necessary condition 
to remain the country untied. It cannot also be seen in isolation from 
accommodating diversity, promoting democracy, human rights, equality 
and development. Therefore, the feasibility of the Ethiopian federal 
arrangement has to be measured in its capacity to end insurgency for 
secession and maintaining national unity through willingness of the 
people. Ignoring ethnicity or concealing diversity does not guarantee 
national unity at any rate. National unity can be maintained only when 
the root cause of the national question is properly addressed, when self-
rule and shared rule are genuinely exercised, when democracy and 
equality of all ethnic groups are ensured in all spheres, and when 
equitable regional development is realized. 
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The Charter of the Transitional Government and the Federal 
Constitution were designed to address the long standing 
National/Nationality question and to hold the unity of the country. 
Nevertheless, the Federal system has not yet completely prevented 
insurgency. Still, OLF and ONLF factions demand full independence. 
There is a broadly held perception that the multiethnic federal 
arrangement impedes free movements of people, capital and trade. The 
critics have some grain of truth, albeit the federal arrangement is not the 
only determinant factor to the existing low mobility of resources in 
Ethiopia. The local language proficiency requirement for civil service 
employment, favouritism to “the son-of-the soil” in acquiring land for 
business, in awarding bids (Daniel, 2003EC:211), imposing systematically 
discriminatory tax burden to non-indigenous ethnic groups and States’ 
reluctance to inter-state resettlement have arrested mobility of 
productive resources. But it is by no means to say the federal system is 
the only determinant factor. Besides, these factors, government land 
tenure policy, welfare policy and social factors also serve as strong 
magnetic forces for rural people to stay in their local area. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that fiscally induced migration to Addis from all 
corners of the country is quite visible for couple of reasons: 
(I) the Addis Ababa City Government has allocated huge public 
resources on subsidized housing development project to its residents as 
well as on MSE to create job for the unemployed youth and women,  
(II) There are better business and career development opportunities, 
and  
(Iii) The City being a melting pot, ethnic conflicts are hardly visible.  
The problem of migration flow to Addis will persist and will be a 
social burden to the City unless the City makes a quest for a coordinated 
action with the major producers of migrants in the long-run. Promoting 
inter-state mobility of labour and capital is necessary for enhancing local 
socio-economic development, for achieving efficient allocation of 
resources, for building single common economic community and for 
strengthening social cohesion. 
The hypothesis of ‘voting-on-own-feet’ is said to be an effective 
instrument to promote responsiveness of politicians to local demands, 
although it is believed more applicable in advanced economies and 
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homogeneous society. It has less relevance in ethnically diverse societies 
like Ethiopia as people are less mobile, among others, due to language 
and cultural barriers. The creation of the States and Zone/Special Wereda 
Government along ethnic lines has further weakened citizens’ position to 
influence or alter State policies or punish predator State officials by 
applying ‘voting-on-own-feet’ or ‘exit’ strategy as a last resort of 
expressing a reaction against unsatisfactory/unmet public service(s) 
delivery. The local language proficiency requirement for civil service 
employment and delivery of public services in local language are among 
the factors that hinder movements of people from one States to another. 
Breaking up the existing overstretched relatively homogeneous States, 
therefore, mean creating two or more States with same languages and 
cultures. This will give citizens of cousin States an opportunity to migrate 
to another State without facing language and cultural barriers in reaction 
to irresponsive officials to local preferences. Thus, creating smaller states 
from the overstretched one may make the sub national governments 
more accountable to their constituents and responsible to local 
preferences. As competition among firms increase consumers’ welfare, 
creating smaller and manageable states from the overstretched states 
would also enhance healthy competition among the States in providing 
public services in quality and quality. 
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Table 3.4.Summary of non-economic and economic arguments 
National unity 
Generic Arguments Proposals  
 for 
more Unity, 
towards 
centralization 
Ethnic-based 
territorial division is 
bad because it causes: 
 ethnic animosity 
 Secession 
 Collapse of the  
federal system 
 
 De-ethnicization of the states 
and apply broad based criteria 
like geography, language, 
Population size, cultural and 
historical tie of communities, 
economic, political factors,etc, 
 Promote individual democracy 
rather than collective rights  
For ethnic-
based 
territorial 
political 
division 
 Promotes unity-in-
diversity 
 Resolves ethnic 
conflicts 
 Guarantees the right 
to exercise , and 
develop own 
language, and values 
 Protects minority 
rights 
Guarantee the self-
determination  of NNP 
 
Democracy and human rights 
 
Individual rights Collective rights 
 local language proficiency  
discriminates employment 
opportunity  
 Exit: ”join the mother 
state” 
 Knowledge of native language proficiency 
is a MUST requirement to be elected; 
 Exercise self rule and shared rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 
 
Economic Arguments 
 
Variables Content 
Skewed natural 
resources and  
economic base 
distribution  
 Elites of rich regions feel they would be better-
off on their own than keeping on subsidizing the 
poor regions(economic chauvinism) 
 Causes economic hegemony and may instigate 
secession mentality 
Population  ethnic-based boundaries has caused 
population polarized states, 
 no economy of scale in providing public 
services 
Geographical  
size 
 The overstretched states of Oromia, Amhara, 
SNNP and Somali have created administration 
inconvenience, 
Mobility of  
resources 
 In addition to the other pulling and pushing 
factors  for migration, the multiethnic federal 
arrangement  hiders free mobility of labour, 
capital and trade across the states 
Hinders inter- 
region 
competition 
 Causes establishment of enterprises on ethnic 
lines. 
Tax rates , tax base , deductions are uniform  
 
Mobility factors 
 
Pushing factors Pulling factors 
Of persons 
Better Job opportunity Social costs: language, culture, ethnicity 
drought Favouring for son-of-the soil in civil services  
conflicts Land tenure system and PSNP 
landlessness Access to public services (education, social 
assistance) 
Of economic activity 
Availability of vast land 
water resources 
Favouritism and lack of rule-of-law  
 Lack of skilled labour 
 Lack of basic infrastructure (water, roads) 
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  Irrespective of the governmental system of a country (unitary or federal), a public sector has to perform three economic functions: 
management of macroeconomic stability, attaining equitable distribution of income, and ensuring efficient allocation of resources97 (Musgrave 1959; King, 1984; Oates 1972). In a highly centralized system, public functions are initiated, decided and performed by a central government 
or by its agents. Under a decentralized system, however, there is separation of responsibilities on the production, supply and/or delivery of public services among different levels of governments–usually central, state and local. 
There is no universal approach for assignment of responsibilities to different levels of governments across federations. Practices of assignment of responsibilities vary from federation to federation due to variations in economic and non-economic factors. For instance, powers 
of the Swiss cantons are not identical with the powers of the states in the USA and the provinces of Canada or the Autonomous Regions of Spain. Likewise assignment of responsibilities of the states in developing countries like India, Nigeria, and Ethiopia are not identical. Moreover, 
assignment responsibilities may also vary within a country. A county may apply symmetric or asymmetric assignment of responsibilities among states/region. For instance, all Swiss Cantons have the same powers and responsibilities, while Autonomous Regions of Catalonia, Galicia and 
Basque country in Spain used to enjoy higher level of powers than the remaining regions. However, this does not mean that assignment of responsibilities among different countries cannot have common features. There are basic principles that guide the assignment of responsibilities. 
Literatures on fiscal federalism are broadly canonized into the First Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism (FGTFF) and the Second                                                  
97Bailey (1999) adds up regulation as a fourth public sector function. 
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Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism (SGTFF)98. The FGTFF is based on 
the Tiebout’s (1956) ‘vote-by-own-feet’ hypothesis, Olson’s (1969) 
principle of fiscal Equivalence, Musgrave’s (1959) trio of public sector 
functions, and Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem. The theory takes 
only economic variables as determinant factors in assignment of 
responsibilities to different levels of government. In contrast, the SGTFF 
is an innovative and a contemporary school of fiscal federalism that has 
enriched the theories and practices of fiscal federalism by incorporating 
new disciplines such as the Principal-Agent problem, the economics of 
information, organization theory, theory of contracts and political 
choices. 
This chapter comprises two sections. The first section reviews the 
theories of fiscal federalism on assignments of macroeconomic stability, 
income redistribution and allocation of resources among different levels 
of government in a decentralized system. The second section reviews 
Dafflon’s (2006) (de)centralization matrix which serves as a general 
framework of assignment of responsibilities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Tiebout (1956); Olson (1969), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) are the founding 
fathers of modern public finance, known as the First Generation Theory of fiscal 
federalism (FGTFF). Dafflon (2006:275) also calls it a TOM model, by taking the first 
letters from the fathers of the modern theory. It is also known as 
traditional/normative theory. In this study,FGTFF, or TOM model or traditional 
normative theory is interchangeably used. Note that Oates (2005) in his work 
entitled “Towards a Second–Generation Theory of Fiscal federalism”.acknowledges 
the arguments of the contemporary theories of fiscal federalism and the emergence 
of the so-called Second generation theory of fiscal federalism (SGTFF). Wiseman 
(1989; 1990) and Dafflon (1977) were the first to develop a logical construct capable 
of embracing the complexity of objectives endemic to federal countries in the real 
world. The method has been further developed over the last 30 years and has been 
applied to many issues, first at the local, cantonal, and federal levels in Switzerland. 
It has also been experimented in several country cases where Prof. Dafflon has been 
active: for the Council of Europe in the Balkan area particularly in Albania (Dafflon 
2011), for the Swiss Cooperation and Development Agency in several Indian states, 
including Sikkim (Dafflon 2009) and Nepal; and for the World Bank in Senegal, and 
Cameroon (World Bank 2011). The method emphasises toward the practical and 
implementation-related problems of decentralization. 
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4.1 Theories of Fiscal Federalism on Assignments of 
Responsibilities 
 
4.1.1 Macro-economic Stabilization Function 
 
Policy makers apply expansionary or contractionary monetary and 
fiscal policies to achieve sustainable economic growth and stability by 
altering aggregate demand, output, and employment. Monetary policy 
refers to matching the supply of money being circulated in the market 
with growth rate of real national income of a country, designing 
appropriate maximum and minimum limits of interest rates as well as 
bank reserves, prescribing, and evaluating exchange rates, and credit 
policies, whereas fiscal policy implies the use of government’s spending, 
taxing and borrowing policies for achieving macroeconomic stabilization 
and inter-personal equity. 
Monetary policy is effectively done by the centre only. The central 
argument for the exclusive assignment of monetary policy to the centre 
is that maintaining monetary equilibrium between the supply of and 
demand for money requires, above all, monopoly power of a National 
/Central Bank.99A decentralized monetary policy cannot be successful, if 
sub national governments were bestowed with monetary authority, each 
sub national government would have incentive to finance its expenditure 
needs by printing money as much as it needs, which, in turn, leads to a 
hyper inflation and unstable exchange rate in a country. This logic 
automatically constraints sub national governments from using monetary 
instruments for the purpose of macroeconomic management (Oates 
1972:4; and 2005:251; King, 1984:37-38). The FGTFF asserts that to 
maintain macroeconomic stabilization Central Governments have to have 
power over monetary policy and fiscal policy instruments. For instance, 
Oates (1972:4), in his decentralization theorem, demonstrates the 
following three potential weaknesses of a decentralized fiscal policy. 
                                                 99 A central government delegates the dynamics of monetary policy to a 
National/Central Bank. The latter is supposed to be an autonomous body, guided by 
an independent Board and directed by a Governor, answerable to a Parliament. Note 
that in some countries it might be accountable to an executive body, where its 
autonomy to formulate prudent monetary policies is compromised. 
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(I)Local governments are small and highly open economies. When 
an economy exhibits a downturn, an injection of additional finance or 
cutting tax by a local government for the purpose of macroeconomic 
stabilization leads to a financial outflow in two ways. First, injection of 
financial asset through purchasing a large quantity of goods and services 
yields quite small multiplier effect to the local government. It brings 
about positive income and expenditure effects to the local government in 
the short run, but it can raise demand for imported goods and services 
and can end up creating deficit trade balance in the long run. Second, 
since capital is a mobile resource, income generated through economic 
activities in one state/LG leaves out easily to others. Quite a small 
proportion of capital accumulation remains within the local government. 
Thus, the problem of capital flight due to smallness and open economies 
make local governments sub-optimal to perform countercyclical fiscal 
policy (Oates, 1972:4-5)  
In addition, local public fund injections to stimulate local economy 
might flow out of a local jurisdiction due to national regulation or 
regional business treaty for open tender requirement above certain level 
of domestic public investment. Hence, there is no guarantee that a “son-
of–the-soil” enterprise will win an open tender in undertaking a certain 
project initiated to stimulate local economy (Oates, 1972). 
(ii)Free riding behaviour- Local governments are exposed to a high 
degree of spill over effects. When a local government takes unilaterally 
macro stabilization measures (for instance, spending considerable public 
fund to reduce unemployment rate), the benefits of the policy may spill 
over to neighbouring jurisdictions. In such a situation, neighbouring 
jurisdictions will develop a strategic fiscal behaviour to benefit from 
other jurisdiction’s expenditure policies without internalizing the costs. 
Therefore, a state/LG does not have incentive to take part in stabilization 
functions that cause spill over effects to others (Oates, 1972). 
(iii) Deficit financing-States/LGs are supposed to operate on a 
balanced current budget, although capital budgets are not often 
balanced if states/LGs have the right to borrow from financial institutions 
or from higher levels of government. States/LGs might end up with debt 
burden if they become reluctant to raise local taxes for debt repayments. 
Such a situation develops lobbying behaviour among officials to ask the 
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central government to come to their rescue for bailing out their debt 
(Oates, 1972). Furthermore, local borrowing may exacerbate inflationary 
pressures as more money is injected to the local economy. 
For the above mentioned three reasons, Oates (1972:30 and 
2005:351) stresses macroeconomic stabilization function “must rest with 
the central government.” The above arguments would be “correct” in 
“normal” circumstances, but not macroeconomic stabilization policy 
which needs rapid answers in a short time. Dafflon distinguishes 
between the concepts of macroeconomic management and 
macroeconomic stabilization policies. The former has long-term 
objectives (economic growth, creation of new jobs, stable exchange rate 
and price); while the latter aims at curbing the consequences of short 
term economic ups and downs. Distinguishing these issues is important 
since one may have State governments joining macro policy but not able 
to or not in a position to have stabilization policies. 
Prud'homme (1995:205) and Tanzi (1996: 305) argue that a 
decentralized fiscal policy aggravates macroeconomic problem. King 
(1984: 38) notes sub national governments are not in a position to 
increase public spending for raising aggregate output, aggregate demand 
and full employment unless they borrow. Neither they can cut spending 
nor raise taxation when the economy heats to check inflation. According 
to King, if sub national governments attempt to deal with stabilization 
policy by borrowing from domestic institutions, it will cause raise in 
interest rates and may negatively affect investment or crowds out private 
investment. If the public spending is financed from abroad, it will disturb 
the current balance of payment. If it is financed from taxes, it causes to 
raise living costs and destabilizes industrial peace leading to wage 
negotiation by trade unions (King, 1984:295, and 303).He also argues 
increasing state spending for the purpose of stabilization policy attracts 
migrants from other jurisdictions (King, 1984:38). 
The arguments for the exclusive monetary power to the central 
government are not contested. However, Dafflon (1977 and 2006: 277), 
Gramlich (1997:398-401), Shah (1997:10) and Boadway and Shah (2009) 
have questioned the conventional wisdom of an exclusive central 
government responsibility over macroeconomic stabilization policy. True, 
sub national governments do not have monetary policy instruments to 
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monitor macroeconomic management. But, according to the SGTFF, 
provided that sub national governments have sufficient budget resource, 
they can have a role in macroeconomic stabilization efforts through 
manipulating fiscal policy instruments. The shared responsibility calls for 
vertical and horizontal policy co-ordination, although coordinating all 
states and LGs for a common objective is really a challenging task. 
Because all stakeholders might not have equal interest in the outcome of 
the policy coordination or each state/ local government might have other 
specific local agenda(s) that they would like to give priority. 
The Swiss experience is typical evidence. Dafflon (2006:277) notes 
that the budget size of the Confederation is too small at the margin to 
successfully perform stabilization policy alone, because about 82 percent 
of the Confederation’s total budget is allocated to rigid budget categories 
(personnel, interest payment, grant-in-aid, revenue sharing written in the 
constitution). Only 11 percent of the total budget is spent on 
consumption and investment, which is suitable to modify in the short 
term for the purpose of stabilization policy. Looking through the public 
expenditures pattern of the Swiss Cantons, 79 percent of the total 
budget is allocated to rigid budget categories (personnel, debt interest, 
revenue sharing and grant-in-aid). The remaining 21 percent (of which 
consumption and investment constitute 12 percent and 8 percent 
respectively) of the total Cantons’ budget can be manoeuvred for short-
term counter-cyclical measures. In contrast, Swiss Communes spend 33 
percent (21 percent on consumption and 12 percent on investment) of 
their total budget on non rigid budget categories. The relatively higher 
consumption and investment budget size of the Swiss cantons and 
Communes attests their capacity to take part in the macroeconomic 
stabilization in the short term (Dafflon, 2006:277). 
Dafflon (2006:277) further argues that investment expenditures at 
the federal level are in fact investment grants and not direct 
expenditures. At the Cantonal and Commune levels, planning and 
democratic decision procedures for investments, including possible 
referendum delay, make it difficult for short term adjustments. Dafflon 
concludes, 
“The actual distribution of expenditure responsibilities between 
the three layers of government in Switzerland, and the very 
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nature of these outlays, do not mean that any macroeconomic 
policy through fiscal instruments is impossible at least from a 
conceptual point of view. Yet, because of the difficulty of acting 
on personnel expenditures and transfers in the short term, one 
must recognize that any macroeconomic policy cannot be 
driven by and at the centre only. It requires some form of 
consensus and vertical cooperation between the three 
government tiers. This is not an easy matter because the (26) 
cantons and (around 2550) communes can conduct their own 
fiscal management, in line with objectives not necessarily 
compatible with those of the federal government”. (Dafflon, 
2006:277). 
It is worth noting that regional development planning which aims at 
attaining economic growth, stable prices, and employment creation, 
poverty reduction in the medium term and long-terms are shared 
responsibilities of the centre and sub national governments. The 
Canadian provinces, Australian states and German länders too, together 
with their respective federal governments, take part on the long term 
regional development endeavour (King, 1984: 45). 
 
4.1.2 Redistribution function 
 
The concept of redistribution has two dimensions: interpersonal 
(individual) equity and inter-regional (horizontal) equity. The former aims 
at ensuring a minimum level of living standard of citizens, without the 
competition of ‘public versus private goods’. The later aims at meeting a 
certain degree of fiscal capacity equalization across states/LGs so that 
poor sub national governments would be able to provide a minimum 
standard of public goods and services to their constituents. Here, the 
discussion focuses on interpersonal redistribution dimension, because 
mobility of people and capital are more affected by differential 
interpersonal redistribution policies. 
Interpersonal redistribution function is a collective good that needs 
government intervention. Governments often engage in interpersonal 
equity function by applying three interrelated instruments, namely; 
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(1)  tax-side redistribution policy (transfer of resources from rich people 
to lower income earners by imposing progressive tax rate on 
personal income), 
(2) expenditure-side redistribution policy through selective free access 
to public services, and 
(3)  Public budget allocation on education, health and the like which 
mainly target at low income groups and introducing various forms of 
social welfare interventions (Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, et.al; 2002; and 
Oates, 2002:723-724). 
Now, the question is: should such redistributive tasks be functions of 
the centre only?100 Or should they be sole functions of states/LGs or 
shared responsibilities of all levels of government? Like the assignment 
function of macroeconomic stabilization, there are divergent views on 
the assignment responsibility of redistribution function, ranging from a 
local public good to a sole function of the central government. The FGTFF 
prescribes redistribution function should be reserved to the centre only 
(Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972:8 and 2005:251; King 1984:33; Sinn, 
1990:503). The central argument is: if a state/LG unilaterally carries out 
ambitious redistribution programs by imposing higher progressive tax 
rates on well-to-do individuals and business firms, two unintended 
effects will flow. On the one hand, other factors remaining constant, 
wealthy people and business firms may leave out to escape the excessive 
and highly progressive income tax jurisdictions and choose their 
residence and business areas in a lower tax jurisdiction. Similarly, poor 
people are bound to move to a relatively more generous welfare 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, a decentralized redistribution policy 
leads to under provision of and variations in redistribution programs 
across states (Brown and Oates, 1989 op.cit King 1992:25). In other 
words, decentralized income redistribution also results in negative fiscal 
externality for a welfarist jurisdiction. Because, immigration of poor 
                                                 100 Under a centralized unitary government system, the issue of inter-personal equity is    
taken for granted. That is to say, uniform tax rate on the principle of “equal treatment 
for equals” can be applied all over a country. To this effect, interpersonal 
redistribution function is carried out by the centre only. However, this is not the case 
in a decentralized federal system, because states and local governments have tax 
powers to apply a differential tax policy either for equity purpose or to attract 
investment into their jurisdiction. 
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people to a relatively ‘better’ welfare jurisdiction causes a higher local 
cost for redistribution programs and a positive fiscal externality for 
jurisdictions which do not have similar redistribution programs. A central 
government, however, has a capability to establish efficient and 
equitable income redistribution programs without causing distortion of 
productive resources, because mobility of people and business firms is, 
by far, less nationwide than at local level (Wildasin,1991). Prud'homme 
(1995:202) also notes that a decentralized redistribution function is 
ineffective because nation-wide income disparities cannot be corrected 
by local governments. Even in low mobility situation centralized 
redistributive policies could be argued for equal access and national 
cohesion. 
Dafflon, (1977:30 and 2006:279); Wallisch, (2000:145), Boadway and 
Shah (2009:73) plausibly argue that the function of redistribution of 
income need not be a sole task of the centre; rather, it is a shared 
responsibility of the centre, states and LGs. States and LGs can design 
effective, specific and complementary redistributive policy packages by 
coordinating their policies. States/local governments would form a forum 
to consult each other and reach a consensus on what and how they can 
pursue common redistribution policies. They can also negotiate with the 
central government to narrow differences if the States’ joint 
redistribution policy deviates much from the central government 
distribution policy 101(Dafflon, 1977:30). A coordinated redistribution 
action among various levels of government would increase social 
welfare, whereas “an uncoordinated regional redistribution program 
leads to substantially low degree of redistribution between mobile and 
immobile residents.”(Wallisch, 2000:145). 
When mobility of resources is believed to be significant, there are 
two practical options of carrying out the redistribution function. (i) If 
inter-regional mobility has a national dimension, centralized 
                                                 
101 However, King (1984 33-34), questions Dafflon’s coordinated redistribution 
responsibility. He points out two objections. One, formulation of ‘common policy’ 
through negotiation could be unpopular for the majority of the population at lower 
levels of government and its cost ineffective. Uniformpolicy is by far more 
costeffective when it is done by the centre rather than by a group of sub national 
governments on negotiation basis. Second, redistribution schemes demand adopting 
progressive tax rate, which is hardly liked by the rich people. 
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redistribution is more effective , or (ii) If mobility is limited to a few 
states/LGs, carrying out horizontally coordinated redistribution function 
among the immigrant hosting jurisdiction(s) and emigrant producing 
jurisdiction(s) is recommended, although horizontal coordination is not 
an easy task. 
Padovano (cited in Oates 2004: 359-360) believes that regional 
governments are superior to central government in establishing efficient 
redistribution function. According to his Italian political economy model, 
central “politics” creates inefficient inter-regional redistributive programs 
and it causes exploitation of a (some) region (s) by others. Padovano 
argues that an exclusive assignment of redistribution function to the 
regions may avoid the problems and each region may rely on its own 
resources for redistribution. However, it should be noted that 
replacement of inter-regional by intra-regional redistributive policies 
does not solve the issue. It is more efficient in the sense that a rich region 
may spend less for its own poor beneficiaries but it leaves out the 
question of the financial resources or poor regions to help its own poor. 
In contrast, Pauly (1973:41) considers redistribution as a local public 
good and concludes that a local level redistribution policy may be more 
Pareto optimal than a centralized distribution one as utility for the poor 
people and disposable income of rich people (businessmen) increase 
simultaneously. Two assumptions have led Pauly to such a conclusion. (i), 
rich people in each jurisdiction are concerned about the wellbeing of 
poor people in their own community, and (ii), households are immobile. 
Wellisch (2000:145) argues that Pauly’s conclusion would be correct only 
if poor people are immobile, not households entirely. King (1984:34-35) 
also criticizes Pauly’s households immobility assumption for its 
inconsistency with the Tiebout’s ‘Voting on own feet’ argument. 
SGTFF challenges the FGTFF’s mobility argument for a centralized 
redistribution function. The SGTFF argues that mobility of labour may not 
be a deterrent factor to carry out a decentralized redistribution function 
for the following reasons. First, people are rooted to their local areas and 
migration has social cost. Strong social attachment and psychological 
feelings (both rich and poor people) towards the origin local area may 
make people stick around in their native place. There are situations in 
which the Tiebout “voting-with-feet” hypothesis makes a weak argument 
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for a centralized redistribution function. In a country where states/LGs  
are characterized by ethnic, linguistic or cultural, religious diversities, 
Inter-state labor mobility is less. Quebec is a typical case in point. 
Quebec, being a high tax province, attains lowest out-migration rate of 
all the Canadian provinces, because 80 percent  of its population is 
French speaking, while the Canadian labor markets outside Quebec are 
English (Vazquez et .al2006:17).Second, local governments are superior 
to the centre in identifying target groups who are encompassed in some 
social assistance schemes. They are cost effective in managing 
redistribution function as well. Third, social group targeted 
redistributions are often undertaken by local governments with time 
specific and defined eligibility criteria. Such a system ties the poor people 
to stay in their origin jurisdictions (Dafflon 2006:278-279); Vazquez et al 
2006:17). Fourth, effect of difference in tax rate on net income would be 
less acute, provided that sub national taxes are credited against central 
government tax liability. Fifth, in countries where housing market is a 
serious problem, mobility of people is constrained (McLure, 1999:17) 
Moreover, higher business profit tax may not necessarily lead to 
capital migration for a couple of reasons. (I) Business firms might not 
perceive a local progressive tax rate for redistribution purpose as a 
painful burden. They may understand that such a policy will create 
positive spill over effects to them in reducing crime, in increasing directly 
or indirectly the demand for their products and in supplying trained 
labour (King, 1984:34) and, (II), if sink cost of the business appear to be 
high, exit for higher tax rate reason may not be an ideal choice, at least, 
in the short term. 
 
4.1.3 Allocation of Resources 
 
There are three items in the assignment of responsibilities to 
States/LGs: (i) Responsibility for the supply (offer), but without necessary 
production or delivery which can be externalized; (ii) the production as 
such, that is; the State/ LG unit hiring the factors of production in order 
to produce certain public services/goods itself without externalization of 
the production, and; (iii) the delivery of the service. In small sized 
jurisdictions, LGs externalize the production in order to grasp economies 
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of scale. For example, for solid waste collection and disposal, small LG 
units do not have to buy a special vehicle for garbage collection and hire 
their own personnel: if so, they would use it only one or two days to fulfil 
the function and the vehicle would be on the stand for the rest of the 
week, which is a waste of public resource. Thus two solutions are 
possible: joint forces in horizontal cooperation with other municipalities. 
Or hire the service of a private entrepreneur. In the latter case, the LG 
would be responsible for the offer and the delivery (in term of service to 
the population), but not the production. 
With regard to efficient allocation of resources102 both FGTFF and 
SGTFF103 use economic criteria as guidelines to determine whether a 
certain public service should be centralized or decentralized. The 
following subsection discusses how the economic criteria serve as 
centrifugal or centripetal forces in designing assignments of 
responsibilities among different levels of government. Oates (1972) 
identifies the following economic criteria and prescribes how the 
(de)centralization assignment of public services should be. 
 
                                                 
102The concepts of economic allocative efficiency and productive efficiency are different. 
Whereas the former is “a broad concept relating to the economically optimal 
allocation of resources throughout the economy”, the latter “relates to the 
production of outputs at the level of the firm or organization” (Bailey, 1999:24) 
103 But, there is a minor difference. The FGTFF Prescribes that an ‘optimal’ assignment of 
responsibility can be designed by reorganizing the existing political territories  or 
establishing functional territoriesas many as the numbers of local public services to 
be delivered, while the SGTFF takes the existing institutional territory because the 
SGTFF, in addition to the economic argument, considers political factors. 
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Table 4.1.Economic criteria for (de)centralizing public services 
Economic 
criteria 
Prescriptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Preference 
If preferences are heterogonous nation-wide and 
homogeneous communities are distributed in a defined 
territory, decentralized decision making in smaller 
community groups would help to provide public 
services tailored to local preferences. The policy 
prescription is, therefore, redrawing as many precincts 
as the numbers of local public services to be provided 
will maximize the welfare of like-minded communities’ 
preference. If preferences are homogeneous nation-
wide, then centralization leads to optimal efficiency 
(Oates, 1972). 
An alternative policy is to empower local 
governments to provide local public services by 
maintaining or modifying the existing institutional 
territory and support them through equalization 
scheme and/or shared tax arrangement if their fiscal 
capacity is found weak to provide local public service. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information 
and cost of 
collective 
decision 
making 
Establishing as many small local governments as 
the number of public services would enable consumers 
to make decisions what they would like to consume. 
Thus participatory democracy or collective decision 
making maximizes welfare. Oates (1972:48) 
prescription is that a separate authority for each local 
public service that would be consumed jointly by a 
group of consumers maximizes welfare. 
Collective decision making in multiple service 
precincts generates greater welfare but it is not 
costless. It requires detail information. Communities 
need to exert efforts to negotiate and compromise 
among themselves until they reach to consensus or 
majority vote. All these imply costs of consensus based 
decision making (Dafflon, 2013: 204-210). 
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Economic 
criteria 
Prescriptions 
Decision makers are confronted with making 
trade-off between enjoying participatory democracy at 
higher costs of information and participation on the 
one hand, and reducing the levels and number of local 
governments by giving up decision powers on the 
other. Therefore, gains from participatory democracy 
and collective decision making costs need to be 
weighted each other. The compromise solution is 
looking for the ‘right’ levels and numbers of 
governments that would minimize information and 
participation costs by scarifying some values of 
participatory democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economies 
of scale 
Some public services require certain minimum 
threshold to produce/provide at or close to the lowest 
average unit cost. That is, for certain public services, 
unit cost falls as the number of beneficiaries increase 
and reach at the turn of U curve. 
The policy prescription is that if production or 
provision of a public service yields cost- saving because 
of economies of scale; centralization of the assignment 
of a local public service is prudent policy. And, 
decentralize the assignment of responsibility, if cost-
saving from centralization is absent (Oates, 1972:37). 
The policy prescription implies trade-off between 
maximizing welfare from economies of scale and having 
many small jurisdictions to enjoy participatory 
democracy. Therefore, decision makers are in an 
ambivalent situation to make a choice enjoying 
participatory democracy or establishing a higher level 
of jurisdiction to benefit from the economies of scale.  
There are alternative policy options that would 
balance, to some degree, the benefits of economies of 
scale and gains from collective decision making: (I) in 
some cases purchasing the desired quantity of public 
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Economic 
criteria 
Prescriptions 
service from the private sector or NGOs, or contracting 
out a public service to a higher level of government or a 
private sector or NGO, where their production 
organizations allow to attain economics of scale in 
production would be efficient  without the need to 
merge in order to reap benefits from economies of 
scale (Oates,1972:45); (ii) cooperating and coordinating 
LGs efforts with others to jointly produce/ supply the 
service by forming associations of LGs to establish 
functional territories for each public service that 
require scale of economies (Slack, 2006;Shah,2006:7) 
and; (iii) merging of local governments to form a bigger 
jurisdiction also allows to benefit from economies of 
scale but causes lose of community welfare from 
collective decisions. 
 
 
 
 
 
Spill over 
effects  
or 
inter-
jurisdictional 
externalities 
Spill over effect/inter-jurisdictional externality 
takes place when an outcome of unilateral policy action 
(say on education, health care, road service, etc….) of 
stateA affects other states. One has to make distinction 
between production externality and consumption 
externality. The former takes place when StateA invests, 
say, on human development program, its citizens 
benefit from the program but some of them might 
migrate to other States to seek for a job and the hosting 
states benefit from the human development policy of 
stateA without incurring public spending. Consumption 
inter-jurisdictional externality occurs If educational 
policy of StateA benefits to students who come from 
other states without paying study fee to StateA either 
directly by the beneficiary individuals or by their 
mother state. Inter-jurisdictional externality can be 
positive or negative. Negative inter-jurisdictional 
externality implies when stateX action reduces the 
welfare of residents of other state(s) or causes to incur 
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Economic 
criteria 
Prescriptions 
additional cost, for example, if it dumps its sewage into 
a river that crosses more than one jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the policy prescription is “...each public 
service should be provided by the jurisdiction having 
control over a minimum geographic area that would 
internalize benefits and costs of such provision” (Oates, 
1972). 
Theories of intergovernmental transfer assert that 
states/LGs would not have incentive to invest more on 
public services that spills over the benefits from their 
boundary if they are not compensated for the cost of 
externalities through some sort of matching grant 
(Oates, 1972:75; Boadway and Shah, 2009:326) or by 
individual beneficiary state. If it is a negative 
externality, the polluter state has to pay for the cost of 
the environment. 
If the benefit has regional or national impact, 
designing appropriate matching grants by a higher 
government level in favour of the victim jurisdiction 
would off-set the spill over effects. If the benefit spills 
over to a single or to a few jurisdictions, both the 
beneficiary and the producer of positive externality 
should reach to mutual understanding on the means 
and ways of compensation mechanism, albeit inter-
jurisdictional bargaining is not easy. If they fail to reach 
into agreement, the central government has to find a 
solution. Appropriate Compensation system stimulates 
local governments to allocate more resource to local 
public goods that yield spill over effects. 
Another way of internalizing the externalities is 
merging territories or moving boundaries so that the 
territory includes all of the beneficiaries of the specific 
public service (Slack, 2009:335).This can be possible if 
the spill over effect takes place between neighbouring 
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Economic 
criteria 
Prescriptions 
jurisdictions. 
Likewise, global scope externalities which are 
caused by multi-governments (example global 
warming) could be internalized by making it a shared 
responsibility of the members of the UN and by 
designing global financial indemnity system in which 
the polluters bear the cost (like the carbon trade fund).  
 
 
Congestion 
cost 
Commuters cause congestion cost on the existing 
residents for non-exclusive local public services, when 
there are capacity limits in the production/supplying of 
a certain public service. The utility an individual derives 
from its consumption is negatively affected, among 
other things, by the number of additional entrants who 
compete out the public service. When the number of 
new entrants cause welfare loses of a community, the 
policy prescription is to apply discriminatory pricing 
policy against commuter beneficiaries or to prohibit 
commuters from using the service (Oates, 1972).  
 
One can conclude from the above discussion that heterogeneous 
national and territorially homogenous preferences and congestion costs 
favour for a decentralized provision of public services. Costs of information 
and collective decision making, economies of scale, as well as spill over 
effects/ inter-jurisdictional externalities are pro-centralization. For the 
FGTFF, economic efficiency is the only parameter applied to determine 
what public services to assign to which level of government. But for SGTFF, 
decentralization of public local services is more than the issue of economic 
efficiency. It is about political and fiscal powers. It is about maintaining 
social and cultural values, including the right to exercise local democracy 
(Dafflon, 2006:285).For this reason, in addition to the economic criteria, the 
SGTFF considers non-economic factors like history, political traditions, 
equity issue, public choice, social and cultural values, demographic 
variables, subsidiarity principle, etc. in the process of assignment of 
responsibilities among different levels of government. 
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4.2 (De) Centralization Matrix for Assignment of 
Responsibilities 
 
Assignments of responsibilities between different levels of 
decentralized governments are not uniform. They vary by country due to 
historical and political realities, social diversities, economic determinants 
and geographical size, fiscal capacity, and principle of subsidiarity, etc. 
Dafflon (2006:301) formulates a comprehensive (de)centralization 
matrix that could serve as a guideline for policy makers and practitioners to 
design the assignment of responsibilities between different levels of 
government in a federal fiscal setting. The matrix is composed of two pillars 
as shown in Table 4.2 below. 
(I)A set of economic and non-economic assignment criteria are listed on 
the first vertical column. The list of assignment criteria is not exhaustive. It 
is left open-ended in order to give freedom for adding or deleting any 
criterion specific to the country under examination. Assignment criteria 
should be decided through participation, consultation, and negotiation 
among stakeholders. Definition and common understanding of concepts 
and terminologies among the stakeholders and reaching to consensus are 
essential conditions to avoid any confusion and misunderstanding. 
Otherwise stakeholders may interpret the concepts and terminologies 
differently and open up for manoeuvre (Dafflon, 2006:302). 
(ii)Various institutional levels of government are enumerated on the 
top of the horizontal columns. All provisions of public services may not 
correspond with the commonly known levels of government (local, state 
and centre). Taken into account the specific government tier under 
examination of a country, it is possible to think more intermediate levels of 
government between the local government and the states as well as 
between the states and the centre or a supranational-state. Simple or 
multi-purpose associations like Special Purpose District Associations of 
communes in the USA, or Zone or Special ‘Wereda (district) levels of 
governments in Ethiopia are typical examples of intermediate governments 
between the State and LGs. It is also possible to think of a government level 
formed by merging two or more states (regions) together or a union of 
states like the EU. The levels of government, therefore, can be organized in 
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a way to approximately reflect existing institutional territory, which have 
consonance with culture, social psychology and administrative tradition, 
etc. It is also possible to re-delineate the existing level of government and 
create a new jurisdiction to accommodate minorities’ preferences (to 
preserve identity, language, cultural and religious values) as well as to form 
indigenous political institutions based on history, political choices and, 
economic symmetry among other factors, if necessary. 
Major stakeholders, namely legislators of different levels of 
government, constitutional lawyer, economist and representatives of 
concerned line Ministers and others are core stakeholders to form the Task 
Force. The stakeholders are expected to fill each corresponding cell in the 
matrix, but with the technical advisors. The role of Constitutional lawyer 
and economist is to provide professional advice in delivering expertise on 
legal and economic arguments respectively, leaving political choice to the 
politicians. Checking the coherences of the political decisions, and alerting 
the stakeholders about the implication of their choice when inconsistencies 
occur are also the task of the economist (Dafflon, 2006: 302). 
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Table 4.2. (De) centralization Matrix 
Assignment criteria Institutional Government Level 
1. Macroeconomic Polices Local  … Regional … central 
Openness           
Free riding           
Deficit financing           
2. Redistribution           
Mobility           
Guaranteed access           
Targeted eligibility           
Minimum service level           
3. Allocation           
Preferences           
Economies of scale           
Spillovers           
Congestion           
Decision cost           
4.Managerial Capacities           
Political           
Institutional           
Administrative           
Technical           
Social capital           
5. Socio Political Arguments           
Subsidiarity           
Participative democracy           
Information           
Control           
Accountability and transparency           
Solidarity           
6. Other criteria           
Poverty alleviation           
Fiscal competition      
Source: Dafflon (2006:301) 
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The matrix is not a prescription but only a framework for 
assignment of responsibility among different levels of government 
in a federal setting. It ensures participation of stakeholders in the 
process of determining assignment of responsibilities. It is a 
political economy process because officials can be cross-checked 
for comprehensiveness. It is a learning-by-doing process as well, 
because once it is understood for any function (say ‘primary 
education’) it can be repeated and adapted for other functions 
too (Dafflon, 2006:303). 
Since the variables stated on Table 4.2 (items 1 and 3 as well 
as item 2) are discussed earlier in the text of this chapter, for 
illustration purpose, some non-economic variables are briefly 
discussed below. 
 
4.2.1 Subsidiarity principle 
 
The philosophical premises of subsidiarity principle are:- 
(I) the sources and the very bases of legitimacy of all powers 
are people; hence, adequate political, economic and social 
powers have to be reserved at government levels closest to 
people. Put differently, LGs deserve powers to decide in all areas 
that affect their life. Reassignment of any public function to a 
higher level of government can take place based only on LGs 
consent and when they believe that it is beyond their production 
function (Dafflon 2006:290; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1998:19). 
Subsidiarity is a bottom-up policy process. It is worth noting that 
the principle of subsidiarity is inconsistent with the concept of 
economies of scale. Hence, in the process of assignment of 
responsibility, decision makers are compelled to compromise 
between the two. 
(II) A government closer to people has a comparative 
advantage to “read” local preferences and demands than a higher 
government level. Such information advantage would help LGs to 
be responsive to local preferences in a more accountable manner 
than by any government level (Dafflon, 2006:290; Oates, 
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2005:35). Subsidiarity corresponds to the “preference” criteria 
discussed in Table 4-1 above. Therefore, subsidiarity principle 
maintains power at lower levels of government. 
 
4.2.2 Minimum national standard of public service 
delivery 
 
In a situation where disparities in economic bases and socio-
economic developments among sub national governments are 
glaring, a decentralized system might cause wide horizontal fiscal 
disparity. Less endowed states/LGs cannot provide comparable 
public services at comparable tax rate to their residents. If they 
are to provide comparable public services they have to impose a 
higher tax rates otherwise residents will consume lower quantity 
and/or quality of public services. Such disparities are likely to 
result in fiscally induced labour migration and /or instigate 
secession feelings among those who perceive they are being 
marginalized. Setting a minimum national standard public service, 
which is the task of a central government, addresses the problem 
of public service disparity among states. How to 
produce/distribute/ deliver public services can be either left to 
the discretion of states/LGs or be an exclusive power of the 
central government or be a shared responsibility of different 
levels of government. Therefore, minimum national standard 
public services delivery is a centripetal force. Basic public services 
delivery might be decentralized but the central government has to 
finance the States/LGs through matching or non-matching grant 
system so that citizens will be able to get access to national 
standard minimum public services at comparable tax burden 
regardless of their choice of residence. 
 
4.2.3 Administrative capacity 
 
If states/LGs are to maximize the well founded advantages of 
decentralization, they need to have adequate administrative 
 115 
 
capacities. Availability of professional and well experienced 
technical and managerial labour force in quality, quantity and 
composition is crucial for deepening decentralization process as 
well as to yield the advantages of decentralized system. 
With regard to the role of administrative capacity on efficient 
decentralization, there are two opposing views. Prud’homme 
(1995) argues that lack of managerial capacity impedes 
decentralization efforts and pursuing decentralization where 
managerial capacity is a serious problem and leads to a failure. 
For Prud’homme, building a competent administrative capacity is 
a precondition for making a decentralized system work. Oates, 
(1994:351), however, contests Prud’homme’s argument and 
assert “decentralized political institutions play an important role 
in developing skilled public administrators by allowing more 
widespread and direct participation in the affairs of government.”  
For the SGTFF, administrative capacity is important to make 
decentralization work but it is not a precondition to decentralize 
power. Lack of administration capacity should not be an excuse 
not to devolve functions and responsibilities downwards, because 
it can be addressed through conducting aggressive short, medium 
and long term training programs and through learning by doing. 
 
4.2.4 Institutional capacity 
 
Institutions imply rules of games in a society or country to 
shape human and organizational behaviours in developing 
incentives or disincentives in the process of implementing 
decentralization. Institutions can be formal or informal. As far as 
the relationship between institutional capacity and 
decentralization is concerned, there are different views. 
Proponents of the institutional approach take the existence of 
well developed institutions as a precondition for success of 
decentralization (Litvack et.al, 1998; Azfar et al., 1999), whereas 
Dafflon (2006:295) and others who belong to the school of the 
SGTFF argue that existence of advanced institutions are key 
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factors in achieving the objectives of decentralization, but they 
can be created and developed during the process of 
decentralization through launching capacity building schemes. 
 
4.2.5 Accountability and transparency 
 
Accountability and transparency are necessary conditions to 
make decentralization work. Accountability is of two dimensions: 
top-down and bottom-up. Politicians have to be accountable to 
their constituencies. Competitive electoral election process, 
consultation with citizens as well as civic societies, and 
responsiveness to local preferences refer to top-down 
accountability, whereas officials’ or agencies ‘accountability to 
their immediate higher superior body refers to bottom-up 
accountability. Transparency implies the how rules of game or the 
way laws, regulations and procedures are applied. Accountability 
and transparency are effective instruments to enhance local 
participation and maximizing benefits of decentralization. 
Accountability should be associated with discretion on 
political, administrative, social and economic matters that affect 
the interests of local people. Political accountability implies 
separation of powers between the legislative, executive and 
judiciary branches; party pluralism, existence of checks and 
balances of power among the branches, strong legislative body, 
competitive, fair and free election process, recall of politicians 
including removing inefficient and/or corrupt officials from office, 
and councillors’ freedom to vote on each motion independently 
regardless of his/her party stand on the motion all manifest better 
political accountability. 
Designing an effective administration, limited/small 
bureaucratic hierarchy, transparent civil service rules and 
procurement procedures; defining objectives, goals and tasks of 
decentralizing public sector promotes administrative 
accountability. 
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Social accountability is linked the degree of citizens’ 
participation in preparing local planning and deciding budget; 
controlling expenditure, monitoring and evaluation of local public 
investments, and citizens’ right to access information and citizens’ 
feedback for service delivery in a Citizens report card, etc. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
 
Literatures on fiscal federalism reveal that there is no golden 
rule of assignment of responsibilities that fit for all federations. 
Rather, it varies from one country to another. The FGTFF is 
adherent to a centralized macroeconomic stabilization and 
interpersonal equity functions. The arguments for centralization 
of macroeconomic function are: (i) sub national governments do 
not have power to create money, which is the most powerful 
instrument of monetary policy. Assignment of monetary power to 
sub national governments means allowing them to print money 
independently to finance their local programs. This causes 
messing up the national economy, and (ii) sub national 
governments are not capable of using fiscal policy efficiently as 
they are highly open economies, vulnerable to free riding 
problems and may cause budget deficits. The SGTFF, however, 
argues that macroeconomic stabilization might be a shared 
responsibility of the centre, states and LGs implying that sub 
national governments can contribute to the macro economy 
stabilization policy through spending and/or taxation policies. 
With regard to interpersonal redistribution, the argument for 
centralization is that decentralized redistribution function leads to 
inefficient allocation of resources as it causes influx of low-income 
groups to a more generous in welfare sub national government. 
Also businesses and rich people would select their place of 
residence a lower corporate income tax (CIT) and personal income 
tax (PIT) jurisdiction. Here again, the SGTFF argues that the sub 
national governments might play role in interpersonal equity 
function, notably through providing free or easy access to basic 
services like education, health and social aid. Furthermore, people 
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are less fiscally induced, particularly in a diverse society. Social 
cost and housing problems in urban centres also hinder migration 
of people. With regard to the location choice of business firms, 
higher CIT does not necessarily hinder mobility, if investors think 
that it yields comparative advantages in quantity and quality of 
inputs in the production process and/or take advantage of market 
size from immobility of citizens. 
In the process of assignment of responsibilities, the FGTFF 
uses economic variables only. There are centralization 
(centripetal) forces and decentralization (centrifugal) forces. On 
the one hand, participatory democracy, principle of subsidiarity, 
political choices, heterogeneous preference for public services, 
etc serve as centrifugal force. On the other hand, inter-
jurisdictional equality, economies of scale, spill over effect, etc are 
centralization forces, because they call for coordination, 
cooperation, and policy harmonization between functions of 
vertical and/or horizontal levels of governments. Hence, effective 
assignments of responsibilities require balanced judgment 
between the decentralizing and centralizing forces. 
The SGTFF believes that economic criteria alone cannot 
suffice for assignments of responsibilities between different levels 
of government. History, political choice, social traditions, 
managerial capacities and other criteria may play greater role in 
the assignment of responsibilities among different levels of 
government. The decision matrix approach has been developed in 
reference to the SGTFF. It offers process in order that 
stakeholders can themselves find the best solution. 
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Knowledge of assignment of responsibilities between different 
levels of governments enables to make a proper appraisal of what roles 
each level of government should play in the economy in general and in 
the provision of public service in particular. A well defined assignment of 
responsibilities to different levels of government shapes a partnership 
based intergovernmental relations between different levels of 
government. 
In Ethiopia, devolution of powers and functions took place in two 
stages. The first phase was the devolution of power from the Centre to 
the Regions (States) in early 1990s. This was a critical step in reversing 
the century old unitary and highly centralized system. The second wave 
of decentralization refers to the Wereda (District) level decentralization 
(WLD) of the 2002, where some powers and functions have been 
transferred from the States to the local governments (LG). The 
objectives of the WLD are to ensure local demand-driven public service 
delivery, to empower people in decision making in all matters that affect 
their life, to promote accountability and to enhance local economic 
development (MoCB, 2002).  
Separation of responsibilities between the Federal and the States 
are laid out in the Federal Constitution of 1995; while local 
governments’ responsibilities are defined in States’ Proclamations. This 
is because local governments are creatures of the States. 
This chapter assesses the assignment of responsibilities between 
the Federal Government and the States as well as between the States 
and LGs in Ethiopia by taking Tigrai as a point of reference. The chapter 
is organized in three sections. The first section analyses the assignment 
of responsibilities from a political economy perspective. The second 
section examines if the Ethiopian states have any role in 
macroeconomic stabilization and short-term stabilization policies, as 
well as interpersonal redistribution functions. It also explores the 
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economic and non-economic principles taken into account in the 
separation of powers and functions between the Federal Government 
and the States. It also tries to link the well founded economic principles 
of assignment of responsibilities with the practice in Ethiopia. The third 
section investigates the extent to which the States and LGs in Ethiopia 
enjoy budgetary autonomy. 
 
5.1 Vertical Separation of Powers in Ethiopia 
 
Art. 51 and 52 of the Federal Constitution define competences of the 
Federal Government and the States respectively. Table 5.1 below 
provides a political economy reading of the assignment of responsibilities 
between the Federal Government and the States, as well as the State of 
Tigrai and respective Weredas (ULGs and RLGs)104. Functions are listed in 
the first vertical column, in line with the IMF’s standard classification of 
functions. The top rows depict levels of government, namely the Federal, 
the States, ULG and RLG of Tigrai. Zone, Special Wereda and Kebele levels 
of government can be included on the top row when one examines the 
assignment of responsibilities of States having such government tiers. 
Looking at the Federal Constitution, public sector functions are either 
exclusively assigned to the Federal Government or to the States or 
shared between the Federal Government and the States. 
                                                 104 Tigrai has been selected for two reasons: It is the only state that has, 
so far, defined (i) the responsibilities of rural wereda government, 
and (ii) taxation powers of urban wereda governments. 
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Table 5.1 Assignment of Responsibilities between Different Levels of Government in Ethiopia 
Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
  
“All powers not given 
expressly to the Federal 
Government alone or 
concurrently to the 
Federal Government 
and the States are 
reserved to the States” 
(52/1)  
ULG has all powers on 
urban affairs. The 
powers include all 
authorized by law and all 
unrestricted powers by 
law (10.1 Proclamation 
65/1995)  
The right of every Wereda to self-
rule and local development and to 
determine its local affair is 
respected (72.2, 45/1994); 
 
General  
Public  
Service 
“Protect and defend the 
Constitution”(51/1) 
“to protect and defend 
the Federal 
Constitution”(52/2a)  
  
“determine and administer the 
utilization of the waters, or rivers 
or lakes linking two or more States 
or crossing the boundaries of the 
national territorial jurisdiction” 
(51/11)  
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
“Administer and expand all 
federally funded institutions that 
provide services to two or more 
states” (51/13) 
   
 
“To establish a State 
administration that best 
advances self-
government, a 
democratic order based 
on the rule of law” 
(52/2a)  
 
Administers institutions which are 
defined by law to Wereda 
(72.3, 45/1994) 
 
“enact and enforce laws 
on the State civil service 
and their condition of 
work; in the 
implementation of this 
responsibility it shall 
ensure educational; 
training and experience 
requirements for any 
“Consistent with the law, 
administer civil servants” 
(10.2d, 65/1995),I.e. 
appointing management 
staff, hiring, assigning, 
promoting, transferring; 
and taking disciplinary 
measures in accordance 
with law. 
Administer civil servants within a 
Wereda. 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
job, title or position 
approximate national 
standards;” (52/2f) 
National 
Defence 
and security 
“Establish and administer national 
defence and security forces 
“(51/6)  
   
Police 
 and security 
“Deploy, at the request of a State 
administration, Federal defence 
forces to arrest a deteriorating 
security situation within the 
requesting State when its 
authorities are unable to control 
it” (51/14 ) 
   
“Establish and administer federal 
police force”(51/6)  
“to establish and 
administer a state police 
force and to maintain 
public order and peace” 
(52/2/g )  
“Ensure the 
maintenance of peace, 
security and order as 
well as observance of 
law.”(65/1995, 11.A V) 
issue directives and ensure the 
maintenance of peace and security 
(74.2h, 45/ 1994);recruit, train and 
lead militia (Proclamation 
No.100/1998 (8.1); coordinates 
police force within the Wereda 
(100/1998, 8.8) 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
Fire 
protection 
 Care for protecting and 
controlling fire 
accident,(pursuant 
to52/1)  
“Care for protecting and 
controlling fire 
accident”(65/1995,11A 
V)  
 
Justice 
and 
Law 
“determine matters related to 
nationality;” (51/17)  
   
“determine and administer all 
matters relating to 
immigration, the granting of 
passport, entry into and exit 
from the country, refugees  
and asylum”(51/18)  
   
“patent inventions and protect 
copyrights” (51/19)  
   
“Establish uniform standards of 
measurement and calendar” 
(51/20)  
   
“Enact laws regulating the 
possession and bearing of arms 
“(51/21)  
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
Enact laws on historical sites and 
objects” (51/5)  
   
“Determine and administer the 
utilization of the water or rivers, 
lakes linking two or more States 
crossing the boundaries of the 
national territorial jurisdiction” 
(51/11)  
   
“Enacts, in order to give practical 
effect to political rights provided 
for in this Constitution, all 
necessary laws governing political 
parties and elections” (51/15). 
   
“Declares and lifts national state 
of emergency and states of 
emergencies limited to certain 
parts of the country” (51/16). 
   
Inter-state 
commerce 
“Regulates inter-State and foreign 
commerce”( 51/12)  
   
Economic “formulates and implements the “To formulate and “Issue policies, Determine social services and 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
and Social 
Policy 
 
country's policies, strategies and 
plans in respect to overall 
economic  and development 
matters “(51/3 )  
execute economic  and 
development policies, 
strategies and plans of 
the State” (52/2/c )  
formulate plan of action 
that help direct, execute 
and support the urban 
development” (65/1995, 
10.2b)  
public administration, and 
implement States’ policies, and 
laws” (45/ 1994, 72.1A) 
Land and 
natural 
resources 
“Enacts law on the utilization and 
conservation  of land and other 
natural resources” (51/5 )  
“To administer land and 
other natural resources 
in accordance with 
Federal laws”;(52/2d) 
“Administer, the lands 
and natural resources 
found within an ULG” 
Administer rural lands and natural 
resources within Wereda; 
Agriculture 
Establishes and administers 
National Agricultural Research 
Institutes and conducts R&D 
activities and disseminates new 
agricultural research findings to 
the public and States (Pursuant to 
51/13)  
Establish and administer 
state level Agricultural 
Research Institutes and 
conduct R&D activities, 
and disseminate 
research findings within 
the State ((Pursuant to 
52/1)  
 “Undertake basic agricultural 
development activities  in the 
Wereda”(45/1994, 74.2B); 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
Mining 
“Issues reconnaissance, 
exploration and mining licenses 
other than those to be issued by a 
State; issues a certificate of 
discovery for strategic minerals; 
issues a certificate of professional 
competence for professionals who 
wish to engage in consultancy 
services in the mining sector, and 
conduct testing and give 
permission for the export of 
samples of minerals”(FDRE, 
Mining Operation Proclamation 
No.678/2010  
“Issue artisanal 
mining105license; issue 
to domestic investors 
for reconnaissance, 
exploration and 
retention licenses with 
respect to construction 
and industrial-minerals; 
small scale mining 
licenses for industrial 
minerals and small and 
large scale mining106 
licenses for construction 
minerals; and certificate 
 Issues license for artesian mining 
and micro construction business 
(100/1998,  15.9)  
                                                 105 Artisanal mining  refers to any mining operation carried out by individuals or cooperatives of manual  operated and does not involve the engagement of 
employed worker ( FDRE,Mining Operation Proclamation No.678/2010) 
106 Small scale mining means any mining operation of which the annual run-off mine ore does not exceedthe limits stated in sub Article 35 of the 
ProclamationNo.678/2010. Large scale miningmeans any mining operationof which the annual run-off mine ore exceeds the limit stated in sub-article 35 of 
this Article with the exception of precious and semi-precious stones (Fedeal Proclamation No.678/2010 and Federal Proclamation No 812/2013). 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
Pursuant to 51/5)  of discovery for minerals 
other than those 
specified above.” 
(Pursuant to 52/1 and 
FDRE, Mining Operation 
Proclamation 
No.678/2010)  
Transport, 
postal and 
Communicat
ions 
“development, administration and 
regulation of air, rail, waterways 
and sea transport, 
telecommunication and postal 
services” (51/9 )  
   
Roads 
“Responsible for development, 
administration and regulation for 
major roads linking two or more 
states” (51/9) 
Construct, upgrade  and 
maintain link, and 
feeder roads within 
States; administer 
vehicle and driving 
license, vehicle safety 
inspections, (Pursuant 
to 52/1) 
Engage in construction 
of intra-city roads; 
provide terminal service, 
carry out security of 
traffic safety (65/1995, 
10.1) 
Construct and maintain intra-
Wereda feeder road 
(100/1998,17.7)  
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
Monetary 
and 
financial 
policies 
“Formulates and executes the 
country’s financial, monetary and 
foreign investment policies and 
strategies”(51/4)  
   
“Administers National Bank, print 
and borrow money, mint coins, 
regulates foreign exchange and 
money in circulation” (51/7 )  
   
“Determines by law the conditions 
and terms under which States can 
borrowing money from internal 
sources” (51/7)  
   
International 
relations 
“Formulates and implements 
foreign relations, it negotiates and 
ratifies international agreements” 
(51/8)  
   
Revenue 
collection 
and 
budgeting 
“levies taxes and collects duties on 
revenue sources reserved to the 
FederalGovernment”51/10) 
“To levy and collect 
taxes and duties on 
revenue sources 
reserved to the States” 
Consistent to the law, 
collects, amends  tax and 
user fees and levy new 
taxes and user 
Collect land use fees, agricultural 
income taxes and  similar other 
taxes as determined by 
law(45/1994, 74.2f) 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
(52/2e) fees(65/1995, 10.1c)  
“draws up, approves and 
administers the Federal 
Government’s budget” (51/10) 
“to draw up and 
administer the State 
budget” (52/2e) 
Determine budget and 
utilize  revenues other 
than those that fall 
within the domain of the 
Regional State 
Determine budget and utilize  
revenues other than those that fall 
within the domain of the Regional 
State( 45/1994, 74.2g); 
 
 
 
Environment 
protection 
 
“Formulates nationwide 
environmental protection policies and 
strategies, carry out environmental 
impact assessment for those entail 
inter-regional effect (Federal 
Proclamation No. 299/2002. pursuant 
to 51./5 
Formulate state scope 
environmental 
protection and carry out 
environmental impact 
assessment within a 
State (Pursuant to 52/1)  
 
 
 
 
“Formulates policies on 
environmental pollution control”  
(pursuant to Art. 51/3) 
Ensure the 
establishment of an 
integrated waste 
management system, 
carry out recycling 
treatment, 
environmental pollution 
Engage in construction 
of drainages, and 
sewerages; manages 
solid waste disposal, 
protect environmental 
pollution, and control 
flood; abattoir (65/1995, 
Engage in preservation, 
maintenance and development of 
natural resources in the Wereda( 
45/1994, 74.2B); 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
control (Pursuant to 
52/1)  
11AI)  
Housing 
development 
“Initiates policies and laws on 
housing development programs” 
(Federal Proclamation No 
471/2005 and Pursuant to 51/2) 
Formulate housing 
development policies 
and strategies of a  state 
(Pursuant to 52/1 
Improve and causing the 
improvement of the 
supply of 
houses(65/1995,  11AII) 
 
Water 
supply 
 Set State water resource 
development policy; 
Construct water supply 
projects (Pursuant to 
52/1) 
Provide water supply 
Service (65/1995, 11AIV)  
Construct and manages hand Dug 
wells, develop springs and ponds  
(100/1998, 15.3) 
Street light 
  Provide street lights 
service(Pursuant to 
65/1995, 10.1)  
 
Recreation 
and culture 
“Establishes and implement 
national standards and basic 
criterion for the protection and 
preservation of culture” (51/3)  
Establish and administer 
parks, sport frequenting 
sites such as stadium 
(Pursuant to 52/1)  
Establishment and 
administer recreation 
centres, gardens; public 
libraries, museums, 
monuments squares, 
sport frequenting sites, 
Cause to expand sports, and sport 
frequency sites, (100/1998, 9.5 and 
9.8) 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
theatre halls (65/1995, 
11AIII) 
Preservation 
of culture 
and historical 
legacies 
“Establishes and implements 
national standards and basic policy 
criteria for the protection and 
preservation of culture and 
historical legacies” (51/3)  
Implement national 
standards, formulate 
policy criteria for the   
protect and preserve 
state culture, historical 
legacies (Pursuant 52/1)  
  
Science and 
technology 
“Establishes and implements 
national standards and basic policy 
criteria for science and 
technology” (51/3)  
Implement national 
standards policy for 
science and technology 
and promote the 
development of science 
and technology 
(Pursuant to 52/2)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Establish and implement national 
standards and basic policy criteria 
for health ” (51/3)  
Set minimum health 
service standards; 
formulate policy to 
control and prevent 
communicable diseases 
Expand health care 
service; regulate food, 
beverages and 
pharmaceuticals; and 
environmental sanitation 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health 
Service 
 
 
in line with the Federal 
standards. Pursuant to 
52/1)  
on the basis of standards 
issued by the 
State(65/1995, 11AII and 
V) 
Constructs, administers and 
provides Specialized Federal 
Referral hospital administer 
medical and nutrition research 
institutes (pursuant to 51/13), 
Construct and 
administer State referral 
hospitals and Zonal 
hospitals; Health 
Centres and Health 
Posts; Provide public 
health services 
(pursuant to 52.1)  
Expand and administer 
health services up to 
Health Centre, and 
provide ambulance 
service, (65/1995, 11AII). 
Construct and administer Health 
centres, Health Posts;  
 
sets minimum health service 
standards and coordinate national 
immunization and HIV/Aids 
programs (Pursuant to 51/2) 
establish health training 
institutions, train Health 
personnel; carryout 
immunization and 
HIV/AIDS programs 
(pursuant to 52.1) 
 coordinate primary preventive and 
curative health care activities; 
control and prevention of HIV/AIDS 
and malaria; administer health 
personnel(100/1998,12.3) 
Education “Establishes and implements national standards and basic policy 
Prepare and implement 
education plans and 
establish and administer 
nursery and Primary 
administer primary schools and 
adult education; facilitate the 
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
criteria for education” (51/3)  standards in line with 
the Federal education 
policy (Pursuant to 52/1) 
schools, administer 
secondary/ preparatory 
schools; deploy teachers 
(pursuant to 65/1995, 
10.1)  
expansion of preparatory schools 
(100/1998, 10.3)  
Establishes and administers public 
universities (pursuant to 51/13)  
Establish and administer 
higher education 
institutes (Pursuant to 
52/1)  
  
Develops curricula for Secondary, 
Preparatory schools, and TVET  
(Pursuant to 51/3. 
Develop curriculum for 
primary schools); decide 
medium of instruction; 
(Pursuant to 52/1)  
  
 Publish text books and 
coordinate the supply of 
teaching aid materials 
for all levels of 
education; (Pursuant to 
52/1)  
Distribute text books, 
(Pursuant to 
65/1995,10.1)  
Provide educational materials 
(100/1998, 10.3) distribute text 
books to schools; 
Social “Formulates and implements the Pursue policies that Implement social  
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Functions 
 
Federal powers and function 
(Federal Constitution, Art. 51) 
States’ powers and 
functions 
(Federal Constitution, 
Art. 52) 
State of Tigrai  
ULGs powers (Tigrai 
Proclamation No. 
65/1995) 
RLG powers (Tigrai, Proclamation 
Nos. 45/1994, and 100/1998) 
Protection country’s policies ,strategies and 
plans in respect of social matters” 
(51/2)  
would expand job 
opportunities for the 
unemployed and 
indigent; provide 
rehabilitation and 
assistance to the 
physically and mentally 
disabled , the aged, and 
orphans (Constitutions 
of the States, Economic, 
Social and Cultural 
Rights) 
welfare policies of the 
State; take care and 
provide free health 
services for the poor and 
provide assistances to 
aged people, 
handicapped, 
abandoned, and 
orphaned children 
(65/1995, 11AII)  
Source: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, 1995; 
FDRE, Proclamation No 299/2002, FDRE, Proclamation 471/2005, 
FDRE, Proclamation No. 553/2007;  
FDRE, Proclamation No.678/2010,  
Tigrai, Proclamation No. 45/1994 E.C, 
Tigrai Proclamation No. 65/1995 E.C , Tigrai Proclamation No. 100/1998, and 
The Revised Constitution of Tigrai National Regional Government
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Exclusive assignments of responsibilities 
 
When column 3 remains empty, the powers and functions listed in 
column 1 are exclusively assigned to the Federal Government. For 
instance, defence and national security,107 finance and monetary policy, 
international affairs, immigration nationality, and refugee issues; water 
bodies that link two or more States, to mention few, are exclusively 
assigned to the Federal Government. In the Ethiopian case, 
decentralizing these functions would cause spill over effect and/or 
inefficiency because it does not allow the states to reap benefits from 
economies of scale. 
Regulations of inter-State and foreign commerce are also exclusive 
powers of the Federal Government (Federal Constitution, 1995, Art.52 
(12)). The rationale is to avoid any tax and non-tax barriers that would 
impede free movements of capital, trade and goods including double 
taxation or practicing discriminatory taxation entering into a State. 
Regulating inter-state and international trade is also a necessary 
condition to build single economic community at national level. 
                                                 
107 Constitutionally speaking international relations and national security rest with the 
Federal Government. In practice, however, the States do engage in cross-country 
security and trade cooperations. For instance, four Ethiopian States, (Tigrai, Amhara, 
Benshagul-Gumuz, and Gambela) and three Sudanese counterpart States have 
established a Joint Border States Cooperation with the objective to promote border 
trade development and to check security problems along their common borders 
(conflicts over grazing lands, banditry activities and illegal arms smuggling). They 
hold annual meetings at High States Officials level. Besides, each Ethiopian State 
signs cooperation agreements with its Sudanese counterpart. For instance, the 
Gambela state and the South Sudanese Upper Nile state signed cooperation on areas 
of security, trade and education in 2008 Similarly, Tigrai state and Sudan’s State of 
Gadarif signed to boost regional cooperation on areas of trade, controlling 
communicable human and animal diseases, culture, environmental protection and 
border security in Gadarif, Sudan(Sudan Tribune, 2009).So did Amhara state with its 
Sudanese counterpart. The State to State co operations and agreements on trade, 
security, controlling communicable human and animal diseases have national 
character. The Federal Government informaly delegates its power to the States on 
an ad-hoc base because in a situation where ethnic identity based mobilization is 
more efficient and effective, the cross border related conflicts cannot be left to the 
centre only. The states and Weredas have a lot to do in maintaining peace and order 
related to cross border conflicts. 
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Similarly, if a matrix cell along column 3 is filled but remained blank 
along column 2, then the power and function is exclusively assigned to 
the States. 
 
Shared functions 
 
When matrix cells along column 2 and 3 are filled, the powers and 
functions are shared between the Federal and State Governments. 
Agriculture, public health, land and natural resources, and road services 
are some examples of shared responsibilities between the Federal 
Government and the States. By the same token, if matrix cells in column 
3, 4 and 5 are filled, the functions are shared between the state and the 
Weredas (rural and urban). 
The responsibilities of formulating social and economic development 
policies, strategies, and plans are also shared between the Federal 
Government and the States. The Federal Government carries out on 
areas which have national scope, while the states limit themselves to 
specific needs (Federal Constitution, Art.51 (2) and 51(3)).  
Education is another example of a shared responsibility among 
different levels of government (see Box 5.1 below). A shared 
responsibility does not mean that each level of government is jointly 
involved in all aspects of the total service. If one distinguishes among 
production, supply, and service delivery, one can see that the Federal 
Government is responsible to establish national standards and the basic 
education policy. The States and the LGs are responsible for delivery of 
education. But the production function is disaggregated in several items, 
with each government level being exclusively responsible for specific 
items. 
Shared functions among levels of governments are likely to generate 
overlapping problems, if the production, supply and service delivery 
functions of the shared responsibilities are not explicitly defined. 
Governments may set various vertical coordination arrangements to 
avoid overlapping problems of production, or distribution of public 
good/service. If the centre is responsible for the production function of a 
certain public goods/services, then it may delegate or deconcentrate the 
function of production/distribution and delivery to the states (for more 
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discussion on deconcentration and delegation, see 5.3 below). 
Agricultural R&D and dissemination is a point of illustration. The The 
Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO), a Federal Agency, 
conducts agricultural R&D activities on areas that have nationwide 
impacts and it disseminates new agricultural research findings to the 
public (States and the private sector), whereas the scope of the States’ 
agricultural R&D is limited to specific state activities. Under such 
separation of responsibilities, some sort of vertical coordination and co-
operation are in place.  
 
Residual powers- 
 
Like in the USA and Swiss constitutions, the residual power rests 
with the States of Ethiopia. By virtue of Article 52(1) of the Federal 
Constitution, “All powers not given expressly to the Federal 
Government alone or concurrently to the Federal Government and 
the States are reserved to the States”. The residual power to the 
States is not made after exhaustively assigning the powers to the 
Federal Government. The intention of reserving the residual power 
for the States is to create strong states by devolving meaningful 
powers. Furthermore, the residual power is supposed to prevent 
any encroachment overtly or covertly attempted by the Federal 
Government.  
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Box 5 1 Decentralization of Education Service in Ethiopia 
Education function is a shared responsibility among the Federal 
Government, the States, and Local Governments (Zones, Weredas and 
Kebeles). There is clear separation of responsibilities among these 
various levels of government. 
The Federal Government sets national standards and basic criteria 
for education, formulates educational policy and strategy, prepares 
national examinations for Grade 10 and 12, designs curricula for 
secondary schools and junior colleges, administers quality assurance of 
education, and accredits levels and competences of higher education 
institutions (Council of Ministries Regulation No.197/1994). It establishes 
and administers public university. 
The States formulate and execute education development plan 
specific to their situation, establish and administer Teachers Training 
Colleges/Institutes, train, hire and deploy teachers, administer 
educational radio broadcast centres. They may establish and administer 
Higher Education Institutions (colleges and universities). They run Special 
schools which provide services for more than one Wereda Governments. 
They design curricula for primary schools and KGs. The states also design 
curriculum of local language for secondary schools (for example ‘Afan 
Oromo’ in Oromia and Tigrigna in Tigrai) in cooperation with the Ministry 
of Education, publish pupils text books and teachers’ guide for primary 
school, decide medium of instruction for primary education and KG. The 
states carry out grade 8 State examinations and fix passing mark. All 
these responsibilities give the opportunity for the States to design the 
education service on their preferences and relevance. 
Zones/Special Weredas, coordinate educational activities. In ethnic-
based levels of government, Zones/Special Weredas decide medium of 
instruction for First cycle primary education (1-4 grade) and KG, with the 
consent of respective State. They also administer TVET. 
Wereda Governments are responsible to determine and administer 
KG, and primary education (1-8), to provide with teaching infrastructure 
(construction, and maintenance of primary school buildings), to 
implement educational development policy and plan in line with 
respective State’s and Zone’s educational policies and strategies, to 
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Symmetric assignment of responsibilities among the 
States- 
 
Unlike in Canada, India, Spain, and Russian Federation, assignments of 
responsibilities to the States are symmetric in Ethiopia, although there are 
economic arguments (economies of scale and inter-jurisdictional 
externalities) that may support for asymmetric assignment of 
responsibilities to the States.108. The symmetric assignment of 
responsibilities among the states is a political choice, because the 
Ethiopian federal arrangement is a federation of NNP where “All 
sovereign power resides in the NNP” (Federal Constitution, 1995:Art.8 
(1)). Treating the NNP unequally is not only against the spirit of the 
Federal Constitution but it would also cause high political cost. 
 
 
                                                 108 Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa City administrations enjoy same assignment of 
responsibilities with the states. 
deploy and administer teachers including  administration personnel. They 
are also delegated to administer secondary education, and preparatory 
education. 
Kebeles Administrations determine direct contact of parents and 
teachers, and hire community teachers, when necessary, sets by-law that 
would govern management of local education services, ensure school 
level Community participation in decision making process through 
Education and Training Board (EaTB), and Parents- Teachers Associations 
(PTA). EaTB and PTA decide flat rate school fee for financing stationary 
supplies of the schools, approve operational expenses of school offices, 
and mobilize community resources for school expansion and 
maintenance of capital, and evaluate school performance. 
Primary education is further decentralized to homestead level. A 
kebele administration may establish a satellite school of grade 1 or 2 so 
that children who are unable to register school because of distance from 
homestead receive education nearby. 
 141 
 
Local Government’s Powers are derived from the States 
 
Article 50(4) of the Federal Constitution in reference to the 
LGs reads,  
“State government shall be established at State and other 
administrative levels that they find necessary. Adequate 
power shall be granted to the lowest units of government to 
enable the People to participate directly in the 
administration of such units.” 
Since LGs are subordinates of the States, what powers and functions 
the States would like to devolve to respective LGs is left to an individual 
State. The four relatively big States (Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia and SNNP) 
introduced Wereda level decentralization (WLD) in 2002. The remaining 
states adapted the WLD latter. The States either devolve, or delegate 
powers and functions to respective Weredas. The States have devolved 
some powers and functions downward. Weredas provide a range of 
public services such as primary education, primary health service, and 
intra-Wereda road service, soil and water conservation, agricultural 
development and extension services, and First Instant court service, to 
mention a few. Administration of personnel is devolved to the Weredas 
too. They hire, promote, transfer and dismiss. Functions of secondary 
education (9-12), health centre and Zonal hospital service, administration 
of rural lands are delegated functions to Weredas. Police service is a 
deconcentrated function. 
The ULGs carry out municipal services such as solid waste 
management, sewerage service, street light, market place, public 
libraries, recreation parks, terminals, slaughterhouses, intra-town road 
services, administration of urban lands, distribution of water supply and 
fire protection. In addition, they carry out state functions such as 
education, health, maintaining peace and order, court service.  
The States have shared a large part of their responsibilities with 
respective Weredas. Shared responsibility does not mean that states and 
respective LGs are jointly in charge of a specific task. With regard to the 
tasks of supply, production and service delivery, the state may be 
responsible in defining the supply whereas the LGs may be responsible for 
delivery. But the production function would-be disaggregated in several 
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items, with each government level being exclusively responsible for 
specific items. In that way, one knows the level of government that is 
responsible for delivery of what public service(s). 
In the process of decentralization, the States may devolve powers and 
function into two ways. (I) they may completely devolve all 
responsibilities to the LGs in accord with the principle of subsidiarity and 
leave the discretion to the LGs what powers and functions to pass upward 
to a higher level of government, or (II) they may apply a top-down 
approach and share some of their authorities with respective LGs. In 
practice, applying option (I) without taking into account the economies of 
scale does not allow the LGs to efficiently provide public services. Neither 
corrects inter-jurisdictional externalities. 
In principle, the process of assignment of responsibilities to LGs 
should be a product of dialogue and negotiation between stakeholders. 
Representatives of State and Zone/Special Wereda/Wereda Councils and 
executive body should sit and decide together how the separation of 
responsibilities between the State and respective LGs with the technical 
assistance of constitutional lawyers and economists. But in practice, the 
assignment responsibilities of Weredas are the outcome of experts’ desk 
work or decisions from the above (States). Thus, in Ethiopia the 
assignment of responsibilities between the States and LGs is a top-down 
out-put. The framers neither consulted LG Councillors and officials about 
what competences they would like to carry out efficiently nor took into 
consideration the nature of production functions of local public services. 
Powers and functions of the Weredas slightly vary across the states not 
on the consent of the Weredas but depending on the generosity of the 
individual State. The assignments of preparatory education, TVET, Zonal 
hospital level health service, by de-facto, are uniformly carried out by 
Zone/Special Wereda Governments although their economies of scale 
vary from Zone to Zone. 
 
Functions and powers of urban and rural LGs are asymmetric 
 
The assignments of responsibilities to Wereda Governments make a 
distinction between the RLGs and ULGs. Such a distinction is justifiable for 
a couple of reasons: 
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(I) In spite of the fact that both ULGs and RLGs have common 
preferences for education, health, water supply etc. they do not have 
homogenous preferences for all local public services. Public transport, 
street light, well developed inter-city road net work, and sewerage system 
are most common public services preferences of ULGs, while for RLGs 
agricultural extension services, feeder roads, soil and water conservation 
activities are among the front line preferences. 
(II) ULG and RLG also widely differ in their technical and institutional 
capacities to produce/distribute public services. ULGs are concentrated in 
small areas. This puts them in a position to take advantage of economies 
of scale for some public services better than RLGs. 
It should be also noted that all grades of ULGs do not enjoy equal 
powers and functions. Higher grades of ULGs are granted higher powers 
and functions than the lower grades of ULGs. For instance, 
Metropolitan/Towns and Emerging Towns in Tigrai or City Administrations 
and Municipality Towns in Amhara, or 1st to 4th grade ULGs of Oromia do 
not have symmetric powers and functions. The same is true in the 
remaining States. The rationale behind this are, presumably, economic 
arguments such as economies of scale, spill over effects and decision 
costs as well as institutional and managerial capacities to properly carry 
out responsibilities. 
 
Symmetrical powers and functions of RLGs within a state 
 
Pastoral/semi-pastoral rural Weredas and Weredas with sedentary 
communities have assumed identical powers which include formulation of 
local policies, determination of the quantity and quality of primary 
education, primary health care, intra-Wereda roads, soil and water 
conservation activities, etc, although there are issues of economies of 
scale109. 
                                                 
109 There are glaring administrative, institutional and financial capacity gaps between 
the pastoral and sedentary settlements too. Neverthless, these variables should not 
deter the process of decentralization as they can be solved through aggressive 
capacity building schemes and intergovernmental transfers. 
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It is understandable that pursuing asymmetric assignment of 
responsibilities in the States where LGs are reorganized along ethnic lines 
is politically unwise. But, one may question the wisdom of applying “one-
size-fits-all” assignment of responsibilities approach to the pastoral and 
sedentary communities of a rural Wereda within the homogeneous States 
and Zonal Administrations, where minority right is not of a concern. 
Neither the production functions of pastoral community dominated RLGs 
are in a position to provide health centre, primary education, and rural 
roads nor their local market allow outsourcing the service.  
Here, the argument is not for centralization of power at State level. 
Rather, it is to emphasize the need for considerations of economies of 
scale, technical and institutional capacities in designing assignment of 
responsibilities to homogeneous LGs for efficient public service delivery. 
In reality, the pastoral dominated LGs hardly exercise the power they 
have been given due to managerial capacity problems they have been 
encountering. As an effect, a great deal of local decisions is made at Zonal 
level. 
 
Zonal and Special Weredas assignment responsibilities 
are not defined  
 
Constitutions of Amhara, SNNP, Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumuz 
enshrine political and cultural powers to respective indigenous 
Nationalities with Zonal or Special Wereda Government status. However, 
the Constitutions of the States do not explicitly define the assignment of 
responsibilities of the Zonal/Special Wereda Governments. In the absence 
of clearly defined responsibilities of Zonal /Special Wereda, one has to 
derive responsibilities of Zones/Special Weredas from the powers and 
duties of Zonal Council and Special Wereda Councils, which includes, but 
not limited to, determine local language and medium of instruction for 
First cycle primary education (grade1-4) level, to preserve and develop 
own culture and values, to determine budget and formulate local 
economic and social development plans (see the Revised Constitutions of 
Amhara, SNNP, Gambela, and Benshangul-Gumuz). Public services which 
are provided in more than one Wereda such as preparatory school (11th-
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12th), TVET, Zonal level hospitals, and inter-Wereda rural roads are carried 
out by the Zonal/Special Wereda Governments. 
 
Voluntarily Abandoning own powers or taken away? 
 
Whose responsibilities are the establishment and administration of 
higher education institutions (universities), specialized hospitals, roads 
that connect two link roads within a state, and construction of irrigation 
dams that benefit a single state? Some may argue that these 
responsibilities fall under residual power of the States; while others may 
contest that they should fall under the Federal powers and functions of 
Article 51(13)110. One may also pose a question if there is a clear border 
line between the Federal Government and the States in the protection 
and preservation of culture, historical legacies and historical sites. 
With regard to the road services, the Federal Government is 
responsible for development, administration and regulation of major 
roads linking two or more States (Federal Constitution, Art.51/9). But in 
practice, the Ethiopian Road Authority (ERA), a Federal Agency, has 
engaged in construction of roads, administration, maintenance and 
upgrading linking roads, and Main Access roads within a State, which are 
predominantly State/ local in scope.111 The engagement of the Federal 
                                                 110 The Article stipulates, “it [the Federal Government] shall administer and expand all 
federally funded institutions that provide services to two or more states.” 
Accordingly, the Federal Government establishes and administers government 
universities in all states. It also establishes and expands specialized hospitals in Addis 
Ababa which serve as referrals at national level. 111 According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal government is responsible to develop and administer “…major roads linking two or more States…”, but the question is how major is major? The Ethiopian Road Authority classifies the road 
system into five categories (Classes) and has interpreted the responsibilities of 
constructions and administrations of roads between the Federal Government and the 
States. 
Trunk roads are roads that connect two or more States and they are linked with 
Addis Ababa. 
Link roads are road networks that connect two trunk roads. 
  A Main Access road connects two link roads. 
  A Collector road links centres of Main Access between each other  
 A Feeder road is a labour intensive and often dry weather road that links two or 
more collector roads. 
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Government on road services that link Weredas within a State is an 
administrative decision of the ERA. My discussion with the Head of 
Planning and ICT Department of the ERA revealed that it engages in 
building Main Access roads (I) to enhance the national economy by linking 
Weredas within a State to a sea port, or to economic growth pole areas 
(such as cash crop areas or mining sites) or to potential tourist destination 
sites and; (ii) to assist the states as they lack technical and financial 
capabilities to construct, maintain and rehabilitate Link roads, and Main 
Access road categories within a State. 
The Ministry of Water Resource Development has also carried out 
construction of irrigation dams and water reservoirs or dams for in 
selected states. But, the question is: what is the legal and economic 
ground of the Federal Government to engage in the construction of big 
irrigation dams that benefit a single state and in supplying clean water in 
some urban local governments? 
The states seem to welcome the intervention of the Federal 
Government. They do not have incentive to engage themselves in these 
public services either they believe these responsibilities are beyond their 
production function, or some of the functions have high degree of inter-
jurisdictional externality effects and require vertical and horizontal 
coordination, or they do not have sufficient money to finance such high 
cost public services. The issue of financing could have been resolved 
through introducing close-ended federal matching grant system and 
carrying out intensive capacity building schemes. The centralization of 
university education and specialized hospital service, at least, for the 
foreseeable future, can be justified from the perspectives of inter-
jurisdictional externality and economies of scale.  
It should be noted that the intervention of the Federal Government in 
the road, water supply, and construction of dams for irrigation have 
creating overlapping. There is no clear demarcation line, at least in 
practice, how the Federal Government selects a given state(s) to engage 
in these overlapped functions.   Such practices open a loophole for unfair 
allocation of off-budget federal public to state and undermine 
                                                                                                               
Accoding to the road classification of Ethiopian Road Authority (ERA), the first three 
road classes are responsibilities of the Federal Government, while the States are 
responsible for the last two categories. 
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transparency and accountability. No one is certain about the fairness of 
the selection criteria or it is immune from lobbying and/or biasness of the 
top decision makers towards own mother state / local areas.   
 
5.2 The Criteria for Assignment of Responsibility in Ethiopia 
 
There is no “optimal” assignment of responsibilities that fits-all. 
Rather, assignments of responsibilities are governed by economic criteria 
and non-economic factors of a specific country. This section examines if 
the States and LGs in Ethiopia have a role in macroeconomic policy and 
stabilization policy; whether the states and LGs deal with interpersonal 
redistribution, and how the well founded economic variables are applied 
in the separation of the powers and functions between the Federal and 
State Governments. It also discusses some non-economic variables that 
are considered in the power separation. 
 
5.2.1 Macroeconomic management responsibility 
 
Macroeconomic management deals with achieving stable price, 
reasonable national economic growth and high employment, etc. 
Economists use monetary and fiscal policy instruments to achieve stable 
macroeconomic environment. Now, the question is do the States/LGs in 
Ethiopia have any role in long-term macroeconomic policy, and short-
term stabilization policy? To answer these questions, one has to examine 
the nature of the monetary and fiscal policies. 
Monetary policy authority rests with the federal Government through 
the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE). The Bank uses supply of money as 
the main and effective instrument of monetary policy to ensure stable 
price112 and to attain sustainable economic growth of the country. The 
Bank exercises its monetary policy by restricting the growth of money 
                                                 
112 The role of a National Bank in ensuring price stability is highly associated with 
independence of the Bank. The National Bank of Ethiopia is governed by a Board of 
Directors, the highest decision making body, and accountable to the Prime Minister. 
This raises an issue of institutional autonomy.The capacity of the Governor to take 
independent monetary decisions that would refrain the Excutive body from excessive 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy is questionable. 
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supply not to be more than the annual nominal GDP growth rate. The 
Bank also sets reserve requirement for commercial banks, and fix floor 
deposit interest rate as instrument of monetary policy (NBE, 2009:3). If 
monetary policy were to be decentralized, the States would print money 
as much as they would like to finance their deficit. Understanding that 
this definitely would result in hyper inflation and macroeconomic 
instability, by design, all financial and monetary policies, administration of 
National Bank, printing money, and mint powers are centralized. This is 
consistent with the theory and global practice of monetary policy. 
The fiscal policy-Maintaining stable macroeconomic environment is 
not an outcome of monetary policy only. It is also a result of prudent 
fiscal policy.113Governments use public spending and taxation tools for 
macroeconomic stabilization purpose. The States114 in Ethiopia take 
employment generating schemes and poverty reduction as their core 
functions. The Ethiopian states manoeuvre the fiscal policy for the 
purpose of long term macroeconomic policy using the following 
instruments: 
(i) The expenditure side-States in Ethiopia have constitutional 
responsibilities to “pursue policies which aim to expand job opportunities 
for the unemployed and the poor and shall accordingly undertake 
programs and public work projects” (Federal Constitution, Art.41 (6)). 
Moreover, the States have powers and functions “to formulate and 
execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans 
of the State” (Federal Constitution, Arrt.52(c)). These powers and 
functions empower the states to take part in the long-term macro and 
regional development policies. 
States’ public financial expenditures from 1998/9 to 2009/10 indicate 
that the states’ own revenue covered only 54 percent of their recurrent 
                                                 
113 Even though there are differences in views and preferences between monetarist and 
fiscal economic schools on the effectiveness of the monetary and fiscal policies in 
attaining macroeconomic stabilization, often mix of monetary and fiscal policy 
measures are taken, depending on the root cause(s) of the problem. An Economic 
Advisory Council of a country is likely to recommend a series of monetary and fiscal 
measures to be taken by a government. 
114 So far the LGs do not have taxation power. The discussion is therefore limited tothe 
role of the States on long term and short-term macroeconomic management using 
fiscal policy. 
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expenditure or 31 percent of their total public expenditures. The balance 
was financed through Federal transfer (see Appendix 8.2). This reveals 
that the states are weak in fiscal capacity let alone to shift money for 
short–term macroeconomic stabilization purpose from their own revenue 
sources. 
However, one can reckon from Appendix 5-2 that the Federal 
Government and the states incurred70 percent and 30percent of their 
total expenditure on Economic, Social and General capital expenditures 
respectively115aimed at ensuring access to basic public services, 
agriculture and rural development, creating jobs, enhancing local 
economic growth, which are vital components of long term 
macroeconomic management. Furthermore, the States have invested 
huge public funds through borrowing from the Federal-owned banks on 
housing development programs (construction of condominium), and on 
Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs)116 with the objective to create jobs 
and combat poverty targeting residents. For instance, in 2011, the 
microfinance institutions lent Birr 7,157,811,913 for 2.5 million borrowers 
(AEMFI, 2013).Therefore, taking into account such engagements of the 
states, one may argue that the macroeconomic stabilization is not a sole 
responsibility of the Federal Government, but a shared responsibility of 
the Federal and the States. 
However, it should be noted that the role of the States in long-term 
macroeconomic management is highly influenced by the state’s fiscal 
capacity, size of fund available for lending through the MFI, Federal 
Government transfer size to the states and states’ access to borrowing. 
The pool of money for lending by the micro finance institutions has grown 
fast. There is no law that compels the Federal Government to set the floor 
Federal subsidy size.117Other variables remaining constant, the smaller 
                                                 115 Economic development expenditure includes Agriculture and natural resource, mines 
and energy, Trade, Industry & tourism; urban development and housing, road 
construction and transport and communication. Social development comprises 
expenditures on education, health, social welfare, and culture and Sports. General 
Development includes puplic Administration buildings, mapping, statistics,etc 116 All the states have MFI, but Afar and Somali for religion reasons. Currently about 28 
MFI share companies are operating across the country 
117 The Federal Government may cut the size of transfer pool when it faces fiscal stress or 
when it undertakes grand pubic investments at national level. For instance, during 
the Ethio-Eritrea border conflict (1998-2001), the Federal Government did cut the 
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the size of Federal transfers (conditional and unconditional), the less is 
the role of the States on long-term macroeconomic management because 
the States’ capital allocations on pro-poor projects are heavily dependent 
on the size of unconditional and conditional federal transfers. Similarly, 
States’ autonomy to borrow for capital investment depends on the whim 
of the Federal Government (see more on chapter 9). 
There is an opinion among economists that engagement of states in 
long-term investment projects financing through borrowing to create 
employment would raise interest rate, adversely affect private 
investments and destabilize macroeconomic environment. It is worth 
noting that financing the MSEs from Microfinance Institutions (MFI) and 
the housing development programs from the federally owned commercial 
banks have not so far caused to raise interest rates and hence have not 
negatively impacted the national investment although the programs have 
crowded out the available deposited money for lending. Lending 
opportunity to MSE is restricted to residents and thus the states’ policies 
towards employment creation and poverty reduction have not developed 
a free riding behaviour of the states. To the knowledge of the writer of 
this dissertation, there are no research outputs about the impacts of the 
programs on deficit trade balance and inflation. But no doubt the 
injection of billions of Birr into the economy has an effect on increasing 
the income of citizens and aggregate demands for consumption, which 
has contribution to the existing hyper inflation rate (34 percent) in 2010-
12. The housing development program has raised demand for imported 
intermediate construction goods (iron bar, glass sheet, cement, etc) and 
contributed to deficit trade balance at national level. 
(ii)The Revenue side-Tax power is another tool of fiscal policy. 
Governments can take expansionary or contractionary policy against 
business cycle through reducing or increasing taxes. Taxation powers of 
the States are discussed in detail in Chapter seven. Here, we briefly assess 
if the States have a role in short-term macroeconomic stabilization using 
taxation as an instrument of fiscal policy. 
                                                                                                               
size of federal unconditional grant as the war had demanded to shift the available 
scarce resources to the defense sector. 
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The States have taxation powers to levy personal income tax (PIT), 
business profit tax (BPT), Value Added Tax (VAT), excise tax and Turn over 
Tax(TOT) on sole proprietorship business organizations, rental income, 
agricultural income tax, and land use fees, to mention some. In practice, 
however, the States’ hardly have the capacity to use tax revenues as 
instruments of fiscal policy for short-term macroeconomic stabilization 
policy, partly because the States’ revenue generation capacity is too weak 
to finance their recurrent and capital expenditure needs and partly they 
apply uniform tax rates. No State is in a position to save funds in good 
periods from its own revenue and use it to smoothing its expenditure 
needs or to swift its capital expenditures for the purpose of stimulating 
the economy for short-term. 
Therefore, unlike the Swiss cantons and communes, the Ethiopian 
states and weredas are unable to shift capital resources (allocating more 
spending) for the purpose of short-term macroeconomic stabilization 
policy as they have hardly any surplus budget. But this by no mean to say 
that the states do not take long term fiscal program measures to promote 
the economic growth through allocating considerable portion of their 
revenue from the Federal unconditional transfer and/or borrowing on 
capital investment, say for construction of condominiums. Cooperation of 
the Federal Government and the States is necessary for an effective long-
term macroeconomic stabilization. The Federal Government alone cannot 
pursue prudent long-term macroeconomic management policy. Because, 
all instruments of fiscal policy are not completely in its hands. For 
example, PIT is predominantly in the hands of the States/LGs. Besides, 
BPT, VAT, and excise tax, derived from sole proprietorship are beyond the 
control of the Federal Government. Moreover, BPT, excise tax, VAT 
derived from Private limited Cos, and share Companies are concurrent 
revenue of the Federal Government and the States (see Table 7.1). All 
these, limit the ability of the Federal Government to unilaterally carry out 
macroeconomic stabilization function. Therefore, the long-term 
macroeconomic management function is a shared responsibility of the 
States and the Federal Government. However, it must be emphasized that 
the states do not have the capacity to engage in the short-term 
stabilization policy (in countering business cycle), because they have no 
fiscal capacity to shift capital resources for such a purpose. 
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5.2.2 Political economy of redistribution policy 
 
With regard to interpersonal equity and promoting welfare, the 
Federal Constitution reads: 
“The State shall, within available means, allocate resources to 
provide rehabilitation and assistance to the physically and 
mentally disabled, the aged, and to children who are left without 
parent or guardian” (Art.45.5). 
 
“Government has the duty to ensure that all Ethiopians get equal 
opportunity to improve their economic condition and to promote 
equitable distribution of wealth among them” (Art. 89.2). 
 
”To the extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall aim to 
provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean 
water, housing, food, and social security” Art.90(1)). 
 
These redistribution functions are replicated in the states’ 
Constitutions. In the Ethiopian context, interpersonal equity is beyond the 
scope of moral or humanitarian assistance. But it is also an issue of right 
to live. Hence, it is linked to meaningful poverty reduction by conscious 
political and policy choices. The States and LGs are involved in 
Interpersonal redistribution tasks through various ways: 
(i) Redistributive income revenue-The States impose progressive tax 
on PIT and rental income tax118 to mobilize resources from the ‘haves’ on 
the principle of the ability to pay. The states’ PIT collection comprises 
about 20 percent of the total national PIT revenue as compared to 2.3 
percent PIT contribution of the Federal Government (see Table7.4 in 
Chapter 7 of this Thesis).In Ethiopia, FGTFF’s argument against a 
decentralized progressive tax on PIT has no impact on influencing 
residence choice of the rich people or migration of the poor people to a 
                                                 
118  PIT and Rental income tax are  imposed progressively which goes 10 %, 15%, 20 %, 
25 % and 30 % for PLC and Sh.Cos, but are fixed at 35% and regressive taxation on 
taxable income above Birr 5000 per month. 
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more generous welfare state. First and foremost, so far, PIT is uniformly 
applied across the states. They apply uniform tax base, tax rate and 
deductions; although they have constitutional power to vary (see more 
discussion in Chapter 7). Second, even if we assume the states apply 
their constitutional power to vary the tax base and tax rate, at least in 
the foreseen future, the variation will hardly induce entrepreneurs to 
move to a lower tax rate jurisdiction because of the language, cultural 
diversity social affiliation and favouritism towards the son-of–the soil. 
Like the PIT, rental income tax is decentralized, and progressively 
taxed. The rationale for decentralizing the tax is that the relatively 
immobile nature of tax base creates less fiscally induced migrations. 
Nevertheless, because of the visible variations in rental income tax 
deduction between Addis Ababa and the States,119real estate 
development companies have made Addis Ababa their prime choice for 
real estate investment.  
Given the States have tax power on PIT and they are major collectors 
of PIT, the Federal Government cannot carryout effectively interpersonal 
equity by ignoring the States. Therefore, interpersonal equity is a shared 
responsibility of the Federal Government and the States. 
(ii) Redistributive public expenditures-All levels of government 
engage in redistributive public expenditures through carrying out the 
following programs: 
Pro poor development programs-There is no single definition of pro-
poor public spending. It varies from country to country. In Ethiopia Pro-
poor public expenditures were initially defined to include development of 
agriculture and natural resources, primary health service, primary 
education, rural water supply, and rural road development. Later on, the 
definition was modified and capacity building programs of LGs, food 
security and rural electrification expenditures have been added.120The 
                                                 
119  The Addis Ababa City Government applies 50 percent deduction from gross rental 
income for land leasers who do not have book keeping records, while all the states 
apply a 20 percent deduction from rental gross income tax. (see Personal income 
Proclamations of the States and the City Governments). 
120 In this study, only food security program, access to water supply, rural road, primary 
education and primary health are considered as pro-poor, believing that these 
services have strong association with poverty reduction, redistribution effects and 
availability of reliable data.Capacity building and rural electrification programs are 
not also considered because theyare mainly undertaken by the Federal Government. 
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States and LGs allocate considerable public expenditure on pro-poor 
development programs with the objectives to guarantee citizens equal 
access to publicly funded social services, to substantially reduce poverty, 
and to enhance local economic development. 
 
Table 5.2 . Pro-poor public spending by SNG, 2008/09, (in million Birr) 
Description State LGs 
State 
and 
Wereda 
Share in percent  
State LGs 
Economic 
Development 
     Food security 2,195 859 3,054 72 28 
Rural water supply 187 358 545 34 66 
Rural Road 1,933 69   2,002 97   3 
Social Development 
     Primary school 58 2,974 3,032  2 98 
primary health 148 496 645 23 77 
Total pro-poor 
spending  4,521  4,756   9,277 49 51 
Total expenditures 10,992 14,397 25,389 43 57 
Share of pro-poor to 
total SNG expenditure 41 33 37 
  Source: Computed from MoFED, 2001EGY (2008/9) Annual Report 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.2 below, the States and LGs respectively 
have allocated 41 percent and 33percent of their total expenditures on 
pro-poor economic sectors121. Such a pro-poor expenditure policy of the 
States and LGs has resulted in an overall fair distribution of primary 
education, primary health care, rural water supply and rural road services 
across the States/LGs. Moreover, the pro-poor public expenditure policy 
                                                 121 One may question the designation of rural road as a pro-poor program believing rural 
road expenditures benefit more rich farmers to transport their products to urban 
centres. However, so far, class distinction in rural Ethiopia is not much visible and 
rural roads serve as blood vain for providing public services like primary education, 
primary health, water supply, transportation service etc to all rural population. 
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has contributed to reduce the share of population under the poverty 
line122 from 41 percent in 1999/2000 to 29 percent in 2012 (MoFED, 
2012). 
A report on Household, Consumption and Expenditure Survey of 
2004/5 indicated a 0.30 national level Gini coefficient in Ethiopia,123 a low 
income inequality as compared to other poor African countries like 
Tanzania (0.35), Burkina Faso (0.40), and Zambia (0.42) (World 
Bank,2007:1). 
(iii) Social welfare programs -Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)124 is 
similar to the supplementary social transfer in the developed countries. It 
is a transfer to chronically food insecure rural people in the form of food 
aid and cash. The intention of this program is not to keep feeding the 
food insecure households for their lifetime, but to graduate them from 
the food insecurity vicious circle within a defined time 125 through 
supporting the poor to engage in various farming and off-farming income 
generating activities. 
The eligible candidates who are able to work are supposed to be 
engaged in public works that builds community assets such as soil and 
water conservation, construction of feeder roads, irrigation structures 
and river diversions, health posts, water points, schools and health 
institutions. Poor people who are physically weak such as orphans, 
                                                 
122 Poverty line is defined as a cut off of one United States Dollar income per day for an 
individual. 
123 The late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi used to claim that his government has attained 
accelerated and equitable economic growth rate (11 percent for consecutive 8 years 
since 2003) with, 0.29 Gini coefficients, the  highest equalization endex in Sub African 
countries( Meles Zenawi lecture at Columbia University, New York, on September 22, 
2010). Professor Desta Asayehgn (2010) is skeptical about the Prime Minister Meles 
Zenaw’s claim for the equitable system. He argues that the Gini coefficient is far below 
the newly industrialized countries and conflicts with the Kuznet’s inverted U curve 
hypothesis. He questions the methodological soundness and reliability of the data, and 
suggests the need to replicate the finding by other independent economists. 
124 The program has been in place since 2005. 
125 Payment in cash enables the beneficiaries to purchase agricultural inputs, (fertilizer, 
improved seeds, tools, ox,etc…) and to start up micro business activities such as 
livestock fattening, planting fruit trees for commercial purpose, small hold irrigation, 
beehives; debt repayment, etc.  
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pregnant and lactating mothers, and elderly are entitled to direct food 
and cash support. 
PSNP is a shared task of the Federal, States (including the City 
Governments) and local governments. The Ministry of Agricultural and 
Rural Development at Federal level, the Agriculture and Rural 
Development Bureau, the Agriculture and Rural Development Office and 
the Kebele administration take part in the implementation of the PSNP. 
The Federal Government sets eligibility criteria for PSNP, provides 
technical support to the States, designs guideline of graduation from 
PSNP and partially finances the program from its treasury.126 The tasks of 
selecting individual beneficiaries and implementation of the PSNP rest on 
sub-kebele (villages) believing that they have better information 
advantage by the fact that inhabitants of the Sub-kebele know each other 
quite well. After identifying beneficiary individuals with due care, Sub-
kebeles submit list of eligible beneficiaries to Kebele Cabinet. Kebele 
officials organize public meetings to comment on the proposed eligible 
candidates and submit it to Wereda Government after approval of the 
Kebele Council. Wereda Councils approve Kebele safety net beneficiaries, 
plan and budget, and coordinate its implementation. Then, Wereda 
Governments submit the approved safety net plan to respective State. 
Finally, the States compile eligible beneficiaries and submit it to the 
Federal Government for final decision and approval. Such a decentralized 
welfare protection has made the redistribution function more human as it 
promotes face to face communication by avoiding long bureaucratic 
procedures. It also offers advantages in identifying the needy with high 
level of transparency and justice (World Bank, 2007b). 
Beside the PSNP, the Federal government has recently introduced 
Health Insurance Scheme (HIS) (Federal, Proclamation No. 690/2010).The 
objective of the HIS is to provide quality and sustainable health care 
coverage to beneficiaries through pooling of risks and reducing financial 
barriers at the point of service delivery. The HIS is of two types: (a) for 
public and private employees and (b) for pensioners. In the case of (a), 
employers and employees contribute three percent of the employees’ 
                                                 126    Large part of the program is finaned by mobilizing resource from development 
partners and loans from the World Bank. 
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gross monthly salary.127In the case of the latter the retired contribute only 
one percent from their income. (b), they contribute only one percent 
from their income. Those not included in (a) and (b) may benefit from the 
community-based health insurance system by voluntarily organizing 
themselves in groups (Federal, Proclamation No.690/2010). 
The Federal Government subsidizes the HIS (Federal, Proclamation 
No.690/2010). The states also subsidize community-based health 
insurance system. Moreover, Wereda governments provide certificate for 
those who cannot afford to pay for their medical expenses that entitles to 
Fee Waiver scheme in health institutions under respective state Health 
Bureau. The Wereda (certificate issuing authority) pays the cost of the 
health services provided to the waived out residents (see for example 
Amhara Proclamation No.117/2005). 
(IV) Subsidization and waiving out user fees-The States and LGs also 
exempt needy people from annual education and court fees as long as 
they present testimonials from respective Kebele office. Besides, ULGs 
provide subsidized water supply targeting the low income population by 
setting block rate pricing policy. Here, the States determine minimum 
daily household tap water demand and then set block rate pricing policy, 
a type of payment in which user charge rate progressively increases based 
on blocks of household tap water consumption. 128 Likewise, a block rate 
pricing policy is applied in household electricity consumption129 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 Health Insurance scheme covers outpatient care, inpatient care, delivery services, 
surgery services and diagnostic testsonly. The Federal Health Insurance Agency opens 
regional branch offices with responsibilities ranging from reporting the number of 
ensured people, to promoting quality health service and paying the cost of the service 
to the providing institution according the contractual agreements. 128 For instance, in Addis Ababa the minimum  tap water household  monthly consumption  
block is set from 1 to 7m3 @ Birr 1.75 / m3 .The second block is 7m3-14m3 @ Birr 
3.75.The pricing rate increases as the block set increases.Note water use fee rate is Birr 
5/ m3 for the first block and increases with block in Hareri. 
129 The Ethiopian Electric Corporation belongs to the Federal Government.It generates and 
distributes power. The power supply subsidy is deductable from the dividend earnings 
of the Federal Government. 
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5.2.3 Residents’ Preferences 
 
One of the prime arguments for decentralization is that it brings 
government close to people and makes local officials to be more 
responsive to residents’ preferences than a higher authority. The core 
issue, therefore, is: to examine whether the assignments of 
responsibilities of the States and LGs in Ethiopia promote bottom-up 
decisions on provision of public services and guarantee accountability of 
local officials. 
The States and LGs are engaged in providing a range of local demand-
driven public goods and services. The States have constitutional power 
“to formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, 
strategies and plans...” that fits to their specific circumstance (Federal 
Constitution, Art.52 (2c). Nevertheless, there is a criticism that the States 
and LGs are not responsive to local preferences as the Federal 
Government influences the States to gear their budget allocation in line 
to the national goals through its Five Year Development Plans (FYDP), 
Sector Development Programs (SDPs) and the centralized Party command 
(Paulos, 2007:263 and 268; Young, 1999). 
It would be an unbalanced judgment to grossly consider that all 
components of the SDP undermine local preferences simply because they 
are initiated by the Federal Government. In a situation where access to 
basic public services were far below the average in Sub Sahara African 
countries 130(EEA, 2000), and were concentrated in a few urban areas, the 
States are likely to have similar preferences for the basic public services 
(primary education, primary health case, clean water and rural road, etc). 
Under such a situation, what is wrong if the States take the federally 
initiated sector development programs (SDP) as their own and implement 
it with the objective to provide basic public services? If the States do not 
                                                 
130 Primary school gross enrolment was only 19% in 1991.Thanks to the Education 
development program(ESDP), by 2011/12, it reached to 95.4 % (MoE,2012), heading 
towards meeting the MDG in education beforethe 2015. Access to primary health 
service and water supply were not more than 10 percent and limited to a few urban 
centres when EPRDF assumed power in 1991.Currently, 64% of the total population 
have access to clean water (MoFED, 2012). Similar achievements have been 
registered in the remaining public service areas. 
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provide such basic services to their citizens what else would be the 
preferences of the States/LGs then? 
Looking on the states’ planning process helps us  whether the Federal 
FYDP gives room to locally driven provisions of public services or not. A 
State’s planning process starts at sub Kebele level. Local people identify 
their wish list of preferences and decide how much they would contribute 
in kind for the realization of capital investment projects through their 
General meetings. The Kebele Executive bodies prepare development 
plan taking into account the demands of the sub-kebeles and submit their 
plans to respective Wereda Administration Office. The latter, in turn, 
dispatches the Kebele plans to the Office of Finance and Economic 
Development (OFED) and to concerned Offices for assessment and 
analysis. The OFED together with respective sector Offices prepare a 
preliminary development plan and submit to the OFED. Then, the latter 
makes budget and priority analysis and prepare a Wereda level 
development plan. Finally it submits to the Wereda Head Administration 
and to Wereda Council budget standing Committee. The administration 
Head tables the plan to the Executive Committee (Wereda Cabinet) for 
discussion. After deliberations, it documents a preliminary wereda 
development plan and sends it to the BoFED. The latter prepares an 
indicative FYDP by making context analysis of the state, reviewing the 
wereda preliminary plans and taking into account the national FYDP. 
Then, the Executive body of the state approves after due deliberations 
and sends it back to the Weredas to adjust their development plan in line 
with the indicative plan. In the same fashion, Weredas prepare an 
indicative plan by taking into account the state’s indicative plan and send 
it back to Kebeles. The Kebele Executive bodies discuss on the issues with 
representatives of sub-Kebele and come up with a modified list of priority 
public service. Kebele Council approves the plan and dispatches it to the 
Wereda Administration Office. Each Sector Office prepares its final draft 
development plan by considering the Kebele and the state’s indicative 
plan and submits it to the OFED. Then the Office prepares a Wereda draft 
development plan. In the process of preparing wereda development plan, 
cancellation of some Kebeles’ preferences from the list of priority 
preference is common mainly the Kebeles’ preference menu is not 
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supported by adequate finance.131 Under such a situation, some local 
preferences are compromised. Wereda Governments postpone Kebele 
demands. Wereda Councils are obliged to consider State’s development 
goals partly because the states are major financers of capital projects and 
partly because equity-oriented access to basic public service across LGs is 
a guiding principle.132 Finally, the States prepare their FYDP by taking into 
account the revised Wereda plans and the Federal Government 
development plans, strategies and policies. Thus the planning process has 
element of bottom up and top-down. 
The planning process does not always guarantee priority preferences 
of the States/LGs, however. There are practices of compromising local 
preferences for Federal /states objectives. Two common cases are in 
point. Despite the fact that there is notable agro ecological diversity 
across the States (even within a Wereda), it is not uncommon to observe 
uniform rural development approach (IFPRI, 2009:31). The Federal 
Government’s agricultural development strategy is cereal production 
centred. It gives less focus to specific local circumstances like ‘Enset’, a 
staple food in large parts of Southern Ethiopia, and animal husbandry, a 
major resource of the pastoral states and means of livelihood for the 
pastoral and semi-pastoral communities, who constitute about 15-20 
percent of the total population of the country. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) imposes on the States the 
use of Urea and DAP fertilizers, regardless of the variations of soil type 
and agro-ecology features of the states. 
The housing development program is another case. The Ministry of 
Works and Urban Development initiated the housing development 
program and facilitated borrowing scheme from the federally owned 
Commercial Bank and Construction and Saving Bank for the States to 
                                                 
131  Local people contribute about 10 -20 percent to the total capital project cost in the 
form of labour, material and money. In such condition, local people cannot hold 
accountable local politicians.  
132 Wereda Council allocates capital budgets to kebeles by taking equity into account (fair 
distribution of local public services across Kebeles). Even if all Kebele plans are 
incorporated in the Wereda development plan, in many occasions, all projects may 
not be implemented according to the plan partly due to lack of implementation 
capacity and partly donors do not disburse sufficient fund on time for the execution 
of projects for various reasons. 
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undertake massive housing development program.133 It is believed that 
the program would be essential for ULGs which suffer from acute 
shortage of residential houses. The program was not a priority preference 
for many ULGs, however. To substantiate this point of argument, for 
residents of Mekele, Shire Endasilassie, (Tigrai) and the City of Harari134 to 
mention a few, lack of drinkable water supply has been the most chronic 
and critical problem that require priority instead of constructions of 
Condominiums. Many ULGs in Amhara, Oromia, and the SNNP face similar 
problems. The states would prefer to give priority to provide water supply 
or develop rural road service than engaging in the housing development 
program. 
The critics of Paulos, (2007:263 and 268) and Young (1999) hold truth 
in relation to the Federal Government initiated housing development 
program and the forced application of Urea and DAP fertilizers at 
household level. The imposition of the Federal Government to implement 
the housing development program has undermined the States’ spending 
choices. Others might argue that in a situation where urban 
unemployment and poverty rates are critical social issues, coordinating 
the Federal and the States’ policies and creating employment 
opportunities for their residents would be among the core functions of 
the States/LGs. 
At this junction, it is worth mentioning how the Federal FYDP 
influences the states’ planning process. The ruling party, which is a 
coalition of TPLF, ANDM, OPDO, and SEPDM, sets general socio-economic 
policies, strategies and targets to be achieved in the next five years office-
term. The Prime Minister, who is a chairperson of the ruling party, 
instructs all line Ministries and Agencies to cope up with a draft of FYDP in 
                                                 
133 The prime objective of the Federal Government Housing development program of 
the 2006-2010 was to create job opportunity for the excessive unemployment, which 
had reached more than 30% in some urban centers by mid 2000s, and to address the 
deep rooted urban poverty. Realizing that the housing development program is not 
demand-driven in many ULG and contributed to the hyper inflation rate in 2005-
2010, the Ministry of Works and Urban Development ordered the States to quit from 
construction of condominiumsexcept for Addis Ababa City Administration in June 
2011. 
134 As of 2009, the problem of drinking water shortage in the City of Harari and its 
satellite towns along the Dire-Dawa-Hareri highway has been solved. Oromia, Dire-
Dawa and Harari have jointly constructed a water reservoir and installed pipes. 
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line with the Party’s development targets. The top party leadership of the 
coalition members, who are also Executive Committee of the EPRDF, 
assesses, deliberates, and enriches the draft plan before it gets approved 
by the Council of Ministries as an official development plan document135. 
Since, by design, the top state leaders are also top decision makers of the 
ruling party, the states own the national FYDP with some adjustments. In 
some cases the states take the Federal development plan as it is. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to generalize that all SDPs 
undermine local demands and preferences simply because they are 
federal initiatives. Given access to education, health service, water 
supplies, rural road, etc in Ethiopia were at the lowest ladder by any Sub 
Sahara African standards, it should be noted that the Federal Government 
initiated SDPs often coincide with the States’/LGs preferences. The SDPs 
are widely shared values. But this is by no mean to say that there is no 
conflict between maintaining States’ spending autonomy and 
implementing the Federal SDPs. 
 
5.2.4 Cost of information and decision making 
 
Other variables remaining constant, a government closest to people 
enhances grass root participation in local decision making process. 
Enjoying participatory democracy is not priceless, however. It involves 
three types of costs: 
(i)Efforts to reach decision making for a function: Exercising 
participatory democracy requires fast dissemination of information for 
decision making. It also requires negotiation and compromise until the 
decision makers reach consensus or a majority vote. Such efforts 
consume time and public funds. 
(ii)Administrative costs: These refer to salaries of administrative 
personnel, operation costs and other related expenses for running many 
but small LG closest to people. Besides, there are costs of periodic local 
election processes and salaries of elected local officials. 
                                                 135It is not clear the role of the Partners’ party and states (Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz, 
Gambela and Somali) in the process of drafting the national FYDP. 
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(iII)Information costs for transparency-. All States/LGs have enacted that 
resources and public spending should be written in a transparent 
accounting system, budget and account should be organized in a suitable 
form (that is current and capital account plus balance sheet, functional 
classification and economic classification of outlays and resources). It 
should be published and available for residents. This is a basic document 
for holding elected politician and for bureaucrats accountable to local 
voters and beneficiaries of public services.  
However, the budgeting-accounting system has its own costs, and 
publication of the budget and accounts also consume public funds. All 
these costs crowd out the scarce resources of LGs that would have been 
allocated to capital investments. Therefore, policy makers have to make a 
choice between having many small LGs, which are closer to citizens and 
reaping from economies of scale by reducing levels of government as well 
as numbers of local governments. In this regard, In Ethiopia, policy 
makers have adopted two pragmatic policies. 
(A) Redrawing LG territories- Heterogeneous States have 
redemarcated their administrative territories on ethnic-lines. Many self 
governments of minority ethnic groups have been established at 
Zone/Special Wereda levels of government regardless of their population 
size by breaking up a big multiethnic Zone/Wereda.136 When a single 
ethnic group was found too small to establish its own Zone/Special 
Wereda, two or more small ethnic groups with similar cultures and 
languages were brought together to form a Zone/Special Wereda 
Government. As a result, in the SNNP, the numbers of ZA/ SWA and 
Wereda governments have increased substantially. The establishments of 
new Zonal /SW and Wereda Governments are associated with exercising 
self-government right. 
                                                 
136 For instance, average population size of a Wereda Government is about 
100,000-120,000, but Irob, a minority ethnic group in Tigrai, enjoys a Wereda 
status with 25,000 population. Regardless of their population size, minority 
ethnic groups of Awi, Oromo, Agew and Argoba in Amhara enjoy preferential 
Zone Government status. So do ethnic groups in SNNP, Gambela and 
Benshagul-Gumuz exercise their right to self-government and celerate 
cultural autonomy, althoughproviding public function is more expensive. 
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In Oromia, Administrative Zones and Weredas were redrawn. As a 
result, the numbers of urban and rural weredas have increased from 180 
to 305 for the same period. The fragmentation of LGs in Oromia is not 
associated with guaranteeing minority rights but was done to make local 
governments closer to people so that citizens would participate actively in 
local decision making process. It means that this territorial organization is 
more homogenous and this reduces efforts to take decision making for a 
function (cost I) above. A citizen, as a voter, can follow the local leader 
without too much effort of information: Citizens’ tastes are closer to each 
other. But it increases administration costs (cost II) and more budgeting 
and accounting processes (cost III). And also it reduces possible 
economies of scale in the production and delivery of local public services. 
(B) Compulsory amalgamation policy- Taking into account the impact 
on administrative costs of having small and many local governments on 
the very scarce public finance, States of Tigrai and Amhara have opted for 
reducing the number of Weredas. Two entire or partial neighbouring 
Weredas were merged to establish a ‘bigger’ Wereda Government. 
Similarly, two or more Kebeles (Tabias) were amalgamated to form a 
bigger Kebele Administration. Such a compulsory merging policy reduced 
the number of rural Weredas almost by half in Tigrai and Amhara. Here, 
Weredas decision making cost is less: less administrative cost(cost II), less 
costs in budgetary and accounting system (cost III), and access to 
economies of scale, but the risk is to have less homogeneous preferences, 
thus the cost of individuals’ information and decision-making is 
higher(costly). 
 
5.2.5 Economies of Scale 
 
One has to distinguish between economies of scale on investment 
and on consumption of goods/services. Capital intensive public services 
may yield benefit from economies of scale, if the production function 
meets a minimal level of thresholds. In other words, unit fixed investment 
cost of public services is high in the first units of service and then the 
average fixed investment cost rapidly decreases with increase in the 
number of beneficiaries (of residents) until it reaches at the lowest point 
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of the U production curve. Economies of scale on consumption of 
goods/services vary by service. Some public services can be consumed at 
a lower cost with the lowest point of U curve number of consumers For 
example, higher education level, hospital level health service, highway, 
demand more numbers of beneficiaries. In contrast, solid waste 
management service is efficient at inverse U curve, meaning it requires 
smaller number of consumers. This is the logic behind the assignment of 
solid waste management to municipalities. Postal, air, train and 
communication services are assigned to the Federal Government for 
reasons of economies of scale and inter-jurisdictional effects. 
Pursuant to State’s residual power, establishing and administering 
Nursing school, Teachers Training Colleges, Regional Agricultural Research 
Institutes, Regional Referral Hospital, to mention a few, are States’ 
responsibilities. The States have not devolved these responsibilities to 
Zone/Special Wereda or Wereda; because these functions require large 
population size if they are to be provided at lower a cost. Devolving these 
responsibilities to the LGs will result in inefficiency or sub optimal 
provision of the public services; because LGs will produce these public 
services within the production frontier. 
This is not to say that the responsibilities of establishing and 
administrating TVET, Zonal hospital service and Zonal Court services, to 
mention some, at Zonal level coincide with the definition of economies of 
scale, because these public services cannot have the same economies of 
scale across the Zones where the population sizes significantly vary by 
Zones. These services could be efficiently provided by establishing 
functional territories for each public service without losing Weredas’ 
discretion power. 
The States/LGs may maximize benefits from economies of scale on 
consumption of goods/services through coordinating their activities. For 
example the states coordinate bulky and high value procurement 
processes. The States have delegated to the Ethiopian Pharmaceutical 
Control Authority, which is responsible to carry procurements of bulky 
and large values of medical equipments and pharmaceuticals. The MoE 
also coordinates publishing of text books for secondary and technical 
schools. Coordination of purchasing processes at Federal level for large 
value procurements reduces costs of information and preparation of bid 
 166 
 
documents. It also increases negotiation power of the buyers and enables 
them to get the goods at a lower price. Coordination of procurements 
processes between two or more states is also possible, although no state 
has taken any initiative to coordinate joint procurement. Similarly, 
publishing secondary and technical text books at national level would 
enable the states to reap benefits from economies of scale. 
Literatures on fiscal federalism suggest that the problem of 
diseconomies of scale and spills over due to smallness of a jurisdiction 
could be addressed either by amalgamation of LGs or contracting out 
public services (Slack, 2006) or establishing functional territories (Oates, 
1972). The City Proclamations of the States acknowledge the first two 
alternative mechanisms, although, so far, no urban local government has 
taken such an initiative. This is because LGs hardly internalize the cost of 
public services with benefits. They wait for the state to finance their 
expenditure needs. Had LGs been made accountable for their decision 
choice, they would have looked for the best alternatives either through 
amalgamation or contracting out the services or forming functional 
territories with neighbouring ULGs. 
 
5.2.6 Inter-jurisdictional externality/ spill over effect 
 
The principle of inter-jurisdictional externality has well served in the 
assignment of responsibilities between the Federal Government and the 
States. The assignments of formulating and executing foreign investment 
policies and strategies, inter-state commerce, establishing and 
administering national defence and public security, as well as federal 
police, development and administration of air, rail, waterways, and sea 
transport and major roads linking two or more States as well as 
determining and administrating the utilization of the river waters and 
lakes linking two or more States or crossing the boundaries of the 
national territorial jurisdictions, administrating and establishing federally 
funded institutions (such as universities) that provide services to two or 
more States, to the Federal Government had been justified by the inter-
jurisdictional externality argument. Had these responsibilities been 
assigned to the States, they would have generated inefficient resource 
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allocation or the services would have been sub-optimally provided or 
would have developed free riding behaviour. 
Inter-jurisdictional externalities (spill over effect) have produced 
positive or negative effects.  
 
Positive inter-jurisdictional externality effects 
 
(I) Higher education service: Tigrai established the Mekele Institute of 
Technology (MIT) that used to admit the best students from all 
preparatory schools of Tigrai,137 with the objective to produce best future 
technocrats in the fields of computer science engineering, electrical 
engineering, Communication engineering, and biochemistry engineering 
by granting scholarships to the outstanding students. Tigrai’s public 
expenditure policy on higher education has produced positive inter-
jurisdictional externality to the other States. Because large part of the MIT 
graduates migrated to Addis Ababa for seeking jobs partly the economic 
base of Tigrai is not adequate to capture all the graduates and partly for 
better payment and career development opportunity. The Federal 
Agencies, Addis Ababa City Government and the private sector have 
benefited from the Tigrai’s investment on the MIT. 
(II) Education and health services: Harari’s and Dire Dawa’s 
expenditures on education primary, secondary and TVET) and health 
services have made beneficiaries to the neighbouring residents of Oromo 
and Somali. 
(III) Environmental protection is another source of spill over effect. 
Highland jurisdictions’ public expenditures on soil and water conservation 
activities produce positive spill over effect on the downstream 
jurisdictions. It not only prevents flooding and gully erosion, but also 
increases ground water sources at the bottom of hill jurisdictions. 
 
Negative spill over effect 
 
There are federal and state laws that oblige the States and ULGs to 
keep the shipment of their solid wastes to other jurisdictions for final 
                                                 137By policy, admission to MIT was limited to Tigrians only. 
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disposal or to recycle or dispose wastes in an environmentally sound 
manner (Federal Proclamation No.513/2007). In violation of this 
environmental proclamation, the States/ULGs have kept polluting 
neighbouring states/LGs by discharging sewerage and dumping waste 
materials. Addis Ababa City Government is a typical example. The City 
discharges its waste water (including industrial chemical by products) 
without any treatment to the Akaki River, which flows to Oromia and 
pollutes those who reside along the river. The City also dumps its solid 
waste materials at Repi area, and pollutes the residents of Sebeta town, 
Oromia State. 
Other ULGs also cause negative externalities to their neighbouring 
rural LGs by discharging sewerage and solid waste materials. For example, 
Jima town discharges its sewer to Gibe River and negatively affects the 
life of residents along the river. Mekele, Adama, Bahia Dar metropolitans, 
to mention a few, also dispose their solid waste materials and sewerage 
at vicinity rural jurisdictions. The Hawasa City pollutes the Hawassa Lake.  
Literatures on fiscal federalism teach that any spill over effect/inter-
jurisdictional externality has to be internalized. Benefits or costs derived 
from policy measure(s) of a jurisdiction have to be compensated through 
financial indemnity. 
Paradoxically enough, neither the negatively affected jurisdictions 
have asked compensation for the negative spill over effects they have 
born nor has the Federal Environment Authority enforced the 
implementation of the environmental protection policy. 
 
5.2.7 Institutional (political) preference 
 
The choice of the ethnic-based political forces to have a strong State 
is a reaction to the unjust relationships the NNP had over the last century. 
As discussed earlier, during early 1900s to 1991, the country was 
characterized by centre-periphery relationship. The political, economic 
and cultural hegemony of a single ethnic group had instigated various 
ethnic-based political forces to wage armed struggle against national 
oppression for broad autonomy under a democratic union or for full 
independence. EPRDF, the architect of the multi-ethnic federal 
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arrangement, and other political elites believe that reshaping the political 
system that grants a wide range of political, administrative, and fiscal 
powers to the States would guarantee a union on free will of people, 
addresses the long standing national question in Ethiopia, and rectifies 
the “historically unjust relationship” between the NNP (Federal 
Constitution Preamble). Therefore, forging strong states from the then 
unitary and highly centralized political system and recognizing the right of 
NNP to self-determination, up to and including secession, has been taken 
as a compromise solution to holding together under unity-in-diversity 
principle. The multiethnic federal setting is also argued to benefit from 
the advantages of both greatness and littleness of a nation-state. For 
EPRDF and many ethnic-based political parties, following suit the Eritrean 
path in establishing small sovereign states would not maximize the 
wellbeing of the NNP, secure economic growth and regional peace and 
security. They also believe that pursuing “one country, one People” by 
concealing the existence of ethnic diversity for the sake of territorial 
integration is not a prudent state building strategy. Thus, the choice for 
the multiethnic federation is to benefit (large market size, security, 
resources, etc) from staying together and to accommodate the long 
standing nation/nationality issue by guaranteeing self-rule right of the 
NNP. 
The federal arrangement has caused a paradigm shift from unitary 
and centralized political system to have strong Regions/States. As Brosio 
and Gupta, (1997:505) note, “The expenditure responsibilities assigned to 
the Federal and State Governments in the constitution is close to what is 
found in a highly decentralized system.” The States of Ethiopia have their 
own constitutions, flags, legislative, executive and judicial bodies. They 
determine their budgets and formulate their own development plans and 
strategies, working language and medium of instruction in schools. They 
establish their own government institutions; including police force. Above 
all, the Federal Constitution guarantees the right of Nations, Nationalities 
and People (NNP) to self determination up to and including secession 
(Federal Constitution, Art.39 (1). and, residual powers are reserved to the 
States (Federal Constitution,Art.52 (1). 
As far as preferences to language and culture are concerned, the 
multiethnic federal arrangement has created more or less a perfect 
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correspondence between the States/LGs on the one hand, and ethnic 
groups who would like to use own language, to develop and promote 
their own culture, and to preserve own history on the other. In other 
words, Zones/Special Weredas have been carved out almost as many as 
the number of ethnic groups. And those ethnic groups who have 
homogeneous tastes and preferences for using own language in offices 
and in primary schools, and those who want to celebrate same culture 
have established own jurisdictions either at State or Zone or Special 
Wereda level of government. 
 
5.2.8 Minimum national standard of public service 
delivery 
 
There is no document that explicitly defines the minimum national 
standard of public services packages in Ethiopia. The nearest proximity 
available legal framework is Article 90(1) of the Federal Constitution 
which notes, “To the extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall 
aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean 
water, housing, food and social security”. In addition, one may also 
include access to rural road service (universal access to road) to the above 
list of the basic public services. 
The Federal Constitution has made delivery of minimum national 
standard public service as a criterion in the assignment of responsibilities 
between the Federal Government and the States. The assignments of 
primary health, primary education, drinkable water, rural road to the 
State ensure minorities’ right to have access to basic public services. 
Ensuring minimum national standard public services delivery 
(MNPDS) is argued both for equity and efficiency reasons. Guaranteeing 
equal access to basic public services to all citizens regardless of their 
residence area rectifies the past asymmetric relationship and serves as an 
instrument to promote voluntarily union of the NNP. Achieving minimum 
standard provision of public service has also efficiency element as it 
checks mobility of fiscal induced mobility by providing better quality and 
quantity of public services. Here, the crucial questions are: which 
government level fixes the MNSPSD? And who pays for those MNSPSD? 
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The Federal Government determines the MNSPSD and each State may set 
its own MNSPSD in line with the Federal objectives. With regard to 
financing, the Federal Government transfers unconditional and 
conditional grants to the states for meeting the national standards, while 
the States allocate capital expenditures to respective LGs taking equal 
distribution of basic public services in mind across the LGs. 
 
5.2.9 Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
The following articles of the Federal Constitution are adhering to the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
 
“All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and People 
of Ethiopia” (Art. 8). 
 
“States shall be established at State and other administrative levels 
that they find necessary. Adequate power shall be granted to the 
lowest units of government to enable the People to participate 
directly in the administration of such unit” (Art. 50.4). 
 
“All powers not given expressly to the Federal Government alone, or 
concurrently to the Federal Government and the States are reserved 
to the States” (Art. 52(1)). 
 
“Guided by Democratic principles, Government shall promote and 
support the People’s self rule at all levels” Art.88 (1). 
 
The subsidiarity principle puts people at the centre. The corner stone 
of the principle is that people are the sources and owners of all powers. A 
government level closer to people is more responsive to local 
preferences. It also promotes bottom-up and top-down accountabilities. 
The Ethiopian experience shows that inadequate institutional, human, 
administrative and fiscal capacities were/are not persuasive arguments 
not to devolve power from the centre to the states. Neither these 
problems are justifications to pass over powers and functions upward. 
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The constraints of managerial capacity have been addressed through 
integrated and multifaceted capacity building programs. The weak fiscal 
capacity of the States has been also addressed through fiscal transfers. 
In Ethiopia, the assignment of responsibilities between the Centre 
and the States is a bottom-up, but a top-down assignment between the 
State and LGs. Any passing over of a State’s competency requires a 
constitutional amendment. But in practice, there are recentralization 
tendencies. Neither the Federal Constitution nor the States’ Constitution 
provides upward delegation clause for whatever reason, although the 
Federal Government may delegate its competence(s) to the 
States 138(Federal Constitution, Art.50.9). The logic behind preventing 
upward delegation is to deter any possible desire of the Federal 
Government to concentrate power since upward delegation is likely to 
undermine the powers and functions of the States. However, upward 
delegation is not only common but has also been initiated by the federal 
Government. The upward power ‘delegation’ of the rural land 
administration to grant land for large agricultural investment and urban 
land administration to establish industrial zones are typical examples. The 
Ministry of Agriculture and natural Resource Development, a Federal 
Agency, has taken away the States’ land administration competence 
above 5000 hectares of rural land suitable for agricultural investment.139 
According to the discussion made with the Head of Agricultural 
Investment Office, the Federal Government has chosen to administer 
unoccupied agricultural lands exceeding five thousand hectares to (I) 
strengthen competitive capacity of the country in attracting FDI by 
preparing and delivering agricultural land for investment at nominal lease 
rate. The policy presupposes that the States lack managerial capacity to 
deliver sufficient land on time to investors because they do not have 
adequate and reliable land stock data, and (II) to curb corruption at lower 
level of government as land has become a major source of rent seeking at 
                                                 
138 Likewise the States may delegate their powers and functions to LGs. 
139 The Federal Investment Agency, established under the Ministry of Industry, has also 
taken the administration of urban lands in selected urban centres for industrial Zone 
since 2009. The Agency decides where to establish high level industrial zones for 
what manufacturing activities. 
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State and local levels of government. The first argument might have some 
grain of truth, although the problem of managerial capacity could have 
been addressed through capacity building programs and providing 
information to the states but there is no empirical evidence that supports 
the Federal officials are less corrupt than local ones. 
The beneficiary states might consider the Federal Government 
intervention in the areas of developing industrial zones as blessing since 
all infrastructural investment costs (road, power, internet and 
communication facilities, etc) are covered by the Federal Government 
and makes them to maximize their share from concurrent revenue 
sources. Nevertheless, the up-ward ‘delegation’ poses constitutional 
issue. It also shifts public investment in favour of the selected states 
which definitely widens the existing fiscal disparity in the long-term140. 
The benefit–received principle is less respected. The benefits of water 
supply service are limited to a small jurisdiction and, therefore, the 
assignment of providing water supply has to be a local task. However, the 
Federal Government used to construct and to co-finance water reservoirs 
for provision of water supply services in some towns141. The States have 
engaged in supply and production of water supply and leave the delivery 
and administration tasks to the LGs. Since the states do not bill the true 
costs of production to the LGs, the pricing determination for the service 
at the local level is incorrect. In other words, LGs do not internalize the 
cost of the benefit. In some cases, construction of intra state roads and 
dams for irrigation that serve a single state are also financed by the 
Federal Government. 
5.3 Budget Autonomy of the States and Local Governments 
Budget autonomy refers to whether a State/LG has the capacity to 
“decide alone, fully independently, the categories, quantity and quality of 
                                                 
140.Addis ababa, Oromia, Amhara(Kombolich) and Dire Dawa have been selected  for the 
establishments of the Chinese style special economic zones 
141 For example, water supply projects of Mekele, Adama, and Bahir Dar, to mention a 
few, were carried out by the Federal Government. In addition, provision of water 
supply has been operated on subsidy by respective States, although a reform has 
undergone to gradually  operate the state owned Water Supply and Sewerage 
Agencies on full cost recovery principle. 
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services that it intends to offer to its residents” (Dafflon and Madiès, 
2009:67).Put differently, states’/LGs’ degree of budget autonomy can be 
explained through the power they have over controlling local policy and 
discretion on recurrent and capital budget; the extent of SNG’s power to 
formulate internal policies and spending discretion between recurrent 
and capital expenditures as well as budget allocation among sectors, 
setting standards and regulations in line with national values, and 
freedom to determine mix and modes of distribution of public services 
(own producing, or outsourcing or introducing build, operate and transfer 
system or privatizing public services)(Bell. et.al. 2006:27,and Shah,2006). 
Budget autonomy and expenditure decentralization are not the same. 
Expenditure decentralization is defined as a ratio of total sub national 
government expenditure to total national expenditure. It provides insight 
into the role of SNGs in public service delivery. However, it is inadequate 
to reveal SNGs’ budget autonomy for the following reasons. (i) Greater 
expenditure decentralization ratio does not necessarily imply high SNGs’ 
budget autonomy, because higher ratio can be achieved by meeting 
targets set by a higher level of government; (ii) higher expenditure 
decentralization ratio could be registered as a result of executing 
delegated functions of a higher authority and/or shared functions 
(including a higher authority), rather than devolved functions, (iii) two 
decentralized states with different degree of budget autonomy may have 
same expenditure decentralization ratio, and, (iv) even under a more 
decentralized system, the ratio does not indicate whether the 
expenditure decentralization is limited at state level or goes down to LG 
levels (Bahl and Linn, 1992:390-91). 
The States enjoy full discretion over recurrent and capital budget 
allocation as well as across sectors. They determine the mix of public 
services and allocation of public budget among social development, 
economic development and General development. They allocate their 
budget where they think appropriate. As can be seen from Figure 5.1 
below, over 1993/4 to 2011/12 fiscal years, Oromia and Tigrai, exhibited 
to be more development orientation in their budget allocation by 
allocating 97 percent and 93 percent of their total capital budget for 
economic and social developments respectively. Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa 
and Gambela allocated about 90 percent of their capital budget on 
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economic and social development. In contrast Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz, 
Harari, and Somali allocated, on average, only 76 percent of their total 
capital budget on economic and social development sectors, and had a 
great share on General development (24 percent), which includes public 
spending on public administration. As discussed above, the states can set 
their own minimum regional standard public service taking the Federal 
standard as a benchmark. 
States’/LG’s budget autonomy should be also assessed from the 
functions they carry out and whether the functions are devolved, 
delegated or deconcentrated (Dafflon and Madiès, 2009:68-69). Looking 
through the Federal Constitution, the States enjoy considerable powers 
(see Table 5.1). 
In line with the Wereda level decentralization (WLD), the States have 
devolved some powers to respective Wereda governments. Weredas 
enjoy Administration autonomy. They have discretion to hire, promote, 
transfer, and take disciplinary measures on their public employees. 
Primary school, Primary health inter-wereda road service, land 
administration are also devolved to the Weredas. Secondary education, 
TEVT, and hospital level health service are delegated powers. Police 
service appeared to be a deconcentrated form of decentralization. 
Weredas prepare their budget and allocate recurrent and capital 
expenditures. Nevertheless, wereda capital budget needs are centralized 
at State level. The States decide what capital projects, and where they 
should be undertaken considering equal access to basic public service 
across the LGs in mind. This implies that Weredas apply States’ policies 
and norms with little discretion to modify and provide public service 
menu set by the States. 
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Figure 5.1. Capital expenditures by States, 1993/34- 2011/2 
 
Source: Computed from MoFED data base 
 
Generally speaking, for technical, managerial institutional and 
political reasons, all Weredas do not enjoy the same level of budget 
autonomy. Weredas in the relatively advanced States enjoy better 
decision making power than their counterparts in the Emerging States. 
Weredas characterized by weak managerial, institutional and financial 
capacities, clan based social organizations have less functions and powers.  
Weredas’ power varies within the relatively advanced States too. The 
Functional Zone Administrations in Amhara and Oromia have stronger 
hands in the local affairs than the Zonal Administrations (ZAs) in Tigrai. In 
the latter, authorities of the ZAs are limited to coordinate the 
responsibilities and functions of Bureaus of Trade & Industry, Urban 
Development & Construction, and Water resource development & 
mining, while in Amhara and Oromia, ZAs are active in all sectors (see 
Amhara, Proclamation No.33/2005, and Megaleta Oromia, Proclamation 
No.16/2006). Moreover, in Oromia, ZAs are stronger than in Amhara as 
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they decide on issues of the Wereda Administration. Mayors are 
appointed by a President of the State (Oromia, Proclamation 
No.16/2006), while in the other States Mayor are elected among the 
City/Municipal Councillors. The concentration of functions and powers at 
the state level and the interferences of functional ZAs over the Weredas’ 
affairs have installed delegation and deconcentration forms of 
decentralization and a paternal State-LGs relationship. 
Establishments of functional ZAs were necessary in the 1990s, when 
administrative, institutional, and technical capacities of Weredas were 
very weak and professionals were almost second to none in the labour 
market. One may question the rationale for perpetuating the FZA after 
two decades where lack of skilled manpower is no more a problem.142 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The Federal Constitution came out of revolution led by predominantly 
ethnic-based political forces, which had been waging armed struggle 
demanding either for wide political power, administrative discretion, and 
fiscal and social autonomy under democratic Ethiopia or for full 
independence. The Federal Constitution grants a wide range of 
responsibilities to the states including the residual power to the States to 
respond the political preferences of the dominant political force. 
Theories of fiscal federalism do not provide golden rule of assignment 
of responsibilities, but only general guidelines. Different countries apply 
different mix of economic and non-economic factors in the process of 
designing the responsibilities to different level of government. The choice 
of non-economic variable and the weights given to each variable are main 
sources of variation for assignment of responsibilities in a federal setting. 
The principles of assignment of responsibilities between the Federal 
Government and the States as well as between the States and wereda 
applied in Ethiopia are summarized below. 
 
 
                                                 
142 LGs have registered remarkable improvements in building their managerial 
capacities. Public and private universities have been producing thousands of young 
graduates every year, although experienced manpower is still unresolved problem. 
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Table 5.3.Summary Principles of Assignment of responsibilities  
Economic variables Non-economic variables 
Macroeconomic management political preferences 
Interpersonal redistribution Minimum national standard 
delivery of public service 
Residences’ preferences Principle of subsidiarity 
Cost of information and  
decision making 
 
Economies of scale  
Inter-jurisdictional externality  
 
 
Managerial capacity (administration, institution) and fiscal capacity 
were not taken into account in the assignment of responsibilities between 
the Federal Government and the States, but they are criteria for the 
Wereda level decentralization.  
In spite of the fact that the States’ fiscal capacity is very weak to play 
a role in short term stabilization policy through fiscal policy, it is by no 
means to say that the long term macroeconomic growth is a sole 
responsibility of the Federal Government. The Federal Government is too 
weak to use unilaterally PIT and business profit tax as fiscal policy 
instruments, because the former is predominantly in the hands of the 
States and a lion’s share of the latter is a concurrent taxation power of 
the Federal and the States. Therefore, the Federal government cannot 
use fiscal policy alone without cooperation and negotiation with the 
States. 
The States control PIT and rental income tax, the most important 
instruments of interpersonal redistribution variable. Large portion of 
progressive taxes such as PIT and rental income tax are derived from the 
States /LGs, which are not in the hands of the Federal Government tax 
power. The PSNP and HIS are also shared functions. These exhibit that the 
Federal Government alone cannot pursue effective redistribution policies 
without the involvement of the States. Therefore, inter-personal 
redistributive function is shared among the federal, States and local 
governments that need cooperation and coordination of policies. 
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The intention of reserving residual power to the States is to guarantee 
wider legislative, political and cultural powers to the States. However, de 
facto the States are not as strong as the Federal Constitution stipulates. 
Moreover, weredas do not have a say in the law making process at States 
level. They do not participate in the law making process. Neither their 
consent is mandatory before legislation is ratified. 
The Party channel is an effective instrument in influencing lower 
levels of government to accept the goals of a higher level of government. 
In doing so, State/local politicians are the core actors. State Heads and 
almost all members of the executive bodies at the States level are top 
party officials.143 Similarly, members of the executive bodies at LG levels 
are, by and large, members of the ruling party. The States prepare their 
Five Year Development Plans in line with the Party policy, strategy, and 
social and economic plan in mind, because State/LG decision makers 
believe that EPRDF’s social and economic policies, strategies and plans as 
well as the developmental statism philosophy are indispensable. 
The separation of powers and functions between the Federal 
Government and the States can be characterized by devolution form of 
decentralization, while few tasks of weredas are devolved and many 
functions are either delegated or deconcentrated forms of 
decentralization. 
  
                                                 
143 State ruling parties in the relatively less developed States and in Harari are not 
formal coalition of the EPRDF, but they are close partners of the ruling party and 
have similar political programs with the EPRDF. 
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Once separation of assignment of responsibilities among different 
levels of government is done, tax assignment should follow. Tax 
assignment refers to which level of government must have what powers 
to determine tax bases, to set tax rates and to administer taxes types 
(Shah, 2004). 
Literatures of the FGTFF consider economic factors such as efficiency, 
national equity, benefit-received principle, and administration feasibility, 
as the main criteria for separation of taxation powers, whereas the SGTFF 
in addition to the economic principles includes non-economic factors. 
This chapter discusses the theories of tax assignment among 
different levels of government in a federal system. The chapter is 
organized into four sections. The first section discusses the general 
principles of tax assignment from the FGTFF and SGTFF perspectives. The 
former prescribes mobile tax bases and cyclical nature tax bases should 
be assigned to the centre, while immobile tax bases like property tax and 
user fees to LGs. Such a prescription presupposes that macroeconomic 
and redistribution functions are sole tasks of a central government. The 
SGTFF takes into account economic and non-economic factors. The 
second section deals with a tax assignment decision matrix that serves as 
a general tax assignment guideline. The third section examines horizontal 
and vertical tax competitions as well as causes and effects of tax 
externality. Objectives and forms of tax harmonization are also discussed. 
The last section deals with techniques for measuring financial autonomy 
and tax autonomy of SNGs. 
 
6.1 General Principles of Tax Assignment 
Literatures on fiscal federalism do not provide any golden rule for tax 
assignment; but there are some general principles of tax assignment. 
Musgrave (1983), in his seminal work “Who Should Tax, Where and 
When?” has formulated some principles of tax assignment to different 
levels of government. The FGTFF principles of tax assignment are based 
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on the premises of the trio branches of public sector that assign 
macroeconomic stabilization and redistribution to the central 
government only and the function of resources allocation to both central 
and sub national governments (Bird, 2008:7; McLure, 1999; Ambrosanio 
and Bordignon, 2006:312 and 319; King, 1984). According to the FGTFF 
prescription: (i) tax bases with cyclical nature should be assigned to the 
centre,  (ii) mobile tax bases having highly progressive rate for 
redistributive purpose should be assigned only to the central government 
to avoid labour mobility and capital flight for tax reasons, wasteful 
competition among states/LGs and to reduce compliance costs 
(Musgrave, 1983; Oates, 1972; Ter-Minassian 1997; Tanzi, 1995), and,  (ii) 
Sub national governments’ taxation power should be limited to immobile 
taxes, user charge fees and excise taxes. Such assignments of tax leave 
sub national governments with the smaller and the less buoyant tax 
bases. As a consequence, it creates a wide vertical fiscal gap. 
The SGTFF gives due respect to the FGTFF’s well-founded economic 
tax assignment principles. But in addition to the economic arguments for 
(de) centralizing tax bases, the SGTFF considers non-economic variables 
like tax autonomy, accountability, tax flexibility, etc. It argues that if 
states and LGs are to enjoy tax autonomy, in addition to user charges and 
immobile real property taxes, they must have access to various revenue 
sources including mobile tax bases, at least marginally. Indeed, the SGTFF 
has enriched the Musgravian tax assignment principles. 
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Table 6.1. General Principles of Tax Assignment 
Criteria Content 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macro-
economic 
stability 
 
Tax bases like CIT and PIT having cyclical nature, 
and fluctuating with economic down turn and boom 
should be assigned to a central government.CIT and 
PIT are also critical instruments of macroeconomic 
stabilization policy (Oates, 1972; Musgrave, 1983; 
Tanzi, 1995 and Ter-Minassian, 1997 and McLure, 
1999). Central government can induce economic 
activities by reducing CIT or granting tax relief that 
would attract investors. It may also increase CIT 
and/or PIT rates to supplement the financing of huge 
public work programs, when it plans to awake the 
economy from recession or to maintain a reasonable 
economic growth rate. As CIT and PIT fluctuates with 
economic environment, disaggregating a large tax 
base through decentralization to SNGs would 
increase SNGs fiscal stress when the economy heads 
for a downturn. The taxation assignment to the State 
should be stable tax bases in order to perform 
smoothly the responsibilities they assume.  
 
 
 
 
Inter- 
personal 
equity 
Progressive PIT must be assigned to the centre 
for redistribution purpose. If a jurisdiction 
unilaterally imposes high progressive tax rate on PIT, 
for redistribution purpose, low income people would 
flow to a relatively generous welfare state/LG. On 
the contrary, high income people would leave the 
jurisdiction and migrate to a less welfare one. Thus, 
decentralizing a highly progressively PIT for the 
purpose of interpersonal equity will end up with 
bankruptcy where the better welfare jurisdiction 
would no longer have the financial means for its 
redistributive policy (Oates, 1972; Musgrave, 1983; 
Tanzi ,1995 and Ter-Minassian,1997).  
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Mobility 
Mobile tax bases should be assigned to a central 
government, because uncoordinated decentralized 
tax decisions of SNGs on mobile tax bases would lead 
to wasteful tax competition to attract investment 
into their jurisdiction. Other variables remain the 
same; capital flow will concentrate in a jurisdiction 
where tax rates are lower and deductions and 
exemptions on mobile tax bases are higher. 
Decentralizing mobile tax bases distorts allocation of 
productive forces, as it causes fiscally induced 
migration of capital and labour to a lower tax 
jurisdiction with better or some public services 
(Oates, 1972; Musgrave, 1983; Tanzi, 1995 and Ter-
Minassian, 1997). 
However, the effects of decentralized PIT and CIT 
might be less in producing fiscally induced mobility 
for reasons of psychological and social values 
(cultural language, and local affection). This is more 
pronounced in multiethnic societies. Decentralized 
PIT and CIT may not lead to inefficient allocation of 
productive resources, if the cost of mobility is 
perceived higher than the net fiscal benefit (Boadway 
and Shah, 2009). Thus, a rational person makes 
calculus not only on tax rate and cost of public 
services that are disposable in a destination 
jurisdiction, but also the cost of social values of 
migration before he /she decides to migrate. 
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Unevenly 
distributed 
Natural 
resources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Musgrave (1983) argues for a centralized 
assignment of natural resources, because 
decentralized unevenly distributed tax bases would: 
(i) Result in a wide disparity in net fiscal benefit 
which, in turn, gives rise to fiscally induced mobility of 
resources. It makes natural resources endowed sub 
national governments to provide more quality and 
quantity public services and/or provide public services 
at lower tax rate, while poor ones will be forced to raise 
their tax rate in order to provide comparable basic 
public services. In turn, this is likely to cause fiscally 
induced mobility of labour and capital;  
(ii) Creates wide horizontal disparity between rich 
and poor jurisdictions. Wide inequality in public service 
delivery across states likely triggers conflicts. There are 
two sorts of revenue that are generated from natural 
resource: revenue from natural resources directly 
(permission to exploit, license) and mobilizing 
revenue (tax) from mining natural resources. 
Revenues from taxation are inherently volatile and 
are highly vulnerable to global economic situations. A 
global price cut adversely affects the macroeconomic 
environment. The effect of a decentralized 
assignment of natural resource taxation makes the 
macroeconomic stabilization more complicated. It 
may result in unsustainable public expenditures 
(extravagant expenditure during boom periods and 
fiscal stress when economy downturns), if sub 
national governments fail to save adequate money in 
good periods for bad days to smooth their 
expenditure needs during economic crises. These 
arguments justify for a centralized natural resource 
tax. 
McLure (1994 and 1999), however, argues that 
assignment of unevenly natural resources and/or 
economic bases to states may serve as a glue to keep 
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Unevenly 
distributed 
Natural 
resources 
resource endowed states within the federation or to 
join to a federation.  
Neither a complete decentralization nor a fully 
centralization of unevenly distributed natural 
resources revenue are immune from problems. Both 
policies may lead to develop secession mentality, 
particularly in a heterogeneous society.  On the other 
hand, a completely decentralized unevenly 
distributed natural resources revenue and economic 
bases likely to cause wide horizontal economic 
disparities and economic hegemony that may 
develop a mentality of “Why we are subsidizing 
others, while we can be better-off separately”. On 
the other, full centralization of unevenly natural 
resources revenues may deny the resource endowed 
States to benefit from our resources. As a 
compromise deal Politicians may assign revenues 
generated from unevenly distributed natural 
resource revenues and economic bases to be shared 
between a central government and sub national 
governments. In addition, guaranteeing SNGs 
compensation scheme for environmental damages 
caused by mining operations and for using local 
public services would be necessary to avoid 
secessionist tendency as well as to address economic 
disparity among States. 
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Benefit- 
received 
principle 
User charges and fees must be assigned to a level 
of government that provides a particular public 
service. LGs have to have access to the user charges 
for providing municipality services like water supply, 
intercity road service, collection of solid waste 
materials, entertainment and parking (Oates, 1972; 
Bird, 2008; 
 
    
        
          
  
 
 
Visibility and 
accountability 
Accountability of local officials to their 
constituencies is stronger if local public services are 
financed predominantly from local taxes and user 
charges, because residents would have power to 
control the utilization of budget allocation. Thus, the 
assignment of taxes to LGs must be visible to tax 
payers, if accountability is to prevail. This needs a 
properly organized budget, account and annual 
publication. (McLure, 1999; 
    
 
 
Tax  
exportation 
Tax exportation occurs when a jurisdiction 
imposes any form of tax on non-residents. Tax 
exportation causes tax burden on non-beneficiaries. 
A tax base that creates tax exportation has to be 
centralized (McLure, 1999; Bird, 2008
 
       
          
         
          
    
 
 
Tax  
externality 
When states and LGs impose tax on a federal tax 
base, unilateral decision of a federal government on 
tax base or deduction on a certain shared tax (say, 
PIT), will negatively affect the revenue size of the 
shared tax, which likely lead the states and LGs to 
fiscal stress (Wilson, 1999:289 and Afonso, et.al, 
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230:417). Vertical tax Coordination may resolve the 
problem. 
 
 
Tax flexibility 
Tax flexibility is very similar to a piggyback. It allows 
states /LGs to impose certain percent of tax on 
shared taxes. It empowers SNGs to mobilize revenues 
required to balance their budget and to provide 
public service according to local preference. The 
centre has to determine the tax flexibility rate. A tax 
flexibility defined by individual jurisdiction would 
lead to tax competition which in turn results in 
inefficient resource allocation and horizontal 
disparity. 
Tax autonomy 
       or  
financial 
independence 
Tax assignments must be designed in a way to 
ensure SNG to have access to various revenue 
sources so that they will be able to substantially 
finance the devolved responsibilities from own-
resources, determine their fiscal destiny and to 
promote accountability (Martinez-Vazquez, McLure 
and Vaillancourt, 2006:21; Bird, 2008; Boadway and 
Shah, 2009:158). In a decentralized budget, own local 
taxation should at least be concomitant with 
devolution of responsibilities. Delegated functions 
should be financed by transfer, or even better by 
additional taxing power. 
 
 
Political 
acceptance 
Tax assignments need to take into account 
political, historical, and institutional realities of a 
country. Countries which pursue a decentralized 
system to end civil war are often associated with 
higher level of tax power to satisfy political demands 
for a higher level of tax autonomy. For instance, if 
assignment of natural resources taxation fails to 
receive acceptance among those who claim to 
possess fully or partially the resources, it may trigger 
political instability (McLure, 1999). 
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Administrative 
feasibility 
Tax assignment should be made where tax 
information advantage, lowest cost compliance to 
tax payers and to tax collection agencies, and tax 
administration convenience are gained. But it must 
be appreciated some technical constraints. If taxation 
on immovable properties is assigned to LGs, then 
they also must have technical facilities in order to 
elaborate the cadastral register and appreciate the 
value of taxable items. This is not always easy to 
organize. A solution could be to have cadastral 
register at the State or even the national level (e-
cadastral system), with access for LGs in order to tax. 
Assessments of VAT, CIT, PIT, import duties, 
natural resource taxes are less administratively 
convenient to LGs, while excise taxes and some user 
charges are of low administrative costs to LGs (Bird, 
2011:21-22; Shah, 2007a:28; Boadway and Shah, 
2009). Nevertheless, administration cost of PIT and 
CIT could be very limited at SNG level, if the tax base, 
deductions and tax rate are defined at the centre, 
but ensuring SNGs the right of surtax (piggy-back). 
 
The above list of twelve tax assignment principles is not exhaustive. 
Here, focus is made on the most common ones. In addition to these criteria, 
other variables can be added on case-by-case basis to the specificity of a 
country. It should be noted that these principles neither lead to ‘optimal’ 
nor to uniform tax assignments across countries.  
Macroeconomic stability, interpersonal equity, mobility of tax base, tax 
exportation, and tax externality are centralization forces. Tax assignment 
criteria such as fiscal independence/tax autonomy, visibility to tax payer 
and accountability, and tax flexibility, to mention a few, justify the 
decentralization of taxation powers. Administrative feasibility and benefit–
received principles, political acceptance and unevenly distributed natural 
resources/tax bases are conditional. The administrative feasibility criterion 
prescribes that tax should be administered by a government which has cost 
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advantage and simplicity. User charges and fees should be paid to the level 
of government that provides a specific public service. 
Since centripetal and centrifugal forces are present at the same time in 
the decision process, the weight and importance given to each of the above 
criterion may well differ when they are viewed through federal or local 
eyes. Thus one cannot apriority decide which tax should be assigned to 
which level based on the fundamental theoretical arguments. At this stage, 
the formal proposition is to construct a decision matrix which gathers these 
arguments for discussion with stakeholders, central and SNGs. This is 
discussed in the next subsection. 
6.2 Tax Assignment Decision Matrix 
 
Bird (2011) and Dafflon (2011) have developed a tax assignment 
decision matrix in line with the SGTFF perspective. The process of tax 
assignment decision matrix presupposes the establishment of an ad hoc 
Task Force drawn from legitimate stakeholders, and professional experts 
like economists and constitutional lawyers. The composition of the Task 
force might vary depending on the mission of the Task Force. If the mission 
is to ascribe taxation powers between a Central government and states, the 
composition of the Task Force should include representatives of legislative 
and executive bodies from the Centre and States as well as representative 
of concerned Ministries/Bureaus. Likewise, if the mission is to assign 
taxation revenue between State and LGs, representatives of state and LGs 
Councils, Mayors, relevant Departments have to participate in the process 
of decision making. Professional advices of economists and constitutional 
lawyers are critical on economic arguments and legal issues respectively as 
well as to ensure the coherence of the choice and weights, leaving political 
choice to the decision makers. The process of tax assignment among 
different levels of government can make more participatory by including 
concerned civil societies. But the problem of involving as many relevant 
actors as possible in the Task Force may make difficult the negotiation 
process to easily reach consensus. Therefore, limiting the size of the Team 
would minimize the problem. As an alternative, civil societies can be 
consulted to express their views. External experts from IMF and World Bank 
may be included but they should not be part of the round table discussion. 
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Table 6.2. Decision Matrix for tax assignment for ‘X’ tax base 
 
 
Selection criteria 
 
weight 
     Levels of government 
central ...... State ....... LG 
Macroeconomic 
stability 
      
Interpersonal 
equity 
      
Mobility       
Unevenly distributed 
natural resources 
      
Benefit-received 
principle 
      
Visibility to tax 
payer and 
accountability 
      
Tax exportation       
Tax externality       
Tax flexibility       
tax autonomy)       
Political acceptance       
Administrative 
feasibility 
      
Reduce horizontal  
fiscal disparities 
      
Compliance cost       
Attitude towards 
corruption 
      
 Others ...       
Total score 100      
Source: Adopted from Bird, (2011) and Dafflon (2011)  
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The decision matrix has five elements.144 
[1] Identify what tax base is under examination: The decision matrix 
supposes “one tax one matrix”. Thus, a matrix decision must be 
constructed for each tax under review. All existing tax bases should be 
investigated against the corresponding tax assignment criteria with the 
help of experts’ technical advices on the advantages and disadvantages 
of (de) centralizing tax bases under study. 
The usual situation would be to start with the existing taxes. New tax 
bases can be suggested by the ad-hoc Task Force, the federation or 
States or LGs. In theory at least, the list of tax base for examination is left 
open-ended. 
[2]List of economic and non-economic tax assignment criteria: The 
first left-hand vertical column presents the list of economic and non-
economic tax assignment criteria. The list is not exhaustive. Members of 
the Task Force may delete irrelevant criteria or add more criteria when 
deemed necessary during the process. The political economy of tax 
assignment gives several analytical criteria that have been shown as 
relevant in practice. Members of a Task Force are supposed to propose a 
list of criteria for discussion to political decision makers. The latter can 
add more criteria that they think important or modify or omit the 
proposed criteria. But a comprehensive list of criteria and explicit 
vocabulary understanding are essential. 
All criteria proposals should be thoroughly examined. The 
interpretation of each criterion applies the same for each tax base under 
consideration. If it is decided that one or more additional criteria should be 
added during the analysis, the process has to be re-started. That is, 
previously discussed criteria must be reviewed in line with the new one in 
order to check coherence. This is to avoid that the ad-hoc criteria should be 
added in the course of negotiation not to influence the outcomes (Bird, 
2011; and Dafflon, 2011). Reaching consensus among the members of the 
Task Force on the list of criteria as well as on definitions and concepts of 
each criterion is necessary. To avoid any misunderstanding of 
communications among the members, setting some rules of conduct that 
governs the dialogue process and procedures as well as clearly defining the 
                                                 144 The decision matrix is heavily drawn from Bird(2011) and Dafflon(2011)  
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meaning of each concept are paramount. These have to be put in place 
before the actual discussions of the various taxes are starts. 
[3] Assignment of weights: Weights have to be given to each tax 
assignment criterion (second column). The issue of weighing poses a 
question: who is entitled to rank each criterion? The Task Force should 
make the proposal which would be explicit and duly informed. Then, 
elected politicians in a Parliament or Members of the State Council have 
to have the final word either to endorse or reject or to make some 
changes on the proposal. Leaving the discretion to determine the weight 
to members of the Task Force may develop biasness as the members 
might assign weights to the criteria that would maximize the benefits of 
their institutional interests (Bird, 2011:23). For instance, decision makers 
at Federal level may like to have control over PIT, business profit, and 
VAT for efficiency reasons, while representatives of States and LGs may 
wish to have access to these tax bases for enjoying more tax autonomy. 
In principle the assignment of weights to the criteria should depend on 
the role they play to achieve the intended objective of a (de) centralized 
tax system. That is, if decision makers at Federal level think that 
macroeconomic stability or interpersonal redistribution is most 
important function of the central government, then they would give 
more weight to the criterion. If they feel that a certain criterion is 
relatively important in decentralized governance, they are expected to 
give more weight to that criterion. 
Criteria that appear to be irrelevant for the particular tax under 
examination should be given zero weight, but for transparency and 
accountability reason, they should remain in the list. Taking a criterion off 
the list might imply the Task Force has not considered it at all. Giving a 
zero weight to a certain variable means that the criterion has been 
examined, but the Task Force’s opinion is that this particular criterion is 
not relevant. The grand weight should be equal to 100 points or percent. 
[4] Levels of government: The vertical columns 3 to 7 represent 
various levels of government. In addition to the commonly known three 
levels of government (centre, state and LGs), other existing intermediate 
like the Special Districts of the USA or Zone/Special Weredas of Ethiopia, 
or supra-nation of the EU, or any new government layers intended to be 
introduced can be considered. Normally one would start with the existing 
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layers of a specified country and possible horizontal cooperative level 
(for example LG units, but also special service precincts of LG units). 
[5] Filling out the corresponding cell in the matrix: Depending on the 
weight assigned to each tax criterion, the suitability of tax base under 
examination should be assessed by the Task Force and then the 
arguments for and against (de)centralization should be explicitly written 
in the corresponding cell of the matrix (Bird, 2011; and Dafflon, 2011). 
The process of the decision matrix enables the ad hoc Task Force to 
formulate a proposal for the separation of taxation powers among 
different levels of government, but subject to the considerations of a 
legislative body. Members of the Task Force are expected to determine 
the assignment of taxation to different levels of government through 
consultation and negotiation.  
In principle, all tax bases have to be examined and the entries in the 
matrix cells should be filled out based on the general principles for and 
against a (de)centralized taxation system vis-á-vis all the listed tax 
assignment criteria presented on Table 6.2.above. But, for the interest of 
space, only PIT is considered as an example below to illustrate how the 
decision matrix of tax assignment works. 
Macroeconomic stability- Progressive PIT expands and remains a 
major long run revenue source in developed economies, albeit it 
fluctuates with economic performance of a government. Revenue yields 
from PIT increases faster than national income growth when a national 
economy performs well and diminishes when the economy declines. PIT 
is a fiscal policy tool for macroeconomic stabilization. Governments may 
reduce PIT rate to stimulate private consumption when economic 
recession occurs. This, in return, contributes to increase output and 
employment. Governments may also raise PIT to finance budget deficit 
or to improve quantity and quality of public service instead of injecting 
new money to the economy which likely causes inflation. Therefore, 
progressive PIT serves as an automatic anti-cyclical stabilization policy 
instrument. 
Inter-personal equity-In many countries, a progressive PIT is applied 
on the basis of ability-to-pay principle to ensure interpersonal equity. 
However, in a decentralized system PIT might not treat equals equally, 
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because tax burden of equals in different states or in LGs within a state 
can differ depending on their tax base and/or expenditure choices. 
Mobility- The conventional theory of fiscal federalism asserts that if 
States/LGs unilaterally impose higher progressive tax on personal income 
for redistribution purpose, rich people would choose their residence 
jurisdiction where PIT is low, whereas poor people tend to move to a 
more welfare jurisdiction. Therefore, according to the theory, such a 
decentralized income redistribution policy will cause two effects. First, it 
would distort geographical distribution of population and thereby 
adversely affect labour market. Secondly, the influx of poor people to a 
more generous welfare jurisdiction would increase the demand for public 
services in this jurisdiction, whereas the migration of rich people would 
make the jurisdiction to lose some tax yield. Ultimately, the higher public 
expenditures need in favour of lower income people and lower tax yield 
on the other would lead the welfare jurisdiction to bankruptcy and poor 
public services. 
The argument against a decentralized PIT may not hold true 
everywhere. In an ethnically diverse country, the association between a 
decentralized PIT and mobility of people could be weak. That is, a 
decentralized PIT might not induce out-migration of-well to do to other 
lowest PIT state or in-migration of poor people from other state for 
language, cultural and local social affection reasons. Moreover, the 
problem of rich out-goers would not be serious if they believe that they 
receive adequate public services for the tax they pay. To avoid the 
problem of mobility, in many advanced decentralized countries, PIT is 
assigned to the centre but SNGs are allowed to impose certain percent of 
tax rate on PIT. 
Unevenly distributed natural resources- One may argue for a 
decentralized PIT generated from economic activities on unevenly 
distributed natural resources to benefit states from its resource. Others 
may argue for centralization of PIT for a couple of reasons:  
(i) Depending upon the PIT size, it may aggravate horizontal fiscal 
disparities, and  
(ii) Natural resource revenues are vulnerable to global prices and 
fluctuate frequently. This may result in significant employees lay-offs, 
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which negatively affects the total revenue of a state, which in turn may 
cause to reduce quality and quantity of public service delivery, and  
(iii) Centralization of PIT on unevenly distributed natural resources may 
enable the Central government to mobilize more public fund for national 
development goals and/or to transfer substantial money to achieve 
minimum national standard public service delivery on the fiscally weak 
SNGs. Still others may argue for shared tax between the centre and the 
state on origin basis. 
Benefit-received principle-This is irrelevant to use as a criterion for 
the assignment of PIT among different levels of government. 
Visibility to tax payers and accountability- PIT is visible to tax 
payers. More than one collector increases visibility. 
Tax exportation-refers to tax imposition by a jurisdiction on non-
residents. If employment and residence are in the same place, then there 
is no exportation problem of PIT. But if the place of residence and the 
place of employment are different, a problem of tax exportation arises. 
The traditional politically correct way is to pay PIT in the place of domicile 
though it does not mean that it is optimal. The extreme reasoning would 
be: if all people work in LG A but live in LG B, the latter will be well-off. 
Normally these differences are solved through some form of 
equalization. 
Tax flexibility-Applying tax flexibility on PIT means allowing 
States/LGs to impose a certain percent of tax on personal income, while 
the tax base of the centre. It enables the SNGs to generate more revenue 
so that they will finance large part of their expenditure needs and to 
provide public service according to local preferences. But completely 
leaving tax flexibility to each level of government increases tax 
competition and vertical coordination is needed to address the problem. 
Tax externality-Any uncoordinated decentralized PIT causes the 
problem of tax externality. If one level of government taps on the shared 
tax base of PIT, the capacity of other levels of government to tap the 
same base diminishes. And therefore, some form of vertical tax 
coordination is necessary to apportion the tax between the concerned 
levels of governments. 
Financial independence/tax autonomy-PIT would be an important 
revenue source to states/LGs if they have powers to set tax on PIT or 
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they are allowed to impose independently tax on the central government 
PIT base. SNG’s enjoy more tax autonomy when they have access to 
more elastic revenue sources like PIT rather than limiting them to 
property tax, user charges and excise tax.  
Political acceptance-Progressive PIT is an effective redistribution tool. 
But heavily progressive PIT or heavy rate on PIT may not only discourage 
economic entrepreneurship, but may not be politically feasible too. A high 
tax burden on PIT deters economic dynamism and induces shadow 
economic activities. 
Administration feasibility-PIT is imposed on taxable total income of 
an individual tax payer. Administrating decentralized PIT is complex at 
local level when an individual tax payer has other sources of personal 
income outside a residence jurisdiction. Under this scenario, centralized 
assignment of PIT might be recommended. Because, LGs lack access to 
information about tax payers’ income receipts outside their jurisdiction; 
unless higher government levels provide them income information of 
individuals to lower levels of government. 
Administration of PIT is easier in the place of residence than on place 
of employment, provided that the tax payers do not frequently change 
their residence jurisdiction. If PIT rate is set centrally, its administration 
at local level is relatively easy. A decentralized PIT but central 
administration of PIT would also avoid administrative inconvenience for 
tax payers. 
Reduce horizontal fiscal disparities-If industrial agglomeration and 
business activities are concentrated in a few states/LGs, centralization of 
PIT may contribute to reduce horizontal fiscal disparity. Others may 
argue centralizing PIT to address horizontal disparity may not help as the 
problem can be tackled through revenue equalization. 
Compliance cost-Assessment of PIT is complicated if PIT is derived 
from more than one jurisdiction that have different exemptions, tax 
schedules and/or tax rates. Such scenario provides strong argument 
against decentralized PIT. However, establishing a single centralized tax 
administration would reduce tax payers’ compliance cost. 
Attitude towards corruption- Transparency and corruption are 
inversely related. If local institutions are more open to the public (more 
transparent), residents will be aware about what is going on with the 
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governance system. Thus, as an effect, low degree of corruption is 
expected. If decision makers think that attitude towards corruption is a 
grave concern at a higher level of government than lower ones, and they 
think there are anti-corruption social values or citizens act as a watch dog 
for public finance and properties at lower level of government, then a 
decentralized PIT might be recommended. If the reverse is true a 
centralized PIT may reduce tax evasion. 
 
6.3 Tax externality, tax competition and tax harmonization 
 
Uncoordinated decentralized tax decision causes tax externality and can 
lead to tax competition. Tax competition may take place vertically and 
horizontally. Vertical tax competition occurs when different levels of 
government in a country impose taxes on the same tax base. Horizontal tax 
competition refers to independently setting tax or taking fiscal actions of a 
state /LG without considering the reaction of the same level of government 
(Wilson, 1999). To avoid the negative tax externality and tax competition, 
vertical and horizontal tax harmonisations are important. 
 
6.3.1 Tax externality and vertical tax competition 
 
There are two categories of vertical tax externalities, one is 
institutional, and the other is its application known as vertical tax 
competition. Consider the following simplified formula which admits that 
three levels of government have access to the same tax base:  
T= t x [B-Di] x [K federal + K states + K LG], where T is the tax yield, t is the tax 
rate schedule, B is the tax base, D is tax expenses and deductions (i of 
them), and K is the piggyback or tax coefficient (limited or not) of each 
government level (Dafflon, 2007). 
Assume, (i) a federal government is in charge of defining t, B and D, 
and (ii) it changes the tax law without considering the position of the 
States or LGs, then its decision creates vertical externalities for the states 
and LGs. The federal decision will affect the t x [B-Di] components of the 
tax system and modify the result for the state and local levels when they 
apply K. These are “tax externalities” because states and LGs have not 
participated in the decision but they suffer (or benefit) from the change 
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(Dafflon, 2007). States and LGs can react to the federal decision: if the 
change produces a reduction of the tax potential (for example more 
generous D), then they can recover the same tax yield by increasing their 
own K under the condition that local voters accept the new higher 
piggyback coefficient. 
Vertical tax competition is introduced with changes intervening in 
the coefficient K. With a given acceptable taxable potential (t x [B-Di]), or 
the maximum acceptable tax burden (for the taxpayers and the 
economy), independent decision to raise the tax coefficient K by a single 
level of government negatively affects the size of shared tax base 
available to the other level of government (Wilson, 1999:289; 
Afonso,et.al 2003:417; Boadway, 2006).  
Vertical tax coordination refers to coordination of the component of 
the tax, and apportionment on coefficient (K) among the federal, state 
and local governments. Therefore, to avoid a vertical tax externality, 
introducing some form of vertical tax coordination is prudent.145 
 
6.3.2 Horizontal tax competition 
 
Horizontal tax competition implies cutting one’s own tax rate to 
attract investment into one’s own jurisdiction. There is no consensus 
among public finance economists on the desirability and outcome of a 
horizontal tax competition. Horizontal tax competition is always bad in 
the logic of normative fiscal federalism. It argues that horizontal tax 
competition leads to inefficient allocation of productive resources, 
because when a state/LG cuts its tax rate to attract investment into own 
jurisdiction, others can adopt the “beggar-thy-neighbour” policy. The 
                                                 
145 In Switzerland, for example, the federal constitution and the law fix the tax 
potential and Kfederal at value 1. That is, the federal government has no way to 
adjust annually K to balance its budget. Balance must be obtained exclusively 
through expenditure adjustments. And most Cantons have put a ceiling on LGs’ 
K. For example in Canton Fribourg, the “normal” ceiling for Klocal is ≤1.00 or 100% of the 
tax potential defined in the law (t x [B-Di]). A Commune can exceptionally increase K up 
to 1.25 but it has to present the Canton with a justified request (normally a five-year 
plan attesting that a 100% coefficient and expenditure cuts will not result in a balanced 
current budget (Dafflon, 2007). 
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policy mainly plays on tax rate and ‘k ‘in the formula.146Oates (1972:143) 
argues that keeping tax rate low in order to attract investment cause to 
loss of government’s tax revenue, which in turn negatively affects the 
quality and quantity of public service delivery. 
Aggressive horizontal tax competition is criticised for various reasons. 
(i)Left wing economists and politicians argue that tax competition is 
associated with welfare-decreasing (Wilson, 1987:855), 
(ii) When states/LGs are required to meet a balanced budget by law, 
they would be compelled to impose higher tax rate on less mobile tax 
bases to compensate the tax loss caused due to tax cut on mobile tax 
base to attract investment to their jurisdiction (Dafflon 2007:149), and 
this leads to economic inefficiency.The reasoning is the following: if LG A 
reduces its own tax coefficient KA, the idea is that it would attract more 
base in its jurisdiction thus compensating the short-term loss of revenue. 
The argument is (t minus ∆↓t) x (B plus ∆↑B) would give higher tax yield 
TA+∆↑TA. But this supposes no retaliation from other jurisdictions which 
see their own bases reduced with the departure of tax payers to LGA. 
Other LGs will also reduce their tax coefficient in order to retain 
economic activities. Thus, in a repetitive game, total tax revenue of LGs 
diminishes. Thus, tax race-to the–bottom makes all competing 
jurisdictions worse-off. This, in turn, leads to low level of public service 
delivery and poor interpersonal redistribution function (Sinn 1990:502; 
Zodrow, 2003: 665). 
(iii) Tax race-to-the-bottom leads to concentration of business firms 
in a few relatively well developed states 147(Aroney, 2003:493). It also 
“further widening the horizontal fiscal gap across 
jurisdictions” 148(Dafflon, 2007:161). 
                                                 
146  Adjustment in B and D are less frequent. It is politically delicate and  it is generally 
aimed either at re-orienting redistributive  tax policies or logrolling and patronage 
for votes of specific support groups. 
147 Tax war on VAT across the Brazilian States has caused concentration of 
manufacturing and business firms in the few States. 
148  Dafflon (2007) argues the tax-race-to the-bottom among the Swiss cantons has 
resulted in horizontal fiscal asymmetry. However, Kirchgasser and Pommerehne 
(1996:361), argues that the fierce inter-cantonal/ inter-communal tax competitions 
do not cause undersupply of public services in Switzerland.  
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Others believe the opposite. For example, McLure, (1999) argures, 
“as competition in market place protects consumers from the 
rapaciousness of business, so tax competition protects citizens from the 
rapaciousness of politicians and bureaucrats. It helps to assure that tax 
payers are getting what they pay for”. Putting in different words, the 
argument for tax competition revolve around: (a) tax competition 
enables tax payers to vote with their feet, to choose a state/LG that 
efficiently delivery public service, (b) it reduces government waste and 
inefficient public spending, and (c) it makes politicians disciplined and 
accountable to their voters (Janeba,Guttorm,2002; Boss,1999). 
Tax competition presupposes the same quantities and qualities of 
public services are provided between two LGs. It also assumes that LGs 
need to maintain balanced budget rule or fiscal discipline, at least, 
implicitly. 
Public finance economists propose various alternative policy options 
of avoiding harmful tax computation:  setting tax floor, or tax 
harmonization or fiscal/budget competition. The first two prescriptions 
are not immune from criticism, however. For example, Baldwin and 
Krugman (2000:1, cited in Stults.2004) criticises the proposal for setting a 
minimum tax rate floor for EU believing it “leads to a weak Pareto 
improvement” , while (Kanbur and Keen,1993) argue the imposition of a 
minimum tax rate benefits both lower and higher rate member countries 
and prevents a racing to bottom. 
Tax harmonization may serve as an effective instrument to avoid the 
“beggar-thy neighbor” approach. The forms of harmonization, as well as 
their merits and demerits are discussed below. 
 
6.3.3 Tax Harmonization 
 
Tax harmonization implies making tax bases, deductions and tax 
rates similar or identical vertically and/or horizontally.Vertical tax 
harmonization avoids vertical tax externalities. Likewise, horizontal tax 
harmonization avoids a tax-race-to the-bottom in a federal system 
(Musgrave, 1977:65-72). Horizontal tax harmonization makes tax 
administration more efficient when a single tax payer operates in two or 
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more states/LGs, or when the legal fiscal domicile of the tax payer is 
different from the place of work/ production. 
Dafflon (2007) distinguishes three forms of tax harmonization:   (a) 
formal, material (real) and uniform. In T= t x [B-Di] x [Federal + K states + K 
local], formal harmonization refers to same definition and computation of 
B, and same list and definitions of Di. Under formal tax harmonization, 
competition takes place on tax rate (t) and on coefficient (K) without 
jeopardizing sub national governments’ tax autonomy. Formal tax 
harmonization brings about multiple benefits. It reduces information and 
transaction costs for tax payers and administrative costs for Revenue 
Agencies. It also avoids sources of tax disputes between different vertical 
levels of government (Dafflon, 2007:144). 
(b) Material harmonization includes formal harmonization plus same tax 
rate schedule (t). That is, sub national governments apply same B, Di and 
t. Under this form of harmonization, only ‘K’, the piggy back coefficient, is 
left to federal, states and local governments to ensure tax flexibility.  Sub 
national governments may vary K state and K local.149 This opens the 
possibilities of fiscal/budget competition. But, it poses the problem of 
vertical coordination (as to percentage of K that should be appropriated 
by the federal, states and LGs). To avoid this problem, one has to fix the 
ratios of K to the federal, states and LGs. Therefore, with flexibility in ‘K’ 
there are advantages and inconveniences.  Material harmonization also 
simplifies tax administration. 
While horizontal tax competition leads to a tax race-to-the-bottom 
and causes distortions of productive factors, material tax harmonization 
corrects distortions of mobile resources. Material tax harmonization 
avoids the harmful effects of tax competition without jeopardizing the 
                                                 
149 It may be interesting to mention that “in Switzerland, from 2001 onwards there is a 
formal tax harmonization on the personal income and wealth and on business profit 
and capital at the federal level with the cantons (vertical) and between the cantons 
(horizontal harmonization). But there are still 27 tax rate schedules (one federal + 26 
canton). Yet, in all the cantons at the local level there is material harmonization¸ that 
is communes have to take t, B and D from the cantonal law without any room of 
manoeuver; they only decide Klocal usually with three constraints: (i) the current 
budget must be balanced; (ii) it must include interest payment for loan and 
amortization (effective reimbursement of external debt at a rate which corresponds 
to the real util life of the investment thus finances–25 years or 4% for a school 
building, for example) and (iii) no bail out from the canton”(Dafflon,2007). 
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efficiency and equity objectives (Boadway and Shah, 2009:192). It obtains 
a certain degree of allocative neutrality and avoids inefficient distortion. 
Since the list of deductions and the rates are also identical, the same 
redistributive ability-to–pay scheme is respected. In fact material 
harmonization leaves out only K, the piggyback coefficient. Yet it has to 
be matched with a balanced current budget and no bailout so that, in this 
way tax competition becomes de-facto fiscal or budget competition. Thus 
mobile bases have to consider at the same time local services and tax 
coefficient in the fiscal part of their choice to move or not.  
(c) Uniform tax system or total tax harmonization refers to same B, Di, t 
and K between states/LGs (Dafflon, 2007:144). A uniform tax 
harmonization means there is no horizontal tax competition since tax 
rates, tax bases, Di and K are defined centrally. ‘T’ can be federal with a 
constitutional formula for apportionment through revenue sharing. Thus, 
states’ and LGs’ tax power is limited to tax administration and to receive 
certain portion from tax collections on derivative base or on a formula. 
Uniform tax harmonization enables the Federal government to pursue 
national equity and efficiency goals at minimal administrative cost. 
Applying material tax harmonization to correct the negative sides of 
tax competition destroys the positive side of tax harmonization. 
Therefore, there is no “best” outcome as the negative side will be 
transformed in the positive side and the reverse is also true. The gray 
area between tax competition and strict tax harmonization should be a 
balanced choice, depending on the specific reality of a country. 
It should be noted that exercising tax harmonization among many 
jurisdictions is not an easy task. Bring all jurisdictions to consensus on 
common goals is cumbersome because, (I) some states may not be 
willing to pass over their full tax discretion power for partial tax control; 
and (II) material tax harmonization, does not equally benefit all 
constituent members of a federation. The outcome of tax harmonization 
may make worse-off rich jurisdictions and better-off the fiscally weak. So, 
those jurisdictions which think they will gain more from a unilateral 
action (non-cooperation) might not be willing to cooperate for a material 
harmonization or for a uniform tax harmonization. 
Fiscal/budget competition and yardstick competition are alternative 
forms of horizontal tax competition. 
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Fiscal/budget competition across SNGs gives the right incentive for 
the efficient provision of public services. Tiebout (1956) views fiscal 
competition among SNGs as efficiency-enhancing tool for mobile 
households. Oates (2003:42) also argues that fiscal competition gives 
policy makers the freedom to make sensible fiscal decisions, but 
“whether or not such competition is likely to be efficiency-enhancing 
depends on the institutional setting in which governments compete with 
one another and on their objectives” (Oates, 2002:183). For Edwards and 
Keen (1996), fiscal competition among SNGs checks the predatory 
behaviours of officials and reduces the size of government. 
Yardstick competition refers to when local voters assess the 
performance of their own local government in terms of quality and 
quantity of public services delivery, tax level, and overall socio-economic 
development by taking the performance of neighbouring jurisdiction as a 
benchmark (Besely and Case, 1995). Yardstick competition promotes 
local innovation in the provision of public services, and induces healthy 
competition for better public service delivery among SNGs. It also serves 
as an efficient instrument to make local officials responsive to local 
preferences. In short, fiscal and yardstick competitions are good 
mechanisms for efficient government. 
 
6.4 Financial autonomy and Tax autonomy 
 
Autonomy refers to making independent decisions and freedom to 
act without being influenced by a higher level of government. As far as 
fiscal federalism is concerned, autonomy has financial and tax 
dimensions. 
 
6.4.1 Financial autonomy of Sub national governments 
 
Financial autonomy of a LG refers to the ability “…to obtain through 
its own means the financial resources it needs without recourse to or 
depending on other local governments situated at a higher level or the 
same level of government” (
 
:62 cited from 
Dafflon and Perritaz, 2003). High degree of financial autonomy implies 
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minimum constraint to mobilize own-revenue and it enables LGs to 
adequately provide public services both in quality and quantity. 
Different experts of fiscal federalism use different methodologies for 
measuring financial autonomy of sub-national governments. Revenue 
decentralization, defined as a ratio of SNG total revenue (excluding 
grants) to total national revenue (Bell. et.al. 2006:27), was used as a 
proxy to measure financial autonomy. Convinced that revenue 
decentralization ratio is inadequate to measure financial autonomy of 
sub national governments; fiscal federalists have developed different 
alternative methodologies of measuring financial autonomy of sub 
national governments. The approaches of Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) and 
Meloche, et.al (2004) for measuring financial autonomy are discussed 
below. 
 
[1] Ebel and Yilmaz (2002:10) measure fiscal autonomy of sub national 
governments as a ratio of own revenue to total revenue. 
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treated as own revenues.” The rationale behind this assertion is that 
SNGs enjoy expenditure autonomy over unconditional specific grant 
(Ebel and Yimaz, 2002:10). The higher the ratio is the greater the financial 
autonomy. 
The Ebel Yilmaz methodology is not immune from critique. The Ebel 
Yilmaz approach is a good example of the confusion between budget 
autonomy and financial autonomy: they include block grants because of 
their characteristic of expenditure autonomy, which is in the other 
column of the account. And they use “fiscal” which in semantic designate 
the total budget. If one uses budget autonomy for expenditures and 
financial autonomy for revenues, this confusion is avoided. Grants in this 
case, whether block or conditional should not be included in OR. 
[2] Meloche et.al. (2004:12-13) have developed three measures of 
fiscal autonomy. The first is same to Financial Autonomy except naming 
RA (for revenue autonomy). 
 
 
 
 
 206 
 
 
 
 
 207 
 
revenue by setting tax rate, determine tax base, and tax administration. 
The latter is defined as a ratio of SNG total revenue (excluding grants) to 
total national revenue (Bell. et.al. 2006:27). It is about the size of SNGs’ 
own revenue source. It indicates the role of SNGs in collecting revenue. 
Higher revenue decentralization is not always associated with higher tax 
autonomy, because a higher revenue decentralization ratio might be 
overwhelmed by tax sharing (grant) which SNGs have less or no role in 
determining the distribution formula. Revenue decentralization ratio 
conceals the real picture of tax autonomy of SNGs151 (OECD, 1999), 
because two SNGs with same revenue decentralization ratio may 
experience quite different tax autonomy. 
Literatures on fiscal federalism identify two approaches of measuring 
tax autonomy: the OECD and the Swiss perspectives. 
 
The OECD Perspective 
 
Noting the revenue decentralization ratio does not reveal the real tax 
autonomy of SNGs, the OECD developed a new methodology of 
measuring SNGs’ taxation power 152(Blöchliger and King, 2006:159). The 
taxonomy of taxation power comprises six tax categories (a) to (f). It 
examines to what extent SNGs have discretion in determining tax bases, 
setting tax rates, and in influencing tax sharing distribution formula. 
SNGs’ tax discretion diminishes as their sources of revenue reliance shifts 
from category (a) to (f). That is, “a” shows independent decision power 
over tax rate and tax base. Categories (b) and (c) represent SNGs’ power 
over tax rate only or tax base only respectively. The more SNGs have 
power to determine their tax base and to set tax rate, the higher is their 
                                                 
151  For instance, among the OECD countries German Länders’ and Belgium states had 
almost same revenue decentralization ratios (21.8 % and 22.8% in 2002 respectively) 
but the former rely heavily on tax sharing arrangement and grants (89.2%) from the 
federal government, while the latter have relatively higher discretion on tax rates 
and relief, which constituted (57.1%) of its total revenue. In contrast, Canada and 
Switzerland demonstrate among the highest revenue decentralization ratios as well 
as tax autonomy (Blochliger and King,2006:180-181). 
152 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs developed taxonomy of taxing power in 1991, 
which classified SNGs’ taxation power into five from ‘a’ to ‘e’OECD,(1999:11) and 
Blochliger and King (2006:159)modified the taxonomy and added one category. 
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tax autonomy. Having considerable power over tax base and tax rate 
enables SNGs to determine the volume of own revenue sources that they 
need to carry out their responsibilities. In contrast, higher SNGs’ reliance 
on tax-sharing (d) means they enjoy less tax autonomy. SNGs’ influence 
on the tax sharing arrangement diminishes as it goes from (d.1) to (d. 4). 
 
Box 6.1.The OECD Taxonomy of taxation power 
“a1 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate and any tax relief without needing 
to consult a higher level of government. 
a.2 The recipient SCG sets the rate and any relief after consulting a higher 
level of government 
B.1 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate and a higher level government 
does not set upper or lower limits on the rate chosen. 
B.2 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate and a higher level government 
does set upper and/or lower limits on the rate chosen. 
c.1 The recipient SCG sets tax relief – but it sets tax allowances only 
c.2 The recipient SCG sets tax relief – but it sets tax credits only 
C.3 The recipient SCG sets tax relief – and it sets both tax allowances and 
tax credits. 
d.1There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the SCGs determine the 
revenue split 
d.2 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split can be 
changed only with the consent of SCGs. 
d.3There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is 
determined in legislation, and where it may be changed unilaterally 
by a higher level government, but less frequently than once a year 
d.4 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is 
determined annually by a higher level government 
e. Other cases in which the central government sets the rate and base of 
the SCG tax 
f.  None of the above categories a, b, c, d, or e applies” 
 
Sources: Blöchliger and King, 2006 
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As far as tax autonomy is concerned, the OECD categorizes SNGs 
revenue sources into the following three: 
(i) Own revenue sources are tax and non-tax revenue sources in 
which SNGs have discretion over tax rate, or tax base or both as well as 
have control over tax administration. The more the SNGs rely on own 
revenue, the higher is the tax autonomy. Higher own revenue is also 
strongly associated with responsiveness to local priority public service 
delivery and deepening political accountability. 
(ii) Shared tax is a tax arrangement where states/LGs can unilaterally 
set tax rate or ‘K’ (piggy back) on central government tax base. Shared 
tax is a common source of SNGs in many developed countries. There are 
three issues that need decision when a government intends to introduces 
a shared tax arrangement: Which tax bases are good for shared tax? Who 
chooses the tax bases to be shared among vertical levels of government? 
And how should shared taxes be administered and disbursed? (Blöchliger 
and King, 2006). With regard to the first issue, there is no ‘same size 
shoe-fits- all’ prescription. Different countries determine their shared tax 
differently. For example, in Canada, PIT, CIT and General Service Tax 
(GST) are shared taxes (Rangarajan and Srivastava, 2004:1899), whereas 
in the USA, CIT in all states and PIT in many states are shared taxes (Rao, 
2007a:325). In Switzerland, PIT and CIT are shared taxes (Dafflon and 
Töth, 2005). In many developed countries, the central government 
defines the shared tax base. There is no uniform rule as to administration 
of shared taxes. They can be administered centrally or decentralized. For 
instance, Canadian Provinces have right to administer shared tax but for 
efficiency reason the Federal Government collects the shared taxes and 
proceeds are transferred to the Provinces and LGs on derivative basis 
except in Quebec (Rangarajan and Srivastava (2004:1899). The Swiss 
experience is quite different. The Cantons collect the shared taxes and 
transfer upward to the Confederation, whereas the Communes collect 
shared taxes for themselves (Dafflon and Tóth; 2005). 
A single tax administration of a shared tax avoids duplication of tax 
administrations and compliance costs to tax payers. Tax administration of 
shared tax can be defined by law or contract agreement. But, in a 
situation where shared tax bases are concentrated in a few States/LGs, 
Shared tax arrangement gives rise to horizontal fiscal disparity. Because 
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those SNGs endowed with more business firms would be able to get a 
larger share.  
(III)Tax sharing (Revenue sharing)-is a different form of transfer. 
Under this arrangement, a single level of government collects and shares 
certain percentage of the revenue to different levels of government. 
Global experiences on which tax base to designate as a tax sharing, which 
level of a government determines the distribution formula and 
administers the tax vary from country to country. Often, central 
governments define what tax bases should be designated as tax sharing, 
and determines the tax rate. Regarding the administration of tax sharing, 
it is centralized and proceeds would be transferred to lower levels of 
government. Decentralized tax administration and up-ward transfers are 
also possible. 
States’/LGs’ discretion over the distribution of tax sharing ranges 
from very limited to none, depending on the legal procedures of tax 
sharing formula. They might have a role in determining how much of the 
distributive pool has to be shared among SNG (d1), or tax sharing 
arrangement might be changed only with the consent or majority vote of 
states (d2) or distribution of tax sharing would be determined jointly by 
the upper and lower chambers as it is the case in Germany on regular 
base (d3), or SNGs might have no say in the determination of tax sharing 
allocation (d4) 153 (Blöchliger and King, 2006:167). 
 
 
The Swiss perspective  
 
Dafflon (2007:146) examines the extent of tax sovereignty of Swiss 
Cantons and Communes by formulating (i) a general taxation of : 
T = tf,c×[ B - (D1, … Dn )]× (Kfederal+Kcanton+Kcommune)      Equation. 6.5 
Where,  
T revenue from a tax 
t tax rate schedule of federal and Cantons 
                                                 
153 Tax sharing arrangement serves as horizontal fiscal equalization mechanism in 
Austria, and Germany, , but not in Spain (Blochliger and King, 2006:167).  
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B gross tax base 
D tax expenses and possible deductions from 
the tax base 
K annual coefficient aiming at a balanced 
budget, and  
(ii) by developing the following criteria: 
 
Criteria Explanation 
“[a] The use of the ability-to-pay principle (taxes) versus benefit 
principle (user charges); 
[b] The object of taxation, implicit in [B-D] in the formula above; 
[c] The circle of taxpayers (including the definition of the 
taxpaying unit); 
[d] The computation of the tax bases (for example, for the 
taxation of income: the definition of gross income [B], and the 
adjustments to taxable income, specific deductions and 
exemptions) [Di]; 
[e] The tax rate schedules [t] , including the amount of 
deductions and exemptions in the previous letter [Di]; 
[f] The annual coefficient of taxation [Kjj]; 
[g] Collecting the taxes 
[h] The procedure in case of tax disputes. » 
 
 
Based on the above criteria, Dafflon has ranked the tax sovereignty 
of sub national governments into four categories:  
(i) Sub national governments would be designated as having full tax 
sovereignty when they may enjoy all tax powers listed (a) through (h) 
above, 
(ii) Sub national governments enjoy partial tax sovereignty if they 
have power to decide on the use of taxes and user charges (a) and some 
but not all items listed between (b) and (e).  
(iii) Tax flexibility exists when sub national governments, at least, 
enjoy liberty to decide on the coefficient of taxation, k, (f) but do not 
have power to determine tax base, and  
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(iv) Compulsory taxation is a case in which sub national government 
has no power over (a) to (f) above listed, but collects taxes and/ or user-
charges according to the regulations set by a higher level of government 
(Dafflon, 2007:144). 
Swiss Cantons have access to various tax sources. PIT and CIT are 
harmonized. Any change in tax rate should be approved by referendum 
which needs double majority of the Cantons to pass. Tax administrations 
are retained at Cantonal and Commune levels (Dafflon and Tóth, 2005:8-
9). 
Each Canton and the Confederation decide their own tax schedule. 
‘K’ is set at 1.00 for the Confederation, and decided elsewhere by 
cantonal parliaments and Communal assemblies. Thus there are actually: 
one countrywide definition of B and D, 27 tax rate schedules (a 
Confederation and 26 cantons) and 26 cantonal K (K federal is one, no 
room of manoeuvre) and almost 2550 K for LGs. All these give Swiss 
cantons partial tax sovereignty. Swiss communes have the liberty to set 
user charge and tax rates which fall in their domain, but they pursue 
respective Canton’s tax base and Di. The upper limit of ‘K’ is fixed by 
respective Cantonal law, but they have power to manoeuvre the ‘K’ 
within the limit. Therefore, Swiss Communes qualify for tax flexibility 
(Dafflon, 2007:145-146). Nevertheless, Swiss cantons and communes 
have broad tax autonomy. There are some legal conditions that limit the 
tax autonomy of the Cantons and Communes. They cannot decide ‘B’ or 
change the list of ‘D’. In addition, Cantons have neither access to levy on 
VAT nor to special consumption taxes, which are exclusively Federal tax 
power. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
There is no golden rule of tax assignment. It varies by country. The 
FGTFF’s tax assignment takes in mind the Musgravian centralized 
macroeconomic stabilization and interpersonal equity functions. The 
prescription is that mobile tax bases which have impact on 
macroeconomic stability and personal equity should be assigned to the 
centre, whereas property tax and user charges should be left to local 
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governments. Excise taxes are considered suitable to States (Oates, 1972; 
Musgrave, 1983; Tanzi, 1995; Ter-Minassian, 1997). 
In practice, tax assignment does not fully respect the conventional 
theories of fiscal federalism (Bahl and Cyan, 2010). This is because, unlike 
the conventional theories of fiscal federalism, tax assignment among 
different levels of government is not guided by economic efficiency, 
national equity, benefit received principle and administrative arguments. 
In addition to these criteria, other factors such as visibility and 
accountability to tax payers, political acceptance, tax autonomy, tax 
exportation, tax flexibility etc do play role in the tax assignment between 
different levels of government. Dafflon (2011) and Bird (2011) have 
developed a general framework of tax assignment decision matrix that 
takes into account various criteria and involvement of stakeholders. 
The desirability of and outcome of horizontal tax competition is 
debatable among scholars and experts of fiscal federalism. Some argue 
for while others stand against horizontal tax competition. Still others 
consider it neither white nor black but a gray one having advantages and 
disadvantages. Therefore, it is up to the discretion of decision makers to 
make trade-off between the merits and demerits of tax competition. 
Literatures on tax autonomy provide us the OECD and the Swiss 
thoughts of measuring tax autonomy. The former analyzes SNG’s tax 
autonomy whether they have power to determine tax base or decide tax 
rate, or both and their influence on the distribution of tax sharing. The 
Swiss perspective measures tax autonomy the extent to which SNGs have 
the liberty to choose between tax and user charges, circle of tax payers, 
to determine tax base and deductions on tax base, to set tax rate, to 
administer taxes, the liberty to tax flexibility, power to administer tax and 
how they set if conflict interest arises among vertical levels of 
government. 
In practice, no state/LG absolutely depends on transfer, nor 
maintains full autonomy. It ranges in between. When states/LGs enjoy 
power to tax base and set tax rate over rang of revenue sources, they can 
mobilize sufficient resources to carry out their responsibilities and to 
promote accountability.  
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Devolving adequate revenue sources to SNGs is a necessary 
condition to make fiscal federalism work. It is strongly associated with 
holding accountability and tax autonomy. Tax assignments of federations 
can be broadly grouped into two categories: highly decentralized 
taxation systems that ensure high level of States’/LGs tax autonomy, but 
accompanied by a wide horizontal economic disparity. Canada, 
Switzerland and Brazil belong to this category. Others pursue a 
centralized taxation power characterized by low degree of tax autonomy 
of States/LGs but maintain relatively low level of horizontal fiscal 
disparity. Germany and Australia are examples of this category 
(Blöchliger and King, 2006). Therefore, it is a political choice whether to 
pursue a highly decentralized or a centralized taxation power separation.  
This chapter examines the practice of tax assignment in Ethiopia. The 
chapter is organized into four sections. The first section describes the 
political economy of taxation powers between the Federal and the State 
Governments as well as between the States of Tigrai and respective LGs. 
The second section explains the principles that govern the separation of 
taxation powers among the vertical levels of government. The third 
section investigates the vertical tax coordination, the existing distinctive 
nature of horizontal tax competitions, and the harmonization 
mechanisms in place. The last section explores the financial autonomy 
and tax autonomy of the States /LGs from the OECD and the Swiss 
perspectives. 
 
 
7.1 The Constitutional Context of the Tax Assignment 
 
The Federal Constitution prescribes taxation powers between the 
Federal Government and the States only. It categorizes taxation powers 
into three heads: the Federal Government taxation power, the State 
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taxation power, and the concurrent taxation power between the Federal 
and the State Governments. Devolution of taxation power is left to the 
States. So far, no state has devolved taxation power to local 
governments, except Tigrai. 
Taxation powers of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa Administration 
Council are stipulated in Federal Proclamations. The City Government of 
Addis Ababa enjoys almost equal taxation powers like the States except 
the concurrent revenue sources. The political economy rationale for not 
granting concurrent revenue sources to the City is not to exacerbate the 
existing wide horizontal fiscal disparity between the states and the City 
as the lion’s share of private companies have made their legal 
registration in the City. The Federal Government takes all revenues 
derived from private companies registered in Addis. Instead, it has given 
rental income revenue on housing to the City (Federal Proclamation 
No.361/2003). The Dire Dawa Administration enjoys almost identical 
taxation powers what the Federal Constitution grants to the states, but 
with the exception of levying taxes on federal public enterprises, and VAT 
on individual tradesmen (Federal Proclamation No.416, 2004, Art.43). 
One may observe that the list of taxation powers stipulated in the 
Federal Constitution of 1995 are less than from the list enumerated in 
Table 7-1 below, because the Table includes tax assignments amended 
by the Joint session of the HoF and the HoRP as well as by Federal 
Proclamations. 
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Table 7.1 Ethiopia’s Fiscal Construction 
Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Personal 
Income  
Tax  
(PIT) 
 
“shall levy and collect 
income tax on 
employees of the 
Federal Government 
“(96.2) 
“shall levy and collect 
income taxes on  
employees of the 
State” (97.1) 
 “shall determine and 
collect PIT on all 
employees within the 
urban jurisdiction except 
on employees of Federal 
and State 
enterprises(42.1) 
“shall collect PIT on 
employees who are 
paid from the 
Wereda budget civil 
servants within the 
Wereda”  (39.1a) 
 
“shall levy and collect 
income tax on 
employees of 
international 
organizations” (96.2) 
“shall levy and collect 
income tax on 
employees of 
domestic non 
government 
organizations”Note1a 
    
 “shall levy and collect 
taxes [PIT] on 
employees of private 
enterprises” 
(97.1)Note2a 
 “shall determine and 
collect PIT on 
employees of private 
business entity”(Art. 
42.1) 
“shall collect PIT on 
employees of 
private[enterprise] 
within the Wereda” 
(39.1c); 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
 “shall levy and collect 
taxes on the incomes 
[PIT] of private 
farmers and farmers 
incorporated in 
cooperative 
associations” (97.3) 
Note 2b 
    
“shall levy and collect 
[personal] income on 
enterprises owned by 
the federal 
government” (96.3); 
“shall levy and collect 
PIT on  [employees] 
of enterprises owned 
by the state”(97.7); 
“ shall Jointly levy 
and collect PIT on 
enterprises they 
jointly establish” 
(98/1); 
“shall determine and 
collect PIT on 
employees of 
development 
enterprises owned by 
the LG” (42.8); 
“shall collect PIT on 
employees of 
enterprises owned by 
the Wereda” (39.1b); 
 
  “shall Jointly levy 
and collect profits 
on dividends due to 
shareholders”(98.2); 
   
“shall tax the income 
and winnings of 
national lotteries and 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
other games of 
chance” (96/4); 
 “Shall levy and collect 
Income derived by 
entertainer, musician 
or sportsman/ 
woman from his/ her 
personal activities” 
Proclamation No 
86/2003 Note1b 
 
 
 
 
“Shall levy and collect 
Income obtained by 
entertainer, musician 
or sportsman from 
his/her personal 
activities 
”Proclamation No. 
86/2003 
  
 “shall levy and collect 
gain on transfer of 
certain investment 
properties(capital 
transfer gain 
tax)”Note 1c 
 “shall determine and 
collect income derived 
from gain on transfer 
of certain investment 
properties” (42.14) 
“shall collect turn over 
tax(TOT) on gain 
transfer of investment 
properties”(40.3b); 
 
  “shall levy and collect 
PIT on interest tax 
from bank deposits” 
(HoF and HoPR) 
Note 3a 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
  “shall Jointly levy 
and collect taxes on 
incomes[PIT] 
derived from large 
scale mining 
petroleum and gas 
operations”(98.3 
   
Rental 
Income  
tax 
 
“shall levy and collect 
taxes  on income of 
houses owned by the 
Federal” (96.6)  
Note 4 
“shall levy and collect 
taxes on income 
derived from private 
houses”(97.6) 
 “shall determine and 
collect rental income 
tax on housing and 
other assets within the 
LG” (42.6); 
“shall collect taxes on 
incomes derived from 
rental housing [within 
the LG]” (39.1e) 
 
“shall levy and collect 
taxes on incomes of 
properties owned by 
the Federal 
Government; fixes 
rents” (96.6) 
“shall levy and collect 
taxes on  incomes of 
other properties 
within the state” 
(97.6); 
 “shall determine and 
collect  rental fees on 
houses and properties 
owned by the LG” 
(42.10);  
“shall collect taxes on 
incomes of properties 
(39.1e); Collect 
revenues from sales of 
mobile and fixed 
assets ,sands along 
rivers’ stones, soil of 
the Wereda 41.1 and ; 
41.2); 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
Agricultural 
income tax 
 
 “shall levy and collect 
taxes on income of 
private farmers and 
farmers incorporated 
in cooperative 
associations” (97.3); 
 “shall levy and collect 
PIT on urban 
agricultural activity” 
(42.3); 
“shall collect income 
tax on agricultural 
activity” (39.1d); 
“Agricultural income tax 
on leased lands  for 
investment purpose” 
(43.1) 
Business 
profit tax  
 “shall levy and collect 
profit tax on 
enterprises owned by 
the Federal 
Government”(96.3) 
“shall levy and 
collect  profit tax  
on income of 
enterprises owned 
by the States 
“(97.7) 
“shall Jointly levy 
and collect profit 
tax on enterprises 
they jointly 
establish” (98.1); 
“shall determine and 
collect business profit 
tax on development 
enterprises owned by 
the LG” (42.8) 
“shall collect business 
profit on envelopment 
enterprises owned by 
the LG” (39.2c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “shall Jointly levy and 
collect profits [CIT] of 
companies”(98.2) 
Note 5 
   
 “shall levy and collect 
profit tax on individual 
traders carried out a 
business within their 
territory” (97.4); 
 “shall determine and 
collect business  profit 
tax on incomes of  
individual traders 
within a LG” (42.4) 
“shall collect business 
profit tax on category 
C” (39.2a) 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
  “shall Jointly levy 
and collect taxes on 
incomes derived 
from large scale 
mining petroleum 
and gas operations” 
(98.3)Note 6 
   
 
“Shall levy and collect 
taxes on the income 
of air, rail and sea 
transport services 
“(96/5). Note 7 a 
“shall levy and collect 
taxes on incomes 
from transport 
services rendered on 
waters within their 
territories” (97/5) 
Note 7b 
 
 
 
   
 “Consistent with the 
provisions sub-Article 
3of Article 98, shall 
levy and collect taxes 
on income derived 
from mining 
operations “(98.8) 
 “shall determine and 
collect business profit 
tax on income derived 
from small scale 
mining activities 
undertaken within the 
LG” (42.11) 
“shall collect income 
derived from small 
scale mining activities” 
(39.2b); 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
 “shall levy and collect 
income tax [profit] on 
gains from renting of 
patent rights within 
the State (Joint 
session of HoF and 
HoPR)”  Note 3b 
“shall levy and 
collect income tax 
[profit] on gains 
from renting of 
patent rights of a 
private company 
(Joint session of HoF 
and HoPR)” Note 3c 
   
Sales  
tax   
[VAT]  
and  
excise 
 tax 
Note 8 
“shall levy and collect 
sales [VAT] and excise 
tax on enterprises 
owned by the Federal 
Government”(Art.96.3) 
“shall levy and collect 
sales tax [VAT] and 
excise tax on income 
of enterprises owned 
by the States(98.7)” 
  
 
 
 
 
 “shall levy and collect 
sales  tax [VAT and 
TOT], excise tax on 
individual traders 
carried out business 
within [the States]” 
(97.4); 
 “shall collect excise tax 
and TOT on individual 
traders within the LG 
“(42.4);  
“shall collect excise 
tax  and TOT on  
individual traders” 
(40.3a); 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
Urban/Rural 
land use fee 
  “Shall determine and 
collect fees for land 
usufractuary rights” 
(97.2).  
 “shall determine and 
collect urban land use  
fees(42.2);Urban land 
rent and house tax”  
(42.5); 
“shall collect land use 
fee, except land use 
fee allotted for 
investment: (39.3) 
 
Fees  
and  
charges 
“Shall determine and 
collect fees and 
charges relating to 
licenses issued and 
services rendered by 
organs of the Federal 
Government” (96.7). 
“shall determines and 
collects fees and 
charges relating to 
licenses issued and 
services rendered by 
State organs “(97.9);  
 
 
“shall determine and 
collect fees on: 
permission, and 
renewal services 
provided by urban 
Administration(42.12); 
Intra-urban road use 
(42.9); shall levy and 
collect municipal 
taxes, duties as well as 
fix and collect user 
charges hereof“ 
(42.13). 
“shall collect use 
charges on: marriage, 
divorce, death and 
contract agreement 
registration(40.2c); on 
permission, renewal 
services (40.2d); toll 
roads, Halls, hostels, 
bridges, well 
irrigations, Health 
Centres, and other 
similar local services 
rendered by 
Wereda“(40.1and 
40.2a)  
“Tourist entrance fee 
derived within the 
Wereda” (43.2) 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
Import  
and export 
duties  
(Note 9) 
“shall levy and collect 
custom duties, taxes 
and other charges on 
imports and exports” 
(96.1) 
      
Monopoly 
taxes 
“shall levy and collect 
taxes on monopolies” 
(96.8); 
     
Stamp 
duties 
“shall levy and collect 
Federal stamp duties” 
(96.9); 
“shall levy and collect 
state stamp duties on 
contracts and 
agreements, as well 
as title duties 
registration executed 
in the State (Joint 
session of HoF and 
HoPR) “Note 3d 
 “shall determine and 
collect stamp duties 
on contracts, 
agreements, title 
duties, and 
registration executed 
in the State” (42.7)  
  
Royalty and 
rent on 
natural 
resources  
  “shall Jointly levy 
and collect royalties 
on large scale 
mining and all 
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Revenue  
sources 
Federal Power of 
Taxation(Art.96) 
State Power of 
Taxation 
(Art. 97) 
Concurrent power 
of taxation (Art. 98) 
The State of Tigrai 
ULG Proclamation 
No. 107/1998) 
RLG Proclamation 
No.99/1998) 
Concurrent taxation 
power between the State 
of Tigrai and RLG  
Proclamation.No.99/1998) 
petroleum and gas 
operations” (98.3); 
 “Consistent with the 
provisions of 
concurrent power of 
taxation [98.3] levy 
and collect royalties 
and land rentals on 
such operations 
(97.8)”;Note 10 
 “shall determine and 
collect royalties, land 
rental fees and 
revenue tax on small 
scale mining 
operations ” (42.11); 
 “Royalties on mining. 
operations  other than 
Small mining petroleum 
products (43.2)  Note11a,  
 Shall fix and collect 
royalty for use of 
forest resources 154 
(97/10); 
   “incense and gums, water  
and other natural 
resources” (43.2) Note 
11b 
                                                 
154  Fixing royalty fee by the State is not limited to use for forest resources .It also includes royalty on artisans and small scale mining operations(FDRE, Mining 
Operations Proclamation No.678/2010) 
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Table 7.1 above, depicts the political economy perspective of the tax 
assignment matrix in Ethiopia. The matrix comprises three components.  
Component one refers to the first column which lists various tax 
bases identified in the Federal Constitution. The taxation powers are 
enumerated in a standard list of tax bases, not in the sequence 
mentioned in the Federal Constitution. Sources of personal incomes are 
grouped under PIT155 category, followed by Rental income tax, 
agricultural income tax and so forth. 
Component two refers to the categories of taxation powers at the 
top row: Federal level (column2), the States (column 3) and concurrent 
taxation (column 4). Columns 5 to 7 depict the de jure tax separation 
between the State of Tigrai and respective Weredas (ULGs and RLGs).  
The third component is the matrix cells. Each corresponding cell of 
the matrix exhibits the revenue sources that belong to a certain level of 
government. The text in the cell also gives the legal reference. If a matrix 
cell is filled out under a single level of government, and the other cells on 
the same row remain blank, then that tax base is exclusively assigned to 
the Government indicated at the top of the column. When more than 
one cell is filled out in the same row, then the corresponding tax base is 
shared between different levels of government. 
  
                                                 
155 Theory of taxation makes distiniction between regular and irregular tax bases. The 
former is a permanent source of revenue, while the latter is a windfall income where 
it may or may not happen once in time according to circumstances. Thus interest 
income tax and dividends would be considered as “regular” and are normally 
included in taxable income defined on a “large basis”, whereas capital gains, lottery 
and similar receipts may be considered as “windfall” earnings and are taxed 
separately on a flat rate basis. Sometimes gifts and inheritance are also included in 
“windfall” earnings. However, in Ethiopia, interest income tax on bank deposit, 
dividends, capital gains, and incomes from winnings of National Lottery and other 
games are not aggregated to wages and salaries in determining taxable PIT. They are 
separately taxed on flat rate basis. 
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 Box 7.1.Some Notes on the Ethiopian Revenue Assignment Matrix 
Notes Explanations 
1a,b, 
and c 
The Federal Constitution is silent on 1a, 1b and 1c revenue sources, 
but they have been listed as taxable in the Federal Income Tax 
Proclamation No.286/2002. Notes 1a and 1b are progressive PIT up to 
gross income of Birr 5,000 bracket. Capital gain on transfer is a flat tax 
payable on gains from the transfers (sale or gift) of properties (a) 
building held for business, factory, and office 15% and, (b) shares of 
companies 30%. The State of Tigrai has ceded these tax sources to 
Weredas. 
2a and 
2b 
Levy and collect on employees of private enterprises and on the 
incomes of private farmers imply income on employees of any 
business organization established for profit that does not belong 
to public sector. (I.e. PIT on employees of individual traders and 
private companies as well as on incomes of private farmers)  
3a,b,c 
and d 
They are undesignated in the Federal Constitution. 
Nevertheless, pursuant to Article 99 of the Constitution, the HoF 
and HoPR jointly designated.  
4 
 
The Federal Government passed over its tax power to levy and 
collect on income of houses to Addis Ababa City Government. 
(Federal Proclamation No.361/2003). 
5 
The Amharic and the English versions of Article 98(2) do not have 
same text. The English version states, “They [the Federal 
Government and the States] shall jointly levy and collect taxes on 
the profits of companies…” while the Amharic version, in addition 
to profit tax, includes sales tax. Since “the Amharic version of the 
Constitution shall have final legal authority” (Article 106), private 
companies are subject to sales tax, which was replaced by VAT in 
2003. Article 98(2) is silent on excise tax, although in practice 
private companies are subject to excise tax. 
6 
The ‘tax on income’ in Articles 98(3) of the Federal Constitution 
is general. The wording of ‘income’ is vague whether it implies 
income on employees or income on business. But the 
Memorandum of HoF on the distribution of concurrent tax 
between the Federal Government and the State, issued in 1996, 
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 Box 7.1.Some Notes on the Ethiopian Revenue Assignment Matrix 
Notes Explanations 
refers to business profit tax.  
7 
The “tax on income” in Article 96(5) and 97(5) is general. In 
practice,’ tax on income’ refers to PIT, and business profit tax 
(BPT). 
8 
The Federal Constitution states sales tax. This tax base was 
replaced by Value Added tax (VAT) and by turn over tax (TOT) in 
2003. 
9 
The term “taxes” in this sub-article (96/1) is general. In practice, 
the term “taxes” includes VAT, withholding tax and excise tax. A 
word of caution is important here. Currently, the Federal 
Government imposes 3 percent withholding tax on imported 
good. Withholding taxes which are deducted from the States’ 
sources of revenue are transferred to the States on origin basis. 
10 
The States fix royalty payment, rental and license fees on small 
scale mining operations. Large, small and artisanal scale mining 
activities are defined in laws (Proclamations No.53/1993 and 
678/2010). 
11a,b 
What sources of revenue (business profit tax, VAT, excise tax, 
royalty) are to be shared between the State of Tigrai and Weredas 
is not explicitly defined.  
 
 
7.2 Some Distinctive Features of the Tax Assignment 
 
As discussed earlier, there is no best model of tax assignment that can 
fit to all countries. Rather it is country specific dictated by economic and 
non-economic variables. This section discusses some unique features of the 
Ethiopian tax assignment. 
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7.2.1 No tax immunity on profit making enterprises 
 
Art.100 (3) of the Federal Constitution notes, “Neither the State nor 
the Federal Government shall levy and collect taxes on each other’s 
property unless it is a profit making enterprise.” Unlike the shared tax 
arrangement, which grants authority to impose certain percent of tax 
rate on the federal tax base, article 100 (3) refers to two ways of taxation 
power (top-down and bottom-up) on profit making enterprises. Reading 
the Article, one may poses couple of practical questions. What type of 
taxes (PIT, CIT, VAT ...) shall the Federal Government or the States 
impose over the other? What tax rate shall they impose? And how can be 
the possible vertical fiscal externality tackled?  
The Federal Government levies custom duties and 10 percent surtax 
on states’ enterprises. The states, so far, have neither imposed tax nor 
fees on the Federal Government-owned enterprises, although Federal 
enterprises like Ethio-tele, Ethiopian Power Corporation, Ethiopian Sugar 
Corporation, Hotel enterprises, mining enterprises, Ethiopian Aviation 
Enterprise etc make wealth by using the land-based resources of the 
states and some of them produce environmental pollution. 
 
7.2.2 Undesignated power of taxation 
 
Tax powers which are assigned neither to the Federal Government nor 
to the States nor concurrent taxation powers of the Federal and the States 
are regarded as undesignated tax power. Allocation of undesignated tax 
powers is determined by joint session of the HoF and HoPR (Federal 
Constitution, 1995:Art.99). 
In Ethiopia, separation of tax assignment are not exhaustive, partly 
because of the distinctive tax assignment nature between the Federal 
Government and the States (the tax assignments in Ethiopia are not made 
on tax base as it is the case in other countries) and partly because the 
Federal Constitution has granted residual taxation power neither to the 
Federal nor to the States. 
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Pursuant to Article 99 of the Federal Constitution, the HoF and HoPR, in 
their Joint Session, 156have designated the following revenue sources. 
(1) Income on interest tax from earnings on bank deposits and income 
derived from company intellectual property right (renting patent and 
coping) are concurrent taxation powers; 
(2) income derived from renting patent right of individual revenues, 
from stamp duties imposed on functions executed by the States are State 
taxation powers (HoF and HoPR minute, 1996); 
(3) Capital gain transfers on investment properties, and income derived 
by an entertainer, musician or sportsman/woman from his/her personal 
activities are subject to tax (Federal Income Tax Proclamation 
No.286/2002). In accord with this Proclamation, the States have legitimized 
their taxation powers over these sources of revenue through respective 
Income Tax Proclamations.157 
In practice the States can invent new tax sources without waiting for 
the designation of undesignated taxes by the joint decision of the Houses, 
provided that the tax base does not refer to any of the Federal Government 
tax base. For example, all the States impose agricultural income tax. The 
pastoral States of Afar and Somali, Oromia (in the Borena Zone) and the 
SNNP (in Omotic pastoral zones) have also introduced livestock tax. Given 
that livestock are main asset for the pastoralists, and providing veterinary 
and other services remain the responsibilities of the LGs, the introduction 
of livestock tax is an important measure to raise the revenue capacity of the 
States. 
7.2.3 Concurrent powers of taxation 
 
Article 98 of the Federal Constitution grants concurrent powers of 
taxation between the Federal Government and the States. Concurrent 
                                                 
156 Article 99 of the Federal Constitution stipulates that any undesignated taxation power has 
to be designated by a Joint Session of the HoF and HoPR with two-third majority votes. In 
reality, as discussed on Chapter 3, the former does not have deterrence power in the 
decision making process of designation tax, because the latter can meet the two-third 
votes to pass a resolution in the joint session without the need of a single support vote of 
the HoF. 
157 Tax bases such as gift tax, real property tax (on buildings residential and commercial and 
vehecles), environmental tax, hotel occupancy tax (tourist tax), highway tax, to mention 
few, are still undesignated taxes. 
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taxation powers should be jointly levied and collected by the Federal and 
the States (Federal Constitution, Art.98). But the Constitution is not clear 
whether the phrase “jointly levy and collect...”implies : (1) the Federal 
Government deals with individual State or (2) the Federal Government and 
the States sit together in a round table and collectively determine the tax 
rate, deductions and exemptions on tax-by-tax-base on consensus base 
(Solomon, 2006:136). If the first scenario takes place, each State may come 
up with a lower tax rate and deductions that would enable it to attract 
investment to its jurisdiction. This is undesirable. So the Constitution seems 
to presuppose Federal Government and the States together decide the tax 
base, tax rate and the tax administration of the concurrent revenues on 
consensus base. 
Realizing the jointly tax administration of concurrent revenue sources 
has created inconvenience, in accord with the Article 105(2) of the Federal 
Constitution, the HoF and the HoPR jointly delegated the tax administration 
to the Federal Government (HoPR and HoF 1996a EC). 
Constitutionally speaking, the concurrent taxation powers are superior 
to the conventional shared tax arrangement which is common in the 
developed nations. Because in the latter sub national governments are only 
allowed to impose tax rate on federal government tax bases, while the 
Ethiopian states have legislative power to jointly decide the tax base, tax 
rate ,deductions as well as tax administration, which do not exist in shared 
revenue arrangement.  
Looking about the practice of the concurrent taxation powers, one may 
find that they are reduced to a revenue sharing arrangement,158 partly 
because the States have abandoned their taxation powers to set tax rate 
and partly because the federal government has instructed the states to 
harmonize and standardize their tax base with the Federal tax base (Federal 
Proclamation No. 57/1996). 
Article 62 (7) of the Federal Constitution notes that the HoF determines 
the distribution of proceeds generated from the concurrent revenue 
sources between the Federal Government and the State. The House 
                                                 
158  Here the author takes the definition of revenue sharing arrangement given by Blöchliger 
and King, 2006 (see Section .6.4.2 of this dissertation). 
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distributes concurrent revenue proceeds on a derivation basis on the 
following percentage ratio. 159. 
 
Table 7.1. Distribution of Concurrent taxation proceeds between the 
Federal Government and States160 
 
Revenue Sources Share of 
Federal 
Government 
Share of State 
Government 
1. From enterprises 
jointly established  
• Business Profit tax. 
• Personal Income tax. 
• Sales** and excise tax. 
 
* 
50% 
70% 
 
* 
50% 
30% 
2. From private companies  
• Business profit tax 
• Sales** and excise tax 
• taxes on dividends   
 
50% 
70% 
50% 
 
50% 
30% 
50% 
3. From large scale mining; all 
petroleum and gas 
operations. 
• Business Profit tax 
• Royalties 
 
 
50% 
60% 
 
 
50% 
40% 
Source: HoF, 1989 E.C 2nd Regular Meeting minute, page76-80. 
* As per capita share contribution.  
**Sales taxes are replaced by VAT  
 
The setting of the HoF opens a loophole for manipulation. The three 
populous states may easily change the rule of game through establishing a 
simple majority rule, by forming coalition, to take lion’s share from the 
                                                 
159 Here derivation basis mean a state obtains part of the tax yield if the economic activity 
(or production) takes place within a state and/or the legal registration of the business 
is within the state. 
160The HoF set the distribution formula in 1988E.C (1995), but it came into effect in 1995E.C 
(2002), because the HoF did not communicate officially the resolution to the 
Ministry,MoFED (HoF,3rd year, 1st Regular Meeting Minute, 1995E.C.)  
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concurrent revenue sources161. If the wide asymmetric representation of 
the States in the HoF is accompanied by deficit of genuine horizontal 
solidarity spirit, the power of the House to determine allocation of 
concurrent revenue sources between the Federal Government and the 
States can be a source of conflicts. Think, for example, what will happen if 
the decision of the House does not satisfy the claim and aspiration of the 
State which generates the concurrent revenue(s)? What will be the reaction 
of the mineral resources rich states but remain minority, if the House sets 
the distribution of concurrent revenue heavily skewed in favour of the 
Federal Government? Given the setting of the HoF, solidarity spirit among 
the states seems to be an effective saviour disposable to the states. If the 
House’s appropriation favours the generating states, it will create wide 
horizontal fiscal and socio-economic development disparities between the 
resource rich state and the ‘have-not’ States. Those states which have legal 
power to change the rule of game to their interest by forming coalition and 
the minority states but endowed with natural resources need to refrain 
from taking any action that could dilute the solidarity spirit that serves as a 
glue to remain united.   
The concurrent taxation powers are designed to ensure States’ access 
to a wide range of elastic revenue sources, so that they would be able to 
effectively carry out their responsibilities. So far the experience does not 
support the intended objective because in some elastic revenue sources, 
the Federal Government takes the lion’s share of the concurrent revenue 
sources. 
7.2.4 Tax Assignment on tax bases is seldom applied 
 
Global experiences show that tax assignments to different levels of 
government are done on tax bases. A certain tax base, say PIT or VAT, is 
either assigned exclusively to a certain level of government or is a shared 
                                                 
161  The SNNP constitutes almost 45% of the total 134 seats. This enables the State to win 
a simple majority vote (50+1) by forming coalition with either Oromia or Amhara or 
Tigrai or combinations of any two states from the emerging states, except Afar and 
Harari. In principle, the simple majority rule enables the SNNP to pass decisions on 
the distributions of revenues generated from concurrent tax powers in its favour or 
to reject, if it likes, any states’ claims for higher share from concurrent revenue that 
generates within their jurisdiction in the name of ‘democratic majority vote. 
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tax between different levels of government. Such tax assignment principle 
is seldom practiced in Ethiopia however. Rather, a single tax base is 
divided between the Federal Government and the States based on 
various principles. They independently levy taxes and administer the 
revenue sources assigned to them. As can be seen from Table 7-1, the 
Federal Government and the States have exclusive taxation powers on 
PIT, BPT, VAT revenue sources etc. This unique feature of the Ethiopian 
tax assignment leads to pose a question: what tax assignment criteria 
have been applied in determining the taxation powers of the Federal, or 
State or concurrent? 
Looking about the tax separation among the Federal, State and 
concurrent taxation powers, we may identify the considerations of 
various principles such as ownership principle, type of business form 
establishment, principle of origin, benefit-received principle, domiciliation 
principle, inter-State and international trade, and administrative 
feasibility. 
Ownership of revenue sources principle refers to the level of 
government that owns the source of revenue. According to this principle, 
the owner of a certain public sector or a business activity has taxation 
power on the resulting tax yield. That is, if the Federal Government owns 
a public sector that generates revenue, then taxation power of that 
revenue sources is assigned to the Federal Government. Similarly, if a 
State possesses a business entity, then that revenue source belongs to 
the State. When a revenue source is jointly owned by both the Federal 
Government and the States, the taxation power is automatically a 
concurrent power.  
The ownership principle ensures the right of the States to have 
access to a wide range of revenue sources generated from public sector 
activities they own and from natural resources located within their 
jurisdictions. Out of the existing 44 total revenue sources, seventeen (35 
percent) are assigned to the Federal, or to the States or to both on 
ownership principle. 
A shift of ownership of a business entity results in a change in 
taxation power over the revenue source. The privatization of Federal 
Government enterprises automatically shifts the taxation power to a 
concurrent or a state taxation power. 
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Type of business organization-refers to the legal registration of 
business organization form. All revenue sources that derive from private 
companies established in the form of Private Limited Companies 
(PLC)and Share Companies (Sh.co) are concurrent taxation powers, 
whereas revenues generated from firms registered as sole proprietorship 
business (individual traders) are State taxation powers. The separation of 
taxation powers between the Federal Government, the states and 
Concurrent are not made on tax base. Both the Federal Government and 
the States exclusively tax on the same tax base. Using type of business 
organization as a criterion for tax assignment between vertical levels of 
government is unique to Ethiopia. A change of business organization 
form causes a shift in taxation power. If an existing individual trader 
registers his/her business as PLC, the taxation power applicable will shift 
automatically from a State to a concurrent taxation power. Likewise, if a 
PLC business organization is reduced to a sole proprietorship, then the 
taxation power will shift from a concurrent taxation power to a State. 
The states’ taxation power on PIT, BPT, VAT, and TOT on individual 
traders (business organization criterion) might be argued for two 
grounds. First, given the economic base of the country is at low level, 
business activities organized on sole proprietorship are not only 
characterized by small scale manufacturing and trading activities but also 
their market (consumption area) are confined to local boundaries or 
assumed less mobile. That is, business entities like restaurants and cafes, 
pastries and bakeries, photo studios and beauty salons, wood workshops 
and garages, small dairy farms and trading etc... are less mobile and are 
established to exploit a niche market. Second, the States have 
responsibilities to discharge vast public functions that require 
commensurable public funds. Thus the assignment of such elastic 
revenue sources to the States, presumably, intends to ensure tax 
autonomy of the States. 
In practice, however, using the type of business organization as a 
criterion for assignment of revenue sources between the Federal 
Government and the States raises some critics:.(i) The criterion does not 
give a dependable source of revenue to the states for a couple of 
reasons:  
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(a).The revenue sources easily get shrink down. They shift from a 
state taxation power to concurrent power when entrepreneurs opt to 
register as Private Limited Company or Share Company any time.162Such 
a shift brings in adverse effect on the State’s fiscal capacity, because the 
revenues generated from BIT, and VAT on sole proprietorship that should 
have been entirely gone to the States’ treasury would become 
concurrent revenues and they will be shared according to the HoF 
distribution ratio.   
(b) Sole proprietorship is not a revenue source of the future. The shift 
from sole proprietorship business organizations to PLC and Sh.Co is a 
natural growth process. With the success of economic transformation of 
the country, revenues generated from sole proprietorship business 
organizations will eventually wither away or small business entities will 
be swallowed by big firms. Therefore, states’ revenue sources from sole 
proprietorship will sharply diminish in the long run.  
(ii)Treating revenue sources generated from local–oriented small 
business entities as concurrent revenue seems to be bizarre because they 
are simply established in PLC to mobilize financial and/or entrepreneurial 
skill. 
Origin principle refers to the production/ business area where a 
particular revenue source generates from. Revenue sources like rental 
income tax derived from private houses and capital transfer taxes on 
properties, tax on incomes from transport services rendered on waters 
within State territory, and PIT on income of private farmers and farmers 
incorporated in cooperative associations are assigned to the States, 
because the production areas are defined within the States’ territory. 
Here, a caution is in order. Location of production/business area does 
not automatically guarantee taxation power of a state. If a private 
companyX established in either PLC or Sh.Co form of business makes its 
HQ stateA but it operates its production or makes business area in States 
of B, C and D, then the taxation power will be concurrent revenue and the 
revenue is distributed between the Federal Government and StateA only. 
States of B, C and D get nothing even if they contribute in the creation of 
                                                 
162  There is a trend to register sole proprietorship business firms as PLC without real 
investment increment, to escape fromthe presumptive tax assessmentmethod, highly 
subjective and heavy tax burden, of the State Revenue Agencies. 
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wealth. If an enterprise organized as a sole proprietorship making its 
HQ163in StateA, but operates in stateB in addition to StateA, then the 
taxation power falls in the domain of stateA. The seat of the enterprise 
(HQ) has denied the hosting states from sharing revenues which have 
generated within the states, except PIT. 
The distribution of concurrent revenues on legal entity registration 
basis would lead to a wide horizontal fiscal disparity as the legal seats of 
private companies are mainly concentrated in Addis Ababa City 
Government. Interestingly, the Federal Government has attempted to 
minimize the adverse effect through introducing asymmetric taxation 
power. Unlike the States, the Addis Ababa City Government does not 
have concurrent taxation powers. The Federal Government takes away 
all concurrent revenue sources. Instead, it has given its taxation power 
stipulated on Art.96 (6) of the Federal Constitution (to levy and collect 
taxes on income of houses owned by the Federal Government) to the 
City. Therefore, in reality all concurrent revenues which would have been 
distributed to Addis are apportioned to the Federal Government which 
partly is transferred to the states in the form of unconditional and 
conditional grants and partly used to carry out Federal functions. Such an 
asymmetric taxation power to Addis is an innovative way of addressing 
horizontal fiscal disparity. 
Benefit-received principle links the real costs of public services with 
beneficiaries. It is a mechanism of financing cost of public services 
through setting user charges and fees. Thus user charges and fees are 
assigned to the jurisdiction that provides a certain public service. 
International trade tax bases-custom duties and other charges on 
imports and exports are exclusive taxation powers of the Federal 
Government. The reasoning is that a decentralized international trade tax 
base leads to inefficient capital resources allocation and distorts inter-
state trade. 
Domiciliation principle refers to the assignment of taxation power to 
different levels of government permanent residence of the tax payer. 
Regardless of the form of business organization, PIT on employees of 
                                                 163 When the states get started varying tax rate, corporations will have incentive to 
transfer pricing and switching costs on paper from lower tax rate state to a higher tax 
rate one in order to reduce their tax burden. 
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private companies is assigned to the States on domiciliation principle. Tax 
payers may earn incomes by performing their activities in various 
jurisdictions, even outside the country, or by renting their patent right 
across the country, but finally they should declare their taxable income 
to a revenue agency where they reside. This principle calls for horizontal 
tax coordination. Exchange of tax related information between the states 
may check tax evasion. 
Administrative convenience- Time and resources devoted to assess, 
collect, and audit for revenues, as much as possible, should be the lowest 
for both the Revenue Agency as well as for tax payers. PIT on employees 
of international organizations, taxes on incomes of air, rail, and sea 
transport services; taxes on monopolies and road funds are assigned to 
the Federal Government on consideration of administrative convenience. 
It is worth mentioning that the above principles (criteria) applied in 
the separation of taxation powers between the Federal Government and 
the States are not exclusive each other. For instance, BPT, VAT, etc 
generated from private companies (PLC and Sh.Co.) are concurrent 
taxation power, but PIT on private companies is a state taxation power 
on domiciliation principle. A revenue sources that should have been 
assigned to the States on origin basis can be concurrent revenue if the 
business is registered as PLC or Sh.co. The Federal Government may 
completely control revenue sources which operate production in StateA 
on ownership principle. 
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Table 7.2. Tax Assignment Principles in Ethiopia 
Tax 
Assignment 
criteria 
Federal power of 
taxation State power of taxation 
Concurrent power of 
taxation (Federal-
State) 
State of Tigrai  
RLG /ULG taxation powers State-LG concurrent power of taxation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ownership 
principle 
PIT on employees of the 
Federal Government  
PIT on employees of the 
State  
 PIT on employees of the LG 
and on employees of 
enterprises owned by the 
LG; 
 
PIT on employees of 
enterprises owned by 
the Federal Government; 
PIT on employees of 
enterprises owned by 
the States; 
PIT on employees of 
enterprises jointly 
established by the 
Federal and State 
  
Rental income tax on 
income of houses owned 
by the Federal 
Government; 
Royalties and land 
rentals on small scale 
mining operations 
 Royalties and land rentals 
on small scale mining 
operations undertaken 
within the LG; 
Royalties on small 
scale mining 
operations, and 
petroleum products; 
Income from other 
properties owned by the 
Federal Government; 
Business profit tax, on 
enterprises owned by 
the States 
Business profit tax on 
enterprises jointly 
established by the 
Federal and the 
States; 
Business profit tax, VAT, 
excise tax on enterprises 
owned by  LGs  
 
Business profit taxes on 
enterprises owned by 
the Federal Government; 
VAT, TOT, excise tax on 
enterprises owned by 
the States 
VAT and excise tax on 
enterprises jointly 
established; 
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Tax 
Assignment 
criteria 
Federal power of 
taxation State power of taxation 
Concurrent power of 
taxation (Federal-
State) 
State of Tigrai  
RLG /ULG taxation powers State-LG concurrent power of taxation 
VAT, and excise tax on 
enterprises owned by 
the Federal Government; 
royalties for use of 
forest resources; 
  Income tax from 
incense and gums, 
water and other 
resources; 
income tax on winnings 
of national lotteries and 
other games of chance; 
Fees for land 
usufractuary rights; 
 
 Services rendered Fees for 
rural and urban land fees; 
 
Tax on monopolies  
 
   
 
 
 
 
Type of 
business 
organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VAT or TOT, and excise 
tax on individual 
traders; 
Profit tax , VAT, and 
excise tax on 
companies; 
VAT or TOT, and excise tax 
on individual traders; 
 
  Royalty on large scale 
mining and 
Petroleum and gas 
operations 
  
 Profit tax on income 
derived from small scale 
mining operation; 
Dividends due to 
Share; 
 
BPT on income derived 
from micro and artisan 
mining; 
 
  income[PIT] derived 
from large scale 
mining petroleum 
and gas operation 
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Tax 
Assignment 
criteria 
Federal power of 
taxation State power of taxation 
Concurrent power of 
taxation (Federal-
State) 
State of Tigrai  
RLG /ULG taxation powers State-LG concurrent power of taxation 
 income tax [profit] on 
gains from renting of 
patent rights within the 
State; 
income tax[profit ]on 
gains 
from renting of 
patent rights on 
private companies; 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Origin 
principle 
Stamp duties; Stamp duties;  Stamp duties  
 Gains on transfer of 
certain investment 
properties;(capital 
transfer tax) 
 Gains on transfer of certain 
investment properties 
(capital transfer tax); 
 
 Rental income tax 
derived from private 
houses,  
 Rental income tax derived 
from private houses within 
the LG; 
 
 Rental income tax on 
other properties within 
the States; 
 Rental income tax on  
other properties within the 
LG 
 
 
 
PIT on income of private 
farmers and farmers 
incorporated in 
cooperative associations 
 PIT on income of private 
farmers and farmers 
incorporated in 
cooperative associations; 
 
 tax on incomes from 
transport services 
rendered on waters 
within State territory; 
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Tax 
Assignment 
criteria 
Federal power of 
taxation State power of taxation 
Concurrent power of 
taxation (Federal-
State) 
State of Tigrai  
RLG /ULG taxation powers State-LG concurrent power of taxation 
  Profit tax on individual 
traders carried out 
business within their 
territory 
   
 
Benefit-
received 
principle 
Fees and charges related 
to licenses issued and 
services rendered by the 
Federal Government; 
Fees and charges 
related to licenses 
issued and services 
rendered by the States; 
 Fees and charges related to 
licenses issued and services 
rendered by the States; 
 
 fees for land 
usufractuary rights 
 fees for land usufractuary 
rights 
 
International 
trade tax 
bases 
Custom duties, taxes and 
other charges on imports 
and exports; 
    
  PIT on employees of 
private companies; 
 PIT on employees of 
private  
Companies; 
 
 
 
Domiciliation 
Principle 
 Incomes [PIT]of private 
farmers and farmers 
incorporated in 
cooperative associations 
   
 PIT on employees of 
domestic NGO; 
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Tax 
Assignment 
criteria 
Federal power of 
taxation State power of taxation 
Concurrent power of 
taxation (Federal-
State) 
State of Tigrai  
RLG /ULG taxation powers State-LG concurrent power of taxation 
 PIT on income derived 
by an entertainer, 
musician or 
sportsman/woman from 
his/her personal 
activities 
 
 
 
 
PIT on income derived by 
an entertainer, musician or 
sportsman from his 
personal activities 
 
Administratio
n 
convenience 
PIT on employees of 
international 
organizations; 
    
Taxes on incomes of air, 
rail, and sea transport 
services; 
    
 
Source: author, constructed based on the Federal Constitution taxation power and Tigrai Proclamations No.99/19998  
and 107/1 
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7.3 Wereda Government taxation powers 
 
As noted earlier, the Federal Constitution defines the fiscal relations 
between the Federal Government and the States only. Wereda 
Government taxation powers are not only derived from the State’s tax 
assignment but also left to the discretion of the States because Weredas 
are creatures of the States. Despite the States have devolved 
considerable assignment of responsibilities to respective Weredas, no 
State, so far, has legally defined taxation powers of Weredas, except the 
State of Tigrai. 
As can be seen from Table 7.1, above, the State of Tigrai has 
devolved most of the revenue sources granted to it. Royalty on small 
local minerals and petroleum products, natural resources (incense and 
gums, water) and tourist entrance fees are also concurrent taxation 
powers between the State and Wereda. Very few revenue sources are 
retained at state level such as PIT on States’ employees, BPT, VAT, and 
excise tax on enterprises owned by the States, and fixing royalty on small 
scale mining. The taxation power gives access to various revenue sources 
to the Weredas. In addition to own revenue, (i) wereda block grant, (ii) 
budget subsidy to be granted by the state for the implementation of 
special purpose, (iii) loan, (iv) assistance from governmental and non-
governmental in cash or in kind, and (v) other sources are defined as 
revenue sources of ULGs. 
The highly decentralized taxation power will make the state of Tigrai 
fiscally starved and to rely mainly on the federal unconditional grants, 
concurrent sources of revenue EFFORT164and borrowing to finance its 
expenditure needs. The devolution of taxation powers envisages strong 
weredas. In practice, however, the tax devolution has remained on paper 
as the Council of the State has not yet determined the minimum and 
maximum tax rate in accord to the Proclamation No 107/1998. 
                                                 
164 Legally speaking the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigrai (EFFORT), a 
second biggest domestic business corporation in terms of investment and 
employment in the country, belongs to the  People of Tigrai. It is supposed to finance 
the State’s capital investment needs.The State receives considerable revenues being 
generated from EFFORT in the form of concurrent taxation.  
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Therefore, taxation powers of the Weredas in Tigrai are limited to 
municipal revenues.  
The Amhara State has identified the following revenue sources to the 
ULGs: (i) City/Municipal revenue sources, (tariffs, land rental fee and 
lease revenues; (ii) dividend of development enterprises administered 
under city/municipal); (iii) revenue sharing between the Regional states 
and ULGs; (iv) subsidy granted by the Regional state(Wereda block 
grant); (v) special budget subsidy or assistance by the Regional state for 
the implementation of special purpose, (vi) short-term and long-term 
loan; (vii) aid from governmental and non-governmental organization in 
cash or in kind, and (vii) other sources(Amhara Regulation No. 37/2005). 
The Amhara state has preferred a revenue sharing arrangement, 
although, again, the State Council has not determined what revenue 
sources should be shared between the state and the ULGs. The Amhara 
revenue sharing system gives less taxation power to the LGs as compared 
to the Tigrai.  
 
7.4 Vertical Tax Co-ordinations 
 
As discussed earlier, revenue sources are either exclusively assigned 
to the Federal Government or to the States or are concurrent (shared) 
between the Federal and the States. Table7.3 shows 44 revenue sources 
of which 13 and 22 are exclusively assigned to the Federal Government 
and to the States respectively, while the remaining 9 sources of revenue 
are concurrent revenue sources.  
Article 96 and Article 97 of the Federal Constitution note that the 
Federal Government and the States “shall levy and collect…” which imply 
each government has legislative taxation authority to determine the B, t, 
Di over their tax domains. Besides, the Federal Government and the 
States jointly determine t, B, Di, and make tax assessment and collection 
on concurrent revenue sources. The joint taxation powers presuppose 
consensus based decision to avoid any fiscal externalities. 
Sub-sections 7.4.1 to 7.4.4 examine how the vertical tax coordination 
works in the Ethiopian taxation system.  Emphasis is given to PIT, CIT, 
VAT and unevenly distributed natural resources. These tax bases are 
purposely selected on their existing and potential contributions to the 
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total revenue pool as well as the degree of cooperation and 
harmonization they entail. 
 
7.4.1 Personal income tax (PIT) 
 
PIT is imposed on taxable income of payees. PIT is a highly 
decentralized revenue source in Ethiopia. It is assigned to the Federal 
Government, the States and jointly to the Federal and the States. 
Constitutionally speaking, in the general taxation formula stated above, 
the Federal Government determines the B, Di and t, on PIT generated 
from its employees, on enterprises it owns, and on employees of 
international organizations. Similarly, the States levy PIT on employees of 
(i) the States, (ii) the enterprises owned by the States, (iii) the private 
companies, (iv) local non-government organizations, and (v) on incomes 
of entertainers, musicians, and sportsmen/women. Constitutional 
speaking, the States have authority to determine the tax base, set tax 
rate, and administer and collect PIT assigned to them. 
In Tigrai. PIT on employees of civil servants of Weredas on employees 
of development enterprises owned by Weredas, and on employees of 
private business entities are assigned to Weredas (Tigrai Proclamation No 
99/1998 and Proclamation No.107/1998). According to these 
Proclamations, the urban Weredas have authority to set tax rate within 
the minimum and maximum tax rate to which shall be set by the State 
Council. LGs have to apply the state’s ‘B’ and ‘Di’. 
The FGTFF argument for centralization of PIT to impede fiscally 
induced labour migration is less persuasive in Ethiopia. In the Ethiopian 
reality, unilateral measures on PIT for interpersonal equity purpose 
would hardly cause out migration of rich people to a lower PIT States. 
Neither will it result in influx of poor people to a more welfare State, at 
least, in the foreseeable future unless unemployment and poverty levels 
become serious problem. Language and cultural diversity, and strong 
social affection towards locality area, strong ethnic identity tension, and 
widely spread indigenous versus non-indigenous mentality in the states 
are believed to make inter-state mobility of people very expensive. The 
existing rural land tenure policy that obliges land users to stay 
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permanently in their local areas and housing problems in big urban 
centres also contribute to the existing low level of inter-state mobility of 
people in Ethiopia.  
But it should be noted that other variables remaining same, 
significant difference on PIT rate for interpersonal redistribution purpose 
within the relatively homogeneous States is likely to result in labour 
mobility to lower PIT rate jurisdiction. For example, in Tigrai, where PIT is 
decentralized to LG, other things remain same, people may be reluctant 
to apply for a job in a higher PIT weredas and thus it may cause 
misallocation of labour force in the State unless (a) the difference 
between minimum and maximum tax rate, to be determined by the State 
Council, (Tigrai, Proclamation No.107/1998) will remain insignificant, or 
(b) residents believe that the higher tax rate brings in better public 
service in their locality. Given Tigrians are relatively mobile people,165 
social affection to birth place is believed to be less to hinder movement 
of people from one LG to another LG within the state. 
The principle of PIT on work place restricts the States/LGs access to 
PIT from their residents who work for establishments in other 
jurisdictions. The case of Addis Ababa Surrounding Special Zone of 
Oromia State is a typical illustration.166 The satellite towns in the Zone 
supply considerable labour force to the Addis Ababa City Government. In 
accord with the principle of ownership or origin principle, commuters pay 
PIT to the Addis Ababa City Government, while the satellite towns, which 
provide public services to the commuters and their families, get nothing. 
This issue is, therefore, an agenda that calls for some sort of horizontal 
coordination and negotiation between the hosting States and employer 
state. 
The decentralized assignment of PIT has made impossible to 
determine the taxable income by aggregating all sources of personal 
                                                 
165For instance, people from the Eastern part of the State have been migrating to the 
western and southern parts of the state since 1950s. 
166 The emerging trends of cluster industrial zones in continuum jurisdictions (for 
example Kombolich and Dessie in Amhara, Adwa and Axum in Tigrai, Shashemene 
and Hawassa) and, the Federal Government public investment on  selected ‘strategic 
industries’ in the economic zones may exacerbate the problem unless some sort of 
compensation mechanisms are designed for the costs of public services provided by 
LG or PIT on place of residence principle is applied. 
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income derived from more than one justification because each level of 
government is entrusted with the power to determine the taxable 
income generated only within its jurisdiction. 
 
7.4.2 Corporate income tax (CIT) or Business profit tax 
(BPT)167 
 
The tax bases of CIT or BPT are public and private profit making 
enterprises. The Federal Government tax bases of CIT are enterprises 
owned by the Federal Government and incomes generated from air, rail 
and sea transport services, whereas individual traders (private business), 
enterprises owned by the States and income from transport service 
rendered on water within states’ territories (private or public) are BPT 
sources of the States. The States can determine B, set ‘t’, Di, independently 
assess and collect BPT. But in practice, the states apply the Federal 
Government’s, B, t, and Di. 
CIT on companies jointly established by the Federal Government and a 
State, as well as on large scale mining on all petroleum and natural gas 
operations are concurrent taxation powers of the Federal Government and 
the States. B, t, Di and tax administration are jointly determined (Federal 
Constitution, Art.98).Such a joint taxation power gives access to elastic 
revenue sources to both governments. 
Literatures on fiscal federalism plausibly argue that a decentralized 
CIT/BPT spurs tax competition among jurisdictions to attract capital to 
their own territory and would cause fiscally induced capital migration. 
This is less practical in the Ethiopia federal arrangement as business 
people perceive that local politicians make favour to the ‘son-of-the soil’. 
In order to avoid tax race-to-the bottom among the States, the 
Federal Constitution designates the relatively mobile nature business 
entities as concurrent taxation power. Business entities characterized by 
immobile tax base are given to the States. Psychological cost of mobility 
                                                 
167 To avoid any confusion, in this study CIT and BPT are used interchangeably. Note that 
CIT/BPT on business entities organized in PLC and Sh.co aresubject to 30 percent tax, 
while sole proprietorshipbusineses are imposed 35percent. 
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to other state for small business entities organized as sole proprietorship 
is believed to be high. 
Other factors remaining the same, effects of the decentralized BPT in 
Tigrai on the choice of investment location will depend upon the tax rate 
to be set in the LGs. The higher the difference between the minimum and 
the maximum tax rate, the greater will be the distortion of capital 
allocation among the LGs. Entrepreneurs may migrate to a lower BPT LG. 
 
7.4.3 Value Added Tax (VAT) 
 
VAT was introduced in 2002 to replace the sales tax. The tax base for 
VAT includes all taxable goods (consumer and capital) and services of legal 
business entities whose annual sale turnover exceeds Birr 500,000 
(equivalent to USD 26,500) except exempted transactions identified in the 
VAT Proclamation. All imported goods and services are subject to VAT 
registration (Federal VAT Proclamation No.285/2002). 
The assignment of VAT implicitly respects the assignment of sales tax 
which has stipulated in the Federal Constitution. The Federal Government 
determines the VAT base, and Di, tax rate, assesses and administers VAT 
bases which fall in its domain. The same is true for state VAT. The Federal 
Government and the States jointly determine the VAT base, Di, and t on the 
concurrent revenue sources. However, in practice, the Federal 
Government defines the tax bases, deductions, exemptions, the rate and 
administration of states’ and concurrent revenue sources of VAT without 
making amendment on the taxation power168 (Federal VAT Proclamation 
No.285/2005). Thus, VAT is uniform across the states. VAT on individual 
traders is assessed, audited and collected by the Federal Custom and 
Revenue Authority (FCaRA) and the Authority transfers the VAT proceeds 
to the States every two months based on the legal entity (seat) of an 
enterprise(Federal Custom and Revenue Authority Directive, No.22/2001) 
True, harmonizing the VAT base, deductions, and exemptions avoids 
inefficient allocation of resources. A single VAT administration might be 
                                                 168 VAT is imposed at 15 percent. Any business organization may also voluntarily 
register for VAT, if it regularly supplies or renders at least 75 percent of its goods and 
services to VAT registered business entities (Federal, VAT Proclamation 
No.285/2002). 
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also desirable to reduce tax administration inconvenience and compliance 
costs to both the Revenue Authority and tax payers. The criticism is 
however, even if there is good justification for uniformity of tax base, Di 
and tax administration on VAT; it should have been done in line with the 
spirit of the Federal Constitution, rather than by a unilateral Federal 
decision. 
 
7.4.4 Natural resources revenues 
 
Article 40(3) of the Federal Constitution reads, “The right to 
ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is 
exclusively vested in the State and in the Peoples of Ethiopia….”  
In the spirit of this article, natural resource revenues are assigned 
either exclusively to the States or, jointly to the Federal and the States. 
The States have power to levy and collect taxes on incomes derived from 
small scale mining activities (Federal Constitution, Art 97(8)) and royalty 
on use of forest (Federal Constitution, Art.97(10). Royalties on 
production, rent on resources, business profit tax, VAT and excise taxes 
on large scale mining and all petroleum and natural gas operations are 
concurrent revenue sources. Like any the other concurrent taxation 
power, tax rates, deductions, exemptions and tax administration on 
natural resources revenues are jointly determined by the Federal 
Government and the States (Federal Constitution, art.98 (3). 
The States have right to determine tax bases, deductions, 
exemptions ,set tax rate and charge fees on natural resources that fall on 
their jurisdiction. The Federal Government has no exclusive taxation 
power on natural resources revenues, but on fees for the services it 
provides (issuing licenses). In practice, however, the Federal Government 
determines B, t, and Di on natural revenue sources. 
The assignment of natural resource taxes to the States and to 
concurrent jurisdictions has both political and economic rationale. In 
terms of politics, guaranteeing the States right to benefit from their 
natural resources endowment is believed to promote holding together of 
the constituent members of the federation. It gives incentive to states 
rich in natural resource to stay within the federation and to undermine 
secession sentiment that might be evoked by ethnic entrepreneurs, on 
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the pretext of ‘We are not benefiting from our natural resources as the 
centre takes all’. It may also serve as an instrument to join the federation 
including neighbouring countries in the future. 
 
Table 7.3. A Summary of taxation power on natural resources 
 
Revenue sources federal state Federal and state 
Concurrent 
revenue sources) 
Royalty on large scale169 
exploitation 
    
Royalty on small scale exploitation      
Large mining License and 
registration fees 
     
Tax on earning and profits of large 
scale operating business 
    
Tax on earning and profits of small 
scale operating business 
    
VAT on large scale exploitation     
VAT on small scale mining 
exploitation 
    
Source: Federal Constitution, Art.98  
 
 
In terms of economics, assignment of unevenly distributed natural 
resources revenue to the States only would cause a wide economic 
horizontal disparity between the resource endowed states and the less 
endowed one. This, in turn, enables them to provide better quantity and 
quality of public services at a lower tax burden than poorly endowed 
states. Hence, the latter would be forced to impose higher tax rate to 
provide comparable basic public services. In addition, resource-rich 
States would have better opportunity to invest on modern 
infrastructures. As a result, business organizations may have an incentive 
to choose the rich states as their investment location. Labour will likely to 
migrate there, although it is not as mobile as capital, seeking for better 
                                                 
169  Large scale mining and small scale minigs are defined in the Federal Government 
Mining Proclamation No 678/2011. 
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job opportunities and higher wages. All these would lead to misallocation 
of productive resources among the States. 
Therefore, natural resource revenues are assigned as a concurrent 
revenue sources as well as State revenue power to achieve couple of 
conflicting objectives: (i). to benefit the states from their natural 
resources. Sharing out the concurrent revenue in favour of the state 
would appease the resource endowed States and may curb secession 
mentality and (ii) to address the problem of politically unacceptable 
horizontal disparity.  
The assignments of natural resources seem to have implicit objective 
to compensate both for environmental damage that would occur in the 
process of extracting the resources and for the public services provided 
by the States/local governments.170 To this end, the states have right to 
claim up to 5 percent equity of the total mining investment without 
paying for it (Federal Proclamation, No. 678/2010 and Federal 
Proclamation No. 816/2013). Surprisingly, so far the states do not receive 
royalty revenue from large-scale miming activities nor they make use of 
the 5 percent equity right on the total capital investment of private 
companies. 
In summing up, the separation of taxation power between the 
Federal Government and the states intends to ensure a high level of tax 
autonomy. It is designed in a way to have access to a range of revenue 
sources, except custom duties related taxes. The Federal Constitution 
empowers the States to determine tax base, set tax rate and tax 
administer. They have also equal legislative taxation powers over 
concurrent taxes. But in practice, tax base, tax rate and deductions are 
uniformly applied across the States, except agricultural income tax, and 
deductions on rental income.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
170 The Federal Government enforces the need for the establishment of 
“Environment Impact Assessment and Rehabilitation Fund” in minig operations 
with the objective to cover the costs of rehabilitation of environmental impact 
in the hosting jurisdiction(Federal Proclamation No 678/2010). 
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7.5 Horizontal Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization 
 
7.5.1 Tax harmonization 
 
As discussed earlier, the phrases “shall levy and collect...“in Art.97 of 
the Federal Constitution imply, the States’ taxation power to determine 
B, t, and Di over a range of revenue sources. Theoretically, such variations 
of the states’ taxation powers would likely lead to tax competition and 
would make the tax administration complicated, particularly for business 
firms which operate in more than one state. In order to avoid the 
possible consequences of tax competition, the Federal Government has 
compelled the States “to ensure harmonization and standardization of 
the States’ new or changed tax bases with the Federal Government” 
(Federal Proclamation No.57/1996 and Council of Ministries Regulation 
No.17/1997).171 That is, in T= tf,c×[B-(Di)]× (Kfederal +Kstate+KLG), the States 
have to harmonize and standardize B with the Federal Government tax 
base. Applying uniform definitions of tax bases, deductions, and 
exemptions on mobile tax bases across the states, make sense, as long as 
constitutional amendments are done   in line to the constitutional 
causes, for well founded economic arguments,, to minimize if not to 
avoid wasteful tax competition, to reduce fiscally induced mobility of 
resources, to minimize costs of tax assessment and administration, and 
to reduce compliance cost when tax payers operate in different states.172  
 
 
                                                 171  The constitutional ground of the Federal Financial Administration 
Proclamation that obliges the states to harmonize and standardize their tax 
base with the Federal Government may raise a legimacy question as the 
Constitution is supreme law over any proclamation and rule. 172 According to the Proclamation, tax base harmonization is limited to tax bases   
common to the Federal and the States. The tax harmonization does not apply on tax 
bases limited to the States. For instance, Addis Ababa sets 50 percent deductions as 
depreciation cost on total rental income, while the states apply only 20 percent 
deduction (see Tigrai Income tax Proclamation No. 86/2003). This has obious impact on 
diverting investment in construction sector in Addis.  
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7.5.2 Tax competition 
 
The States have legislative power to set tax rates, however, they are 
de-facto uniform across the States, except agricultural income tax, rural 
land use fee and urban land lease fee. One may ask why the States do 
not exercise their constitutional right to set tax rate. We may postulate 
some possible political economy explanations for the existing uniform tax 
rate in Ethiopia: 
(i) The States have either ‘voluntarily abandoned’ their right and have 
preferred to pursue the Federal tax rates or they are ‘advised’ by the 
‘invisible hand’ [ ruling party] not to dare playing with tax rate intending: 
(a) to avoid the possible consequences of inter-state tax competition; 
and (b) to provide minimum standard public services at nation-wide at 
comparable tax burden.   
(ii) It could be “gentlemen’s agreement” in the sense of Nash cooperative 
equilibrium in the prisoner’s dilemma. Cooperative equilibrium avoids 
moral hazard in that each State is acting the same: StateA does not use its 
own tax rate schedule but the Federal one, knowing that the other States 
will do the same. So, StateA takes no risk having to respond to tax 
competition from the other States. This may make each State to benefit 
equally or denies benefits equally. 
(iii) It could be simple tax mimicking in the sense that politicians in StateA 
adopt exactly the same tax behaviour in the other States. State 
politicians may prefer to stick to the Federal tax rate schedule. Adopting 
the same tax behaviour makes politicians in StateA not to be judged by 
their constituents on their “tax performance” in comparison with what 
has been happening in other States (benchmarking). So, politician may 
opt to compete not with very sensitive tax variable, but playing with 
public expenditures. 
(iv)The States may not have incentive to raise tax rate as the Federal 
Government is generous enough to transfer large sum of unconditional 
grant and specific grants to them, although these sources of revenue do 
not meet all their expenditure needs. The Federal transfer has developed 
dependency feelings on the States. They expect the Federal Government 
to finance all their expenditure needs as much as possible. 
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(v) The States may believe that the existing tax burden is heavy enough173 
and raising tax rate may not be politically feasible. Rather they may opt 
for broadening their tax base than raising the tax rates. 
(vi) The States may feel that reforming the archaic tax administration is of a 
priority issue. This assumes that once the States feel that they modernize 
their tax administration system, and make necessary capacity building 
measures, they may start tax games. 
The de-facto uniform harmonization (same B, Di and t across 
states/LGs) has made the states to lose setting tax rate power, the basic 
instrument of tax autonomy. It has precluded the States from designing 
their tax policies to maximize their revenues, which contradicts with the 
intention of the Federal Constitution that perceives strong states. 
The States attempt to attract investment into their jurisdiction not in 
the conventional way of cutting tax rate on mobile taxes such as PIT, CIT, 
VAT, but by differentiating urban land lease rates, agricultural income tax 
and by public expenditure competition and providing single window 
shopping service to investors. 
 
Land leasing and Agricultural income tax as instruments of 
inter-state competition 
 
The States have used land lease rate174 variation as an instrument of 
inter-state competition to attract investment into own jurisdiction. Until 
2012, the states used to offer urban and rural lands: (i) at nominal rate or 
for free by assessing the impact of the investment on the states social and 
economic developments, or (ii) on negotiation bases (between the 
government who supplies the land and investors), or (iii) on bid auction for 
                                                 
173 Note that VAT for all sorts of transactions is 15%, BPT on Corporation is 30% 
whileBPT on sole proprietorships is 35% of the taxable income. 
174 Ethiopiahad different forms of land ownership policy.During the Imperial regime, land 
property rights included communal lands, private, state, church and open land (no-man 
lands). During the Dergue regime, In line with the socialist economic principle, land 
became under the ownership of the entire people. The current regime has perpetuated 
similar land policy with the Dergue regime with minor modifications. Land 
administration is entirly State’s function. 
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land lease.175Urban land lease rates widely vary not only across the States 
but also within a LG depending on infrastructure development (availability 
of utilities, transport net work, etc), grade category of an urban centre, and 
distance from economic centres. The States/ LGs use land lease as an 
effective means of inter-state competitions to attract investment by 
adopting differential land lease rate per square meter, lease duration by 
sector, grace period of land lease payment, and payment modality (say, 
small portion advance payment with pieces of instalment). 
The inter-state competitions on urban and rural land lease rates have 
influenced, to some extent, the choice of investment location of both 
domestic and FDI. The land lease policy of Oromia could be an illustrative 
case. Land lease rate per M2 is the highest in Addis Ababa City Government 
than in any other State for the comparative advantages it has (market size, 
relatively well developed infrastructure and availability of inputs to start a 
business, etc). One may not expect a wide difference in urban land lease 
rate between the suburb of Addis Ababa and its adjacent towns of the 
Special Zone of Addis Ababa Surrounding Oromia as they have similar 
infrastructural development, access to market and proximity factors. 
However, in the mid 2000s, minimum land lease rate at grade five of Addis 
Ababa (continuum to the Special Zone of Oromia), was 191.00 Birr per M2, 
while it was between Birr 5.85 to Birr 6.50 per M2 at a short distance in the 
Oromia towns, showing 31 times lower than that of its adjacent Addis 
Ababa areas (Ethiopian Investment Agency, 2008). The Oromia state had 
also designed an attractive lease payment modality to attract investment. 
The significant cutting off land lease rate to the bottom has attracted Addis 
Arabian investors to choose Oromia (continuum to Addis) for 
manufacturing location rather than Addis.176 Language difference is not 
found to be a constraint as Amharic, the working language of the Federal 
                                                 
175 The highly decentralized land lease system has become one sources of rent-seeking, and 
has resulted in land garbing. Understanding the severity of the problem, the Federal 
Government issued a land leasing modality Regulation recently (2012) that prohibits 
offering land for free or on negotiation basis, but on bid only. Note that the regulation 
gives discretion to a Mayor , upon the consent of respective Council, to provide land on 
negotiation basis for huge private investments that are believed to bring significant 
impact on social and/or economic development to a ULG. 
176  However, the highly decentralized land lease management was found among the main 
sources of rent seeking, and the first two alternatives have been ruled out since mid 
2012. 
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Government, is well spoken in the Zone. The political choice of the Oromia 
state to offer land at low lease rate and the locational advantage have 
made the Surrounding of Addis a leading industrial zone. It also contributed 
to rank the Oromia State a second (next to Addis Ababa) investment 
destination in the country (MoFED, Macro Development Reports of 2007/8 
to 2008/9). 
The remaining States have also pursued the “beggar-thy-neighbour” 
strategy. They set low urban land lease rates, or negotiable fee and/or 
offering lands for free for investors who would like to invest on the states’ 
priority areas. The States of Amhara, SNNP and Tigrai have managed to 
attract substantial ‘son-of-the-soil’ investors. However, the strategy has 
lured little domestic investors in the Emerging States. Many factors have 
contributed to this. First, the Emerging States have not yet built-up 
indigenous entrepreneurs, partly due to the marginalized economic policies 
they experienced in the previous regimes, and partly due to the clan-based 
social structure they have. The market size is very small and transportation 
cost is costly. Besides the economic variables, investors take into account 
various non-economic factors like rule of law and internal political stability 
in selecting investment location. These states have relatively low record in 
respecting rule of law and stability. 
It should be stressed that the States’ cutting down land lease rates 
have less influence in swing capital from one State to another, except 
from Addis to Oromia. It has not pulled out an Amhara investor who 
resides in the State of Amhara to Tigrai, or to SNNP or to Oromia, etc. 
The reverse is also true. My discussions with the top officials of States’ 
Investment Agencies revealed that almost 100 percent investments in 
Tigrai have been made by Tigrians, and more than 90 percent 
investments in Amhara have been made by Amharas. The remaining 
balance has been made by non-Amharas who have lived for long periods 
of time in the urban centres of Amhara. 
The roles of non-indigenous domestic investors and FDI are more 
pronounced in Oromia, SNNP, Gambela, Gambela and Benshangul-
Gumuz for a couple of reasons: (i) for historical reason ‘non-indigenous’ 
or ‘settlers’ are dominant in number and have economic power in the 
relatively big urban centres, and (ii) the states have comparative 
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advantage on land and water resources, very critical components, to 
attract mechanized agriculture investment 
The tax base of agricultural income tax is land size in hectare, not the 
income generated from the agricultural land. Agricultural income tax rate 
varies across the States, although it is not significant. In Oromia, 
Benshangule-Gumuz and Gambela, agricultural income taxes are 
progressively levied, while it is a fixed rate per hectare of land in Tigrai 
and Harari. In Amhara agricultural income tax rate varies depending on 
the food secure status of a Wereda. That is, agricultural income tax per 
hectare of land in food in secured weredas ranges from Birr 5 to Birr 20, 
while in the food secured weredas range from Birr 10 to Birr 25. In the 
SNNP, agricultural income tax varies depending on whether the purpose 
of agricultural production is for market or for personal consumption. It is 
higher on cash crops such as ‘chat’ and coffee production than crop 
productions for personal consumption, which range from Birr 5 to Birr 
300 per hectare (HoF, 2007:20-21).  
So far, the variations in agricultural income taxes across the states 
have insignificant influence to attract investment. Because availability of 
vast agricultural land, infrastructure, water supply, labour and rule of law 
are more critical to engage on mechanized agricultural investment.   
 
7.5.3 Fiscal/budget competition 
 
Fiscal/Budget competition refers to mimicking of public expenditure 
spending policies and strategies on economic sectors of a jurisdiction in 
line to spending policy of neighbouring jurisdictions. The states use public 
expenditure competition as a strategy to attract investment into their 
jurisdiction. It takes in two ways: (i) by allocating large public fund on 
infrastructural development. Understanding investors are more 
interested in the availability of basic infrastructure stock, market size and 
trained labour to engage into a business, the States spend large public 
fund in physical and social infrastructural developments177; and, 
                                                 
177 For example, when the State Council of Oromia decided to move its seatfrom Addis 
Ababa to Adama City in early 2000s, the Council allocated one billion Birr 
onintercity road, sewerage and pavement works with the objective to make the city 
a centre of conference tourism and business. The Council of SNNP, astonished by 
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(ii) By spending public fund on human development and institutional 
capacity building programs. The States invest on their civil servants and 
institutions through introducing new management systems to make the 
bureaucracy more efficient and customer-oriented. The states also 
attempt to attract investors providing a “single-window-shopping” 
service for investors. 
These non-tax competitions are necessary and healthy; however, the 
nature of competitions crowds out public spending on education, health, 
rural roads, etc in favour of the private business service. For example, 
public spending on establishments of industrial Zones have taken the 
capital budget that would have been allocated to education, water 
supply, and road services and on other pro-poor public investments. 
 
7.6 Financial Autonomy and Tax Sovereignty 
 
Financial resources play a make or a break role for fiscal federalism 
to work. Lack of resources was one of the causes for the failure of federal 
systems in many developing countries (Elazar; 1987:242). If States and 
LGs lack access to adequate revenue sources, they cannot adequately 
carry out the responsibilities they assumed. In a situation where 
competitive election for political power is weak, reliance on transfer 
undermines accountability. 
The Federal Constitution allows the States to levy tax, set tax rates 
and tax administration on a range of revenue sources. But, what degree 
of financial autonomy and tax sovereignty do the States and LGs enjoy? 
To what extent is really in practice the Ethiopian tax assignment 
decentralized? In order to examine the extent of financial autonomy of 
the States and LGs, Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) and Meloche, et.al (2004) 
methods are used, while the Blochliger and King taxonomy of taxation 
power and the Dafflon tax sovereignty criteria are applied to investigate 
the degree of tax sovereignty of the States and LGs in Ethiopia. 
                                                                                                               
the success story of Adama, allocated Birr 750 million to improve intercity roads of 
Hawassa in mid 2000s.The Amhara state made similar investment in Bahir Dar. The 
States of Amhara, Oromia and the SNNP have also  allocated public fund to build  
modern stadiums , and international standard conference Halls following suit the 
State of Tigrai. 
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Before we examine the extent of financial autonomy of the States, it 
seems worth noting briefly how the tax revenue structure of Ethiopia 
looks like. The ratio of tax revenue to GDP in Ethiopia used to be among 
the lowest in developing countries, but it grew, from 7 percent in 1992/3 
and 16 percent in 2012(MoFED data base). Since 1993/4, the indirect tax 
revenue (foreign trade related taxes and VAT) has dominated the 
national tax structure. In the 2009/10 budget, it constituted about 80 
percent of the total national revenue (MoFED, data base). 
The States have direct access to various revenue sources, except on 
import and export duties. Nevertheless, the States and weredas 
mobilized only 15.41 percent of the total national revenue in 2009/10 
budget year. 64 percent of their revenue was generated from direct tax 
of which PIT and BPT constituted 32 percent and 9 percent respectively 
for the same year. Urban land lease contributed 6 percent while the 
share of agricultural income tax was only 4 percent of the SNGs’ total 
revenue. The share of domestic indirect tax was 20 percent and the 
remaining balance was generated from non-revenue tax and municipality 
revenues178
                                                 
178 The share of municipal revenue to the States has to be interpreted with 
caution. While municipality revenue is compeletely decentralized to LGs, it is 
centralized at state level in Harari and Dire Dawa (because they are of two tiers 
of government-the statel and Kebele). 
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  Table 7.4. Revenue Structure 2009/10, in Million Birr 
 
 
Federal level State level State and Wired 
SN Revenue sources 
% to total  
Federal revenue 
In Birr 
% to total 
state revenue 
In Birr 
% to total 
wereda  revenue 
In 
Birr 
1 Direct Taxes 16.8 8801 62 1184 64 6105 
1.1 Personal income tax 2.3 1220 20 393 32 3171 
1.2 Rental income tax 0 0 1.6 31 1.5 142 
1.3 Business income tax 0 0 10.3 198 8.8 844 
1.4 Corporate income tax 12.2 6388 1.5 29 0. 4 37 
1.5 Capital Gains Tax 0 0 0.16 3 0. 4 37 
1.6 Agri. Income Tax 0 0 1.2 22 4.0 389 
1.7 Royalty Payment 0 0 1.2 24 0.4 39 
1.8 Withholding on imports 1.5 796 21.6 4161 4.4 416 
1.9 Tax on dividends and Chance winning 0.6 314 
 
0.49  0.49 
1.10 Interest income tax 0.2 83 0.16 3  3 
1.11 Chat Tax 0 0 1.8 35 1.3 122 
1.12 Rural Land use Fee 0 0 0.5   9 2.8 270 
1.13 Urban Land Lease 0 0 1.2 23 6.3 606 
2. Indirect taxes 67 34862 23 440 20 1905 
2.1 Indirect taxes(domestic) 17 8825 23 440 19 1903 
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2.1.1 
VAT on goods 0.12 
5166.1
* 0.18 388.86# 
0.11 
0.12 
2.1.2 Excise Tax on Local Goods4 
 
 
 
 0.05 0.003 
2.1.3 Turn over tax on goods 
 
 0.6 12 2.7 254 
2.1.4 Service VAT/ TOT 7 3503 1.2  25 2.4 226 
2.1.5 Stamp sales  0.3 156 0.7  14 1.6 157 
2.2 Indirect taxes on Import  50 26037 
  
 
 2.2.1 Custom duties 11 5852 
  
 
 2.2.2 VTA/excise taxes   16 8352 
  
 
 2.2.3 Other imports  23 11833 
  
  
 Total tax revenue 83.8 43663 85 1624 84 8010 
3 Non-Tax Revenues 17  8719 0.024 47 7.0 663 
3.1 Charges & Fee 0.1 311 0.024 47 1.8 178 
3.2 Other non-tax reve5 16 8408 0 0 5.1 485 
3.3 Municipality Revenue 
  
0.13 2506 9.0 872 
 Total Revenue 100 52382  100 1921 100 9545 
Source: MoFED, 2010 FY data base Ethiopia Federal and Regional Governments Revenue performance.www.mofed.gov.et 
1Weredas do not have taxation power but they collect taxes on delegation base. 2 did not include withholding tax and VAT which were 
transferred to the States from the FC&RA. 2% withholding tax is imposed on goods when purchasing takes place but 3% is imposed on 
imported goods. 3 Includes VAT and excise tax. 4 Includes excise tax on petroleum, alcohol & tobacco 5 Includes sales of goods, residual 
surplus, reimbursement and property, miscellaneous revenues; 6 Municipality revenues are mobilized at state level in Harari and in Dire 
Dawa as they are two tiers government. 
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7.6.1 Financial autonomy of the States and LGs 
 
This section investigates the financial autonomy of sub national 
governments in Ethiopia using the Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) and Meloche, 
et.al (2004) methods. 
Table 7.5. Financial autonomy of States and LG, 2009/10, in million Birr 
 
 
Tax and non-tax 
revenue 
 
States 
 
 
LGS 
 
 
Total 
SGN 
 
Share to 
totalrevenue 
of 
State LGs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.0 Own-revenue 8,380 1238 9,618 23.7 25.9 
1.1 tax revenue+ 8,010 - 8,008 22.7 - 
1.2 Non-tax revenue++ 297 1,238 1,535 0.8 25.9 
1.3 Concurrent taxation+++ 73  73 0.2  
2.0 Federal 
UnconditionalGrant1 
20,934  2094 59.1  
3.0 Wereda block grant2  3,424 3,424  71.6 
4.0 Tax sharing3 306 121 427 0.9 2.5 
5.0 Specific purpose grant4 5,774  5,774 16.3  
6.0 Total revenue 35,394 4,783 4017 100. 100 
7.0 Total Federal Government revenue(FR)                           44, 029 
8.0 Financial Autonomy 
 
Ebel and Yimaz 
method  
Financial autonomy (FA)= 
ORSNG/TRSNG= 30,552/40,177 
76 
 
 
Meloche,et.al 
method 
Revenue autonomy(RA)=  
ORSNG/TRSNG= 30,552/40,177 
76 
Own revenue Ratio=  
ORSNG/TRSNG+FR30,553/(40,177+44,
029)=  
 
36.3 
Dependent Revenue ratio (DRR)= 
IGT/TRSNG+TRFR 
=27,135/(40,177+44,029)= 
32.2 
Sources: + and ++ are derived from Table 7.6 above. Note ++ includes 
municipality revenues. 
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+++ Federal Revenue and Custom Agency; 
1 Federal Government, 2010 budget proclamation 
2 MoFED data base. Note that Wereda block grant is State transfer to LGs. The 
States allocated Birr 11,048.9 million as Wereda block grant, however, since it 
was off-set from total LG revenue collections, in effect, the size of Wereda block 
grant was 11,048.9 million minus7,623.9=3,424million Birr. Note also the grant 
did not include Wereda capital expenditures. 
3 Office of Road Fund, MoARD, 
4The figure is not complete. It includes only Agricultural Marketing Improvement 
program (2009/10), Birr 13.9million, Productive safety net Program Birr 
5billion;Sustainable land management, Birr 102million (2009/10), MoH, 
UNICEF, (2008/09) Birr 2.6million; Rural Capacity Building Project, (2009/10) 
Birr 293.2 million and Public service capacity building program (2009/10) Birr 
64.3million, Italian cooperation to ESDP Birr14 million, (2002EFY), Italian 
Cooperation to HSDP Birr 113million(2002EFY), Pastoral Community 
development program (PCDP) Birr 153million. In order to avoid double 
accounting, the grant is treated under state column. 
Notes: 1. The Federal Government transfers specific purpose grants to the 
States through its Line Ministries. The States again transfer it to the eligible LGs 
after they take about 10 percent of the total project cost for themselves as 
project administration cost. 
2. Amounts of Specific purpose Federal grants are deflated for lack of data. 
Thus all Federal Government transfers to the States through Line Ministries are 
not included. 
 
Column 2 on Table 7.6 above identifies various revenue sources of 
sub national governments ranked in descending order according to the 
policy control they enjoy. Columns 3 to 7 show States’ and LGs’ revenue 
size both in absolute figures and in percent. The revenue share of States 
and LGs are disaggregated in column 6 and 7 depicting the share of each 
revenue sources to the total state/LG revenue. Raw 8 depicts the extent 
of financial autonomy of the States and LGs. 
According to the Ebel and Yilmaz financial autonomy (FA) and 
Meloche, et.al, revenue autonomy (RA) methods, in 2009/10, the States 
and LGs in Ethiopia had policy control over 76 cents on every Birr 
collected in setting budget allocation between recurrent and capital 
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budget as well as among various sectors179. True, the considerations of 
unconditional grant as own revenue source of the States/ LG raised the 
degree of financial autonomy of the States/LGs. Had we considered only 
row [1.0] of Table 7.6above, the degree of financial autonomy would 
have been reduced to 23.7 percent. This undermines the States’ 
spending discretion on the Federal unconditional grant which constituted 
59.1 percent of the total revenue of the States. 
Concurrent taxation power is designed to empower the States with 
various elastic tax bases, however, so far, its contribution to the States’ 
total revenue is very small (2 percent) partly because secondary and 
tertiary economic sectors (manufacturing and services) are not well 
developed and partly the existing medium and large scale manufacturing 
and national corporations (power supply, Air Lines, Shipping Lines, Ethio-
telecom, Banking and Insurance, sugar plantations, and Hotels, National 
Metal Corporation, etc) are still owned by the Federal Government.180 In 
addition, the allocation of the concurrent revenues between the Federal 
Government and the States favours the former (see Table 7.2). Tax 
evasion is another serious problem not to tap the potential of concurrent 
revenue. This is highly associated with weak tax administration and 
corruption.181 
FA/ RA and DRR are inversely related. Higher FA /RA rate means 
lower DRR. The reverse is also true. The rates of FA/RA and DDR for 
2009/10 in the above Table should be interpreted with caution, however. 
The DRR (32.2 percent) is understated and did not reflect the reality, 
because all specific conditional grants channelled through the Line 
Ministries were not considered due to lack of aggregated data. 
                                                 
179 Note that SNG’s financial control included unconditional federal transfer. 
180 The share of concurrent taxation receipt to the States revenue will raise up 
with the expansion of private sector and the ongoing privatization program 
181  According to the Addis Fortune (2011), total Birr 397.9 million (equivalent 
to USD22 million) tax evasion was reportedfromOiLibyaover Birr210 million 
on dividend tax and capital gain tax, Total Ethiopia Birr 23.3 million on 
VAT,withholding tax, and profit tax; National oil Company Birr2.6 million 
on profit tax and VAT;BGI-EthiopiaBirr 109 million, and Bambis Super 
Market53 million on VAT andBPT.  
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7.6.2 Tax Autonomy of the Ethiopian States/LGs 
 
This sub section assesses the degree of tax autonomy of the States 
and LGs from OECD and Dafflon’s perspectives with the objective to draw 
public policy lessons that might parallel the realities of the Ethiopian 
fiscal federalism from the comparative analysis of the OECD and the 
Swiss experience. 
 
Tax Autonomy from OECD Perspective 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the OECD tax autonomy 
categorizes SNG’s revenue sources into three:(i) own-revenue (tax 
revenues and non-taxes) where SNGs have full control over tax rate and/ 
or tax base and tax administration;(ii) shared tax, where the central 
government determines the tax base, but SNGs impose tax rate only, and 
(iii) tax sharing, where the SNGs may have influence on the revenue split 
of the central grant. 
Table 7.7 below measures the degree of tax autonomy of the 
Ethiopian SNGs from OECD’s perspective. The first row depicts the 
taxonomy categories as defined by Blöchliger and King (2006).      The 
cells were filled out taking in to account Article 98 of the Federal 
Constitution, the Federal Financial Administration Proclamation 
No.57/1996 and related States’ tax proclamations. The States have 
constitutional power to levy tax which includes defining tax base, setting 
tax rate and collect taxes on all revenue sources that fall in their domain. 
But through the Federal Financial Administration Proclamation 
No.57/1996, the states are compelled to harmonize and standardize their 
tax base including Di with the Federal tax bases. Thus, own-revenue of 
the states would fall under (a2).In spite of the fact that the States have 
access to wide range of revenue sources, own-revenue constituted only 
23.5 percent of the States’ total revenue. 
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Table 7.6.Tax autonomy of States and LGs from OECD perspective, 2009/10 in million Birr 
 a1 a2 
 
b1 
b2 C1 C2 C3 
D 
e f 
Total SNGs 
revenue d1 d2 d3 d4 
st
at   8307 
(23.5%) 
      306 
(0.9%) 
   26,7811 
(75.6%) 
35,394 
LG
s 
 
 
  6222 
(13 %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121 
(2.5%) 
  6163 
(12.8%) 
 
3,4284 
(71.7%) 
 
4,787 
 
Source: own computation from MoFED consolidated revenue performance data base, 2009/10 
1includes Unconditional federal subsidy to the States (Birr 20,934 million), concurrent revenue (Birr73 million) and total 
specific purpose grants (Birr 5774 million) 
2Municipality revenues (Birr 622 million)  
3 Non-tax revenue of LG minus municipality revenue (Birr 1238-622= 616million)  
 4 Sum of Wired block grant (Birr3.428billion). 
Note figures are rounded to the nearest whole number 
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The States have not devolved taxation power to respective LGs but 
municipality revenues by setting the minimum and maximum user charge 
fee (b2) which contributed 13 percent of the total ULGs revenue for 
2009/10 budget year. 
The Road Fund is the only revenue sources of the States and the LGs 
that meets the tax sharing definition of Blöchliger and King (2006). The 
Road fund is generated from fuel tax, annual vehicle license renewal, fee 
based on axle weight and configuration, over-loading fine, and 
municipality tax on fuel oils and lubricants, Federal Government budget 
and any other road traffic levied, as may be necessary, (Federal 
Proclamation No.66/1997). It is the Federal Government that sets the tax 
rate/ fees of the sources of Road Fund. Tax administration of the fund is 
centralized but the States collect some proceeds on delegation basis. The 
Ethiopian Petroleum enterprise, a Federal agency, collects fuel levies on 
oil and lubricants). Annual vehicle license renewal fees are collected by 
Federal and State agencies. Bureaus of Transport (state organs) collect 
fees from respective State plated motorized vehicles, whereas the 
Ministry of Transport collects fees from Federal plated vehicles and on 
overloading fine. 
All the States and eligible LGs receive a certain percentage of 
revenue from the Road Fund proceeds on formula basis. The transfers 
are earmarked for road maintenance and road safety only. Currently the 
Road Fund has been distributed on 70:20:10 ratios among the Federal 
Road Authority, State Road Authority and ULGs respectively. Decisions 
about how much to allocate for distributive pool each year and how the 
pool should be distributed among the Federal, the States and LGs are 
decided by the Road Fund Board, where the States have five 
representatives out of fifteen182. Therefore, the States do influence the 
split of the Road Fund among the eligible Agencies. The Road Fund 
contributed only 0.9 percent and 2.5 percent to the total revenue of the 
States and LGs respectively in the 2009/10 fiscal year (d2). 
                                                 
182  Management of the Road Fund is structured in a way to promote a Public–
Private partnership, as the Board is composed of six Federal appointees, five 
State representatives on rotation base and four Private transport sector 
representatives.  
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The OECD tax autonomy approach fits less to assess the tax 
autonomy of the Ethiopian states, because it does not recognize the 
concurrent taxation power, which is an emerging revenue source of the 
States and the unconditional transfers and the specific purpose 
conditional grants, which are major revenue sources of the States. 
According to the OECD taxonomy, all these three revenue sources have 
to be treated under (f) category. Putting the concurrent revenue sources 
and the unconditional grants under (f) does not reflect the reality of tax 
powers of the states and LGs, because (i) treating the concurrent revenue 
under (f) category underestimates the States’ tax autonomy. The States 
have as equal tax legislative power to determine tax base, set tax rate 
over the concurrent revenue sources as the Federal Government. This 
makes the concurrent taxation power superior to the shared tax 
arrangement as the latter limits SNGs to impose tax rate only, (ii) putting 
the unconditional Federal transfers under category (f) also conceals the 
States’ role in designing the federal subsidy (unconditional grant) 
through the HoF. It also undermines their discretion over the spending of 
the unconditional transfers. 
Article 100(3) of the Federal Constitution also grants the states to 
levy on Federal Government profit making enterprises, which is related 
to the shared tax assignment.   
Despite the fact that the States have access to various revenue 
sources, as indicated above, the States’ own revenue constituted only 
23.5 percent of their total revenue in the 2009/10 budget year, a far 
lower than the 35 percent states’ own-revenue of Indian,(Bhattacharya, 
2001:269), presumed a centralized federation, or even slightly less than 
the 25.9 percent of the Spanish Autonomous Regions’ own-revenue 
collection of the total revenue (Castella, 2001:91), which is a unitary 
decentralized system. This may pose a question: Do the shares of own-
revenue to the total Indian States or the Spanish Autonomous Regions 
alone testify higher tax autonomy than the Ethiopian states? Judging the 
states’ tax autonomy from their share of own-revenue to total revenue 
source without examining their constitutional taxation power may 
mislead the reality. It is true that low level of own-revenue implies high 
level of States’ dependency on Federal Government transfers but does 
not necessarily mean low degree of tax autonomy. Constitutionally 
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speaking, the Ethiopian states have more taxation power than the Indian 
counterpart states and the Spanish Autonomous Regions. 
 
Tax autonomy of Weredas 
 
The States have retained all taxation powers except municipality 
revenues. ULGs may manoeuvre municipal revenues within the lower 
and upper limit rates determined by the State (b2). Legally speaking, the 
State of Tigrai is the only State that has defined taxation powers of 
Weredas, even though it has not been implemented. The State of 
Amhara has introduced a revenue sharing arrangement between the 
State and Weredas (Amhara, Regulation No.37/2005). Again, the 
Regulation has not been put into effect as the State has not so far 
determined what revenue sources to be shared. Therefore, in effect, 
weredas do not have any tax powers, but the States have delegated the 
weredas to assess and collect some revenue sources, while deductions 
and tax rates are defined at states level (e). 
Degree of tax delegation to the Weredas varies by State. The States 
of Tigrai, Amhara, the SNNP, Gambela and Benshangul-Gumuz have 
delegated the collection of all revenue sources to respective weredas 
except PIT on State civil servants and on employees of enterprises owned 
by the State, BPT on enterprises owned by the State, rental incomes 
derived from housing and other properties owned by the State, and user 
charges for services provided by the State. 
The State of Oromia has delegated less revenue sources collection to 
its LGs on the pretext of LGs do not have managerial and institutional 
capacities to collect taxes. In addition to the above mentioned ownership 
based revenue sources, Oromia retains royalty payments, and TOT 
revenue sources at the State level. The same is true in Afar and Somali. 
Unlike the other states, Harari and the Dire Dawa Council 
Administration have not delegated any tax administration to Kebele, the 
lowest level of government. The explanations for such tax centralization 
are: (i) delegation of tax assessment and collection to respective Kebeles 
would increase administration cost as the Kebele Administrations are too 
small to yield benefits from economies of scale, and (ii) Kebele 
administrations do not have managerial capacity to carry out the tasks. 
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Until 2010, the City Government of Addis Ababa used to delegate all 
its revenue sources to the Weredas but PIT on civil servants of the City 
Council and employees of Agencies owned by the City Government. But 
with the merging of the Addis Ababa Revenue Authority and the FR&CA, 
Weredas are left only with collection of rental income tax and 
municipality related revenues. 
Weredas collect taxes and non-tax revenues on behalf of the States 
and deposit the proceeds into their own accounts. They do not need to 
transfer to the States’ treasury but the revenues are off-set from the 
States’ block grant on monthly basis (f). It might be worth noting how off-
setting mechanism operates at Wereda level. The Bureaus of Finance and 
Economic Development (BoFED), States agencies, send revenue collection 
target to respective Weredas based on the states GDP growth rate plan. 
The revenue targets are often higher than the Weredas’ Office of Finance 
and Economic Development Office (OFED) because the former perceives 
that the latter look at the State to finance their expenditure needs 
without exhaustively exploiting their revenue potentials. Though, there is 
some room for negotiation in setting Wereda revenue collection plan 
between the BoMED and the OFED, the voice of the former prevails in 
case they do not reach a consensus on the size of the revenue collection 
target. Local Councils approve annual revenue target ‘suggested’ by 
respective BoFED as well as the size of recurrent and capital expenditure 
budget. Finally, the approved revenue plan of the wereda is off-set from 
the Wereda block grant. In many weredas performance of revenue plan  
is by far less than expenditure plan and therefore the difference is 
covered through block grant. A few fiscally strong LGs may collect 
revenues more than their expenditure needs. In such a case the weredas 
are supposed to transfer the surplus revenue to the States. They do not 
use for themselves. 
 
From Swiss tax sovereignty perspective 
 
This subsection assesses tax sovereignty of States and LGs in Ethiopia 
from Dafflon’s perspective. 
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Table 7.7. Tax sovereignty of Ethiopian States and LGs 
Tax sovereignty 
criteria 
Taxation power of the States 
Taxation power of Local 
Governments 
[a] The use of the 
ability-to-pay 
principle (taxes) 
versus benefit 
principle  (user  
charges); 
The States have constitutional 
right to exercise tax powers on 
all ‘ability -to-pay’ type taxes 
and on benefit principle (user-
charges) assigned to them 
(Federal Constitution, art.97).  
LGs have no taxation power 
to levy tax, but ULG 
determine user charges 
within the lower and 
uppers limits of respective 
state.  
[b] The object of 
taxation, implicit in 
[B-D] in the formula 
The Federal Constitution grants 
the States to levy taxes which 
imply determining B and Di. 
The Federal Financial regulation 
, however, notes that the States 
need to ensure the 
harmonization and 
standardization of their tax 
bases with the Federal 
Government tax base (Federal 
Proclamation No.57/1996) 
LG do not have any power 
to deal with B, and Di. They 
have to compel with 
respective states’ tax 
system.  
 
[c]The circle of tax 
payers (including the 
definition of the 
taxpaying unit 
States have power to 
determine the circle of tax 
payers. 
LGs adopt respective state 
definitions of taxpaying 
units. [c] Cannot be in the 
hands of the LGs. 
[d] computation  of  
 the tax bases, and 
the adjustments to 
taxable income, 
specific deductions 
and exemptions  
The States apply Federal 
Government definitions of B 
and Di with the objective to 
harmonize the tax system, but 
there is variation in rental 
income deductive between 
Addis Ababa and the remaining 
States. 
They respect respective 
State’s tax laws. 
[e] The tax rate 
schedules [t] 
including the 
amount of 
deductions and 
exemptions in the 
The States have constitutional 
power to set tax rate (Federal 
Constitution, Art.97). But the 
states apply federal tax rate, 
with the exception of 
agricultural income tax. 
LGs do not have power to 
set tax rate, but determine 
user charges within the 
ranges set by respective 
State. 
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Tax sovereignty 
criteria 
Taxation power of the States 
Taxation power of Local 
Governments 
previous letter [Di] 
[f] The annual 
coefficient of 
taxation [K] 
‘K’ is  may imply Article 100(3) 
of the Federal Constitution that 
grants the states to levy on 
Federal Government profit 
making enterprises, although it 
is not in practice. State Councils 
also give liberty to the 
Executive branch to quest for 
various off-budget revenue 
sources. (mobilize revenues 
from NGOs, and voluntarily 
contributions from residents) 
“K” is not applicable. 
Alternatively, LGs organize 
various fund raising 
schemes such as 
Development fund 
(contribution from 
residents), donations etc as 
a-filling-gap mechanism of 
budget deficit.  
[g] Collecting the 
taxes 
The States collect taxes and 
user charges on all revenue 
sources reserved to them. 
LGs collect municipality 
revenues. They also collect 
State taxes and user 
charges on delegation basis. 
[h] The procedure in 
case of tax disputes 
When conflicts arise on 
taxation power between the 
Federal Government and the 
States, the case will be referred 
to the Constitutional Inquiry 
Commission of the HoF for 
interpretation. If the House 
decides it does not need 
constitutional interpretation, 
any competent court may give 
decision. 
If tax disputes arise 
between the State and 
respective LGs, decision of 
the former prevails, 
because the States can 
retake the tax power any 
time.  
Source: First column Dafflon, 2007:146, the rest author 
 
Constitutionally speaking, the Ethiopian States have power on [a], to 
[g] criteria. Criterion [h] is conditional. Therefore, taking the de jure, the 
Ethiopian States enjoy somewhat full tax sovereignty. 
There is a wide gap between the de facto and the de jure, however. 
Criterion [b] has been taken by the Federal Government as the States 
need to ensure the harmonization and standardization of their tax bases 
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with the Federal Government tax bases (Federal Proclamation No.57/1996 
and Council of Ministers Regulation No.17/1997)183. Specific deductions (Di) 
are also required to be harmonized and standardized. The rationale for 
the uniformity of tax base and Di is to avoid vertical and horizontal fiscal 
externalities. The States have liberty to decide Di, and the amount of Di 
for tax bases which are not common to the Federal Government taxation 
power. Criterion [e] is uniformly applied. PIT brackets and deductions on 
all revenue sources are uniform across the states except agricultural 
income and cattle tax. 
In spite of the fact that the Federal Constitution enshrines the States 
considerable tax powers, in practice the States do not fully exercise their 
taxation powers; rather they systematically align their taxation choices 
on the rule of Federal Government. They apply uniform tax base, 
deductions and tax rate. Therefore, by de jure the states can be 
categorized among the states/cantons of federations that enjoy high 
level of tax autonomy, but by de facto, they have little tax autonomy and 
have reduced to tax administration only. 
Federal decision makers favour tax harmonization. The argument is 
to provide comparable basic public services at comparable tax effort. 
True, high level of tax autonomy and achieving politically acceptable 
horizontal parity do not go in parallel. On the one hand, tax autonomy is 
desirable to promote economic efficiency, fiscal accountability and 
budget discipline. It is also an instrument to link the cost of public 
services with benefits. On the other, high level of tax autonomy may 
distort efficient allocation of resource, exacerbate horizontal disparity 
and may undermine long-term macroeconomic management 
stabilization role of the Federal government. Therefore, choosing the 
“right” degree of tax autonomy is a political choice. Above all, setting 
minimum and maximum tax rate could be the best choice to address the 
fear of horizontal tax competition. 
As far as the LG is concerned, legally speaking, two regimes exist. 
Theoretically, LGs in Tigrai meet criteria ‘a’ ‘c’, ‘e’ and ‘g’ which place 
them at partial tax sovereignty position. LGs in the remaining States also 
                                                 183 Although it is debatable if this Proclamation is a binding law upon the States, as it has 
no constitutional base. 
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meet ‘a’ and ‘g’ but limited to municipality revenues. In practice, no State 
has yet devolved tax power to the LGs. Instead, they have delegated tax 
administration power to respective LGs, which designates the LGs what 
Dafflon (2007:146) calls compulsory taxation. 
 
Creeping to Centralization of Taxation Power? 
 
There is no clause in the Federal Constitution that provides upward 
delegation of taxation power. Federal Constitutional Assembly Meeting 
Minute, (1994) reveal a purposeful choice against upward taxation power 
delegation, with  the intention to restrain any recentralization of taxation 
power tendency that may arise from the Federal Government. 
Reassignment of any revenue source should be implemented in line with 
Articles 104 and 105 of the Federal Constitution. However, in addition to 
the desire to apply uniform tax B, Di and tax rate across the states, 
discussed above, there are couples of unconstitutional centralization 
trends. 
(I) Centralization of ‘Chat’ excise tax. According to the Federal 
Constitution, Art.97, levying and collecting excise tax on individual 
trading falls on the States’ taxation power. Contrary to this Constitutional 
provision, the Federal Government has taken away the ‘chat’ excise 
taxation power. It determines excise tax rate (Birr 5 per Kg) on ‘chat‘, 
decides the checking points of ‘chat’ and collects the revenue. As far as 
the distribution of chat revenue is concerned, the Federal Government 
transfers to the concerned state on monthly basis (Federal Proclamation 
No.767/2012). 
(II) Value Added Tax 
Legally speaking, all State’s sales tax competences which are replaced 
by VAT should remain states’ VAT taxation power. The practice is quite 
different, however. The Federal VAT ProclamationNo.285/2002 has 
granted the power to assess and collect VAT on individual tradesmen and 
states’ public enterprises to the Federal Inland Revenue Authority and 
Federal Custom Authority184, without any Constitutional amendment in 
line with Art.104 and 105 of the Federal Constitution. 
                                                 184 Latter the Internal Revenue Authority and Federal Custom Authority 
amalgamated to form the current Federal Revenue and Custom Authority. 
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(iii) Addis Ababa City Government had been granted equal tax 
powers like the States with the exception of the concurrent taxation 
power185. The City Government had legislative tax power to levy tax, to 
invent new taxes, to assess and collect taxes, and to remit and write-off 
tax 186 (see the Federal Proclamation No.361/2003).However, the Addis 
Ababa City Government taxation powers on PIT, BPT, VAT, and excise tax 
have implicitly ceased to exist, as all its legislative and tax administration 
powers have been taken by the Federal Revenue and Custom 
Authority(FR&CA)187 with the objective “to establish strong, equitable, 
coordinated and efficient tax administration system” (Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU), 2010). As a result, the City’s tax responsibilities 
have been reduced to conduct research on how to increase revenues and 
revenue projections of the City together with the FR&CA and to limit 
taxation power to user charges and rental income (see the MoU, 20110). 
One might argue that the City has lost nothing since in practice the 
City Government has to harmonize its tax rate with the Federal 
Government and what has happened is simply merging of the tax 
management with that of the Federal Government. But the impact of 
centralizing is beyond that. According to my discussion with the high 
level heads of the FR&CA, the initiative to merge tax administration came 
from the Federal Government, not from below, and there is an intention 
to gradually scale up the practice across the county. Such centralization 
of tax adversely affects the tax autonomy of the City Government and 
weakens responsiveness of politicians to local preferences. The merging 
has made the performance of socio-economic development plans of the 
                                                 
185 Unlike the States, Addis Ababa City Government does not have concurrent taxation 
power. The reason is to avoid  fiscal asymmetry as lion’s share of revenue sources 
are concentrated in the City.  
186 For instance, Addis Ababa City Administration has introduced a five percent greening 
tax (environmental tax) on tap water consumption. 
187 The Revenue Authority of the City Government entered into agreement with the 
Federal Revenue Agency and Custom to merge the former to the latter. According to 
the agreement, the City Government shall entirely cover all costs related to tax 
administration incurred by the FR&CA, while the latter deposits all collections into 
the bank accounts of the City on daily basis.The Agreement neither explicitly refer to 
the size of annual collection target nor indicate what percent of the revenue 
collection shall be paid to the FR&CA as cost of tax management. The Agreement has 
become effective as of 10th January 2011 
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City to depend on the performance of revenue collection of the FR&CA. 
The problem will be of grave concern when two feuding political parties 
share power through election, say, one party at the City Government 
level and the other at the Federal level.188 A political party which controls 
the Federal seat may systematically collect revenue below its capacity 
with the intention to undermine the deliverability capacity of its rival 
political party. When all legislative tax powers are fallen in the hands of 
political rival party, how can a winner party in the City Council 
manoeuvre tax rate or invent new tax source to finance its ambitious 
socioeconomic development plans that enables it to win another 
election? 
Keeping the administration of mobile tax bases at the centre is 
advisable as it reduces tax administration cost, contributes to avoid tax 
evasion and enhances enforcement of tax law. There is no testimony that 
justifies the centralization of the chat excise tax and VAT to meet the 
criteria, however. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
The prescription of FGTFF has little influence on the separation of 
taxation power between the Federal Government and the States as well 
as between the State of Tigris and respective LGs, because in addition to 
economic variables, tax separation in Ethiopia considers non-economic 
choices. 
The taxation power is separated between the Federal, the states 
and concurrent. The principles applied in separating tax assignment 
between the Federal Government and the States is not on the basis of 
tax bases as what we see it in other decentralized system. The Federal 
Government and the States can levy independently on the same tax 
base. Taking a PIT as an example, the states have taxation power to levy 
PIT on state-owned enterprise, state employees on ownership principle, 
and on employs of sole proprietorship on type of business organization 
and on employees of private companies on origin principle. The tax 
separation is unstable as a shift of ownership and a change in the form of 
                                                 
188 In 2005, Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), a feud with the ruling party 
(EPRDF) had won the City Council of Addis Ababa. However, CUD failed to take over 
the City Administration because the Members of the Coalition entered into 
conspiracy over power struggle, which shortly  all  had fallen apart.  
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business organization (sole proprietorship vs. PLC or Sh.Co) cause 
changes in taxation power. Principles of domiciliation, benefit-received, 
administrative convenience and international trade are applied in the 
separation of taxation powers between the Federal governments and the 
States. 
The States have access to various revenue sources including elastic 
bases like business profit tax, VAT, excise tax, and natural resource 
revenues. The logical reasoning is to commensurate States’ expenditure 
assignment with taxation power as the huge economic, social and 
political responsibilities of the States cannot be met with devolving only 
the benefit–related taxes and property tax.  
Constitutionally speaking, the states have power to determine the 
tax base, set tax rate and administer on their tax domains. They have also 
legislative power to jointly determine on the concurrent revenue 
sources. The separation of taxation power is designed in a way to ensure 
high level of tax autonomy of the states. In practice, however, tax base, 
deductions, and tax rates are uniform. The states’ tax powers are 
reduced to tax administration. 
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Federal Government controlled, on average, 80percent of the total 
national revenues (see Appendix 5.1). Wide horizontal fiscal disparities 
are also visible. Asymmetric distribution of economic bases and wide cost 
differential for providing public services among the states are among the 
major reasons.  Since the states cannot finance simultaneously their 
backlog development and the emerging expenditure needs from their 
own revenue sources, and minimum national standard of public services 
delivery are fixed at the national level, federal transfers are major 
revenue sources of the states. Without the IGT system, the State/LGs 
cannot properly carryout their assignment responsibilities. Nevertheless, 
designing of the Federal transfers and their distribution across the States 
are among the central policy issues and are public debates in Ethiopia 
and will continue to be so in the future as long as the States remain 
heavily dependent on the Federal transfers. 
This chapter assesses the practice of IGT system in Ethiopia. The 
Chapter comprises four sections. The first section discusses the legal 
framework, principles and objectives of the IGT. The second section 
describes the four components of IGT system: the unconditional, 
conditional, road fund and wereda block grant. It also attempts to 
examine the implications of the IGTs on equity, efficiency, accountability, 
incentive, and predictability. Section three reviews and assesses the new 
fiscal equalization system which was introduced in 2007/8 and revised in 
2009. The last section identifies some limitations of the fiscal-gap 
equalization systems. 
 
8.1 Legal Ground, Principles and Rationale of 
Intergovernmental Transfers 
 
8.1.1 Legal framework of transfers 
 
The legal ground and principles of intergovernmental transfer system 
emanate from the Federal Constitution. The following provisions of the 
Constitution explicitly or implicitly refer to Federal transfers.  
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Art.62 (7) notes, “It [The House of Federation] shall 
determine ....the subsidies that the Federal Government may 
provide to the States”.190 
 
Art.89 (4) stipulates, “Government shall provide special 
assistance to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples least 
advantaged in economic and social development,”  
 
Art.94 (2) reads, “The Federal Government may grant the 
States emergency, rehabilitation, and development assistance 
and loans, due care being taken that such assistance and 
loans do not hinder the proportionate development of States”  
 
Article 62(7) refers to vertical transfers. But it is vague whether the 
“subsidies” refer to unconditional grant only or include also conditional 
grants. In practice, the HoF determines the distribution of unconditional 
grant formula only, while conditional grants are transferred to the States 
via line Ministries on ad-hoc basis. 
Art. 89(4) implies equalization grant in favour of the disadvantaged 
Nations, Nationalities and People (NNP). By reading the Article, one can 
infer that the grant aims at equalizing NNP, not jurisdictions191, with the 
objective to rectify the unfair economic and social relations they 
experienced over the last century. The grant has also conditional nature 
since it aims at offering special assistance to disadvantaged NNP. 
Art. 94 (2) refers to the Federal short-term grants and long-term 
development loans. But it raises the question of definition, perimeter 
and extent of the federal aid in case of “emergency, rehabilitation and 
development”. Emergency is short time aid. Rehabilitation may imply 
that there has been some form of environmental damage due over 
                                                 
190 In many legal documents and financial reports, the term ‘Federal subsidy’ is 
often used. In this study, Federal subsidy, budget subsidy, and unconditional 
grant/transfer are interchangeably used.  191 Art. 89(4) does not direct to individuals or jurisdictions but to NNP. When the 
disadvantaged NNP coincides with territorial demarcation of the States/ 
Zone/Special Wereda Governments, then double achievements will be met. 
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population density, and/or vulnerability to drought or social and 
economic damages because of civil war and, therefore, they should be 
corrected per definition. Rehabilitation grants may not necessarily be 
“financial assistance”, but they must restore a previous acceptable 
situation. Development is a long term and structural. Thus there is quite 
a large array in this Article of the Constitution. 
 
8.1.2 Rationales for intergovernmental transfers 
 
In a decentralized system, intergovernmental transfers are designed 
to meet various national objectives which include to attain minimum 
national standard of public services delivery, to close vertical fiscal gap, 
to reduce horizontal fiscal disparities, and to address inter-jurisdictional 
externality effects (Shah, 2007a:28-31; Boadway, 2007:57-62). In 
addition to these economic objectives, governments also use transfers to 
maximize political benefits (Grassman, 1994, Sorenson, 2003). 
Official documents and reports of the MoFED (2003) and HoF (2007) 
disclose that the objectives of the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
system in Ethiopia aim at attaining the following objectives. 
 
Achieving minimum national standard of Public Services 
delivery 
 
There is no document that explicitly identifies list of minimum 
national standard public service delivery. In such situation, Art.90 (1) of 
the Federal Constitution may be invoked, which notes, “To the extent the 
country’s resources permit, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians 
access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food, and 
social security.” The various sector development program (SDP) 
documents, which have been designed in line with the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) objectives and targets, may partly support the 
argument. The policy documents of the sector development programs 
describe the minimum level of quantities and qualities of public services 
that have to be provided at national level. For example, 
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 The education sector development program document stipulates 
access to universal primary education (grade 1-8) within 4 km walking 
distance, at most 50 pupils in a standard class room, teaching in a self 
contained modality for First cycle primary education (grade 1-4), one text 
book per subject for each pupil, and a certificate (12+1) holder for the 
First cycle primary school, a diploma holder in education for grade 5-8, 
and a degree holder for secondary school (grade 9-12)as minimum 
qualifications of instructors; etc.... 
 Access to clean drinkable water is defined as delivering 30 litres 
of drinkable water per day/person within 500 meter distance for urban 
areas and 15 litres of drinkable water daily within 1.5 kames walking 
distance in rural areas from his/her place of residence (Mowed, 2008). 
 The health Sector Development program defines Minimum 
national standard health as ensuring access to (I)a Health Post service at 
Keble level to serve 5,000 residents staffed by two health extension 
workers, (ii) Health Centres at Wired Government level to serve as a 
referral centre for 5 Health Posts or for 25,000 residents, directed by a 
Nurse or a Health Officer, composing 5 mid-wineries, two environmental 
Health Officers, a laboratory technician, and a Druggist; (iii) Zonal hospital 
service for about half a million residents, and (iv) a referral hospital at 
state level (MoH, 2005and HoH,2008) 
 Universal rural road access implies ensuring accessibility to all 
weather road coverage of 45.7 km per 1000 Km2 by 2015 
(HoF,2009:33) 
The qualities and quantities of the minimum national standard of 
public services are not static, but dynamic. They are expected to be 
improved with the economic growth of the country. The setting of 
minimum national standard basket of public service is based on the 
principle of: 
“Every Ethiopian national has the right to equal access to 
publicly funded social services” (Federal Constitution, 
1995, Art. 41(3). 
 
At the outset of the federation, there was a wide horizontal disparity 
in terms of access to public services among the States, partly because the 
distribution of public services were concentrated in a few urban centres, 
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and partly because the States’ fiscal capacity was too weak to finance the 
backlog development needs as well as to meet emerging social and 
economic development needs from own revenue. The strong 
commitment of all levels of government to the success of the sector 
development programs, the dedication of the Federal Government to 
allocate considerable transfers in unconditional and conditional forms 
(since minimum standard requirements are fixed at national level) have 
exhibited a visible convergence in access to the minimum standard public 
services across the States.  
Bridging the Vertical Fiscal Gap (VFG) 
 
VFG refers to revenue deficiency of SNG arises mainly due to 
mismatching of assignment of responsibilities and tax assignment to 
SNGs, and wasteful horizontal tax competition (Shah, 2007b:17). 
Therefore, VFG can be addressed either by reassignment of 
responsibilities or devolving commensurable taxation powers or 
designing appropriate transfer system or checking/avoiding unnecessary 
tax competitions among states/LGs.  
VFG indicator ranges from zero to one. A VFG closer to zero means 
States/LGs finance large part of their expenditure needs from own 
revenue sources and/or shared tax, while a VFG approach to one means 
there is a wide mismatch between the revenue means and expenditure 
needs of SNGs. What degree of VFG is desirable is a matter of fiscal 
constitution of a specific country. That is, it is a political choice whether 
to devolve more responsibilities to SNGs by retaining lucrative tax bases 
and filling the gap through designing various forms of transfers, or 
devolving assignment of responsibilities with commensurable taxation 
powers (Boadway and Shah, 2009:341). If politicians in states and LGs are 
to be accountable for their own expenditure decisions, large part of the 
devolved functions and powers should be financed through own-revenue 
sources. Delegated functions should be also financed by the delegating 
unit. A fiscal constitution may make trading-off between enjoying a 
higher level of decision-making power and achieving politically desirable 
horizontal equity. High degree of VFG is associated with less horizontal 
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fiscal disparity. More SNGs’ tax autonomy can be achieved at the cost of 
horizontal fiscal equity. 
As discussed in chapter 5 above, the separations of powers and 
functions between the Centre and the states make the Ethiopian federation 
among the most decentralized federations in the World. The fiscal 
Constitution also grants the States a wide range of revenue sources. 
Nevertheless, the Ethiopian fiscal federalism is characterized by a high 
degree of VFG. The data for 1998/9 to 2009/10 revealed that the Federal 
Government controlled about 80percent of the total national revenue but 
covered 62 percent of the total national expenditures, whereas the States 
had control over only 20percent of the total national revenue but covered38 
percent of the national expenditure (see Appendix 5.1and Appendix 5.2). It 
must be noted that such a high concentration of revenues in the hands of 
the Federal Government is not an outcome of the fiscal constitution but the 
existing tax structure of the country. It is dominated by custom duties and 
VAT on imports, where, on average, it contributed to about 80 percent of 
the total national revenue.  
Currently, states’ fiscal capacity is very weak owing to the existing low 
economic development. 
In principle, there are four policy options to address the existing high 
VFG in Ethiopia:  
(i).Passing over some of the States’ assignment responsibilities to the 
Federal Government,  
(ii)Further decentralizing of buoyant taxation field in favour of the States 
(such as PIT, BPT, VAT, etc) levied from private companies organized in 
PLC and revising the distribution of concurrent revenue, 
(iii) Designing appropriate federal transfers to the States, and, 
(iv) Increasing states’ revenue collection by broadening their tax bases and 
reforming their tax administration. Policy option (i) is not politically feasible 
as it stands against the very basic purpose of the Ethiopian multiethnic 
federal arrangement. Option (ii) is possible but does not seem to a feasible 
choice for the Federal politicians. There is a dominant perception among 
some policy designers and decision makers that further devolution of 
taxation power to the States may paralyze the Federal Government’s fiscal 
capacity, exacerbate horizontal fiscal disparity and may instigate 
secessionist feelings among the resource endowed states. Option (iii) has 
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served as a gap-filling mechanism. The Federal Government attempts to 
address the gap by transferring unconditional and conditional grants to the 
states. For the fiscal years 1998/9 to 2009/10, 69 percent of the States’ total 
expenditures were financed through Federal subsidy. This means for each 
States’ expenditure of one Birr, the Federal Government transferred 69 
cents in the form of unconditional grant192 (see Appendix 8.2). The fiscal 
relation between the States and respective LGs is also characterized by a 
wide VFG, because the LGs are major local public service providers without 
devolving taxation powers to them, except municipal revenues. Option (IV) 
is also feasible project and has been implemented. 
Reducing horizontal fiscal disparities 
 
The concept of horizontal fiscal imbalance and horizontal fiscal disparity 
are often interchangeably but mistakenly used. Horizontal fiscal imbalance 
refers to the gap between stats’ expenditure needs for devolved functions 
and fiscal mobilization capacity from own revenues. In a federal setting, 
horizontal fiscal disparity implies significant deviations in tax bases among 
states. It occurs when States with low fiscal capacity are obliged to impose 
higher tax rate(s) in order to provide comparable public service or when the 
states cannot provide the required minimum national standard service at 
comparable tax rate (Boadway and Shah, 2009:233). Thus when one 
compares a State/LG on a horizontal base, he/she talks about disparities in 
the tax base, disparities in cost of public services or disparities in needs 
among the states. So, we do not use fiscal imbalance for horizontal 
difference in capacity but horizontal disparities. 
In Ethiopia, a wide horizontal fiscal disparity is visible. The main causes 
are: (i) variation in tax bases. Other variables remaining same; revenue 
raising capacity of the States is a function of their economic base. Economic 
bases are concentrated in Addis Ababa, followed by Oromia, Amhara, Tigrai 
and SNNP. The Emerging States have very weak economic bases mainly 
associated with marginalized public investment policy of the previous 
regimes. In the post-1991, they have also exhibited less investment 
destination regions partly they are relatively unstable due to inter-ethnic 
                                                 192Note that due to lack of data, the figures did not include federal conditional grants. The 
degree of State dependency on federal transfer would have been higher had the 
conditional transfers been included. 
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and intra-ethnic conflicts associated with controlling power and partly 
development infrastructures still lag behind, (ii) Expenditure needs of the 
states differ for various reasons. Costs of public service delivery among the 
States greatly differ due to variations in physical topography, cost of inputs 
and economies of scale. For example, in mountainous states like Tigrai, 
Amhara and some parts of Oromia; unit cost of road construction per KM is 
higher than in the lowland states. Cost of industrial inputs increase with 
distance from Addis Ababa. This has forced the periphery states to expend 
more public money for building standard elementary schools and Health 
Centres. Settlement pattern is also a cause for cost differences among the 
States to provide same quantity and quality of public services. The scattered 
settlement of the Emerging States has forced them to provide public 
services at higher cost than the States characterized by sedentary 
settlement because the former hardly benefit from economies of scale. 
Population size is another factor as the populous states need more money 
to ensure minimum national standard of public service delivery than the less 
populous states. 
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Table 8.1. HFI before and after Federal Subsidy, 2008/9, in million Birr 
  
Own 
Revenuea 
Concurren
t tax 
shareb 
Total 
own-
revenue 
Total 
Expend-
ituresc 
Federal 
Subsidy 
HFI before 
Federal 
subsidyd 
HFI after 
Federal 
Subsidye 
Rank 
Before 
Federal 
subsidy 
After 
Federal 
Subsidy  
1 2 3 4=2+3 5 6 7=4/5 8=(4+6)/5 9 10 
Tigrai 605 83 688 1578 1109 0.44 1.14 2 2 
Afar 69 3 72 563 450 0.13 0.93 10 8 
Amhara 950 49 1000 4615 4139 0.12 1.11 6 3 
Oromia 1421 121 1542 7188 5571 0.21 0.99 7 6 
Somali 101 1 101 1066 1153 0.09 1.18 11 1 
B-G 51 0.62 51 335 268 0.15 0.95 8 7 
SNNP 671 56 727 3163 3301 0.23 0.8 5 9 
Gambela 34 1 35 248 177 0.14 0.85 9 10 
Harari 38 2 41 160 135 0.25 1.1 4 4 
Dire Dawa 102 5 107 160 135 0.25 1.1 3 5 
AA 3553 111* 3,664 6180 202** 0.59 0.61 1 11 
Total 9835 434 1029 25389 16505 0.4 1.04 
  Sources: a ,d and e author’s computation based on MoFED data base b    data include withholding tax, Federal Revenue and Custom Authority 
cMoFED data base www.mofed.gov.et.net visited (September 2010);*3% withholding tax on imported goods.  
**Addis Ababa does not receive Federal subsidy from the Federal treasury, but it receives external loans and external assistances Federal subsidy. 
Note 1 Column 5 (total expenditures) did not include expenditures of external loans and assistances which are part of the Federal subsidy. 
 
 289 
 
Using a minimax indicator, the discrepancies before and after Federal 
subsidies are 6.55 and 2.60 respectively. The figures reveal the role of 
Federal subsidy in narrowing horizontal fiscal disparities. Looking at the 
fiscal rank of the States before and after the Federal subsidy, one may 
observe frog-leaping of some States. 
Political rationale 
 
Governments may use transfers to swing states/LGs or appeasing 
states/LGs held by strong opposition or rewarding supporter jurisdictions 
(Grossman, 1994; Rangarajam and Srivastava 2004).Johansson (2003) 
finds that swing voters in Swedish municipalities get larger grant as a 
reward. Sorenson (2003) also finds the influence of local lobbying groups 
in grant distribution among municipalities and counties in Norway are 
visible.  
Whether the Federal Government of Ethiopia uses transfers for 
swing, appeasing opposition jurisdictions or supporting jurisdictions 
remain controversial. The opposition block accuses the ruling party for 
using federal subsidy for political agenda. Some may argue that the 
advantageous financial logrolling by the ruling party in the form of 
federal transfers to the States contributed to win the national (96.6 
percent) and regional (100 percent) elections of the 2010. Examining the 
design of the federal unconditional subsidy, one may find no association 
with swinging, appeasing or rewarding of voters, as the distribution of 
the federal subsidy among the states and Dire Dawa is transparent and 
there is no room to manipulate for electoral purposes. 
The generosity of the ruling party for pro-poor public spending in 
general and on the productive safety net program, on micro and small 
enterprises development, and on housing development seems to 
implicitly serve for political purposes. Moreover, the Federal conditional 
grants can be manoeuvred for maximizing the ruling party’s political 
agenda, as the selection of eligible States is at the discretion of line 
ministries.193 The Federal Government transfers to the states not only to 
                                                 
193 The conditional grants have equity nature.Once eligible States are selected, the 
distribution of conditional grant among the eligible States is made on the percentage 
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achieve minimum national standard of public services at comparable tax 
effort but also has political objectives. 
Inter-jurisdictional externalities-A missing rationale 
 
The central argument for inter-jurisdictional externality is that 
jurisdictions which generate positive impact on national goal or to a 
neighbouring jurisdiction have to be compensated. The issues of inter-
jurisdictional externalities involve: Who should compensate whom? 
What type of grant is appropriate (unconditional or conditional) for inter-
jurisdictional externality? And how much compensation should be 
enough? If the benefit of inter-jurisdiction externality has country-wide 
scope, the central government has to compensate to the provider. If the 
externality is limited only to a few jurisdictions, then the beneficiary 
jurisdictions have to compensate to the producer of the positive 
externality. In case of negative inter-jurisdiction externality, the polluter 
should be penalized. Specific purpose matching grant is an appropriate 
instrument to address the problem of inter-jurisdictional externality. 
Depending on the impact of the public service to the national goal, the 
matching grant can be open-ended, or closed–ended. With regard to 
how much compensation is enough for positive inter-jurisdictional 
externality, theory of intergovernmental transfer suggests the 
equilibrium point of marginal social cost and marginal social benefit gives 
the right incentive to keep on allocating budget to the producer (Oates, 
1972:72; Bird and Smart, 2002; Slack, 2009:336). 
As discussed in Chapter 5 above, spending choices of some Ethiopian 
States have produced positive and negative inter-state externalities. 
Three cases of inter-jurisdictional externalities are presented below. 
The State of Tigrai has been engaged in providing elite-oriented 
tertiary education service as part of its human capital development 
strategy by establishing Mekele Institute of Technology (MIT). Admission 
policy of the Institute targeted at outstanding Tigrian students within and 
outside Tigrai on competitive basis without any tuition fee. The benefits 
are not limited to Tigrai, however. The State’s spending choice produced 
                                                                                                               
share of the States which is computed for the distribution of unconditional Federal 
subsidy among the States. 
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positive externalities nationwide.194 MIT Graduates migrate to other 
States to work in their profession and use the competences acquired in 
the MIT and they are hired by various Federal, States and private sector 
organizations. Nevertheless, the State of Tigrai did not get a single cent 
from the Federal Government as a compensation for the inter-
jurisdictional externality effect it has produced. As the externality effect 
is nationwide, the practice of an open-ended conditional grant would 
have been ensured the sustainability of the Institute.195. 
The spending decisions of Harari and Dire Dawa Administration 
Councils on education and health care have benefited Oromia and 
Somali. The House decided, 15 percent196 of Harari’s and Dire Dawa’s 
public spending on education and health services to be treated in the 
2007 fiscal equalization system with the objective to compensate the 
producers for the spill over effects consumed by the residents of the 
neighbouring state (HoF, 2007:61).Two shortcomings have been 
observed on the principle of the spill over effect compensation scheme. 
First, fiscal equalization is not a good instrument to address spill over 
effect for a couple of reasons:  
(i) It does not promote allocative efficiency. Rather, it develops free 
riding behaviour on the part of the neighbouring States, and          (ii) the 
system does not promote justice. Why should the non-beneficiary States 
sacrify to compensate Harari and Dire Dawa for the public service 
                                                 
194 Tigrai allocates considerable public investment on MIT through its Development 
Chambers such as EFFORT (Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigrai), TDA (Tigrai 
Development Association) and Relief Society of Tigrai (REST).The degree of 
externality from the MIT is believed to be significant for couple of reasons. One, the 
State of Tigrai is very small to absorb all MIT graduates.Second, the areas of 
specialization also matters a lot in the labour market.The MIT produces relatively 
expensive and scarce professions in the country. 
195 For budget constraint reason, the sustainability of the Institute was at risk. As an 
effect, the Board of MIT decided the transfer of the Institute to Mekele University, a 
Federal Government Institution as of July 2013 academic year. 
196 Harari and Dire Dawa receive partial compensation through the Federal subsidy 
formula. They received 15 percent compensation during the 2007 and 2009 
equalization formula, but it has been reduced to 10 percent in the 2011 equalization 
(HoF, 2007 2009, and 2011). 
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consumed by residents of Oromia and Somali? 197 Should not the 
beneficiary states bear the cost? Is not conditional grant a good tool to 
address such a spill over effect? The second point relates to the accuracy 
of the computation of the compensation. How did the decision makers 
set the 15 percent compensation? In a situation where the costs of spill 
over effects are not estimated by an independent body based on hard 
facts, the rate may produce a wrong incentive to Harari and Dire Dawa to 
manipulate their public spending on the services in order to receive more 
money from the equalization system or they might not be fully 
compensated for the positive spill over effect they produced really. 
Highland Weredas allocate large amount of money, labour and time 
on land reclamation and environment rehabilitation activities through 
soil and water conservation programs to increase agricultural 
productivity and development of ground water resources. Such public 
investments of the highland States/Weredas on soil and water 
conservation activities have direct positive impact on the bottom hill 
neighbouring jurisdictions. It reduces, if not avoids the problems of 
seasonal flood and gully erosion at the lowland jurisdictions. Again, there 
is no practice of cost compensation mechanism for such positive 
consumption spill over effects. Unless some sort of horizontal 
compensation mechanism is designed, the highland jurisdictions might 
not have incentive to allocate much public spending on environment 
rehabilitation in the future. 
The intergovernmental transfer system of Ethiopia does not respect 
inter-jurisdictional externalities, or wrongly addresses the problems. The 
education and health externalities should have been solved by 
introducing horizontal transfers between the states instead of the 
treating it through equalization transfers from the centre. In economic 
logic, beneficiary jurisdictions should compensate to the positive 
externality producing jurisdiction; and jurisdictions which produce 
negative externalities should compensate to the polluted jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
197 Here the argument is not to undermine any sense of horizontal solidarity.One 
State has to value the concern of  other State(s),if the Ethiopian multiethnic 
federal arrangement is to be footed on strong foundation. 
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8.2 The Intergovernmental Transfer System (1994/5-
2006/07) 
 
As far as IGT is concerned, distribution of federal transfer among the 
states has been a political issue. The intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
system takes place at Federal, State and Wereda levels. The transfer 
system comprises the Federal subsidy (unconditional), the Federal 
conditional grant, the Road Fund, the Wereda block grant and Kebele 
block grant. During the last two decades, the distribution of Federal 
Subsidy has passed through various changes. From 1992/3 to 1993/4, the 
Central Government transfers were allocated on ad-hoc basis. A Federal 
subsidy based on some socio-economic variables was introduced in 
1994/5 and lasted until 2006/7.198 The prime reason for shifting from the 
ad-hoc basis to the formula based subsidy was aimed at designing a 
relatively more transparent grant system using ‘objective’ indicators. In 
2007/8, the HoF replaced the socio-economic variables based formula by 
a fiscal equalization grant with the objectives to (i) “address the 
subjective selection of variables and assigning weights to the variables” 
(HoF, 2007:6), and (ii) reduce the per capita Federal subsidy distribution 
among the States by considering the expenditure needs and the revenue 
raising capacities of the States (Kirchgassner, 2008:2). 
 
8.2.1 The federal subsidy 
 
The Federal subsidy is a formula based ‘unconditional grant’. It is a 
major revenue source of the States. The right to decide Federal subsidy 
formula is reserved to the HoF (Federal Constitution, 1995 Art. 62(7). 
Since 1994/5, the Federal subsidy has been designed in two generic 
ways: (i) the 1994/5-2006/7 federal transfer used certain socio-economic 
variables to measure some expenditure need indicators and the revenue 
generation capacity of the States. Weights for each variable were 
                                                 
198 In 1994/5, two separate grant formulas, capital budget and recurrent budget were 
designed. Allocation of recurrent expenditure for 1994/5 was made on the basis of 
number of zones and Woredas, structure of bureaus/offices, number of civil servants, 
length of rural roads to be maintained, previous year budget implementation 
capacity, and number of agricultural demonstration centers(MoF,19995). 
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assigned subjectively. (ii) Since 2007/8, Australian equalization model has 
been applied. It has equalized the revenue raising capacity and the 
expenditure needs of the States with the objective to fill the fiscal nee 
gap. 
Source of Fund and nature of the Federal subsidies- The Federal 
subsidy has been derived from three sources: Federal treasury, external 
loans and external assistances. The Federal treasury comprises a lion’s 
share. For example, from 1998/9 to 2009/10, it accounted for about 75 
percent of the total Federal subsidy, while the shares of external loan 
and external assistance together covered the remaining balance (MoFED 
data, see Appendix 8.2). 
The Federal subsidy has both elements of unconditional and 
conditional grants. The Federal treasury part of the Federal subsidy is an 
unconditional grant. The States spend it where they deem appropriate 
without any ex-ante verifications of its utilization by the Federal 
Government, although the grantor has authority “to audit and inspect 
the proper utilization of subsidies it grants to the States” (federal 
Constitution, Art.94). The external loans and external assistances part of 
the Federal subsidy have conditional elements, because the external 
grantors not only predetermine the intervention sector areas but also 
verify the utilization of the resources before fund replenishments are 
done. That is, the external loan and external assistance parts of the 
Federal subsidy are ear-marked and thus the States have no discretion or 
full expenditure control over the selection of the project areas and on 
the size of loan/grant. 
As can be seen from Table 8-2 below, the Federal subsidy formulas 
used to consider various variables such as population size, development 
index, revenue raising capacity; capital budget implementation capacity, 
geographical size and poverty index. The variables were skewed to 
expenditure needs. Emphasis was given on the first three variables, as 
they were dominant variables in designing the formulas. 
The premise of assigning the highest weight to population size in the 
Federal subsidy formula was, other factors remaining same, populous 
States need more public fund to provide basic public services to their 
residents than the less populous States. But this does not mean to say 
that the expenditure needs increase proportionally with population size. 
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That is, the State of Oromia which is about 6 fold in population size to the 
Somali State cannot have 6 times greater expenditure needs to provide a 
certain public service than the latter State, because costs of delivering 
public services are affected positively or negatively by economies of 
scale, distance and topography. For some public services, populous 
States can reap benefit better from economies of scale than less 
populous ones. 
Looking through the various Federal subsidy documents of the 
MoFED (2003) and HoF (2007), one may infer that the consideration of 
development level index in the formula was aimed at ensuring universal 
access to the basic public services such as primary and secondary 
education, primary health care, and rural road and clean drinking water 
across the States. In line with this objective, States with lower coverage 
rate on these variables used to receive more Federal subsidy from the 
pool of development level. The development index had couple of 
shortcomings: 
(i) It considered only States’ needs for capital investment required to 
deliver basic public services. Recurrent expenditure needs for running the 
public services were ignored, and  
(ii) The index was input based, not output based. These had created 
wrong incentive on the states. Somali and Afar states used to receive 
relatively larger development grant by keeping up low development 
level.199 By its nature, unconditional grant is not appropriate to pursue 
performance–oriented goal as the states have absolute freedom to 
allocate funds where they think appropriate. Matching earmarked grant 
is appropriate transfer system to promote output based grant because it 
would enable the Federal Government to check whether the states have 
really used the transfer for the desired purpose or not. 
                                                 
199 Afar and Somali states  used to get relativelly large development grant with the 
objective to address the development backlog. Neverthless, accesses to education, 
health, clean water, rural road, etc have remained far below the national average, 
not only because of the low initial development level they had, but also their  
choices to spend less public investment on these public sectors. 
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Table 8.2.Federal Unconditional grant formulae, 1994/5 to 2008/09 EFY 
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2 
I–distance/ 25 33.3    
Fiscal need for education, health care, safe drinking water, rural road   25 20  
development index200     25 
 
 
3 
*Revenue generation  capacity 20 33.3 15  10 
Revenue raising effort (11%) and sectoral performance(4%): change 
in health centres, education participation, length in rural road, 
and safe drinking water  
   15  
4 Capital budget allocated in 1993/4 15     
5 Geographic size 10     
6 Poverty line    10  
Source: Various Reports of Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, Department of Regional Affairs, and HoF Regular Meetings 
Minutes and HoF, 2007 and 2009 Federal Budget Distribution Formula. 
                                                 
200 I-distance variable was in application from 1994/5 to 1997/97.It was replaced by development index which was in usein different terms until the 
introduction of the fiscal equalization. 
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Talking about the revenue raising capacity criterion, its weight 
fluctuated over time, ranging from 10 percent to 33.3 percent. The 
rationale for including this variable in the formula was to encourage the 
States to make tax effort as much as possible. 
The external loan and external assistance parts of the Federal 
subsidy were/are uncertain- There had been and there is still a wide 
discrepancy between the states’ subsidy entitlement and the actual 
transfers. The Federal treasury portion of the Federal subsidy is certain to 
reach at the hands of the States and has remained dependable revenue 
source to the States. If there is unutilized fund, it is carried over to the 
next budget year. This is not a case with the external loan and external 
assistance part of the federal subsidy. The external sources of the Federal 
subsidy are double edged sword for the States. First, the States’ subsidy 
entitlements which derive from the external source (loan and assistance) 
are not certain to reach to the States’ treasury. For example, only 18.5 
percent of the “promised” external loans and assistance were utilized 
during the same period with wide variation among the States (13 percent 
in Dire Dawa and 46 percent in Benshangul-Gumuz in 1998/9-2002/03 
fiscal years) (see Appendix 8.1). Dire Dawa, Afar, and SNNP were the 
three bottom States which utilized the external sources of the Federal 
Subsidy least, whereas Benshangul-Gumuz and Harari utilized about 40 
percent of the external fund sources.201 The reasons for such a low 
utilization rate of external source could be partly due to the existing 
weak institutional and human resource capacities of the States to meet 
donors’ detailed performance report requirements on time, and partly 
due to the donors’ long bureaucratic decision making process and the 
stringent purchasing policies and procedures. These conditions have 
caused to delay the release of fund. 
The external sources portion of the Federal subsidy crowds-out the 
Federal treasury grants too. If the money is not utilized within the project 
period even because of the financing institution’s fault or long 
bureaucratic procedure, it is not carried forward to the next budget year. 
Thus, large parts of the external sources are nominal, uncertain to 
                                                 
201 Paradoxically, Benshangule-Gumz and Gambela, which have weak managerial 
capacity, utilized their external sources  of the federal subsidy better than the 
relatively advanced States (see Appendix 8.1). 
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receive and they are “perceived as inferior substitute for treasury 
funds.”(World Bank, 2000: 45). 
The socio-economic formula-based grant system was implicitly 
expenditure need equalizer-The considerations of population size and 
development variables were aimed to ensure equitable access to 
education, primary health care, access to safe drinking water and rural 
road service among the States. As can be seen from Table 8.2 above, 
population size and development index constituted a lion’s share of the 
Federal subsidy, because: (i) a populous state needs more fund to 
provide basic public services at comparable tax burden than a less 
populous one, and (ii) the periphery States have to receive more federal 
transfer to significantly narrow the development disparity across the 
States. 
However, the equity concern was compromised for a couple of 
reasons. First, the Federal subsidy formulas did not consider the cost 
differential factors in providing public services across the States. Failing 
to consider the impact of economies of scale on the cost of delivering 
public service in the formula adversely affected the Emerging States as 
they are scattered populated. Secondly, the subjective allocation of the 
external sources across the States undermined the equalization system. 
Some States used to have a large proportion of the external sources than 
the others (see Appendix 8.1). In effect, the higher the share of external 
sources to the total State subsidy entitlement, the lower the actual 
States’ subsidy entitlement is, because large portion of the promised 
external resources are not disposable to the States. For instance, over 
the 1998/9 to 2002/3 fiscal years, Dire Dawa’s external loan and 
assistance constituted fourfold of its Federal treasury revenue, followed 
by Tigrai (23 percent), SNNP (21 percent), and Somali (19 percent). But 
they utilized only 6.4 percent, 6.7 percent, 5.1 percent and 19 percent 
respectively. The remaining balances did not reach the hands of the 
States and were freezed out, when the project phases out. What is the 
rationale to allocate 23 percent and 21 percent of the subsidy 
entitlement in the form of external source for Tigrai and SNNP 
respectively, but only 16.6 percent and 16.4 percent for Amhara and 
Oromia respectively (see Appendix 8.1). Was not this injustice as it is 
known large part of the external sources is not transferred to the States’ 
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treasury? Thus the subjective allocation of the external loans and 
assistances as part of the Federal subsidy to the States has built in 
discrimination and injustice. 
The socioeconomic based formula was discouraging the states from 
generating more revenue-The socio-economic formula- based Federal 
subsidy was ill designed to generate more revenues for two reasons. 
First, States’ revenue raising capacity was estimated on actual collection 
not on the potential revenue capacity of the States. Second, because of 
the practice of the so-called budget netting from the total Federal 
subsidy entitlement and budget off-setting mechanisms, the transfer 
system used to penalize the States which collected more own-revenue. 
The netting system refers to the deduction of State’s expected 
(targeted) own-revenue collection202 from the total Federal subsidy 
entitlement. MoFED and the States used to set ‘jointly’ Five Year the 
State’s revenue collection plan, although the former was more vocal in 
the decision making process. Once, the States’ expected revenue was 
determined, MoFED used to transfer the difference between the Federal 
subsidy entitlement of the state and the targeted revenue collection of 
the state on a monthly basis. If a State collected above the revenue 
target, MoFED used to deduct equal amount from the State’s subsidy 
entitlement. In principle, States which performed better tax effort203 
should have been rewarded. But in practice it was not the case. Rather 
the Federal subsidy system used to penalize the States which exerted 
better tax effort. 
The off-setting mechanism204 implies deduction of State’s Federal 
subsidy entitlement equivalent to multilateral and bilateral funds (UN 
agencies, CIDA, EU, etc) directly channelled to the BoFED and to Wereda 
                                                 
202 States’ own revenue collection plans or revenue targets were estimated in 
considerations of previous year actual revenue performance and forecasted regional 
economic growth. Revenue targets often were not attainable, partly due to 
unrealistic target setting (top-down decision) and partly weak collection performance 
of the States. 
203  In this context, tax effort is defined as the change in revenue collection between 
current year and  previous year. 
204 The practice of offsetting mechanism is argued to correct the concentration of 
individual donors’ fund channels in a few States. 
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sector offices.205 The external sources include packages of software’s like 
new management system, capacity building projects, management 
auditing, and reporting system, capital investments on economic and 
social infrastructures, etc. However, the States have shown little interest 
to make use of the external funds. Because the budget off-setting system 
has caused equivalent deduction from their Federal subsidy entitlement, 
even if they do not make use of the fund because of the donors fault 
and/or the states’ capacity limitations Therefore, the budget off-setting 
mechanism blunts the incentive to use external resources (World Bank, 
2000:30).. 
The Federal subsidy was less predictable-As can be seen from Table 
8.2 above, the formula changed five times within a dozen years, or, on 
average, about every two years. Such frequent changes had made the 
formula less predictable and adversely affected the States’ capacity to 
make medium and long term development plans. Moreover, the 
frequent change of the formula made some States win and some States 
lose. For example, raising the weight for population from 55 percent to 
65 percent in the 2003/4 had benefited the three populous states at the 
cost of the less populous States (see Appendix 8.3). To make the matter 
worst, there was no hardship fund mechanism that would rescue the 
losers due to the change of a formula. 
In summing up, in the socio-economic based Federal Subsidy 
formula, the selection of the socioeconomic variables and the 
assignment of the weights were subjectively determined. There was no 
consensus among the States about the variables and the weights to be 
given to each variable. For example, Tigrai had requested a higher weight 
assignment to revenue raising effort. The periphery States had argued for 
consideration of distance from the centre. Somali and Oromia preferred 
the consideration of geographical size. Moreover, Oromia, Amhara and 
the SNNP were in favour of higher weight to population size. The SNNP 
demanded for consideration of unit cost administration and general 
                                                 
205 Note that multilateral and bilateral grantare transferred to the States through various 
channels. Channel-1 refers to those  funds which pass to the States through the 
MoFED.Channel-2 is transfersmade directly to BoFED.Channel-3 is fund granted 
(mainly by NGOs) to specific wereda sector Offices.Channel 1 and Channel-2 are 
incorporated in the Federal Subsidy entitlement and they were subject to budget-off-
setting from the Federal subsidy entitlement. Channel-3 is off-budget. 
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service as large part of its recurrent budget is consumed by Zone/Special 
Wereda levels of government, whereas Afar and Somali demanded a 
higher weight for the development index (HoF, 1994). The states and the 
HoF felt that the socio-economic based formula was not equitable. To 
this effect, the House decided the replacement of the socio-economic 
variables formula by a fiscal equalization grant (see more Section on 8.3). 
 
8.2.2 Conditional (specific purpose) grants 
 
The Federal Government channels various kinds of conditional grants 
through Line Ministries, which constituted about 25 percent of total 
States’ expenditure in 2005206 (World Bank, 2006).Federal conditional 
grants are attached to specific sector development programs/projects 
where the Federal Government sets the priority. All conditional grants 
are attributed to states not to individuals except the PSNP. The Federal 
Government makes ex-post verification of the use of the conditional 
grants. 
Conditional grants are exogenously financed. Large portion of the 
conditional grants are financed by multilateral and bilateral loans and/or 
assistances. The grants are close–ended matching where the Federal 
Government and eligible states contribute in kind up to 20 percent of the 
total project cost. Thus, the pool size and the intervention sector areas 
are influenced by the donors/grantors. Such an over dependency on 
external sources raises a sustainability issue and political cost on the 
sovereignty of the country207. 
                                                 
206 So far the conditional grant includes AMIP(Agricultural Marketing improvement 
program),ASSP (Agricultural sector Support Program),CBDSD,(Capacity Building for 
Decentralized service delivery),CIP( Coffee improvement project),ESRDF(Ethiopian 
social rehabilitation and development fund),HSDP(Health Sector Development 
Program),NLSDP( National Livestock Sector Development Program),PCDP( Pastoral 
Community Development Program),PSCB(Public service capacity building program 
),PSNP(Productive Safety Net Program),PSSIDP(Participatory Small Scale Irrigation 
Development project),RCBP(Rural capacity building program), SLMP (Sustainable 
land  Management Program), ULGDP( Urban Local Government Development 
Program), etc 
207 It is open secret that the donors use grants and loan an instrument to fulfill their 
political, security and economic motives. The donors had suspended all grants during 
the Ethio-Eritrea war and the 2005 controversial National and Regional elections. 
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Conditional grants are not all state-inclusive. In many cases the 
eligible states are selected at the discretion of the Federal Line Ministries 
and many of the conditional grants are asymmetrically arranged to some 
States. Only a few conditional grants such as Ethiopian Social 
Rehabilitation Development Fund (ESRDF), Public Sector and Capacity 
Building (PSCAB), Health sector Development Program (HSDP) and 
Education sector Development Program (ESDP) were all States inclusive. 
The remaining conditional grants do (did) not encompass all the States208 
Selection of beneficiary states of a conditional grant is guided by 
pragmatic economic and political considerations to meet specific national 
objectives. For example, PCDP targets pastoral communities only (Afar, 
Somali, and Pastoral Weredas of Oromia and the SNNP) to enhance local 
decision making, to build managerial capacity of local people in 
identification, implementation, supervising, and monitoring local 
projects; to promote accountability through public censorship, and to 
promote local economic development, whereas PSSIDP, RCBP and SLMP 
have targeted States having long history of sedentary and mixed 
agricultural economy practices. The discretionary selection of beneficiary 
states may raise equity issue. 
Conditional grants are less transparent and less predictable-
Conditional grants are less transparent because the selection criteria for 
eligibility are determined by political choice of the Federal Government, 
of course, with the consent of the external financing agencies. Line 
Ministries prepare policy documents and project proposals, then the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development seeks finance. Once 
beneficiary States are identified, the total conditional grant is 
redistributed among the selected states. 
Conditional grants are designed for a short maturity period, often 
ranging from three to five years and they lack predictability. The grants 
heavily depend on the willingness 209of the lending institutions. This 
hampers the States/LGs ability to make long-term development plans. 
                                                 
208 For example ULGDP, PCDP, PSSIDP, RCBP, SLMP target specific States. 
209 Availability of conditional grant reflects political and economic motives of the 
financers. For instance, multilateral lending institutions and donors substantially cut 
the loans and assistances in reaction to the Ethiopia’s action to reverse the Eritrean 
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The conditional grants alter less States’ resources. In principle, 
matching conditional grants alter States’/LGs’ resources towards meeting 
national objectives by sacrificing state/local priorities. This is not a case in 
the Ethiopian transfer system, because matching grants rarely practiced 
and they have little effect in altering States’ meagre resources to meet 
national objectives. The States are required to contribute a small portion 
of matching grant, less than 20 percent of the total entitled to the 
matching grant often in kind (labour and local materials) which are 
abundant resources of the States. The introduction of such in-kind 
contributions is unique experience from the conventional matching grant 
system we find in the literatures of intergovernmental transfers. The 
Ethiopian experience could be a good innovation as it is designed in a 
way to overcome the capital constraints of the States and softens the 
problem of shifting meagre capital resources to achieve national goals. 
Thus, the conditional matching grants are designed in a way not to 
crowds-out States’ budget. 
The conditional grants are development oriented and are output 
based- Conditional grants are channelled to finance capital projects that 
would contribute to promote local development. They are measurable 
and goal-oriented. Both financers and beneficiary weredas enter into an 
agreement on the objectives, output, outcomes, and impact of each 
program/project. The Weredas prepare grass root, flexible annual work 
plan. The plans have to be endorsed by the respective State Steering 
Committee and then by the respective Federal Steering Committee. The 
plans are used as instruments to track with expected performance 
targets. The Line Ministries also apply carrot and stick management 
approach. Those weredas that perform according to the annual work 
plan get replenishments of project funds and receive recognition for their 
excellent performance in their joint consultative meetings (the Federal 
Government and the States). Those which fail to perform according to 
the approved annual work plan would be sanctioned from getting 
additional replenishments until they produce standard performance 
report for the previous transfer. 
                                                                                                               
aggression in 1998-2001as well as the 2005contested results of National and 
Regional election. 
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Conditional grants are also designed in a way to promote local 
participation and accountability by making local people main actors in 
the process of project identification, implementation, procurement and 
supervision. It might be worth noting that there is visible gap between 
the blue print and the reality on ground. 
 
8.2.3 The Road fund210 
 
The Road fund is earmarked to road maintenance and road safety 
purposes. It is distributed among the Ethiopian Road Authority (Federal 
Government), the States, and selected ULGs.211 As stated in the previous 
chapters (see Section 7.5.2), the Road Fund is derived from various 
sources. It is also managed by a Board drawn from public and private 
sectors, accountable to the Ministry of Works and Urban Development. 
The Federal and the States are represented by five and four appointed 
members respectively, while the Private transport sector has four 
elected, by the Association, representatives. All stakeholders make 
decision on the (i) determination of the pool size for distribution, and (ii) 
the distribution of the Road fund among the eligible levels of 
government. Currently the distribution of the Road fund takes place in 
the proportion of 70 percent to the Federal Road Authority, 20 percent 
to the States and 10 percent to eligible ULG (Road Fund Office, 2010). 
The skewed of the distribution of the Road Fund in favour of the Federal 
Road Authority is associated with the proportion of the road network it 
administers and its traffic load with respect to all roads in Ethiopia. With 
regard to the distribution of the Road fund among the States and the 
ULGs, the Board designs separate criteria. The 20 percent of the Fund is 
distributed among the States depending upon the proportion of the 
length of road net-work they manage. As far as allocation of Road fund 
among the ULGs is concerned, 50 percent goes to the Addis Ababa City 
                                                 
210   This dissertation uses the definition of  tax sharing( revenue sharing) developed by 
(Blöchliger and King,2006) (see Section 6.4.2, page 142-3) 
211 The Road Fund has come into effect in 1997. Eligibility of ULGs to the Road Fund 
increases from time to time.It increased from 11 cities (Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, 
Mekele, Hawassa, Adama, Bahir Dar, Jimma, Shashamene, Gonder, Combolicha and 
Harer) in 1997 to 25 in 2012. The Road Fund Board determines the eligibility criteria. 
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Government, on the basis of some criteria like: road network, traffic load, 
and social and economic importance of the city. The balance has been 
distributed among the remaining ULGs based on various criteria: 80 
percent on population size of an eligible town and 5 percent value has 
been assigned to each to the following criteria: (i) regional administrative 
centrality (seats of Regional State), (ii) degree of transit traffic load, (iii) 
township grade, and (iv) proportion of asphalted road to the total road of 
the towns. 
Given the Road Fund is earmarked to road maintenance and traffic 
safety, one may question the wisdom of assigning 80 percent weight to 
population size of an eligible town and only 5 percent value to the degree 
of transit traffic load, because the latter causes adverse spill over effect 
on life time of the road and congestion is not obvious. Moreover, the 
distribution formula ignores States’/LGs’ maintenance cost of road and 
road fund generating capacity of the ULGs. 
Road Fund is performance oriented, predictable and certain- 
Beneficiaries are supposed to prepare a detailed five year action plan 
disaggregated by annual work plan. The system promotes accountability. 
The Road Fund Office applies a strict policy of “No performance report 
vis-á-vis work plan, no additional transfer”. Road Fund does not freeze 
out because unutilized funds are carried forward to the next year. This 
makes the Road fund certain to reach at the treasury of the eligible 
agencies as long as they produce realistic performance report. It is also 
predictable. 
 
8.2.4 Wereda Block Grant (WBG) 
 
The Wereda Block grant (WBG) is a transfer from the States to 
respective Weredas (rural and urban). It was introduced as a component 
of the Wereda level decentralization. 
Before the introduction of the existing expenditure need 
equalization, the states used to apply the socioeconomic variables based 
formula (population size level, development index, and revenue 
generating capacity). At present, all the states compute Weredas’ 
recurrent budget need on unit cost approach basis, which considers 
major recurrent expenditure cost drivers. Unit cost is a ratio that 
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expresses the relation of physical output and financial input such as the 
cost of education per student, health service per patient, cost of 
agricultural extension service per household etc. 
The WBG considers similar expenditure representatives and 
indicators between the rural and urban Weredas. The only difference is 
that ULGs considers trade and industry development expenditure needs 
instead of pastoral/agricultural development. Water supply expenditure 
need is also ignored as urban dwellers finance the cost on benefit-
received principle. Municipality functions are exclusively financed from 
own revenues. 
The total worked recurrent expenditure needs is the sum of 
estimated costs of all sector. WBG is transferred into two ways. In the 
relatively homogeneous states, it is directly transferred from the states 
to respective whereas. States having constitutional Ronal Government 
use two-steps approach to distribute block grants. First, the states 
allocate transfers to the Zones, and then the Zones reallocate block 
grants to respective Weredas. 
 
Table 8.3 WBG Recurrent Expenditure needs and indicators 
Expenditure 
needs 
Indicators 
Education School age population, actual No of enrolled  
students, expected No of students to be served, actual 
No of teachers, number of schools and classrooms, 
unit cost of construction, actual financial expenditure 
salary and operation costs for the previous year 
Primary health  
Care 
No of health centre and health post, health staff 
salary, standard operational expenses for the health 
institutions 
Rural water  
Supply 
Water infrastructures, costs of major maintenance for 
unfuctional schemes, minor maintenance cost for 
functional schemes 
pastoral/agricult
ure and rural 
development 
No of development agents(DA’s), salary of 
development agents, No of FTC and kebels, No farmer 
households and standard ratio to DA, operation costs 
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for extension service delivery; salary of veterinary 
staff , operational expenses for veterinary services. 
Administration 
and general 
expenses. 
Estimation of salary and operational cost for all 
sectors those are not covered in unit cost service 
delivery institutions. 
Micro and small 
scale Enterprise 
costs required to facilitate job opportunities for 
economically active unemployed population, 
Cost factors Implies the consideration of cost differences among 
Weredas due to number of kebeles, distance from the 
zonal and regional centres and area size of Weredas. 
Sources:  Oromia, Tigrai, Amhara BoFED 
 
Distribution of Capital Budget among Weredas 
 
Capital budgets are transferred based on inter-wereda infrastructure 
deficit comparison. Access to education, primary health, portable water 
supply, rural road, and agricultural facilities are taken into account. The 
infrastructural deficit index favours weredas with relatively poor 
infrastructural development. 
Based on each index, the capital budget need of each wereda is 
estimated. Wereda capital transfers are made on ad-hoc basis. They are 
conditional transfers. The States do not set floor pool size of WBG for 
capital expenditures. It is a function of expected Federal transfers to the 
States, States’ revenue mobilization forecast, and States’ sector 
development plan. Whenever decision makers allocate capital budget 
among Weredas, they keep equitable access to public services in mind, 
although it is completely free from influence of vocal Wereda politicians, 
negotiation and lobbying. 
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Table 8.4.WBG Capital Expenditure needs and indicators 
Expenditure 
need 
Indicators 
Education 
infrastructure 
No of schools, class rooms and school age population 
Agricultural 
infrastructure 
No of farming households, No. farmers training centre, 
No. of livestock in TLU, No. Vet; 
Health 
infrastructure 
Population size, No. of Health Centre and No. of Health 
Post; 
water supply Water coverage percentage ; 
Rural Road 
infrastructure 
Population, Area(Km2),Road Length(Km) Road Density; 
Cost factor Distance from the centre. 
Sources:  Oromia, Tigrai, Amhara BoFED 
 
8.3 The Fiscal -Gap Equalizations (2007/8 -2010/12) 
 
The HoF felt that many of the states perceived the socio-economic 
based federal subsidy formula was not equitable (HoF, 
1994).Understanding this fact, the HoF reached a consensus on the need 
for a new grant system that would address the concerns of the States. 
Fiscal equalization can be designed either by equalizing States’/LGs’ 
fiscal capacity (revenue raising capacity) like in Canada and Germany, or 
the expenditure needs (fiscal need) of state/LGs like in India, or by 
equalizing both the fiscal capacity and expenditure needs (fiscal-gap) of 
states/LGs like in Australia and Denmark. 
Fiscal capacity equalization standardizes major tax bases and 
respective tax rates. It lifts up the fiscally weak jurisdictions to politically 
acceptable predetermined national level fiscal capacity. States/LGs with 
lower-than-national average fiscal capacity receive more transfers, while 
those states/LGs with higher-than-national average capacity receive no 
transfers or may be asked to contribute to the equalization pool if the 
equalization scheme is horizontal. 
Expenditure need equalization standardizes three sources of 
expenditure differentials:  
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(i) cost of public service delivery of states/LGs by considering various 
disability factors such as topography, distance from centre, variation of 
cost of inputs etc., 
(ii) need differences which arise due to population size in general and 
demographic factor such as population age/sex structure in particular, 
and  
(iii) Cost of public services difference incurred due to economies of scale 
(Dafflon and Mischle, 2008: 215, and Dafflon and Vaillancourt, 2009). 
Fiscal gap equalization measures both relative fiscal capacity and 
relative expenditure needs of states/LGs with the objective to bridge the 
gap between the fiscal capacity and expenditure needs of states/LGs. 
There is no consensus among public finance economists about which 
fiscal equalization modality (fiscal capacity or expenditure need or fiscal-
gap) is appropriate. Dafflon and Vaillancourt (2003: 405) indicate a 
preference for fiscal capacity equalization as “cost differences are more 
arbitrarily measured than fiscal capacity differences.”Shah (2007b:312) 
also argues for fiscal capacity equalization because expenditure need 
could be compensated “through sectoral transfers or by providing a 
special grant” to fiscally weak states. But, for Boadway (2004) 
expenditure need equalization is superior to fiscal capacity. According to 
him, expenditure need equalization has potential to eliminate distortion 
of resource allocation that might arise due to fiscally induced migration 
(Boadway, 2004: 237-238). 
Since the choice for fiscal equalization modality is left to politicians; 
the HoF has been inspired by the Australian fiscal-gap grant system. It 
hired an International Consultant and directed to customize the 
Commonwealth grant system to the Ethiopian situation believing that it 
would “satisfy” all the States, as  the system compensates both cost and 
revenue differentials of the States. 
One of the principles of fiscal equalization is to provide adequate 
financial means to the States that would enable them to deliver 
comparable basic public services such as health, education, clean water, 
housing, and rural road to their citizens regardless of the choice of 
location (Federal Constitution, 1995 Art. 90(1)) at comparable tax effort. 
Equalizing expenditure needs of the States is necessary in today’s 
Ethiopia, because there are visible gaps in the distribution of basic public 
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services among the States due to cost and need differentials. Equalizing 
the revenue side is also a politically feasible, because there is wide 
asymmetry in the economic bases among the States. The fiscal-gap 
equalization is not immune from side effect. The impact of the fiscal–gap 
equalization on disincentive is discussed in 8.3.1 and 8.3.2 below. 
Once the modality of fiscal equalization is determined, the next 
critical policy choice is to determine what the direction of fiscal 
equalization to be pursued. There are three options: vertically (parental) 
or horizontally (fraternal) or both vertical and horizontal equalizations. In 
the case of vertical fiscal equalization, transfers are made from a higher 
level of government to a lower one. Canada and India apply vertical fiscal 
equalization. Horizontal fiscal equalization refers to transferring 
resources among the same levels of government. Under this option, 
fiscally better-off states/LGs contribute to the equalization pool in favour 
of the less fiscal endowed ones (Dafflon, 2009b).Germany is a typical 
example of horizontal fiscal equalization.212 Political cohesiveness 
between constituent state members is a critical factor to adopt a 
horizontal fiscal equalization (Vaillancourt and Bird, 2005).Switzerland 
practices both vertical and horizontal fiscal equalization approach. 
There is no perfect direction of fiscal equalization. All have merits 
and demerits. Vertical fiscal equalization does not cause disincentive to 
raise more revenue. However, it makes lower levels of government grant 
dependent upon a higher level of government as it implicitly presupposes 
control of lucrative tax revenue sources at a higher level of government. 
Horizontal fiscal equalization enhances solidarity among constituent 
member states of a federation. Nevertheless, it is criticized for (i) 
creating disincentives to exert more tax efforts (Vaillancourt and Bird, 
2005:5), and for (ii) ‘levelling down’ of rich states/LGs to national average 
target.  
There are sound equity and efficiency arguments for pursuing a 
horizontal or a vertical revenue raising (fiscal capacity) equalization 
whereas expenditure needs equalization should be vertical only (Dafflon, 
2007), because horizontal expenditure needs equalization would bring 
                                                 
212 In addition to the horizontal fiscal equalization, German Landers also receive VAT 
vertical fiscal equalization. 
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distortion in the relative tax-price of local public services and result in 
inefficient allocation of resources. Adopting simultaneously the vertical 
and horizontal equalization has a potential to correct the shortcomings of 
the vertical and horizontal fiscal equalizations. 
With this regard, Ethiopia applies vertical fiscal equalization. The 
conventional horizontal fiscal equalization does not seem feasible in 
Ethiopia, at least, in the foreseeable future for two reasons. First, so far, 
no State is in a fiscal position to fully finance its expenditure needs from 
own-revenue, leave alone to contribute to a horizontal equalization 
pool.213 Second, applying horizontal equalization seems politically 
sensitive; because it might serve as a breeding ground to the political 
forces which think their state is subsidizing others and subscribing to 
secession. That is, ethnic entrepreneurs who claim their State is ‘well-off’ 
may rally their ‘fellow men’ for secession by instilling that they will be 
‘better-off’ if they secede from the federation. The existing strong ethnic 
identity may also make it difficult to pursue the conventional horizontal 
fiscal equalization. 
Another equalization issue that needs political decision is to 
determine the optimal degree of fiscal equalization. Degree of fiscal 
equalization ranges from zero to100 percent. Zero implies no 
equalization policy, while 100 percent refers to full equalization or 
bridging 100 percent difference between potential fiscal capacity and 
expenditure needs of states/LGs. Other factors remaining constant, full 
fiscal equalization makes states/LGs to have national average financial 
means per capita. It may also curb secessionist tendency from a state 
whose elites believe they do not receive what they deserve from the 
national cake. Nevertheless, full equalization is likely to create 
                                                 
213 It seems worth mentioning the practice of an ad-hoc basis horizontal solidarity in 
Ethiopia.The relatively advanced States provide technical assistances in areas of 
capacity building programs, carrying out investment projects, providing trainings to 
civil servants,etc to neiboghboring Emerging States based on solidarity principle. For 
example, Tigrai and Amhara provide technical assistance to Afar State. The State of 
Amhara also assists to Benshagul-Gumz, while SNNP and Oromia provide technical 
assistance to Gambela and Somali respectively. Furthermore the four relatively 
advanced states , Harari and Dire Dawa have voluntarly given 1 percent of the total 
federal subsidy to the Emerging states. 
 312 
 
disincentive among high contributors to the equalization pool and 
laziness among the beneficiary States/LGs. 
Applying fiscal equalization more than zero but less than 100 percent 
is referred to partial fiscal equalization. For instance, the German VAT 
based equalization program lifts up the revenue capital capacity of the 
Länders to 92 percent of the national average, while the horizontal 
equalization program equalizes the poor Länders up to 95 percent of 
national average fiscal capacity (Bird and Vaillancoutr, 2007b:281).A 
fiscal equalization approach closer to 100 percent means a higher 
disincentive degree to improve own situation (tax effort or utilization of 
resources) and less tax autonomy of States/LGs. The German fiscal 
capacity equalization system is an illustrative case in creating disincentive 
to collect more revenue. Partial fiscal equalization balances the issue of 
equity (justice) and efficiency (incentive to raise revenue), although both 
of them cannot be achieved simultaneously without trading-off one for 
the other. It also reduces fiscal burden of those states/LGs that 
contribute more resources to the equalization pool size (Dafflon, 2009: 
380). 
In Ethiopia, the fiscal-gap equalization system fully equalizes (100 
percent)both the revenue raising capacity and the expenditure needs of 
the States with the objective to create “...comparable financial capacity 
among regions in order to provide standard public services, (in addition to 
the effort to be put by each region to collect average revenue)” (HoF, 
2007:9). The full equalization has created disincentive to maximize their 
revenue potential and to compete on the common federal resources. 
The following subsections assess the fiscal gap equalizations of 2007 
and 2009. It begins with assessment of the 2007 fiscal revenue and 
expenditure need equalizations and followed by the 2009 equalization 
formula. 
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8.3.1 Assessment of the 2007 fiscal gap equalization 
 
The Revenue Raising Capacity Equalization 
 
The 2007 revenue raising capacity equalization considered six major 
revenue sources, which constituted more than 80 percent of the States’ 
total tax own-revenue sources. When the revenue capacity equalization 
includes more tax bases, it reduces more the annual revenue fluctuation 
and smoothes the Effective Yield Tax (EYT) system through time. 
 
Table 8 5 Revenue sources and their contribution to total revenue in 
the 2007 equalization 
Tax base in the ETY 2007 
State’s proportion from their 
total revenuea 
(2002-2006average) 
Personal income tax 30.2 
Business profit tax 24 
Agricultural income tax 5.3 
Rural land user fee 5.4 
Tax on Chat NA 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 14 
Total 80 
Source: HoF 2007, the New Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula,  
a own computation based on HoF 2007:19 and MoFED data base. 
 
Revenue sources to be included or excluded in the fiscal capacity 
equalization should be, as much as possible, free from subjective 
judgment. Arbitrary selection of revenue sources can be escaped 
through: (i) carefully selecting important revenue sources from the tax 
structure of States, and (ii) checking whether the annual yields of the 
selected tax bases are regular and predictable. 
The 2007 revenue raising capacity equalization is appreciated for 
disregarded insignificant revenue sources such as income taxes on 
dividends, chance winning (lottery), and interest income on bank 
deposits, as well as unpredictable and irregular tax bases such as capital 
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gains tax. However, there is no explanation why the emerging revenue 
sources such as rental income tax, turn over tax, royalty payments, and 
urban land lease fees were ignored in the revenue raising capacity 
equalizations. One may challenge the wisdom of disregarding these 
revenue sources from the ETY as they significantly vary across the states. 
Moreover, urban land lease fee contribution to the total revenue of the 
States is greater than the agricultural income tax and rural land use fee. 
For instance, in 2009/2010 fiscal year, urban land lease fee accounted for 
6 percent of Sub national’ total revenue, while the share of agriculture 
income tax and rural land use fee were 4 percent and 2.7 percent 
respectively for the same period (see Table 6.3, page196-197). 
The consultant Team designed two formulas (equations 8-1 and 8-2 
depicted below)214 to determine the revenue raising capacity of the 
States. 
(i) Revenue raising capacity of the States on the personal 
income tax (PIT), business profit tax (BPT), tax on chat and 
value added tax (VAT) were computed as:  
 
 
 
Whe  
 
 
 
Where  
 where 
 
  
  Revpcij raverage revenue per capita of category in state 
  T taxRevj rave. total tax revenue of category (2002-2006) 
  Tax Revij rave tax revenue (2002-2006) of category in States 
  Ave.T pop  raverage total population (2002-2006) at national  
       raverage population (2002-2006) in statei 
αj degree of revenue category 
 
                                                 214 Equation 8-1 and Equation 8-2 are taken from Professor Kirchgassener (2008) 
(St.Gallen University), who served as a consultant to the HoF in designing the 2007 
fiscal equalization. 
                                                                    
 Equation 8-1 
AvgRevpcij = αj 0 ≤ α ≤ 1  
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(ii) Agricultural income tax and rural land use fee were 
measured using Equation 8-2. In order to compute the 
average revenue per capita of agricultural income tax in 
Statei, agricultural land size was taken as a parameter and it 
was computed as:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where  
  
 TTaxRevj 
TaxRij 
TAgArea 
Total tax revenue per capita of categoryj in 
Statei 
Tax revenue per capita of agri. In statei 
Total agricultural area in the country 
 SAgAreai Share of total agricultural area in Statei 
 αj Degree of revenue categoryj 
 
Average revenue per capita of rural land fee of the States was 
estimated by applying the same equation 8-2. 
In summing up, the per capital revenue raising capacity of the states 
and Dire Dawa Administration Council was computed through the 
following steps:215 
[1] Five years (2002-2206), average population size of each state 
(statei) was estimated. i.e.
 
 
 
∆ RevPci,j=αj 
 
     -      x     0≤ αj≤1 
Eq. 8-2 
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capita. The results of some states’ revenue sources were found 
to be positive sign and negative sign for others. 
[5] Finally, the individual value of the six per capita revenue raising 
 
 Capacity of each state was summed up to determine the aggregated per 
capita revenue of statei. The result was positive for Afar, Amhara, Somali 
and the SNNP, implying lower revenue raising capacity than the national 
average per capita. Tigrai, Oromia, Benshangule-Gumuz, Gambela, 
Harari, and Dire Dawa designated negative signs, referring a higher 
revenue raising capacity than the national average. (HoF, 2007:25, Table 
2.8). The revenue raising capacity equalization system has rewarded Afar 
and Somali for their political choice not to levy tax on agricultural income 
and on land use fee (see HoF, 2007:22 Tables, 2.4).216 It is paradoxically 
enough to index the fiscally weak States of Benshangule-Gumuz, and 
Gambela negative sign as compared to the Amhara and the SNNP. 
Literatures provide various methods of measuring revenue raising 
capacity of states. Macroeconomic variables (state gross domestic 
product, state income factor (state personal income as indicator) and 
Representative Tax System (RTS) are the most common ones. The RTS 
measures states’ standard tax rate (tj*) and standard tax base (bj) 
(Boadway and Shah, 2009: 358-359). 
Despite the 2007 Federal subsidy document claims that the revenue 
raising capacities of the States were assessed using RTS, it was no longer 
a RTS, because the fiscal equalization considered actual average revenue 
collections of 2002-2006. Therefore, in practice the revenue raising 
equalization measured Effective Tax Yield (ETY) of the States, not the 
potential revenue capacity, although one cannot say with confidence 
that the tax assessment book is comprehensive, identifies and registers 
correctly all and every revenue sources. 
                                                 
216  These states collect negligible revenues from agricultural income tax and land use 
fees not only because the States are predominantly pastoral communities but also, 
in effect, land resource is controlled and managed by clan leaders, not by the 
Government Agencies. Leasees make deal with clan leaders on how much land use 
fee to pay and the modality of payment.   
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The revenue raising equalization has failed to consider states’ 
concurrent revenue sources. It favours to Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, 
Dire Dawa and Harari, which receive relatively higher concurrent yields, 
as it enables them to get more federal subsidy at the cost of the 
Emerging states. 
Revenue raising ability for one year, six taxesj in Statei could be 
computed as: 
 
1. ETYi =(PITi x t*PIT)+ (BPTi x t*BPT)+(TCi x t*TC)+(VATi x t*VAT)+(AITi x 
t*AIT)+(RLFi x t*RLF) Equation 8-3 
 
2. 
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[1] Six functional categories217 of public services were identified for 
equalization and objective indicators of each functional category were 
determined. 
Determining objective indicators of each functional category helps to 
quantify the expenditure needs in terms of units of workload. The six 
major function categories constituted more than 85 percent of the total 
expenditures needs of the States. The HoF has legislative power to 
identify the public services that should be equalized. The 2007 
expenditure categories are more or less consistent with the Federal 
Constitution stipulated in Art.90 (1). They are considered as minimum 
national standard for regional public services. 
[2] Average population size (2002-2006) of statei was computed. 
[3] The expenditure need of each functional category in terms of money 
using the monetary value of a workload unit of the various indicators was 
estimated based on actual costs of the 2002-2006 fiscal years. In doing 
so, disaggregating the production function is important in order to assess 
with accounting line in each function what attributed to which criteria. 
Without examining production function of public servicej for statei, the 
expenditure needs of the States do not reflect the reality. The 
Consultants designed one formula for each functional category to 
standardize the expenditure needs of the states. 
 
                                                 
217It should be noted that Items 6.1, 6.2.3 and 6.3 above are not functions but elements 
(criteria) that influence certain costs. 
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Table 8.6 Expenditure needs equalization of 2007 
 Function Indicators Causes of cost differential  
1 Agriculture: expenditure need    
1.1 Extension services No of farm house hold Rural population size  
1.2 Crop development cultivated land area size Pop.size  engaged in crop cultivation 
1.3 Animal Development No. of animals Livestock size 
1.4  Research, administration and 
others 
 simple average of these  
2 Rural water supply expenditure 
need  
assessment 
Additional rural population served between 
the current situation and the target for 
2011  
Rural population size and 
underground/surface water resource 
potential 
3 Rural Road expenditure need  
assessment 
Potential increase “desirable Road” length 
in km and road construction unit cost 
Geographic terrain,  
4 Education expenditure need    
4.1a Primary education recurrent  Actual  primary school enrolment in 2006 Primary school pop. size, economies of 
scale 
4.1b Primary education  capital  
 
No. of primary school age population (7-14 
years )who should be enrolled  
Primary school pop Size, economies of 
scale and cost factor 
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4.2a Secondary education recurrent 
expenditure 
Actual secondary school enrolment in 2006  Secondary school pop. size and 
economies of scale 
4.2b Secondary education capital  
expenditure 
50 percent target participation rate of the 
secondary school age population (15-18), 
Secondary school Pop. size economies 
of scale and cost factor 
4.3 Education, Admi, unallocated 
and other exp. 
 Share of the young population in State of 
age 5-24 
Population size  
5 Health expenditure need    
5.1 Malaria Recurrent Expenditure 
need 
Percentage of population in malaria prone 
areas in 2005  and, percent of malaria 
reported cases in 2006 
Malaria prone population size 
5.2 Health Capital Expenditure Health service uncovered population Population size, economies of scale 
 
6 
Administration and General  
services expenditure .need  
  
6.1 Economies of scale on General 
administration and services 
Administrative expenditures based on the 
level of Harari serves as benchmark 
Government structure, Ethnic–based 
No. of government tiers,  
6.2 Differences in cost Factors   
6.2.1 Wages and salaries  Wage rate to civil servants Population size 
6.2.2 Non-wage recurrent cost  
(Cost of Fuel) 
Average expenditures on benzene and 
motor oil 
Geographic size and distance from the 
centre 
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6.2.3 Dispersion and Distance  
Factors 
Cost of transporting materials from the 
centre (Addis Ababa), cost of travel within, 
distance, costs of telecommunications 
within  
Economies of scale and distance from 
the centre 
6.2.4 Construction Cost  Eight major inputs of construction  Distance from the centre 
6.3 Spill over Effects 15 percent of health and education total 
expenditures  of Harari and Dire Dawa 
(2006) 
 
Source: Organized by the author based on the HoF, 2007:25-57.The New Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. 
Note that the list of expenditure needs of the States in second column of Table 8.4 above were taken from the HoF,2007 
document as they are. 
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[4]The results of [3] were divided by the average population size of 
Statei to arrive at Statei standardized per capita expenditure need 
categoryj. 
[5] Standardised national expenditure per-capita for each functional 
category was computed as a ratio of sum of standard States’ per-capita 
for functional category to218the sum of all States’ population (national 
population). 
[6]Per capita difference for functional categoryj in Statei was 
estimated by subtracting the estimated State’s standardized expenditure 
needs [4] from the national average expenditure needs. 
[7] The results were positive for some states and negative for others. 
When [4] > [5] the sign is positive and it means, Statei has higher per 
capita need for expenditure categoriej, than the national average. When 
[4] < [5], the sign is negative implying Statei has below the national 
average per-capita for expenditure categoryj. 
[8] Finally, the values of per-capita differences of all categoryJ of 
Statei were summed up to determine the aggregated per-capita 
expenditure need for Statei. I.e.,∑ [6]. 
The expenditure need assessment resulted in positive sign for Tigrai, 
Afar, Somali, Harari, Gambela, and Dire Dawa, while negative sign for 
Amhara, Oromia and SNNP (See HoF, 2007:63, Table 3.19). 
 
Comments on the 2007’s expenditure need equalization 
1. The agricultural expenditure needs-The exclusion of capital 
expenditure needs for small scale earth dam irrigation development and 
sustainable land management is correct because these needs are 
addressed through specific conditional grants. 
2 The rural water supply expenditure need assessment equalized 
only capital expenditure needs. Ignoring the recurrent expenditure need 
for rural water supply from equalization was prudent policy as 
maintenance and operating costs are financed through water fee 
collections on the benefit-received principle. 
                                                 218  Note this cannot be done for economies of scale, dispersion and distance; spillovers 
in Table 8.6 above. 
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However, the expenditure need for water supply did not take into 
account the cause for construction cost variations (such as surface or 
ground water potential). It did not also consider the production function 
of water because States characterized by scattered settlement pattern 
need more money to provide the minimum quality and quantity of clean 
water supply service within a standard radius. 
3 The rural road construction expenditure need for Statei was 
computed based on (i) the gap between the potential increase in 
‘desirable’ road length and actual road systems of Statei and, (ii) unit cost 
of road construction. Standardized road expenditure was calculated by 
standardizing the total average 2002-2006 expenditure of Statei by the 
percentage share of Statei (HoF, 2007: 32-35). Excluding periodic and 
routine maintenance expenditure need for rural road in the 2007 RES 
was a wise decision as the States receive money for these purposes from 
the Road Fund. 
The 2007 RES also excluded intra urban road expenditure need. The 
logic is that unlike the rural people, urban households have to bear the 
cost of the service on the benefit-received principle because they have 
the ability to finance the road capital expenditure need. 
Unit cost of road construction for Statei was based on previous 
bidders’ average price per km data in Statei. It did not take into account 
the variation in physical topography219. This has created incentive to 
overstate road construction unit cost. 
4 The education expenditure needs included three sources of 
expenses, namely (i) recurrent expenditures, (ii) capital expenditure and 
(iii) education administration, unallocated and other expenditures. 
(i) Recurrent expenditure- the difference between the actual gross 
primary education participation rate and a 100 percent target 
participation rate by 2015 were taken as indicators to compute recurrent 
expenditure needs for primary education for Statei. 
                                                 
219 The unit cost of rural road construction per km was assumed Birr 0.4 million for 
Tigrai, Amhara, Oromia, SNNP, Harari and Dire Dawa; Birr 0.45 million for 
Benshagul-Gumz and Gambela and Birr 0.50 for Afar and Somali per Km (HoF, 
2007:35). 
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Per capita recurrent expenditure of secondary education need for 
Statei was computed based on 2006 student enrolment rate and 
corresponding actual expenditure. 
(ii) Capital expenditures- Capital expenditure need of primary 
education aimed to equalize the gap between the actual participation 
rate in 2006 and 100 percent target participation rate by 2015220. Annual 
expenditure per capita was calculated as a ratio of annual expenditure 
required for additional enrolment for Statei and average population of 
2002-2006 of Statei. 
Capital expenditure needs of secondary education for Statei aimed to 
achieve 50 percent target by 2015 against the actual participation rate in 
2006. Hence, additional expenditure required to meet 50 percent 
participation target for Statei was computed 
(iii) Educational administration expenditure need was assumed to be 
proportional to the share of young population age 5-24 of Statei (HoF, 
2007:47). Despite the fact that educational administration is strongly 
associated with actual number of enrolled students, the use of the 5-24 
age groups in estimating the administration expenditure need is not 
realistic. It also favours the populous states. 
The computation of education expenditure need ignored the cost 
differential of primary and secondary education delivery that arises due 
to economies of scale. A state with scattered settlement communities 
need more school infrastructures and school teachers, supervisors, and 
administration support staff to deliver standardized education service 
within the determined benchmarked school distance from residence. 
Failing to consider the impact of economies of scale in delivering 
education service understated the expenditure need for primary and 
secondary education of the scattered settlement States of Afar, Somali, 
Bensghangul-Gumuz and Gambela as well as in the pastoralist 
communities of Oromia and SNNP. 
The education expenditure need also failed to consider the special 
school needs (schools for visual impaired and deaf), where the numbers 
                                                 
220  Note that the document did no clearly define series time frame leads to 100 
percent target. 
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of disabled young people significantly vary across the States. It is also 
constitutional right to educate. 
5. The health expenditure need considered only the recurrent 
expenditure on malaria prevention, control and treatment services 
because other health services were assumed proportional to the total 
population of state221(HoF, 2007:48).Prevention and control of malaria 
expenditure need for Statei was estimated based on population size living 
in malaria prone areas in 2006, whereas expenditure need for malaria 
treatment service is a function of the number of malaria cases reported 
in Statei in 2006 (HoF, 2007:48). 
The logic for equalizing malaria prevention and treatment 
expenditure need poses question as the states receive a large sum of 
money from the Global Fund for eradication of malaria via the Ministry of 
Health. 
The assumption of proportionality of health expenditure to 
population size is also wrong as the dispersedly settlement of states and 
costs of construction of health institutions are main cause for health cost 
differentials. 
The health expenditure need considered investments required only 
for construction of Health Posts and Health Centres with the objective to 
meet 100 percent primary health service coverage by 2015. It ignored 
the capital investment required for Zonal Hospitals and Regional Referral 
Hospitals as well as costs of health equipments, although these services 
are provided below standard in all the States. 
6. The administrations and general service expenditure needs of the 
states cannot be uniform across the States due to variations in 
organizations of the executive body (civil service Agencies), legislative 
body, and the judiciary body (including police and prisons), number of 
government tiers, population size, climate, dispersion and location, to 
mention some. The 2007 RES administration and general service 
expenditure needs assessment considered the following variables: 
                                                 
221  The assumption seems to be flaw, because states with same population size may 
have different health expenditure needs due to difference in population structure 
(health expenditure per capita for states with more infants, and aged population 
size might be highet), sex (maternal cost) attitude towards modern health service, 
and urbanization degree ,etc  
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Economies of Scale  
 
Densely settlement and populous States may operate at relatively 
lower per capita administration cost as they can better reap benefit from 
economies of scale on administration and general service than the 
scatter settlement and less populous States. Similarly, per capita 
administrative and general service expenditure in the relatively 
homogenous States is less than the relatively ethnic diverse States 
because the latter set more ethnic-based government tiers than the 
former. 
Both the densely populous and scattered populous as well as the 
relatively homogeneous and the heterogeneous States require some 
fixed administrative costs to smoothly run public functions, while 
variable cost for administrative and general service is mainly a function of  
settlement pattern, degree of heterogeneity and population size of 
Statei. 
Harari’s total expenditure of administration and general services was 
considered as a fixed cost for statei’s administrative and general service 
expenditure need. The variable cost for administrative and general 
service was computed as a ratio of percentage of statei population size 
over Harari to total administration and general expenditure of Harari 
(HoF, 2007:54). 
Then total administration and general expenditure of statei was 
computed as summation of the fixed and variable costs of statei. 
Expenditure per capita of statei was estimated as a ratio of statei total 
administrative and general service expenditure to statei average 
population. Finally the per capita difference was computed as a 
difference between the national and statei . It can be argued that taking 
Harari’s total expenditure as a bench mark to estimate the fixed cost of 
statei administration and general expense would create an incentive to 
Harari to expand its administrative and general expenses unnecessarily 
(Kirchgässner, 2008: 13). The 2007 RES ignored administration costs 
related to Zones/Special Wereda and Wereda Governments peculiar to 
ethnic diverse States. 
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Differences in cost factors 
 
(i).Wages and salaries –at present, wages and salaries to public servants 
are not sources of cost differential among the States as the States apply 
uniform salary scale. Wages and salaries are mentioned in the 2007 
equalization document, presumably, to enlighten the readers/decision 
makers that the labour cost factor was in the minds of the consultants. 
(ii).Non-wage recurrent cost- The 2007 RES considered fuel cost 
variation across the states. Prices of benzene and motor-oil were taken 
into account. Cost of diesel was not included due to lack of reliable data 
(HoF, 2007:56) although it is a substantial cost of the States.222 
Consideration of fuel cost variation in the equalization is appropriate 
because it crowds-out recurrent and capital budget of the remote States, 
albeit the fuel expenditure needs of Statei failed to take into account the 
geographical size of the states. 
Dispersion and distance Factors- Costs of some public services 
delivery are sensitive to minimum threshold. For example, rural areas 
and urban centres, or pastoral and sedentary settlements cannot have 
same production function for identical public services. Those States 
which are characterized by scattered settlements are compelled to 
provide the same quantity and quality of public services to their residents 
at higher per capita expenditure, because they yield less benefit or none 
from economies of scale. 
Distance from the centre is also a source of cost differential among 
the States. Cost of travelling to supervise performances within a State, 
travelling to and from the centre (Addis Ababa) to attend frequent 
nationwide meetings, conferences and short-term training, and 
transportation cost for moving materials from the centre crowd out the 
capital expenditure of the periphery states. Therefore, population 
densities and geographical sizes of the States were taken as proxy to 
estimate the cost difference of Statei due to dispersion and distance 
(HoF, 2007:58).  
                                                 
222Prices of fuel increase with distance from the Ethio-Djibouti border.. 
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Construction cost variations- Unit costs of public investment 
(construction of schools, health institutions, water reservoir and 
administration buildings, etc) vary significantly from State to State. This is 
associated with variation in price of construction materials and cost of 
mobilization. In order to address the impact of price differences on cost 
of public investment, eight major construction materials223 were 
considered and construction cost index of the inputs were computed for 
Statei (HoF, 2007:59-60). 
Spill over effect 
The expenditure need assessment compensate15 percent of Harari’s 
and Dire Dawa public spending on education and health for the positive 
spill over effect they have produced to the residents of neighbouring 
States of Somali and Oromia (HoF, 2007:61). 
From the efficiency point of view, equalizing spill over effects has 
negative impacts. First, it develops free riding behaviour among the 
beneficiary States. Second, it is unjust as the cost is born by the other 
States. Horizontal compensation would have been the appropriate 
method of compensation. Third, the practice poses questions: how are 
the effects of spill over effects measured? Who estimated the spill over 
effects? And how much of the cost does the compensation covers?  
 
8.3.2 Assessment of the 2009 fiscal-gap equalization 
 
The Revenue Raising Capacity Equalization 
 
The 2009 revenue raising capacity equalization included seven 
revenue sources which captured about 80percent of the States’ own-
revenue source.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 223 Cost of cement, corrugated iron sheet, nails with cape, wood, wall paints, 
hollow concret block, iron pipe and chip wood were considered( HoF, 2007:59). 
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Table 8.7. Revenue sources considered and their Contributions in 
the 2009 Revenue raising equalization 
Tax base in the ETY 2009 
Proportion in total revenue  
(2005-2007average) 
Personal income tax 36.2 
Business profit tax 17.8 
Agricultural income tax 2.9 
Rural land user fee 4.2 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 18.3 
Turn over tax(TOT) NA 
Fees from medical supplies and 
treatment 
NA 
Total 79.4 
Source: HoF, 2009 The Federal Budget grant distribution formula  
 
The 2009 revenue raising capacity measures ETY of Statei by taking 
several assumptions. Brief review is made for each revenue source. 
[I] Personal income tax- per capita of Statei was computed on the 
actual average revenue collection of statei in 2005-2007. 
[II] Business profit tax (BPT)-Availability of robust data on socio-
economic variables is scant in Ethiopia. Data on states’ PIT and VAT are 
not exception. Thus, states’ ETY of BPT was assessed based on the 
following assumptions. 
(a) Revenues from wholesale enterprises, retail enterprises, service 
enterprises and small scale firms were assumed as the tax bases of BPT. 
(b) 10 percent profit margin on wholesale enterprises, retail 
enterprises, service enterprises and small scale manufacturing was 
assumed at national and state levels. 
(c) 10 percent States’ business profit from each business activity 
(wholesale enterprises, retail enterprises, service enterprises and small 
scale firms) was computed based on State’s share of enterprises to the 
national total number of enterprises.  
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 (d) State’s total business profit was calculated by adding up the 10 
percent profit margins of sales made on all business activities (whole sale 
enterprises, retail enterprises, service enterprises and small scale 
manufacturing) (HoF, 2009:17-19)  
(e) A ”representative tax rate” of business profit tax was calculated 
as a ratio of average national revenue from business tax (2005-2007) to 
total States’ 10 percent business profit on national sales. The 
“representative tax rate” was computed to be 14 percent 
(f) Finally, business profit tax “potential” of Statei’ was computed as a 
product of ”representative” business profit tax rate (14 percent) and the 
States’ total business profit tax (total 10 percent business profit tax 
generated from all business enterprises) (HoF; 2009:19, Table 4.15). 
 
[III] Agricultural income tax 
“Potential” agricultural income tax of the States was computed:  
(a) Agricultural land size categories in hectare by number of land 
holders in each State were set. 
(b) Tax rates by category of land size of the States were examined 
and the lowest tax rate in the national tax rate schedule per hectare was 
taken as the standard tax rate. 
(c) States’ ETY on agricultural income tax was estimated as a product 
of number of total land holders and the standard tax rate (HoF, 2009:15-
16). 
[IV] Land use fee- Same approach and procedures were applied in 
the computation of the ETY agricultural income tax (HoF, 2009:16-17). 
[V] Value Added Tax- 
To estimate the VAT revenue raising capacity of Statei, actual VAT 
collection from wholesale enterprises, retail enterprises, service 
enterprises and small scale firms were added up and then multiplied by 
the nationally applicable 15 percent rate (HoF, 2009:21-22). 
[VI] Turn over tax (ToT)- 
Revenue raising capacity of Statei from TOT was computed by (I), 
assuming 10 percent profit margin on small scale business activities, and 
(II) applying the nationally 2 percent tax rate for sales of goods and 10 
percent tax rates for sales of service (HoF, 2009:19-21). 
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[VII] Medical Supplies and Treatment Fees (MST) –are collections 
made from patients on benefit–received principle. Number of patients 
who visited public health institutions during the last two months of 2004 
was considered as the tax base for medical supplies and treatment fees. 
‘Representative’ tax rate was computed by dividing total actual revenue 
collected from health services provided during 2005-2007 to total 
number of people who received public health service same period. 
Finally, revenue raising capacity of Statei from medical supplies and 
treatment was calculated by multiplying the tax base to the 
‘representative’ tax rate (HoF, 2009:22-23). 
Assessment of the revenue raising capacity 
The 2009 RTS excluded ‘chat’ tax without explanation but included 
ToT and fees from medical supplies and treatment. There is no official 
explanation why ‘chat’224 was disregarded in the 2009 revenue 
equalization despite it is a significant source of revenue for Oromia, 
SNNP, and Harari. It will be a potential revenue source for Dire Dawa, 
Somali, Afar, and Amhara if they properly administer it. The 
consideration of ToT is justifiable as it is an emerging revenue source to 
the States. 
Comparing Table 8.5toTable 8.7above, one may observe that the 
choice for which revenue source needs to include in or to exclude from 
the RTS calculation seems to be determined partly on subjective 
judgment of the Consultant Teams who were involved in designing the 
2007 and 2009 fiscal gap equalizations and partly on the result of political 
bargaining as the availability of robust statistical data are so scant in 
Ethiopia. 
The consideration of medical supplies and treatment fee in the 
revenue equalization negates the principle of benefit-received principle. 
The Expenditure Need Equalization  
One finds visible similarities with some differences between the lists 
of the 2007 and 2009 functional categories. Functional categories 1 to 5 
are almost the same, with minor differences in functional categories 4.3 
and 5. Element of Item 6 of 2009 was quite different from item 6 of 2007 
expenditure need category. Item 7 and 8 are new functions. 
                                                 
224Chat tax is imposed on domestic consumption. It is a State tax power but has 
been administrated by the Federal Government. 
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Table 8.8. Expenditure needs equalization of 2009 
S.N Function Indicators Disability factor 
1 Agriculture  
and  
Natural 
 resource 
No of rural 
households,  
Rural number of 
population   
area of land 
cultivated, in hectares, 
Rural household 
Population engaged 
in crop cultivation 
tropical livestock 
units,  
Livestock size  
inverse of population 
density  
2 Provision of clean 
water Rural  
Rural people target 
access to water in 
2010(15 litters of 
water per day within 
1.5 km ) and 
maintenance cost  
Rural population 
size, economies of 
scale, 
ground/surface 
water resources 
potential 
3 Rural Road  Proportion of new 
road construction and 
maintenance cost of a 
State. 
Geographical 
terrain, economies 
of scale 
4 Education    
4.1a Primary 
education 
recurrent  exp. 
No. of students 
enrolled. 
Primary school 
population age size 
4.1b Primary 
education capital 
exp.  
Primary school age 
population (7 to 14), 
(100 percent target). 
Primary school 
population age size 
4.2a Secondary 
education. 
recurrent 
expenditure 
No. of students 
enrolled. 
Secondary school 
population age size 
4.2b Secondary 
Education Capital  
25% targeted 
participation rate of  
Secondary school 
population age size 
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 Expenditure. the secondary school 
age population (15 - 
18). 
 
4.3 Text Book 
Development 
No. of languages used 
in grade 1-4 and total 
text books (subjects) 
Ethnic composition 
of a state, pupil 
population size, 
cost of publishing 
books 
5 Public health    
5.1 Treatment 
related 
expenditure 
need  
No. of ill people who 
visited health 
institutions, and the 
ratio of poor people 
who received 
treatment 
Population size 
5.2 Health Extension 
Program 
No. of Health 
Extension Workers  
(HEW), and guards, 
Training cost of HEW,  
Population size, 
economies of scale, 
6 Administration  
and General 
Service 
  
6.1a   Expenditure need 
for hardship 
allowance   
No. of Weredas with 
degrees of hardship 
allowance (20%, 30% 
and 40%),  
No. of civil servants 
working in hardship 
allowance Weredas, 
and their salaries in 
1999. 
Climate variation,  
6.1b   Expenditure 
needs for 
extreme weather 
conditions 
 No indicator was 
applied. * 
Climate variation 
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6.2   Expenditure need 
for Special Zones 
and regional level 
NNP federations  
   
Organs of State level 
NNP Council, and No. 
of Constitutional 
Zones/Special Wereda 
Administrations   
Ethnic composition 
of states 
6.3 Cross-border 
related 
expenditures 
Ratio of expenditure 
on cross-border 
conflict to justice and 
security in 1999 
cross border conflict 
prone weredas  
7 Micro and Small 
Scale Enterprises 
Development 
No of  average urban 
unemployed people in 
2003-2005 
Cost of creating job 
per person, urban 
population size 
8 Urban Works and 
Development  
No. of urban 
population 
Unit cost of Urban 
population 
 
Source-Organized by the author based on HoF, 2009: 24-40. The 
Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula, Addis Ababa 
*The consultant Team accounted for air conditioning and 1000 offices for 
ventilation for only 10 Regional Bureaus of Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz, 
Gambela and Dire Dawa. In addition, costs of 20 refrigerators to each 
hardship Wereda were used. 
 
The expenditure needs of each functional category (sector) of statei 
were added up to get the total expenditure need estimation. In order to 
account for price differences and remoteness, 60 percent of it was 
multiplied by the adjusted price index (HoF: 2009:40). The result gives 
the expenditure need of the statei. Then, revenue raising capacity of the 
statei was subtracted from its corresponding expenditure need to arrive 
the fiscal gap of Statei. Finally, percentage share of each state from the 
total resource pool was determined as a ratio of statei fiscal- gap to total 
average population of Statei. 
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Comments on the expenditure need of 2009 
 
[1] The Rural water supply expenditure need equalized both capital 
cost and maintenance cost for rural and urban water supply services 
(HoF, 2009:35).The political choice to equalize the capital expenditure 
need for the provision of rural water supply is sound partly because the 
service is strongly associated with primary health, girls’ school 
participation, and women’s participation in local decision making 
process, and partly currently the rural population are not in a position to 
cover the entire capital investment through benefit–received principle. 
However, equalization of capital cost and maintenance cost for the urban 
water supply as well as the cost of maintenance for the rural water 
supply is not convincing for a couple of reasons: First, the urban 
beneficiaries pay user fees for the provision of water service based on 
benefit-received principle, and second, water point beneficiaries in the 
rural area pay monthly a fixed amount of money designed for the 
purpose of operational expense and maintenance cost. 
[2] The rural road expenditure needs- equalized rural road 
construction cost as well as periodic and routine maintenance costs. It 
considered road density gap as a difference between the State’s targeted 
road density (45.7 km per 1000 Km2)and actual road density km per 
10002 km in 2008 (HoF, 2009:33). The unit road cost per km for 
construction and maintenances was based on simple average national 
data, which did not consider variations in geographic terrain among the 
state. The failure not to consider cost differential underestimates the 
expenditure need of the mountainous states. Moreover, there is no logic 
to equalize the rural road periodic and routine maintenance costs as the 
States receive road fund for that purpose from the Road Fund Office. 
[3] Primary and secondary education expenditure needs- the 
consideration of States’ text books development expenditure need in the 
2009 is positive because it not only enhances development skill of the 
teaching-learning process of primary school students, but is also a vital 
instrument to maintain and develop own language. Nevertheless, the 
text books development expenditure need assessment took into account 
only the existing languages being used as medium of instruction. It failed 
to consider the states’ need to introduce new languages as medium of 
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instruction. For example, in the SNNP, there are about 56 ethnic groups, 
but the text book development expenditure needs considered only 13 
languages. Without considering the expenditure needs for the 
development of text book for all languages, how can the SNNP deliver 
the service then?  
[4] Health expenditure needs failed to take into account capital 
expenditure needs although there is visible disparity among the States in 
Health Centre and hospital level health services among the States. 
[5] Administration and general service expenditure needs 
This function considered various variables. The 2009 RES estimated 
fixed cost of administrative and general expenses of each State to be Birr 
65.2 million. Total variable cost was estimated 24 times State population 
size of 2000.225 Thus, total administrative cost of state was computed by 
adding the fixed cost of administrative (Birr 65.2 million) and total 
variable cost. General Service expenditure needs consider the following 
expenses. 
 [5.1] Administration cost of Ethnic-based Zones, Special 
Weredas and State HoF 
States’ executive organs are not uniformly structured across the 
states. The heterogeneous States have more executive agencies, more 
legislators and more levels of government than the relatively 
homogeneous ones. Besides, the SNNP, Gambela and Harari are 
bicameral legislation bodies. The heterogeneous States need more 
money to exercise their right to self administration at State, Zone, or 
Special Wereda or Wereda levels of government. In line with this spirit, 
the 2009 considered total actual expenditures allocated for running 
Zone/Special Wereda, and NNP Council of the SNNP as benchmark 
expenditures. Birr 3.5 million running cost per Zone/Special Wereda per 
annum was estimated as fixed administration cost for an ethnic based 
Zone/Special Wereda. Hence, total expenditure needs of a State for 
running Zone/Special Wereda or Nationality Zone Administrations were 
computed as a product of the fixed cost and number of Zone /Special 
                                                 
225The regression based analysis of fixed and variable costs were found to have 
strong correlation between the administrative and general expenditure 
needs of the States and their population size,R2= 0.865 (HoF,2009:25). 
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Wereda or Nationality Administration of a State. In addition, 
administration and general service expense for running NNP Council 
(upper house in the multi-ethnic States) was taken into account. Total 
administrative expense for NNP Council of SNNP was estimated Birr 4.7 
million. For the NNP Council of Gambela, half of SNNP (Birr 2.35 million) 
was assumed (HoF, 2009: 26 and 30). 
The consideration of administration cost of ethnic based self 
government can be seen as a positive measure, as it enables the 
ethnically diverse States get additional money. However, it has some 
limitations. First, it is discriminatory. It did not treat the States equally as 
the assessment benefited the States of SNNP, and Amhara only. There is 
no rationale to exclude Benshangule-Gumuz, and Gambela which have 
three ethnic based Zone Administrations. There is no convincing reason 
to exclude Harari which is a bicameral like the SNNP and Gambela. 
Second, it takes actual administrative and general expenses of Zone, 
Special Wereda and NNP Council of the SNNP as a benchmark without 
measuring the workload of each activity. Such a system develops 
incentive to expand administration expenses of the beneficiary States. 
[5.2] Hardship allowance and extreme weather condition 
Unlike the 2007 RES, the 2009 considered expenditure needs for 
hardship allowance of the states. All States except Harari and Dire Dawa 
provide hardship allowance benefits, ranging from 20 percent to 40 
percent of gross salary, to their civil servants who work in Weredas 
designated as climatically harsh areas. Thus, hardship allowance 
expenditure needs is a function of degree of hardship of working area, 
number of civil servants of a State who work in climatically hardship 
areas, and gross salary of employees who are paid hardship allowance. 
The 2009 RES also considered state’s expenditure needs for air 
conditioner, ventilation and refrigerator in climatic harsh Weredas. 
However, the need assessments were subjectively determined. It was 
discriminatory, because the need assessments for air conditioner and 
ventilator were limited to Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz, Gambela and Dire 
Dawa only (HoF, 2009:29) rather than selecting eligible weredas based on 
objective indicator like temperature level. The expenditure need for 
refrigerator in harsh climate Weredas were not also assessed based on 
need. Only 20 refrigerators per hardship weredas were considered. 
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[5.3] Cross-border conflict related expenditures 
For reasons of economies of scale and spill over effect, the 
responsibility of cross border related tasks are reserved to the Federal 
Government. All the States except Hareri and Dire Dawa have engaged in 
maintaining peace and order associated with international cross-border 
conflicts. Because in a situation where identity based mobilization is 
easy, strong and effective, to sporadic ethnic nature guerrilla warfare 
calls for active involvement of the concerned State and LG. The States, 
through their local government agencies, play vital role in maintaining 
local security and gathering intelligence about the movements of 
infiltrators. However, these tasks have drained their public money. The 
burden is heavier in Tigrai, Somali, Afar and Oromia. 
The cross-border conflict expenditure need was estimated in the 
following ways: first ratio of cross-border conflict was measured by 
dividing statei reported expenditure for cross-border conflict in 2006/7 to 
actual expenditure on justice and security for the same year. Then the 
ratio was adjusted to national average. Finally, the adjusted ratio was 
multiplied by actual expenditure on justice and security in 2006/7 (HoF, 
2009: 26-27). 
The computation of cross-border conflict expenditure need creates 
incentive to manipulate the figure as it was based on the states’ reported 
expenditure on cross border conflict. One may also challenge the wisdom 
of addressing the cross-border related security expenditure needs of the 
States in the fiscal equalization formula rather than a specific grant. 
[6] Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) Development  
Since 2005 the States have aggressively engaged in micro and small 
scale development with the objective to (i) reduce urban/rural poverty, 
(ii) create employment to the youth and women, and (iii) enhance local 
economic development. The States/LGs organize unemployed citizens in 
business associations or PLC on voluntarily basis, provide short–term 
training, facilitate access to loan for the unemployed nationals from 
micro financial institutions, and create marketing link with government 
agencies. 
The 2009 RES equalized states’ expenditure need of MSE 
development. Three years average urban unemployment rate (2003-
2005), urban population size in 2002, and average unit cost of creating 
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job to an unemployed person were used as proxy indicators. Expenditure 
need for MSE development of the States was computed by multiplying 
average cost of creating job per person (Birr116.00) and size of urban 
unemployed population in 2000 (HoF, 2009:39). 
In a situation where reliable data on unemployed population is 
hardly available, equalizing MSE development favours the relatively 
urbanized states and it is easy to manipulate the data226.The objective of 
MSE development would have created more incentives had it been 
treated through a matching conditional grant rather than equalization. 
[7] Urban Works and Development Expenditure Need Assessment-
The States/LGs engage in construction of condominiums, cobble stones 
and drainage network to meet couple of objectives: (i) to significantly 
alleviate housing problem in the urban centres and, (ii) to create job and 
foster entrepreneurship skill through integrating the housing 
development program with MSE development. Urban population in 2000 
and unit cost of housing and urban facilities were taken into account. 
States’ expenditure need for urban work and development was 
estimated by multiplying average unit cost of housing and urban facilities 
per urban person by total urban population 2007/8 (HoF, 2009: 40). 
The Urban works and development program is a cost recovery 
scheme. The States borrow seed money from federally-owned banks to 
undertake construction of condominiums and then they transfer this 
debt to those who buy the condominiums. Therefore, the wisdom of 
considering urban works and development expenditure need in the 
equalization system is questionable. It creates two problems. One, it 
develops incentives to raise unit cost of providing housing. Two, it takes 
the entire urban population in its calculation even those who already 
own a residential house. The formula favours the relatively urbanized 
States at the cost of the less urbanized one. 
 
 
                                                 226 Large part of unemployed people do not have incentive to visit Labour Offices and 
register for seeking job for couple of reasons. Firstthere is no unemployment benefit 
system. Second, employers invite job applicants often through advertizing on news 
papars or through personnal relations. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
 
The intergovernmental transfers are designed to provide minimum 
standard basic public services across the States, to close vertical fiscal 
gaps, and to address horizontal fiscal disparities. Transfers to correct 
inter jurisdictional externality are not respected or wrongly designed. The 
sources of the Federal subsidy/ fiscal equalization derive from Federal 
treasury and external sources (loans and assistances). 
The intergovernmental transfer system contains various elements. 
The Federal transfers (unconditional, conditional and Road Fund), 
wereda block grant and Kebele block grant. The transfer system is 
dominated by unconditional grant. This has both positive and negative 
impacts. On the one hand, it gives to the States and LGs budget 
discretion authority. On the other, it has created disincentive to exert 
more tax effort. The Federal subsidies which are derived from Federal 
treasury are stable, predictable and certain (received regularly), but the 
external sources (loan and assistance) are less predictable and are not 
paid on time. The Federal conditional grant is channelled through Line 
Ministries to achieve national goals. Conditional grants are mainly 
derived from external sources. They are uncertain and unpredictable. 
The HoF has introduced a fiscal equalization transfer system that fills 
up the gap between the revenue raising capacity and expenditure needs 
of the States. The expenditure needs and fiscal capacity are fully 
equalized. Such a political choice, however, has inherent disincentive 
problem. 
The Federal subsidy (both the socioeconomic variable formula and 
the fiscal equalization) is characterized by a highly centralized 
distribution of transfer. That is, the size of Federal transfer is determined 
by the HoPR on ad-hoc basis every year. There is no legal framework that 
guarantees a minimum or floor Federal transfer to the States. Neither the 
States nor the HoF has any legal right to negotiate with the Federal 
Government on the size and composition of the Federal transfer. The 
Federal Government allocates Federal subsidy to the States after it 
allocates recurrent and capital expenditures for itself. The Federal 
subsidy pool size depends on internal and external factors such as 
volume of Federal domestic revenue collection, Federal Government’s 
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Five Year socio-economic development plan, and the availability of 
external loans and assistances. 
The fiscal-gap equalization has been introduced to address the 
shortcomings of the socio-economic based formula and to enable the 
States to provide comparable public services at comparable tax efforts. 
The 2007 and 2009 fiscal equalization arrangements equalized about 80 
percent of the revenue sources and the expenditure need. The fiscal 
equalization system is not immune from technical and conceptual 
problems, however. 
 
[A] The fiscal equalization used incorrect expenditure need 
indicators. 
 
One might ask the wisdom of equalizing the following expenditure 
needs: 
(i).the prevention and treatment of malaria in the 2007; 
(ii).the maintenance costs for rural water supply in 2007; 
(iii).the capital cost and maintenance costs for urban water supply in 
2009; 
(iv).the routine and periodic road maintenance costs in the 2009 (rural 
and urban road); 
(v).the cost of cross- border related conflicts; 
(vi).The inclusion of Education and health expenditures of Harari and Dire 
Dawa in the equalization; 
(vii).the MSE development and; 
(viii).the Urban Work and Development.  
The states have received money from the Global Initiative Fund227 in 
the form of conditional grant to prevent, control and treatment of 
malaria. The equalization of the maintenance costs for rural water supply 
in 2007; as well as the capital cost and maintenance costs for urban 
water supply in 2009 create inefficient allocation of resources. They 
should have been financed by users on benefit- received principle basis. 
One might also criticize the inclusion of routine and periodic rural road 
maintenance costs in the 2009 RES as the States receive money from the 
                                                 
227 Global fund finances malaria and TB eradication, and reduce HIV/AIDS programs. 
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Road Fund for such purposes based on the length of the rural road they 
have. The cooperation of the state with the Federal Government in cross 
border conflict activities could have been treated through conditional 
grant. The Federal Government and the concerned State could sit 
together in a round table and separate the tasks and roles of the 
states/LGs determine budget requirement to carry out the task, revisit 
periodically the cost elements and reach an agreement on cost 
reimbursement for the cross-border services rendered by the States. 
The equalization of Harari’s and Dire Dawa’s education and health 
services contradicts with the well established theory of 
intergovernmental transfer. The practice develops free riding behaviour. 
The compensation mechanism should have been born by the beneficiary 
States of Oromia and Somali rather than correcting the spill over effect 
through fiscal equalization. 
There is no logical argument to treat MSE development as well as 
urban works and development expenditure categories in the fiscal need 
equalization system. Matching conditional grants would have been 
appropriate mechanism to deal with. 
 
[B] The fiscal equalization system promotes disincentive 
 
Re-revenue Raising Capacity equalization 
The introduction of fiscal equalization has avoided the problem of 
disincentive that had been caused due to the Federal subsidy netting 
mechanism. This is by no means to say that the new fiscal equalization 
system encourages tax effort. The 100 percent revenue raising capacity 
equalizations does not give incentive to exert more tax effort as the 
system does not estimate potential revenue capacity of the states but 
actual collections. 
In effect, ETY is applied, which means that neither the difference 
between the potential tax revenue and the effective revenue, nor the 
difference between the tax bill and the effective payments are taken into 
consideration. So if Statei has a potential of 100, but bill only 80 because 
of its inability to mobilise the total tax base, and then cash only 70 
because of mismanagement, then 70 only are considered. Then, the state 
will gain the total difference between 70 and whatever the national 
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average could be. Thus the revenue raising capacity equalization does 
not sanction laziness in matter of taxation. A “lazy” state in any case 
obtains a revenue equalization that corresponds to the national 
average.228 
Re-expenditure Needs Equalization 
The full equalization system has also created incentive to 
increase public spending. The states establish unnecessary 
government structures. For example, they establish the same 
executive structures at Zone and Wereda levels parallel to 
respective State. Since the average per capita expenditure per 
function serves as a reference, the states have interest to push as 
much as possible for higher standards in those functions because: 
(i) the large part of their budget is paid by federal transfers–so the 
financial consequences of higher standards are supported by the 
centre; (ii) what is not covered by own revenue are made up by the 
equalization system, at least, for all states that are below average. 
So the incentive to push for a higher standard is real. It develops 
the common pool problem: it is almost a free lunch since each 
state has an egoistic rationale to get more than its “fair” share–
payment is vertically externalized. These two reasons are 
structural. 
 
[C] Technical problems  
 
Re-expenditure needs equalization 
The road expenditure need assessment has technical problem 
because it failed to consider the impact of physical topography difference 
among the States on the expenditure need for road construction of the 
States. The rural water supply also does not take into account the cost 
                                                 
228 For instance, the system rewards Afar and Somali for their choice not to impose tax on 
agricultural income and rural land use.It is understandable that rural land use fee is not 
conducive  tax base in the predominantly pastoral States of Afar, Somali, Borena of 
Oromia and Omotic of the SNNP.Nevertheless, it could be substituted by livestock tax. 
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differential due to water resources potential (surface and underground) 
variation of the states. 
The IGT system conceals the inter-jurisdictional externality effects. If 
there is at all, it wrongly addresses through unconditional transfers. 
Failing to address the externality effect creates disincentive to allocate 
more budget on the sector. 
 
[D] Failure to design hardship fund 
 
The shift from socio-economic variable based formula to fiscal gap 
equalization has resulted in winners and losers. The fiscal equalizations 
have made losers the less populous States in general and Gambela and 
Benshangul-Gumuz in particular. They receive a lower share of 
equalization entitlement as compared to the socio-economic variables 
based formula. It caused them to face severe financial stress to the 
extent they become unable to finance their recurrent budget needs, let 
alone to finance the work-in-progress capital projects or to undertake 
new capital investments.229Although the adverse effect of the 2007 fiscal 
equalization on some states was known, it failed to design a hardship 
fund for a transition period. 
Understanding the severity of the problem, the designers of the 2009 
fiscal equalization proposed one percent of Federal subsidy additional 
payments for the Emerging States. The relatively advanced four States, 
Harari and Dire Dawa expressed their willingness to give 1 percent of the 
total Federal Government equalization pool to the Emerging states (HoF, 
2009:45). This is something that should be appreciated. It is unique 
symbol of expressing solidarity. The fund serves as hardship fund to the 
recipient states, which are severely disadvantaged by the introduction 
othe new transfer formula; it is akin to horizontal equalization or at least 
brotherhood230. 
                                                 
229 My discussion with Head of Planning and Programming of the Ethiopia Road 
Authority revealed that the Authority was ordered by the Prime Minister Office to 
finance the in-progress intra state rural road projects in Gambela as the State was 
unable to effect payments to road contractors as per the agreement entered 
previously. 
230 The willingness of the states to give 1 percent from their equalization entitlement 
can be cited as a unique expression of solidarity. One may argue that it is not made 
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[E] Equity concern: rhetoric or reality? 
 
As discussed earlier, no State was happy with the variables and 
weights assigned to the socio-economic based formula. Each State was 
demanding incorporation of variable(s) that would maximize its Federal 
subsidy entitlement. The less populous states felt that the higher weight 
assignment to population distorted the distribution of national cake in 
favour of the populous states. To address the problem, the HoF has 
introduced the fiscal-gap equalization. Paradoxically enough, the fiscal-
gap equalization system has exhibited less equitable than the socio-
economic based formula. The Federal subsidy standard deviations show 
8.58 and 10.69 for 1994/5 and 2003/4 respectively. In contrast, it is 11.73 
for 2007 and 10.83 for 2009 fiscal gap equalization (see Appendix 7.B), 
showing worsening inequality of Federal subsidy distribution among the 
States. Taking into account the solidarity fund of the 2009, the Federal 
subsidy standard deviation was reduced to 10.59, which is close to the 
standard deviation of the 2003/4 Federal subsidy. According to the 
standard deviation values, the 2007 fiscal equalization was found the 
most unequal Federal subsidy allocation ever seen. 
Therefore, shifting from the socio-economic variables to the fiscal 
equalization without consideration of a solidarity fund, did not bring 
about better equitable distribution of Federal subsidy as it was intended 
to achieve. Rather it has made the less populated States fiscally starved 
than ever before. The 2007 fiscal equalization had resulted in shifting 
national resource from the less populated and fiscally weak States to the 
populous States of Oromia, Amhara, and SNNP which have better 
economic base and institutional capacity to mobilize better revenue than 
the Emerging States. The equalization system has narrowed the per 
capita distribution among the states at the cost of the small populous 
states without scrutinizing the causes of cost differentials among the 
states. 
 
                                                                                                               
between same level of jurisdiction but vertical. But one has to understand that it is 
the states money voluntarily endorsed to be given to their counterparts which are 
severely disadvantaged by the introduction of the fiscal equalization. 
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Balanced budget occurs when total public current expenditure of a 
government (GE) matches with its total current revenues (GR). When GR 
exceeds GE, a government will have net saving on current revenue. 
Budget deficit occurs when government recurrent spending exceeds 
government revenue. Various factors drive governments to operate in 
budget deficit situation. Economic recession, high inflation rate, spending 
and revenue policies, natural disasters, size of civil servant, social security 
scheme/ unemployment benefit scheme, war/civil war, to mention 
some. Governments may reduce or avoid budget deficit either through 
cutting public expenditures, or increasing tax revenues (by raising tax 
rate or improving tax administration) or combinations of both. Political 
implications of all these policy measures need careful analysis. 
In a decentralized system, whenever States’/LGs’ own-revenue plus 
transfers are not found sufficient to finance their expenditure needs, 
they often take borrowing as a means of financing but for long term 
investment only. Governments may borrow money by selling bonds both 
at domestic and international capital markets, treasury bills and direct 
loan from domestic and/or international lending institutions. 
Ensuring States/LGs the right to borrow from domestic and/or 
external financial institutions can be seen as a manifestation of tax 
autonomy. In some federations, such as the USA, Canada, Switzerland, 
Brazil and Argentina, the States and LGs can borrow from domestic and 
external financers without interferences from respective federal 
government. There are legitimate concerns for defining the purpose of 
borrowing and limiting the States’/LGs’ indebtedness, because 
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States/LGs are eager to borrow but reluctant to payback their debt either 
through raising tax /inventing new tax bases or setting the right user 
charges. They would rather develop strategic behaviors to pass their debt 
burden to a higher level of government, to secure bail-out policies or 
postpone the cost to the future generation. Therefore, borrowing should 
be evaluated from its impact on macroeconomic stability, inter-
generational equity, and efficiency. 
The Chapter is organized into three sections. Should borrowing right 
be limited to finance capital investment only or should it open to finance 
recurrent budget too? The purpose of borrowing, source of credit, how 
much to borrow, when to borrow and who should bear the debt burden, 
etc… are points of debate among public finance economists and decision 
makers. The first section, therefore, discusses on these issues. Section 
two examines the legal framework of borrowing and purposes referring 
to the Federal Constitution and other pertinent proclamations. The 
natures of balanced budget, and requirement/ rule are also discussed. 
The last section assesses the practice of borrowing in Ethiopia. 
 
9.1 The ‘Revisited golden-rule’ 
 
The ‘revisited golden-rule’ answers, at least, two core standing 
questions: Should states and LGs have freedom to borrow for financing 
current expenditure or should borrowing restricted for capital 
investments only? Should a long-term investment be financed by 
borrowing (pay-as–you-use) or from current revenues (pay-as-you-go)? 
Unlike the classic ‘golden rule’, the ‘revisited golden rule’ distinguishes 
between current and capital budget231.’ For the classical golden rule, 
balanced budget would mean the total equilibrium between public 
                                                 
231 Current budget refers to spending for public service that are consumed within a 
budget year (salary, administrative costs, operation expenses including interest, 
depreciation, etc), whereas a capital budget is public spending on investments that 
yields service for more than a year. 
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expenditures (current and capital) and monetary revenues from taxation. 
It emphasized maintaining a balanced budget for equity and efficiency 
without differentiation of current and capital budget (Dafflon, 2010).But, 
with time, considering balancing the budget which contains in block 
current and investment expenditures on one side against taxation on the 
other revealed too restrictive in order to undertake capital investment. 
Thus, the “pay-as-you-use” concept, developed by Musgrave, has 
challenged the freedom of states/LGs to operate at deficit on current 
budget and filling the gap through borrowing. 
The conventional wisdom and the content of the ‘revisited golden-
rule’ prescribe:  
[A] Governments should run at balanced current expenditure, 
[B] Borrowing should be allowed to finance capital expenditure only 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1976; King, 1984, Denison and Hackbart, 
2006:316; Dafflon, 2010);  
[C] Interest and amortization expenses are recurrent expenditures and 
they have to be paid out of current budget (Dafflon, 2010).232 
[D] Maintenance costs of the new investment and functional costs must 
be incorporated in the future current budget (Dafflon, 2010). 
The rationales behind the contemporary ‘golden-rule’ revolve around 
the benefit-received principle, inter-generational equity, efficiency, 
distribution and macroeconomic consideration (King, 1984; Rosen and 
Gayer, 2008:472-473; Dafflon, 2010;). 
The benefit-received principle implies that consumers of a certain 
public service have to internalize the cost of the benefits they receive 
through tax or user charge. The inter-generational equity argument 
asserts that the burden and benefits of long-term capital investments 
should be spread out between the present and future generations. 
                                                 
232 Dafflon (2010) in his article “Local debt: from budget responsibility to fiscal 
discipline” revisited the ‘golden-rule’ and links the classic ‘golden-rule’ for a 
balanced budget with Musgrave’s “pay-as–you-use” principle.  
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Allowing governments to finance their current expenditures from 
borrowing mean passing debt burden to the future generation without 
any additional physical asset. It would also imply maximizing current 
consumption by inheriting polluted environment to the future 
generation. Financing capital investments by imposing higher taxes or 
user charge on the current generation only is equally imprudent policy 
because the future generation will enjoy consuming public service 
without paying for the benefit. Designing the financing modality of a 
capital project in a way to be paid by beneficiaries over the life period of 
the project through taxes or directly user charges is necessary. Thus, 
spreading out the cost and benefits of capital investments over 
generations is prudent for the reason of inter-generational equity and 
the benefit-received principle. 
The efficiency argument is associated with matching politicians’ 
decisions with preferences of tax payers and beneficiaries. In other 
words, granting state/LGs the right to borrow limited to capital 
expenditure only upholds politicians’ accountability for their tax and 
expenditure policy decisions. The issue of efficiency also implies 
identifying the most economic modality of financing a capital investment 
(borrowing vs. tax). According to Rosen and Gayer (2008: 473), financing 
capital projects from borrowing with small tax rate is more efficient than 
through taxing. They further argue that when domestic borrowing 
crowds-out private investment, financing a capital project through tax or 
user charges is more efficient than borrowing. Also, allocative efficiency 
is satisfied when at the time of decision for an investment financed 
through borrowing, [C] and [D] above are taken into consideration and 
recounted at the moment of decision to guarantee that future current 
budget can support the new expenditure. This corresponds to inter-
temporal accountability of politicians. 
Whenever there is an intention to finance public investment through 
borrowing, analyzing its impact on macroeconomic stability is necessary 
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too. Governments face serious fiscal stress during economic recession. 
The problem is more sever in the absence of “rainy day funds”. Injecting 
public fund through borrowing during economic turn down to stimulate 
the macroeconomic environment may increase output, income and 
employment. But it should be noted that timing is very critical because 
continuing or excessive expansionary fiscal policy “when it is no longer 
required” will cause unintended consequence such as inflation (Rosen 
and Gayer, 2008: 473). 
Source of loan-Governments may borrow to finance long term 
capital expenditures either from domestic or external financial 
institutions or from both sources. There is a general understanding 
among economists that financing government budget deficit from 
domestic borrowing would ‘crowd-out’ private investment. The private 
sector will compete with the public sector for the scarce capital resource 
and will be compelled to bid at a higher interest rate that makes 
investment more costly. This, in turn, may raise inflation rate.233 
Experiences on the purpose of borrowing and sources of credit vary 
among federations. For instance, Canadian Provinces are not required to 
balance their current budget. LGs borrow from domestic as well as from 
abroad without the interference of the Federal Government (Krelove, 
Stotsky, and Vehom, 1997: 221), while Swiss Cantons and Communes 
have to operate on balanced current budget and can mobilize fund even 
from external sources but for investment purpose only (Spahn and 
Fotting, 1997: 334). The states and LGs in the USA are also restricted by 
law to operate at balanced current budget. They have freedom to borrow 
from both domestic and abroad to finance long term investments, to 
subsidize private industries and to meet short-term cash flow needs234 
                                                 
233  The argument will be convincing when the lending institutions face a 
problem of cash liquidity. 
234 Here a word of caution is in order. When states borrow to subsidize private 
industries, the rule is same. They must meet the requirement of running balanced 
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(Stotsky and Sunley, 1997; Rosen and Gayer, 2008: 474). Moreover, the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the Maastricht Treaty, considers the 
‘golden rule’ although it is not respected by all EURO-Zone members. 
Debt ceiling (debt limit)-There is no golden rule how much debt 
ceiling and public indebtedness of a state/LG should be. In principle, a 
state/LG must have unlimited freedom to borrow for capital investment 
“as long as the current budget can support the debt service and 
amortization” (Dafflon, 2010:8). But, unlimited debt may give incentive 
to politicians to maximize their political rent seeking behaviors by rolling 
over loans or putting citizens in a vicious circle of debt. In order to avoid 
such a risk, governments set debt ceiling rule either on their constitution 
or statutory, or apply rule of the thumb or exercise informal to control 
SNGs to behave in budget discipline (Denison and Hackbart, 2006, 
Dafflon, 2010:11).Thus, the legal rule for debt ceiling would be to require 
that [C] and [D] (above) future cost be calculated at the moment of 
deciding the investment and the discounted sum could be supported in 
the current budget in balance. 
Governments may finance their additional investment need [∆I] 
either by mobilizing additional borrowing [∆B] or from own revenue, or 
from grant and donations from domestic and/or abroad) what Dafflon 
(2010) calls [F] or combinations of various source options.  
i.e., [∆I] = [∆B] +F Equation 9-1 
 
According to Dafflon (2010: 6) the general debt ceiling formula for a 
state/LG can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
 
 353 
 
and foreign grants-in-aid, donations). 
S net savings on the current account (according to the 
European System of National and Regional Accounts 
M maintenance costs in a given year, related to the new 
asset created by ∆I 
E current costs in a given year, related to the local public 
service that ∆I allows to offer 
R revenues from the operation of the asset (e.g. user 
charges, sponsoring); 
O Operating grants received from other government 
entities for the planned investment programme 
i Interest rate for B (%); 
d Depreciation rate of ∆I. It corresponds to the 
amortisation (instalment) rate of ∆B (%), according to 
the pay-as-you-use principle. If the useful life of the 
investment is 20 years, then d = 0.05. 
 
Dafflon (2010:7) links the revisited golden rule with the debt ceiling 
of a State/LG by considering investment costs (investment and 
amortization), and operating costs (maintenance cost, M and costs 
required to provide public costs, E) which should be financed from 
current revenues.  
An additional investment [∆I] can be initiated as long as the economy 
is in a position to pay all cost of investment and operating costs. Cost of 
[∆B] varies with the amount of [F]. The lower the [F], the higher the need 
for [∆B] is. The internal borrowing limit in equation (9-2) is computed on 
accrual accounting system. That is, it calculates asset and liability terms 
not in cash terms (Dafflon, 2010:7-8). 
Governments and IMF use various ratios to indicate indebtedness 
level. Burden of debt service, net debt per population, net debt/cash 
flow ratio, net debt/own revenue ratio, debt/GDP ratio or debt/ export 
ratio are the common ones. The more the ratios are, the higher the debt 
burden is. 
Fiscal discipline versus Budget responsibility - Governments adopt 
rules to prevent proactively defaults of states/LGs and they apply 
administrative and financial sanctions against an act of breaking the 
rules. For instance, the EU issues laws, directives, and rules that compel 
all Member States (MS) to run at a balanced budget but in economic 
 354 
 
downturn environment they are authorized to operate budget deficit up 
to 3 percent of individual State’s GDP. Violation of the budget deficit limit 
causes serious administrative and financial sanctions235 (Vaneecloo, et.al, 
2006:67-68). In practice, however, some MS of EU experience budget 
deficit beyond the limit and no sanction measures have been applied. 
The EU has hardly power to put into effect the budget deficit limit among 
the MS or it does not have strong enforcement means to coordinate 
fiscal policies of the MS when they do not behave appropriately.236 Thus 
in effect the administration sanction remains nominal. 
Dafflon (2010) argues that budget discipline is not an effective 
instrument to maintain a balanced budget in a decentralized system 
because with top down rules, states will engage in strategic behavior to 
avoid the severity of the rules and sanction. Dafflon (2010) further argues 
that maintaining States’ and LGs’ budget discipline by defining rules and 
sanctions is important but not sufficient condition because imposing 
strict central control over States/LGs may not necessary ensures budget 
discipline.237 As an alternative, he suggests a shift from fiscal discipline to 
budget responsibility. Dafflon (2010) plausibly argues budget 
responsibility is superior to fiscal discipline for the following reasons: 
(I) Budget responsibility relies on self-made rule or continuous self-
assessment and it would have a better chance to be accepted and 
respected through time. It helps States/LGs to “adjust their investment 
policy to their real fiscal capacity and assess costs and benefits of each 
capital programmes in advance, in order to avoid excessive debt”, 
(ii) “It avoids bailout by a higher government” and, 
(iii)It is “more proactive thinking” (Dafflon, 2010). 
                                                 
235 According to the Growth and Stability Pact, any excessive budget deficit is not 
allowed. If a MS violates the deficit limit rule, it has to make a non-interest 
deposit of 0.2 to 0.5 percent of GDP. If the country still fails to manage its 
budget deficit to the target limit within two years, the deposit is lost and 
becomes a fine (Robert and Daniel, 1998:18). But the EU applies exceptions. 
236  The recent years high budget deficits in Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Italy 
are illustrative (See Rossi and Dafflon, 2012). 
237 The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the EU is a typical 
example. 
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The argument for the budget responsibility is not to say that rules 
from the above are irrelevant or should not be respected, but self–
discipline is more effective than rules from above (Dafflon, 2010:12). 
 
9.2 The Legal Framework and Purpose of Borrowing 
To explore the existing legal framework and purpose of borrowing in 
Ethiopia, references were made to the Federal Constitution, National 
Bank of Ethiopia financial Regulations, Financial Administration 
Proclamations of the Federal Government and respective states as well 
as the States’ City proclamations. 
The Federal Government  
The history of public budgeting in Ethiopia reveals an evolution from 
a surplus in the early 1950s to a balanced budget up to the mid 1965, a 
small budget deficit in the late 1965-74 periods and then has grown 
rapidly since 1975. The conservative fiscal policy of the imperial regime 
had contributed to the small budget deficit (EEA, 2000/2001:372). 
Budget deficit began to grow rapidly during the Dengue regime and 
Ethiopia became one of the heavily indebted among the Least developed 
countries in the 1980 and mid 1990s (World Bank, 2000b) partly due to 
the then excessive government intervention in the economic activities 
and partly because of the steep growth of the defense spending to 
reverse the invasion of Somalia Republic in 1978-79, and it quagmired in 
the long civil wars. The budget deficit situation continued in post the post 
1991 too. Since 2003, the Ethiopian government has been running a 
budget deficit between five and seven percent of GDP per year (NBE, 
2009). The budget deficit is mainly associates with the Federal 
Government’s extensive infrastructural development programs, huge 
public investment on strategic manufacturing sectors (sugar 
development, fertilizer plants, engineering plants, etc….), and defense 
budget (modernizing the defense to adjust with the highly volatile and 
conflict- prone regional geo-politics). Federal Government deficit has 
been financed mainly from external loans, domestic borrowing (from 
banks and issuing bonds), saving and printing money. The share of selling 
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domestic bond is small because capital market in Ethiopia is very small. 
Issuing bonds to external lenders has not been yet introduced.  
The Federal Government may borrow for short-term and long-term 
from the Commercial Banks and National Bank of Ethiopia(NBE) through 
direct loan, and issuing securities such as (Treasury bill, issuing a 
promissory note and bond) (Federal Proclamation. 591/2002). 
Borrowing by the States 
Borrowing right of the states emanates from the Federal Constitution. 
Art.51 (7) stipulates, “…States can borrow money from internal sources.” 
Terms and conditions of States’ borrowing are defined by the Federal 
Financial Administration Proclamation No 57/1996 and the Federal 
Proclamation No.591/2008 of National Bank of Ethiopia. 
The federal Government grants preferential right to the City 
Government of Addis Ababa and the Dire Dawa Council Administration to 
borrow, in addition from domestic sources, directly from external 
sources by short-term and long-term repayment arrangement or by 
selling bonds. The Cities are expected to identify international lenders 
and solicit the Federal Government to borrow on their behalf (Federal 
Proclamation No. 361/ 2003and Federal Proclamation 416/2004). 
According to the Proclamations, the states may use selling bond and 
direct loan to finance short-term budget deficit and long-term capital 
investment. State Councils, up on the proposal of respective Executive 
Committee, may approve short-term for: 
(I) redemption of direct advance or security, such sum of money as 
are required for the payment of any direct advances, or securities that 
have been called for redemption, and 
(ii) General obligations when the Committee believes that 
consolidated fund is insufficient (see Financial Administration 
Proclamation of the States). 
The States’ Financial Administration Proclamations conceive the 
states would exercise self-restrain when they borrow to finance their 
short-term budget deficit. States’ autonomy to borrow for long-term 
investment is restricted, however. The states need to get the 
authorization of the Federal Government to borrow from domestic 
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sources directly or by way of selling bonds, for long-term investments238 
(Federal Proclamation No.57/1996). 
With regard to domestic sources, the laws are silent about who the 
lenders are (NBE or CBE or DBE or CBB, or private banks or combinations 
of all); although in practice the CBE and CBB give loan upon the 
instruction of the Federal Government. 
Borrowing by local governments 
All the States and the City Governments recognize borrowing as a 
means of ULG financing source 239 (see for example Tigrai Proclamation 
No. 107/1998 and Amhara Regulation No.37/2005).  
Borrowing by ULG is subject to the approval of respective State 
Council. Long-term borrowings to ULGs are taken into account national 
and regional economic stability as well as debt payment capacity of the 
requesting ULG. But, the right of the LGs to borrow remains on paper. 
 
Box 9.1.Frame Work of ULG borrowing in Ethiopia: the Case of Amhara 
State 
Like in the other States, borrowing is one sources of finance to the 
ULG in the Amhara National Regional State. The State guarantees the 
ULGs access to short and long-term borrowing from internal financial 
institutions. Short-term loan is allowed to disburse general obligations 
when the ULG face fall short of revenue. Long-term loan is authorized for 
capital investment only on infrastructure development, undertaking 
investment activities, production of fixed assets and repayment of the 
long-term loan taken previously. 
For any loan, ULGs have to submit their request to the Common 
Financial Board, a body jointly established by the ULGs and the State. The 
loan application has to provide detail information about total previous 
outstanding debt, if any, the purpose of the loan, required amount of 
                                                 
238 In this context repayment implies payment of interest and principal that are 
not repaying debt in due time according to rules of economic amortization, 
thus they may re-borrow to reimburse past debt. It also refers to current 
payments for interest and principal for long term investments projects. 
239  The States do not explicitly allow borrowing to rural Wereda Government. 
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loan, and debt repayment schedule, to mention a few. The Board 
assesses financial stands of the loan requesting LG, whether it has 
dependable fiscal capacity to repay its debt on due period, and reviews 
the impact of the loan on macro-economic management, as well as 
regional and local socio-economic development. The Board submits its 
recommendation to the BoFED for further assessment and then, in its 
turn, submits its recommendation to the State Council for final decision. 
The Proclamation recognizes the right of residents to submit their 
comments to respective Council in writing or in person on the loan 
request before it is approved (Amhara Regulation No.37/2005). 
Allowing the ULGs to borrow for repayment of long-term loans likely 
to develop bailout behaviour and/or make the ULGs to quagmire in debt 
crisis situation. 
 
It must be noted that there is no legal framework that limits the 
Federal Government and the states to operate at balanced budget 
deficit. They can finance their current deficits through supplementary 
budget for both recurrent and capital budget240 upon the authorization 
of respective legislative body. Interestingly, conditions of supplementary 
budget are not defined by law. It is simply left to the discretion of the 
Executive Committees of the Federal and the States. 
In case of investments financed by net saving and federal transfers all 
costs are accounted as expenses at the time of completion of the project. 
Thus amortization and maintenance costs are not recognized. 
Investments are defined in assets and liabilities, or on modified cash-
based accounting system rather than in accrual terms (expenditure and 
revenue stream over the life of the project). The modified cash system 
does not allow internalizing cost and benefits of public investments. 
Sources of credit-The Federal Government can finance its recurrent 
deficit by borrowing from domestic sources or ratifying supplementary 
                                                 240  For instance, in 2007/8 fiscal year, the HoPR ratified supplementary budget 
amount to Birr one billion for capital budget and Birr 16,026,300 for 
recurrent (Federal Proclamation No. 579/2008).Similarly the States often 
allocate supplementary budget for recurrent and capital purpose. 
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budget by the HoPR. NBE and CBE are domestic financers. When the NBE 
intends to give any loan, maintaining stable price is taken into 
consideration (Federal Proclamation No 591/2008), although in practice it 
poses a question. Multilateral, bilateral donors and Non-Paris club are 
major external lenders.  As can be seen from the above Table 9.1, the 
Federal Government has chosen the external lenders as it’s primarily its 
source of borrowing, except in the 2007/08 fiscal year. Domestic 
borrowing sharply declined and the Federal Government has aggressively 
mobilized external concessional loans241 and grants from multilateral 
organizations as well as bilateral agreement loans. 
 
Table 9.1. Federal Budget deficit and financing 2007/8-2011/12, in 
million Birr 
                                                 
241 The external sources can be concessional or non-concessional loan. In the 
case of the former interest rate is low, with grace period for the first two or 
three years and long-term maturity period. 
Description 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 
Revenue 29794 40174 53861  69120  102864  
Grant 9911  14454 12376  16491  12795  
Revenue &grant 39705 54628 66237 85611 115659  
Recurrent expenditure 24121  27176  32012  40535  72971 
Result of the current account  15’584 27’452 34’225 45’077 42’687 
Capital expenditure 22794  30599  39322 53,297 51446  
Deficit -7210 -3146 -5097 -8220 -8758  
Financing           
External borrowing(net)1 2396 3176 4,131 7798 6,530 
Domestic borrowing(net)2 6400 107 1,758 111 3,793 
Sources: Compiled from NBE Annual Various Reports  
 
1 External debt refers to: (i) all Federal Government external loans, (ii) Federal 
Government-guaranteed external loans granted to the public enterprises, and (iii) 
The non-government guaranteed external loan contracted between public 
enterprises, mainly the EAL and Ethio-Tele  
2 Domestic borrowing includes all banking (direct loans) and non-banking (bonds 
and Treasury bills) borrowings. 
Note the sums of net external and domestic borrowing are not equal to the 
public deficit, because loans given to public enterprises such as Ethiopian Air Lines 
and Ethio-Tele are included. Note also the above Table did not include States’ 
borrowing as there are no data on States/LGs deficit and how they finance. 
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The rationale behind the outward borrowing orientation of the 
EPRDF regime, presumably, is sympathy to the argument for the 
domestic borrowing not to crowds out with the private sector. However, 
relying on external source raises concerns of sustainability and high risk 
of hard currency flight in the form of debt service. It also compromises 
the sovereignty of the country as getting loans from multilateral (IMF and 
World Bank) and bilateral agreement loans and grants are often 
accompanied by some preconditions. In order to minimize the possible 
political and economic costs of relying on external sources, the current 
government applies two strategies: (a) diversifying the potential lenders 
(Multilateral organizations, EU, BRICS,) to widen the possibility of getting 
loans, at less political cost, and (b) rapidly increase the financial capacity 
of the country to cover its capital projects through introducing tax 
reform, and broadening the tax bases as well as mobilizing resources 
from the public by selling bonds and issuing Treasury bills242. 
Debt Limit 
(a) of the Federal Government 
Own-revenue is insufficient to finance the intended development 
programs. Borrowing from domestic and external sources are major 
financing means. But how much should the Federal Government borrow 
to accelerate the economic growth Unless the borrowing is restricted, it 
will have inevitable consequences on macroeconomic stabilization Does 
the debt management system enable us to calculate the maximum limit 
of the Government?  
The debt limit for external and domestic sources is treated 
differently. There is not legal limit for external source. It depends on the
                                                 
242 Because of the water politics over the Nile River, Egypt has aggressively 
engaged in lobbying potential lenders not to lend to Ethiopia for financing 
its power plant projects. As a response, the Ethiopian Government has 
mobilized from its own revenue to finance its power plant projects such as 
Tekeze, Belesa, and Gibe power plants from its own resources. Moreover, 
the Government has launched the Great Renaissance power plant, which 
costs USD 80 billion, to finance from saving and by selling bonds to 
nationals. 
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negotiation process between the Government of Ethiopia and the 
lending institutions. It also depends on the type of borrowing 
(concessional or non-concessional). In the case of concessional loan, 
multilateral institutions and bilateral agreements are the major lenders. 
The loans are development–oriented and are long-term(up to 40 years)at 
lowest interest rate (not exceeding 1 percent).Non-concessional credits 
are borrowed by profit making enterprises like Ethiopian 
telecommunications, Ethiopian Air Lines, Ethiopian Electric Power, 
Ethiopian Sugar Corporation. The lenders take into account feasibility of 
the investment project and the repayment capacity of the concerned 
enterprise. Once the lending institution/country decides to lend, the 
Legislative body has to ratify the loan agreement on simple majority 
vote. The body considers the overall impact of the debt on the national 
economic development. 
The NBE has restricted the maximum Federal Government domestic 
borrowing to be: 
(I) direct short-term loan “up to 15 percent of average annual 
ordinary revenue of the Government for three fiscal years immediately 
preceding for which accounts are available.” Principal and interest rate 
for short term loans have to be repaid within the next one year. 
(ii) Borrowing by issuing Treasury bill shall “not exceed amount of 25 
percent of average annual ordinary of the Government for three 
immediately preceding fiscal years for which accounts are available”. 
(iii) “The total amount of the bonds held by the NBE and other Banks 
is limited up to 50 percent of the average annual ordinary revenue of the 
Government for three immediately preceding fiscal years for which 
accounts are available” 
(iv) The Federal Government may issue bonds for financing long-term 
investment but the maturity period shall not exceed 10 years (Federal 
Proclamation No.591/2008). 
 
(b) of the States and ULG  
 
The State’s Executive Committee may determine the limits of the 
short-run debt size of the states (see Art.39 of the States’ Financial 
Administration Proclamation), whereas the Federal Government 
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determines long-term loan demands of the states taking in to account its 
impact on macro-economic stability and repayment capability of the 
states.  
With respect to LGs, no state sets a rule on debt limit, except the 
Amhara state, which stipulates a LG may obtain loan for capital 
expenditure not more than “10 percent of its annual revenue without 
securing the prior consent of the city residents” (Amhara Proclamation 
No.43/2000). According to this rule, the debt limit is limitless as long as 
local residents vote for any amount of loan. Unfortunately this broad 
autonomy remains on paper. 
 
9.3 The practice of borrowing 
 
Despite the Federal Constitution grants to the states the right to 
borrow from domestic sources, they enjoy limited borrowing autonomy. 
There is widely spread perception among top officials that uncontrolled 
state borrowing schemes will cause macroeconomic instability. As an 
alternative, the Federal Government designates pragmatic borrowing 
schemes. LGs also receive state backed short-term and long-term loan 
schemes. This section deals with the various channels of borrowing are in 
place. 
(i) Federal owned banks as borrowings channels  
The Federal Government initiates and facilitates borrowings for the 
States from the federally owned banks namely the Commercial Bank of 
Ethiopia (CBE) and the Construction and Business Bank (CBB). Federal 
Government initiated borrowings are designed to meet the goals of the 
series Five Years Development Plans of the Federal Government and the 
States. For example, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Federal 
Government used to sponsor the states to borrow from CBE for (a) 
purchasing agricultural inputs mainly, fertilizer, to achieve food security 
at household and national levels. The peasants were supposed to pay 
back the principal and interest including interest immediately after next 
harvest season. The MoFED used to act as an intermediate agency 
between the borrowing State and the lending Bank by issuing an 
undertaking letter to the CBE and the concerned States. The states also 
issued a short term promissory note to the lender. MoFED uses Federal 
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subsidy entitlement of the states as collateral. If a borrowing State fails 
to collect from the beneficiaries and repay the debt back within the 
specified due date, the Ministry used to deduct equal amount of the debt 
from the State’s subsidy entitlement. 
(b) Housing development program. The housing development loan is 
long-term. It requires a tripartite agreement among the MoFED, 
individual borrowing State and lending bank on the terms and conditions 
of the borrowing scheme. The MoFED and the States issue undertaking 
letter and bonds respectively that enable the states to borrow seed 
money from CBE and CBB to carry out construction of condominiums 
from CBE and CBB. Here, the States borrow money from the Banks to 
build condominiums and, upon completion of the project; it transfers to 
lucky urban dwellers by lottery modality. 
The Federal initiative borrowing schemes are designed in a way to 
close the possibility of bail out problem by transferring all liabilities to the 
beneficiaries of the programs. For instance, in case of borrowing for 
purchasing fertilizer, the States transferred all liabilities to the wereda 
Administration and the latter, in its turn, transferred the liability to 
individual beneficiary peasant. But the experience of bail out risk was 
mixed. My discussion with Agricultural extension experts in Tigrai in 2009 
revealed that repayment rate was recorded more than 95 percent 
because the Weredas made maximum efforts in compelling the debtors 
to pay in the next harvesting season at any cost (even by selling whatever 
assets they have or by arranging another borrowing facility from state-
owned MFI to settle previous debt). Any wereda which failed to collect 
the repayment was subject to the merciless deduction of budget from 
the Wereda block grant. The experience of Oromia was open for bailout 
problem. Oromia Weredas are found lenient in collecting the fertilizer 
debt and the state paid Br 400 million Birr for the uncollected debt 
(Oromia Cooperative Agency Assessment Report, 2002/3 EC budget 
year). 
In case of the housing development scheme, the States borrow seed 
money for construction of condos. Once the constructions of the 
condominiums are completed, the States/LGs sell the condominiums to 
residents through lottery modality. Winners have to pay, at least, 20 
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percent of the total liability in advance and the remaining liability is 
transferred to the buyers by linking with the lending bank. 
(ii) MoFED as a borrowing channel of the states 
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Financial Administration 
Proclamation 57/1996ensures the right of the States to borrow from the 
MoFED to settle short-run general obligations of individual states. Such a 
borrowing aims at filling States’ immediate recurrent expenditure needs. 
Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambela can be cited as illustrative cases. They 
were unable to pay salary for their civil servants in 2007/8 Fiscal Year as 
the introduction of the 2007 fiscal equalization system negatively 
affected their subsidy entitlement. The MoFED used to lend to the states 
and deduct the same amount of the debt from the next States’ subsidy 
entitlement in the next budget year. 
(iii).Water Resource Development Fund from the MoWRD  
The Office for Water Development Fund has established a revolving 
fund by mobilizing loans and grants from multilateral, bilateral lending 
institutions as well as from the Federal Government budgetary allocation 
(Federal Proclamation No.268/2002). 
The Fund is a long-term and earmarked loan for urban water supply 
and sanitation and for construction of large scale irrigation dams. The 
States are required to submit a feasible and bankable project proposal 
which includes information on social and economic impacts of the 
project, investment cost of the project, State’s investment contribution, 
sustainability of the project and repayment schedule. The Office reserves 
power to approve or reject any loan request after evaluating the 
feasibility of a project proposal, although equitable distribution of the 
Fund among the States is a point of concern (Federal Proclamation 
N0.268/2002). The Water Supply Projects of Harari and Dire Dawa are 
points of illustration. The Water Resource Development Fund does not 
attach borrowing with any collateral binding243 and thus opens for 
bailout mentality. 
                                                 
243 In order to discourage bail out sentment, the Office for Water  Development Fund 
included a sancrion clause in the lending agreement that states “In the event of delay 
in the payment of any sum payable by the debtor, it shall automatically and forthwith, 
became liable to pay by way of liquidated damages, an amount equivalent to interest 
at the rate 3 percent will be increased by 2.5 percent per annum calculated on the 
sum due from the date up to the actual date of payment” (see theLending Agreement 
 365 
 
(iii) State sponsored borrowing channel from MFI 
With the exception of Afar and Somali for religious reason, all the 
States and the two City Administrations (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) 
have established micro finance institutions (MFI). Oromia has also 
established a Cooperative Bank to mobilize saving and investment. 
The MFIs function in a business-like manner. They target the lower 
income group and the rural population who are unable to present 
collateral asset to borrow from the conventional banks. The States 
facilitate borrowing to unemployed youth, women who are willing to 
organize themselves in syndicates (Associations) and to residents who 
would like to engage in MSE activities from the MFI. The States also 
facilitate credit facilities for poor farmers for purchase of agricultural 
modern inputs with the objective to ensure food security. The States 
guarantee to respective MFI by issuing bonds so that the MFIs receive 
loans from the Federal owned Banks. The MFIs, in turn, lend to the rural 
population (for purchasing agricultural inputs, family-focused food 
security packages, etc) and low income urban dwellers (see Amhara 
Proclamation No.116/2005). 
The Weredas are responsible to collect the repayment of the debt. If 
they fail to collect the debt, the States deduct the same amount of 
money from their block grant entitlement. This has made the default rate 
very low (less than 10 percent with some variation among the States). 
 
(v).Federal Government sponsored borrowing channel from 
abroad 
The Federal Constitution does not allow the States’ to borrow from 
abroad. The prohibition of state’s external borrowing might be supported 
by a couple of economic arguments: First, external debt policy is closely 
linked to macroeconomic policies such as exchange rate policies and 
foreign reserve management, which require Federal Government control. 
Second, as Teresa and Craig (1997: 168-9) note, lenders often “require an 
explicit central government guarantee for sub national government 
borrowing.” Third, it negatively affects balance of payment of the 
                                                                                                               
between the Water Resources DevelopmentFund and Dire Dawa Water Supply and 
Sewerage Authority, June 2012). But the question is what legal enforcement 
mechanism does the Office have if the debtor fails to pay its debt? 
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country. Nevertheless, the City Government of Addis Ababa and Dire 
Dawa enjoy special preferential treatment to get access fund for 
infrastructural investments from international financial institutions or 
bilateral loan agreement.244 The HoPR has to endorse the borrowing 
after examining the impact assessment report made by the MoFED and 
the NBE on the relevance of the borrowing and on the macroeconomic 
management. 
Given capital market is very weak in Ethiopia, the private financial 
sector is not interested to lend the States/LGs. The 
Federal owned Banks are also reluctant to lend long-term loan to the 
states unless they are instructed to do so. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
Operating at balanced budget and restricting borrowing to long term 
investment project only is justified for benefit-received principle, 
intergenerational equity, efficiency, redistribution and macroeconomic 
stabilization reasons. Applying a balanced budget for current 
expenditures also makes politicians discipline and promotes 
accountability. 
The Federal Constitution of Ethiopia secures the right of the States to 
borrow from domestic sources. However, the States enjoy little 
borrowing autonomy. State’s borrowing right is subject to the discretion 
of the Federal Government. So far, borrowings are initiated by the 
Federal Government. The states can borrow for financing current and 
capital expenditures. So far, with the exception of Water Development 
Fund and the housing development program, the borrowing practices are 
short-term and medium-term. Although borrowing at state/LG level is 
believed to be a major source of financing long-term investment, it is 
perceived as a risky business that cause macro economic instability and 
                                                 244 For example, the Federal Government borrowed from the export–import Bank of 
China for Addis Ababa deep wells water supply project (Phase III) (see Proclamation 
NO.724/2011). It also secured USD 45 million for financing the Bole Ring road to 
Meskel Square Road project. Moreover, China has financed the Light railway project 
of Addis Ababa. 
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burden on future generation. It is understandable that in the absence of 
budget responsibility, lenient borrowing policy would bring unintended 
consequences. But such fears should not preclude the States/LGs from 
borrowing for long term investment. 
There is no law that compels the Federal Government and the States 
to operate at balanced budget. Budget discipline is less respected. The 
Federal and State governments often spend more public fund than the 
initially approved annual budget. No state issues a comprehensive 
audited financial annual report to respective Council on a timely basis. 
.
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assimilation and centralization as instruments of modernization and 
national unity. The Military regime also pursued a highly centralized 
system as a state building strategy. Given Ethiopia is characterized by 
diversities in language, culture, religion, ethnic, etc, the highly centralized 
state building strategy and the core versus periphery ethnic groups had 
caused to raise nationality question as a central political issue. Dozens of 
Nations and Nationalities which believed they were oppressed and 
marginalized had waged armed struggle against the centre for genuine 
autonomy. EPRDF, a leftist coalition and adherent to self-determination 
of NNP, defeated the Dergue regime in May 1991 and has instituted a 
new state building strategy under the motto of unity-in-diversity as a 
means of accommodating ethnic diversity, ensuring last peace and 
guaranteeing democratic order. 
The third Chapter briefly explains about the first wave of 
decentralization that caused the devolution of considerable powers to 
the Regions. The core objective of the Ethiopian Federal arrangement is 
to address the century old nationality question and to hold together with 
free will of the NNP under a democratic Ethiopia.  
The Ethiopian Parliament has a dual Chamber structure. The HoF in 
Ethiopia has, at least, two distinctive features. First, it is a House of NNP 
because it represents the NNP within the states, not the state per se. 
Representation in the HoF is a function of the numbers of indigenous 
ethnic groups within a State, and population size of each ethnic group in 
a state. Such representation practically gives upper legal ground to the 
three big States to influence decisions in their favour. Second, the HoF 
has legal authority on various fiscal issues which include but not limited 
to: designing distribution of federal subsidy to the States, jointly deciding 
undesignated tax bases and on concurrent taxations powers, interpreting 
the Federal Constitution, deciding on issues related to self-determination 
of NNP, etc(Federal Constitution, 1995, Art.62). The House, however, 
does not have legislative power as what we see in the conventional 
bicameral houses. The Lower House ratifies laws without the need for 
approval of the House of Federation. 
The Chapter also deals with making and remaking of the States and 
LGs. The Federal Constitution recognizes nine states and Addis Ababa 
City Administration. The States are established on “the basis of 
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settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of People 
concerned” (Federal Constitution, 1995 Art. 47). There is no consensus 
among political parties, academia and ordinary people on the need and 
outcome of the multinational federal arrangement. Art.39 that 
guarantees the right of NNP to self determination including secession is 
the most controversial one. Some perceive the multiethnic federal 
system as a means of balkanization of Ethiopia, while others believe that 
the system has uprooted the source of national oppression and has 
guaranteed self-rule and shared rule.  
The debates on individual rights versus collective right have been one 
of the contested areas among various political elites. All political forces 
believe that democracy is a necessary condition for the success of the 
federal system in Ethiopia. The presence of strong and critical opposition 
parties, independent free press judiciary body competitive electoral 
system, and good governance are effective instruments for promoting 
democracy, and respecting human rights. However, there is no 
consensus among the parties on the meaning and essence of democracy. 
The ruling party claims to be adherent to ‘democratic’ developmental 
state, revolutionary democracy, collective rights. In contrast, the ‘multi-
nation’ opposition parties are adherent to the neo-liberal politico-
economy philosophy and they put individual rights first. 
There is a critic that the federal system impedes mobility of labour, 
capital and trade across the States, although it is not supported by 
empirical study. It is true that the federal system has contributed to the 
existing low level of inter-state labour mobility. But it should be noted 
that in addition to the federal arrangement, economic, political and 
social factors have contributed to the existing low inter-state mobility of 
people and capital. The convergence trend in the distribution of public 
services across the states, strong ethnic identity, social affection to local 
area, rural land policy, the welfare scheme (PNSP), the language policy 
and favouritism towards “son-of the-soil” are factors that pull productive 
forces from mobility. But labour migration to Addis Ababa is high 
because there are better job, business and career development 
opportunities for all sects of population-labourers, entrepreneurs and 
professionals. Migration to Afar, Gambela, Benshangul-Gumuz and SNNP 
from the neighbouring states is also evident because these states adopt 
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Amharic as their working language partly to attract professionals to run 
the bureaucracy apparatus, and partly to serve as a common language in 
the ethnically diverse states. Federal mega projects such as construction 
of dams for power plants, sugar plantation, and fertilizer projects have 
promoted temporary inter-state movement of labour. 
The Ethiopian federal arrangement neither is a product of European 
colonization as it is the Nigerian federation nor prescribed from outside 
as it was the Ethio-Eritrea federation of the 1952-1962. It has been 
developed indigenously by Ethiopians that considered unique political, 
history, cultural etc circumstances of the country. It is innovatively 
designed to hold together the NNP through accommodating diversity. 
The sustainability of the federal system, however, depends on how 
Ethiopians make work the system. It can be a successful marriage, glue 
for unity, solidarity, efficient instrument for power sharing, and balanced 
socio- economic development among the States, if it is used properly. Or, 
it could be unequal marriage promote ethnic animosity and recipe 
disintegration, if it is used wrongly. 
Chapter four reviews the theories of assignment of responsibilities 
among different levels of government. There is no consensus among 
public finance economists whether the competence of macroeconomic 
stability and interpersonal income redistribution should be confined to 
the Centre only. The FGTFF prescribes the functions of macroeconomic 
stabilization should be reserved to the centre only. The logics are: (i) in a 
decentralized system. SNGs might have different preferences and 
perceptions on the objectives and means of addressing macroeconomic 
stabilization, (ii)taking unilateral measures on macroeconomic stability 
may result in spill over effects, budget deficit and develop free riding 
behaviour, which discourage SNGs to take counter-cycling measures for 
national goal, (iii) Central governments have the competence to influence 
the overall level of aggregate demand and to shift resources for short-
term counter-cyclical purposes. This centralist prescription is contested, 
however. The SGTFF argue that macroeconomic stability is a shared 
responsibility of the Centre, the states and LGs. According to the SGTFF, if 
SNGs have fiscal capacity they may take short-term counter-cyclic 
measures through taxation and public spending. The states may sit 
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together and negotiate on how they can achieve common goals with 
respect to macroeconomic and redistribution functions. 
The assignment of responsibilities to different levels of government 
varies from one country to another due to economic, political, historical, 
and social specificities. Among the economic arguments, economies of 
scale, spill over effect, and homogeneous preferences are centralizing 
forces, while heterogeneous preference, and congestion cost are 
decentralizing forces (Dafflon, 2006). 
The process of assignment of responsibilities to different levels of 
government can be a top-down approach or on subsidiary principle. The 
latter demands for active participation of core stakeholders in the 
decision making process of the separation of power. 
Chapter five discusses the assignment of responsibilities between the 
Federal Government and the States as well as between the States and 
LGs in the Ethiopian federal arrangement. Legally speaking, the Federal 
Constitution enshrines considerable powers and functions to the States. 
The assignment of responsibilities between the Federal Government and 
the States are among the highly decentralized federations. The Federal 
Constitution envisages strong states. All powers not assigned to the 
Federal Government are residual power to the States. 
Various economic and non-economic variables have been applied in 
the separation of power between the Federal Government and the 
States. Subsidiarity principle, economic variables (economies of scale, 
inter-jurisdictional externality, cost of information and decision making), 
political preference, macroeconomic stability, interpersonal equity, and 
minimum national standard public service delivery have been 
considered. 
The Federal Constitution grants symmetric powers and functions to 
all states (Federal Constitution, Art.52). Despite there are economic 
arguments (for example economies of scale, externalities and technical 
capacity issues) that support to pursue asymmetric assignment of 
responsibilities to the States; it is not politically desirable. Because, 
treating the NNP unequally has dear political cost. 
The Ethiopian states are not in a position to take short-term counter-
cyclic measures as their fiscal capacity is too weak to shift their capital 
budget for short-term stabilization purpose. But the states, coordinate 
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their economic plans with the Federal development plans, to make 
influence on the levels of output and employment in the long-term. 
LGs’ powers and functions are derived from respective State, 
because by design they are created to be agents of the State. This has 
enabled the states to restructure the LG (Zones, Special Weredas, and 
Weredas and Kebeles) in a way to fit with their specific circumstances. As 
a component of the WLD, the States have devolved some political and 
administrative powers including preparation of development plans, 
approval of annual budgets, administration of resources and provision of 
basic local public services. 
In principle, the process of assignment of responsibilities among 
vertical levels of government should be a product of dialogue and 
negotiation between stakeholders (local councils, local 
executives).However, the process of assignment of responsibilities to the 
Weredas was a desk work of experts (consultants) and decision from 
above. The framers neither consulted local officials about what 
competences they would like to carry out effectively nor the considered 
the nature of production functions of local public services, and factors 
like institutional, social organization and communities’ settlement. 
There is widely spread perception that the States have no discretion 
power local priorities. For example, Pawlos (2007:263) and Young (1999) 
argue that States’ budget autonomy is very limited as decisions are often 
guided by the Federal Government sector development programs (SDP) 
and Federal Five Year Development Plans(FYDP).Given the current 
government inherited the lowest level of primary education, primary 
health care, rural road, water supply service, etc... by the standard of the 
SSA countries, one may argue that the preferences for these public 
services are likely to be uniform across the states.  
This may perpetuate till in the coming few years, although with 
economic progress and increasing citizens’ disposable income, difference 
in preference for public services in quality and quantity across the states 
inevitable.  
Therefore, as long as the States own the Federal Government SDP, it 
does not imply sacrificing local preference for national objectives. The 
States’ SDP often coincide with the Federal FYDP but not all. Above all, 
the states determine spending choices between recurrent and capital 
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budgets as well as among various sectors. They formulate own 
development plans. But there are cases where the Federal Government 
dictates the States to take national goals by establishing minimum 
national standard public service deliver using the conditional grants as 
instruments. 
Chapter six discusses on theory of tax assignment to different levels 
of government. The FGTFF assigns taxation power on economic principles 
only. It prescribes that mobile and highly progressive distributive tax 
bases should be assigned to the centre for macroeconomic and 
interpersonal equity purposes. The theory limits user charge, real estate 
property tax and excise taxes to SNGs. For the SGTFF, there is no golden-
rule of tax assignment among vertical levels of government. The 
economic criteria are necessary but not sufficient. Considerations of 
historical, politic, and specific realities of a country are critical. The SGTFF 
may apply a decision matrix approach to determine what tax base should 
be assigned to which level of government. But it should be emphasized 
that the decision matrix offers paths to solutions but it is not a blue print 
for practical decentralization taxation policy. 
Uncoordinated unilateral taxation decision causes horizontal and 
vertical externalities. Horizontal externality causes tax competition. 
There is no consensus among economists on the desirability of tax 
competition. Some argue that as competitions among business firms 
increases consumers utility, tax competition among states/LGs enhances 
government efficiency. Others argue that tax competition causes waste 
of resources and reduces government revenue which in turn leads to lose 
of citizens’ welfare. To avoid, the disadvantages of tax competition, SNGs 
may harmonize their tax base (B), deductions (Di) leaving the states to 
manoeuvre with t and k or harmonizing B, Di and t by allowing SNGs to 
compete using K. The chapter also discusses on financial autonomy and 
tax autonomy of SNGs from the OECD and Swiss perspectives. The 
chapter is designed in a way to serve as a theoretical background for the 
assessment of the Ethiopian taxation assignment between the Federal 
Government and the States. 
Chapter seven examines the vertical tax assignment of Ethiopia from 
the constitutional context and practical perspectives. The separation of 
taxation powers are categorized into the Federal Government, the 
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States, and concurrent between the Federal and the states. 
Constitutionally speaking, the states have taxation power to determine 
tax base, to set tax rate and to administer taxes over a range of revenue 
source. The States have access to various revenue sources including 
business profit income tax, personal income tax, value added tax, and 
excise tax. Moreover, considerable elastic tax bases are shared between 
the Federal Government and the States. The existing lopsided revenue 
collection in favor of the Federal Government is not because the states 
have meager taxation powers. Instead this Thesis argues that the 
separation of taxation power between the Federal Government and the 
states has been designed in a way to ensure tax sovereignty of the states. 
There is a gap between constitutional tax assignment and practice; 
however. The States do not exercise their tax powers. Tax rates are 
uniform across the States, except agricultural income tax and land use 
fees. This practice has diminished tax autonomy of the States. 
The States have retained all taxation powers. They have not devolved 
any tax power to Weredas except municipal revenue sources. The 
Wereda level decentralization (WLD) is not accompanied by taxation 
powers to weredas. Weredas collect revenues on behalf of respective 
State. The states set revenue targets which are not often realistic. The 
Weredas get what they have collected back in the form of Wereda block 
grant. If they collect less revenue than the predetermined revenue 
collection target, they do not receive the difference. But when they 
collect more revenue than the target, same amount of money is 
deducted from the Weredas’ block grant entitlement. This system may 
create distinctive to raise more revenue. 
Tigrai is the only state that has, so far, legally decentralized taxation 
power to Weredas in the same fashion which the Federal Constitution 
has applied. Referring to the Proclamation No. 107/1998 of Tigrai, 
taxation powers of ULGs are not limited to benefit taxation and real 
property tax base. They have power on mobile tax bases such as PIT, BPT, 
and VAT. Given Tigrai is a relatively homogeneous and Tigrians are 
relatively mobile people, a significant tax rate variation between the 
ULGs are likely to cause fiscally induced migration of labour and capital 
within the Sate.  
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The tax assignment in Ethiopia does not coincide with the 
conventional revenue assignment theory of fiscal federalism. Of course, 
it does not need to match with the theory as specific political preference, 
and historical circumstance of the country have govern the separation of 
tax assignments between the Federal Government and the States. 
On average, so far, states’ own revenue size has not exceeded 25 
percent of their expenditure needs. This wide fiscal-need gap makes the 
Federal transfer more critical to provide minimum national standard 
public services at state level. 
Chapter eight examines the practice of intergovernmental transfer 
system in Ethiopia. The transfer system uses unconditional, conditional, 
wereda block grant and road fund as policy instruments to correct VFG, 
to address horizontal fiscal disparity, and to provide minimum national 
standard of public service. 
The unconditional grant gives liberty to the states to allocate on what 
they think appropriate. It is also equity-oriented, but it creates 
disincentive to mobilize more own-revenue and develops the common 
pool problem. In the Ethiopian context, conditional grants also serve as 
equalization tools for two reasons: (i) eligibility for conditional grants aim 
at enhancing equitable socio-economic developments across the States, 
and 
(ii) Distribution among the eligible States is not made by the capacity of 
the States to contribute to a fixed grant pool, but based on the Federal 
subsidy entitlement percentage share designed by the HoF. 
The state own revenue–federal transfer balance has skewed to the 
transfers implying that the States are heavily dependent on Federal 
transfers. This is so partly because the states revenue raising capacity is 
weak and partly because the states are engaged in carrying out national 
standards. The skewed distribution of concurrent revenues between the 
Federal Government and the states also favour the former. 
The transfer system is dominated by unconditional grant, 
comprising about 70 percent of the total Federal transfers. In a situation 
where the distributions of basic public services are at lower level across 
the states, the lion’s share of unconditional grant is expected. 
Nevertheless, with the per-capita growth of the population, variations of 
local preferences for public services are expected to be visible. By then 
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conditional grants will be more effective instruments in gearing the 
public spending to meet national concerns (World Bank, 2000b). The 
choice between unconditional and conditional grants depends on what 
objective(s) the decision makers would like to achieve (such as budget 
autonomy, narrowing horizontal disparity, efficiency etc).If the Federal 
Government gives more focus on State’s budget autonomy, then 
unconditional grant is more appropriate instrument. If emphasis is given 
to efficiency, then conditional grants are good policy tools. Therefore, 
what mix of unconditional and conditional transfer should a country has 
to have is a political choice. From technical perspective gradual shifting 
from the unconditional to conditional grants would bring better 
efficiency. 
At LGs level, recurrent expenditure needs are almost covered by 
WBG, whereas capital budgets are financed through specific purpose 
grants. The capital budget allocation to LGs is subject to States’ priority 
and equitable distribution of basic public services across the Weredas. 
Over the last two decades, the unconditional grant has gone through 
modifications and changes. Socio-economic variables formulas were 
applied from 1994/5to 2006/7. The variables were more of expenditure 
needs indicators and, on average, only less than 20 percent weight had 
been dedicated to revenue raising effort. The subjective selection of the 
variables and assigning weights to each variable instigated voices from 
the States. As an effect, the HoF replaced it by fiscal gap equalization in 
2007/8 (HoF, 2007). 
What should the Ethiopian fiscal equalization equalize? Should it 
equalize expenditure needs only or revenue capacity only or both? 
Equalizing the expenditure needs only ignores the existing wide 
asymmetry in revenue raising capacity among the States. Likewise, 
considering only revenue capacity equalization understates States’ 
expenditure differences due to expenditure needs and cost differentials 
among the States. Therefore, in the current Ethiopian context, applying 
combinations of both expenditure needs and fiscal capacity equalization 
is a prudent policy to ensure minimum standard provision of public 
services at comparable tax effort. The fiscal-gap equalization equalizes 
about 80 percent states’ own- revenue sources and more than 90 
percent of the expenditure needs of the states 
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The fiscal-gap equalization has fully equalized both the expenditure 
need and the revenue raising capacity of the states. The political 
rationale for the full equalization is to ensure provision of minimum 
national standard public service at comparable tax effort. However, it has 
developed incentive to compete for common pool. The revenue raising 
capacity equalization has also developed disincentive to optimize their 
revenue potential, because it considers actual revenue collections of the 
states, not their potential fiscal capacity. 
The last chapter discusses the golden-rule of borrowing and the 
borrowing practice in Ethiopia. Contemporary literatures on public 
finance prescribe for a balanced recurrent budget. Borrowing should be 
allowed to finance capital investments only for reasons of 
macroeconomic stability, inter-generational equity, efficiency, and 
redistribution. 
The Federal Constitution ensures the right of the States to borrow 
from domestic financial institutions. In practice however, the states enjoy 
little autonomy to borrow. State borrowings have aimed at financing 
short-term budget need, except the Water Development Fund and 
Housing Development program. All the states recognize the right of ULGs 
to borrow from domestic lenders but no state has implemented. All 
levels of government do not run on balanced budget. They can finance 
recurrent expenditure either through borrowing from MoFED or by easily 
ratifying supplementary budget by respective legislative body. And, thus 
the ‘revisited golden rule’ is not respected. 
 
 
10.2 Policy Recommendations 
 
[1] Efficient provision of public services 
 
The Ethiopian federation is a federation of NNP. Regardless of the 
population size of the NNP, all are granted the right to self government 
and self-determination. The formation of Zone/Special weredas along 
ethnic groups guarantees minority’s rights to self rule as well as to 
develop and maintain communal value (local cultural identity, language, 
and history). However, some ethnic-based Special Weredas and Wereda 
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Governments are too small in population size to efficiently provide some 
public services like Teachers and Health Colleges, hospital level health 
services, Zonal level Court service at lower cost because the production 
function of these public services do not allow them to reap benefit from 
economies of scale. Policy makers are, therefore, confronted between 
two conflicting objectives. On the one hand, they want to empower local 
people by establishing ethnic-based small governments closer to the 
people. On the other, providing public services at the lowest cost 
(bottom of U cost curve) demand minimum threshold of population size. 
Merging forcefully small ethnic-based jurisdictions with the intention to 
take advantages from economies of scale or centralizing the functions at 
Zonal level contradicts with the basic principle of the Federal 
Constitution. The assignment of the above mentioned public services 
uniformly across the Zone Administration has also technical problem 
because the public services cannot have identical economies of scale 
across the Zones. Each public service attains minimum average unit cost 
at different production function. For instance, TVET and Zonal hospitals 
cannot have same production function across the states. Moreover, the 
centralization of the public services at Zone Administration level has 
made the public services far away from citizens. For example, in many 
weredas, students are compelled to leave out their local areas for 
seeking preparatory or technical schools. Patients are referred to next 
higher layer of health institution, which are located far away from their 
residence areas. The referral treatment system is not patient-centred245. 
The Special Weredas or Wereda Governments can efficiently provide 
the public services without sacrifying their right to self–rule by 
establishing special purpose functional units for each public service (for 
example, for polytechnic  institutions , Preparatory school, Hospital level 
health service, taped water supply service etc). Establishments of such 
special functional units presuppose consultations and negotiations 
among the concerned LGs as well as coordination of tasks. 
                                                 
245 The current practice of health service referral system is confined to health institution 
within a state: Health Post→ Health Centre→ Zonal hospital→Regional Referral 
Hospital→ Federal Referral Hospital. 
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An alternative policy option is to introduce inter-state or intra-
Wereda compensation agreement for the public services provided to 
non-state/LG residents. This policy option would be more ideal for health 
service. It would be cost saver and comfortable to patients to refer them 
to the nearest hospital, belonging to a neighbouring State/LG rather than 
referring to a higher level health institution within a State/LG, located far 
away from the user residence area. For instance, it would be convenient 
and cost saving to refer patients from West Gorji Wereda, Oromia, to 
Hawasa Referral Hospital, SNNP State, rather than to Adama Referral 
Hospital of Oromia. Similarly, for Kafta–Humera Wereda residents, (Tigrai 
state), Gonder Referral Hospital (in Amhara state) is by far closer and 
more equipped than Shire Zonal Hospital. Such an arrangement can be 
introduced by signing a contract agreement between two states or 
between the service providing institution and beneficiary Wereda 
Government on the admission, quality of the service, language usage and 
compensation modalities etc. 
Provision of tape water supply service has become a serious 
challenge for many ULGs in all the states partly because the initial 
investment cost is beyond their financial capacity and partly many urban 
jurisdictions do not have surface or underground water resource. ULGs 
may provide dependable water supply service at lower cost by: (i) 
establishing special territorial function for water supply that would serve 
for a wider population size, or (ii)Voluntarily amalgamation of vicinity LGs 
(Rural and urban) located within a defined radius. These policy options 
may enable LGs to combine their resources (water resources and finance) 
and to reap benefits from economies of scale. The amalgamation option, 
however, is not priceless. It makes trade-off between sacrificing 
autonomy and reaping benefits from economies of scale. 
 
[2] Inter-jurisdictional externality/Spill over effect 
 
The intergovernmental transfer system of Ethiopia does not respect 
the principle of inter-jurisdictional externality. It neither acknowledges 
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vertical nor horizontal transfer for inter-jurisdictional externality 
benefits.246 
Theories of intergovernmental transfer assert that states/LGs would 
not have incentive to allocate more public budget on public services that 
would produce positive spill over effect to other jurisdiction, in the 
absence of compensation mechanism for the cost of externalities 
through designing some sort of matching grant (Oates, 1972:75; 
Boadway and Shah, 2009:326).With regard to this, the so far Ethiopian 
experience is mixed. Tigrai’s public spending on MIT generated positive 
externality to the national stock of skilled man power. An appropriate 
Federal compensation mechanism in the form of matching conditional 
grant would have given incentive to the Tigrai state to spend more public 
funds on the sector, or to smoothly run the Institution. Unfortunately the 
absence of such a compensation mechanism has caused the MIT to shut 
down.247 
Failing to compensate inter-state externality effects, however, has 
not precluded the highland jurisdictions from investing on soil and water 
conservation that produce positive spill over effects to the 
States/weredas down the hills. How long the highland States/weredas 
will keep on financing projects/programs that produce positive 
externalities without any compensation is questionable, however. 
If the States are to invest more on public services that would produce 
positive inter-jurisdictional externality effect, compensation mechanism 
has to be designed. This may pose who should compensate whom? If the 
spill over effect is confined to a neighbouring jurisdiction, the beneficiary 
has to compensate to the positive spill over producing jurisdiction. By the 
same token, a polluter jurisdiction has to bear the cost of the pollution. If 
public spending policy of a state produces a positive inter-jurisdictional 
externality at national level, the Federal Government should design a 
compensation mechanism in the form of conditional matching. 
                                                 246 Except Harari’s and Dire Dawa’s public spendings on education and health 
services. 
 247 The State of Tigrai handed over the MIT to the University of Mekele because the 
MIT budget burden was perceived too heavy to the state.  
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Addressing inter-jurisdictional externality effects through 
unconditional grant/equalization, as it has been practicing for Harari and 
Dire Dawa, is a flaw policy because equalization does not properly 
measure the costs of the inter-jurisdictional externality effects. 
Introducing an open-ended conditional matching grant will address the 
problems of inter-jurisdictional externality effects. 
[3] Ensuring the tax autonomy of the states and LGs 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the Ethiopian states cover 
small portion of their total expenditure needs from their own revenue 
sources. The fiscal position of the states can be strengthened by taking 
the following measures: 
 
[3-1] Introducing objective financial indicators of business 
income profit to distribute revenues generated from more 
than a state- 
 
As discusses in Chapter seven, location of production/business area 
does not automatically guarantee a state to control over taxation power 
or to get share from concurrent revenue sources. The issue of 
registration of legal entity (HQs) has precluded the states from benefiting 
revenue sources generated within their jurisdiction, because many of the 
enterprises have made their HQ in Addis Ababa. It is understandable that 
prorating the sources of business profit of a company which operates in 
more than a state is difficult, but it is not impossible. Proceeds derived 
from business income profit can be distributed between the hosting 
jurisdiction(s) and the HQ by applying some objective economic and 
financial indicators like share of capital investment, share of production 
value, sales volume, insurance premium, share of wages and salaries, or 
some combinations of the variables  
[3-2] Let the states exercise their constitutional taxation powers 
This recommendation includes, but not limited to: 
[3-2-1] Allow the states to set their tax rate to maximize their 
revenue sources. 
The fear of racing-to -bottom tax rate to attract investment among 
the state could be addressed by setting a minimum floor tax rate. A 
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maximum tax rate may also be set to avoid excessive tax burden on 
residents and businesses (see [6] below). Undo the act of recentralization 
of state’s taxation powers at the Federal government on excise tax on 
‘chat’ and letting the states to set the rate and administer it. 
 
[3-2-2] Invent new revenue sources such as real property tax, 
environment tax, road tall tax, etc 
[3-2-3] Impose certain percent of tax on the Federal Government 
profit making enterprises as per art.100 (3) of the Federal Constitution. 
The Ethiopia Electric Corporation, Ethio-Tele, Ethiopian Sugar 
Corporation, Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Insurance 
Corporation, Ethiopian Mine Development Enterprise, and Ethiopian 
Aviation Enterprise are most likely candidates to tape revenue. This 
proposal is justified for couple of reasons: First, these Federal-owned 
enterprises make profit using the State’s resources (land, road, etc) and, 
second, the States provide public services (education, health, road, 
security, etc) for the employees of the Federal Government owned 
business firms. Third, some federal-owned enterprises pollute local 
environment. 
[3-2-4]The states can maximize their revenue capacity by securing 5 
percent free equity on the total investment of large scale mining and by 
buying shares on lucrative mining enterprises in line with the Federal 
Mining Proclamation No 816/2013. 
[3-3] Revise and correct the existing unfair distribution of concurrent 
revenue sources between the Federal Government and the States, which 
favour the former. Taking away lion’s share from the concurrent revenue 
pool by the Federal Government and giving it back in the form of federal 
transfers to the states undermines the tax autonomy of the states. 
Allocating fairly the concurrent revenue sources between the Federal 
Government and the states could improve the existing wide VFG and tax 
autonomy of the states. 
The states have not been benefiting from royalty fee as stipulated in 
the Federal Constitution Art.98. Royalty fees generated from large scale 
mining are collected by the Ministry of Mine and Energy (MoM&E). So 
far, the Federal Government takes all royalty fees. The HoF must enforce 
the MoFED/ MoM&E to transfer royalty fees related to mining operations 
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to respective states, because interpretation of the Constitution is 
absolute power of the HoF (Federal Constitution, 1995, Art.83). Any 
unconstitutional act of the Federal Government is expected to be 
automatically nullified by the House. 
[4] Launching the Third wave of decentralization 
[4-1] Abolish Zonal functional Administrations 
 
In spite of the fact that the Wereda level decentralization was 
intended to empower the local government politically and 
administratively, yet considerable powers and functions remain 
delegated or deconcentrated to the LGs. Many functions like secondary 
school, TEVT, hospital level health service,Collector road category (that 
link centres of Main Access roads to each other) are still retained at 
functional Zone Administrations. 
Functional Zone Administrations were important to coordinate the 
activities of Weredas when skilled manpower was very difficult to find at 
Wereda level in the 1990s. Nowadays labour supply of skilled manpower 
(university graduates) is not a point of concern. Therefore, abolishing the 
functional Zonal Administrations by launching the third wave of 
decentralization that devolves more powers and functions downwards 
will empower local governments and promote accountability. There is no 
more need to suppress weredas by functional Zonal Administration on 
the pretext of “supporting and coordinating” wereda activities. Weredas 
may coordinate their functions horizontally through establishing LG 
Associations without the need of Zonal Administration control. 
Therefore, if elected politicians are to make responsive to local needs 
and accountable for their decision choices, first and foremost, the 
Functional Zonal Administrations should be removed and let the 
Weredas decide what functions/ responsibilities would they like to retain 
and to pass over. The (de)centralization matrix discussed on chapter 4 
may be helpful by adapting it to specific individual wereda’s political, 
institutional, economic and social realities. 
[4-2] Devolution of taxation power to LGs 
 
The second wave of decentralization has not been accompanied by 
devolution of taxation. The third wave of decentralization has to devolve 
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adequate taxation powers to the LGs. As far as tax devolution to the LG is 
concerned, there is a widely spread perception among centristic minded 
State politicians and bureaucrats. If taxation powers are devolved 
downword, LGs may not use revenue yields properly and as a 
consequence provision of public services may deteriorate in quality and 
quantity. The argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, despite 
capacity problems are undeniable; in practice the LGs collect taxes on 
behalf of respective State. The problems of managerial and institutional 
capacity are relative concepts and they can be addressed through 
launching extensive capacity building schemes. Second, by establishing 
democratic local institutions that would promote grass-root participation 
in local affairs and strengthening the existing ones would make local 
politician accountable to their decision choices. 
 
[5] Determine the size of Federal subsidy by law 
 
In some federations, size of federal transfer/equalization and 
revenue source(s) of equalization are explicitly stated by law248. These 
make the intergovernmental transfer system more transparent, 
predictable and stable. In Ethiopia the source(s) and size of federal 
transfer are not explicitly defined by law. The HoF sets the Federal 
subsidy/equalization formula. The Federal Government determines the 
equalization grant pool size on ad-hoc method from its general revenue 
collections (central treasury), external loans and external assistances 
after it takes for itself. Finally, the HoPR approves the size of the Federal 
subsidy. No fiscal negotiation/ bargaining takes place between the HoF 
and the legislative or between the Federal Government and the States on 
the size of the Federal subsidy. This makes the equalization system less 
predictable. To avoid this problem, the HoF or the States need to initiate 
a law that enforces the Federal Government to determine the 
equalization pool size by law. The determination of federal subsidy by 
law may also curb the Federal Government from manoeuvring transfers 
                                                 
248  For example, in Australia, the national goods and services tax (VAT) is the only source 
of equalization fund (Spasojevic, 2007:270). 
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for buying votes by shifting from unconditional grant to conditional ones. 
A legal framework that compels the Federal Government to dedicate 
some percent of its total tax revenue to transfer would enable the States 
to predict the size of the Federal transfer pool and to forecast how much 
they can receive in the coming years by analyzing the macroeconomic 
performance of the country. 
 
[6] Setting the “right” degree of tax autonomy 
 
The choice for the federal system in Ethiopia, among others, is 
argued to devolve powers and functions as well as to ensure the states to 
have access to various revenue sources. The Federal Constitution 
envisages strong states. The states have Constitutional rights to 
determine B and Di and to set t and to administer taxes on ranges of 
revenue sources. But, there is a centralization tendency on the pretext of 
tax harmonization for ‘achieving fair horizontal equity and /or fearing of 
tax war among the states. Ensuring high level of tax autonomy of the 
states and achieving horizontal equity are not mutually inclusive. 
Therefore it is a political choice to make the right balance between the 
two conflicting objectives of ensuring higher levels of tax autonomy with 
wide horizontal socio-economic disparity and relatively better horizontal 
equity at the cost of tax sovereignty. 
Now, the question is: What extent of cost of horizontal inequality is 
tolerable for what degree of tax autonomy? Or how much tax autonomy 
should be forgone to achieve horizontal equality? If one advocates for a 
high degree of tax autonomy of the states, he/she should answer 
whether there are well developed institutional self-controlling 
mechanisms that would bear the costs of tax war, or whether tax race-to-
the bottom will not exacerbate the existing economic development 
disparity across the States, and how minimum national standard public 
service delivery can be achieved at comparable tax rate by pursuing tax 
competition? Likewise, if one argues for low level of tax autonomy by 
harmonizing B, Di, and t with the objective to narrow horizontal 
development disparity among the states or to provide minimum national 
standard public services at uniform tax rate but comparable tax efforts, 
there are some concerns to worry about. Does uniform tax system 
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enable the States to provide basic public service to the satisfaction of 
their residents? Are there mechanisms in which citizens directly decide 
and control budget implementation? Are there adequate institutions to 
hold politicians accountable to their constituencies? Would not a uniform 
taxation system induce states’ dependency on the Federal transfer and 
exacerbate competition for the common pool? Does not the system 
preclude the States from prioritizing their real choices? 
Therefore, the extent of tax autonomy to achieve is a political choice. 
Nevertheless it should be in harmony with the spirit of the Federal 
Constitution. There are obvious concerns about the inherent negative 
effects of horizontal tax competition in exacerbating horizontal economic 
inequality. Allowing the States to engage on tax war would neither 
contribute to provide comparable minimum national standard public 
services at ‘uniform’ tax rate nor to achieve a balanced socioeconomic 
development across the States. Similarly, the uniform tax system has 
precluded the States from exercising their constitutional right. In the 
Ethiopian context, the horizontal equity/comparable public service 
delivery and tax autonomy are necessary ingredients for the 
sustainability of the federal system. Hence, balancing these conflicting 
objectives by sacrificing some degree of tax autonomy for some degree 
of horizontal equity seems necessary. A balanced trade-off between 
autonomy and addressing horizontal disparity can be achieved by 
allowing the States to exercise their right to set tax rate but refrain them 
not to go for not tax wars by voluntarily ratifying an Economic Charter 
where all the States and the two City Governments negotiate, set a 
binding minimum and maximum tax rate agreement on consensus basis. 
This policy option is believed to yield multiple advantages. It upholds the 
States’ tax autonomy and allows them to manoeuvre regulated tax 
competition within a limited range. The minimum tax rate will address 
the legitimate concern of those who pronounce the adverse effect of tax 
competition. Setting maximum rate will preclude politicians from 
imposing excessive tax on tax payers. It also promotes accountability.  
The range can be determined in a way to reflect how much the states 
are willing to trade-off tax autonomy for horizontal equity and provision 
of comparable public services at comparable tax rate. The HoF or an 
Association of the States (when they form) may take the initiative and 
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chair the negotiation process in shaping consensus based Economic 
Charter in the future. 
 
[7] Promote Accountability 
 
Accountability can be promoted through setting transparent 
budgeting process, and citizens’ participation in setting budget priority, 
applying public procurement procedures and ensuring citizens control 
over performance based budget execution so that voters will have 
information not only what resources are used but also what outcomes 
have been achieved at what cost. Competitive electoral system at all 
levels of government and establishing active democratic institutions will 
enhance accountability. 
Periodic Kebele meetings and people’ conference at Kebele and 
Wereda levels are held annually to discuss on various issues like good 
governance, annual budget evaluation, performance report, as well as on 
State policies, strategies and plans. However, these forums play little role 
in enforcing bottom-up accountability, because by de facto officials are 
primarily accountable to their Party. Elected politicians are dismissed by 
Party Assessment. Demotion of politicians for their incapacity and 
corruption by the voters is less common.249 
In principle, State Council is the highest decision making body at any 
level of government. The Councils have legal rights to decide on annual 
budgets, planning, quality and quantity of public services to be delivered. 
They have power to oversee the performance of the Executive body. But 
in practice, the Executive body is stronger and vocal than the Legislative. 
By de-facto, real powers rest on the hands of the Executive body, who 
are among the top ruling regional party and almost all Heads of Bureaus 
and Wereda Executives are Members of respective Council. Such system 
has created strong Executive bodies at all levels of government. There is 
asymmetric of information and competence between the Executives and 
Legislators. Many of the Councillors at state, Wereda and Kebele levels of 
government have little academic capacity. They are handicapped with 
reliable and updated information on technical issues. They lack 
                                                 249 There are few incidents where local officials were demoted for wrong doing or 
inefficiency because of pressures from bottom. 
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knowledge of laws of the land, government regulations and bureaucracy 
procedures. The centralized party channel and strong party discipline 
(democratic centralism) do permit little room to accommodate different 
views and alternative options other than the Party and government 
stands and policies. Moreover, there is no clear red line demarcation 
between the Party and the government. All these have created strong 
and vocal Executive bodied at the cost of the legislative and judiciary 
bodies.  
 
[8] Borrowing 
 
States’/LGs’ current expenditures exceed to current own revenues. 
The gap is financed through transfers. Transfers are not only sufficient to 
cover all expenditure needs, but also not ideal sources of financing long-
term investments. Due to very limited availability of fund, large public 
works like roads, bridges, water supply service, housing developments, 
hospital level health services, preparatory and technical educations etc. 
are either underprovided or not provided. Neither undertaking long-term 
investment projects on pay-as-you-go base is appropriate from inter-
generational equity and efficiency reasons. Therefore, guaranteeing 
states’/LGs’ access to borrowing but restricted to capital investment only 
enables the States/LGs to adequately provide public services.  
True, there is legitimate concern of exercising borrowing rights 
on the impact of macroeconomic stability and bail out risks. The 
fear can be checked by limiting borrowing for feasible investment 
projects only and by setting institutions and rules that promote 
self-discipline of the borrowers. 
At the current situation the supply side of domestic lending 
institution (capital market) is undeveloped and is very weak in 
Ethiopia. The existing private commercial banks are not interested 
to give long-term loans to the States/LGs. The Development Bank 
opts to provide long-term loans for profit-making enterprises and 
to enterprises engaged on import substitution or export oriented 
firms. Therefore, under such weak credit market environment, 
establishing State Development Banks (SDB) that will operate in 
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business-like may solve the existing credit market problem. A 
state/LGs and/or Associations of LGs may take the lead in 
facilitating the formation of the SDB where the LGs will be major 
share holders. 
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Appendix 5.1. Federal Government and States’ public expenditure and own revenues, 1997/8 to 2009/10, in million Birr 
 
 Fiscal year ending July 7 1998/9  1999/0 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 Average 
Fe
de
ra
l 
re
ve
nu
e 
Direct tax revenue 1141  1378  1593  1917  1682  1632  1792  2183 2775  3789  5437  8801  2703  
domestic indirect revenue 1005  1168  1136  1248  1432  1834  2173  2534 3156  4226  5964  8824  2742  
Foreign indirect revenue 2301 2694 2821 3293 3564  5276  5746  6587 8189  11693  11814  17685  6447  
Non tax revenue 3561  3188  2303  1972  2366  2087  2299  3829 3293  4598  8708  8719  3812  
Total revenue 8009  8428  7852  8430  9043  10829  12011  15133 17413  24307  31923  44029  15704  
  S
ta
te
s’
 re
ve
nu
e 
 
Direct tax revenue 876 989 1142 1202 1329 1798 2138 2278 2393 3226 4432 6105 2212  
Domestic indirect taxes 204 274 246 251 236 366 548 577 841 866 1361 1903 608  
Non tax revenue 475  478  435  511  540  924  885  1542 1151  1396  2468  1827  1011  
sub total revenue 1555 1741 1823 1964 2105 3088 3571 4397 4385 5487 8261 9835 3831  
Federal subsidy 4165 3141 4417 4653 6043 5970 6365 7833 9880 14261 17439 20934 8758  
From Federal treasury 3,527 2,475 3,076 3,340 4,556 5,056 5,556 7,056 9,056 13,556 16,556 19,556 7781  
From  external loan and 
Assstance  638 667 1,341 1,313 1,487 914 809532 777 824 705 883 1,378 978  
Grand  States’ revenue 5,401 4,550 5,570 5,961 7,405 8,601 9,538 11,842 13,853 19,396 25,259 30,080 12288  
Federal and States total revenue 9,564 10,168 9,674 10,393 11,148 13,917 15,582 19,530 21,797 29,794 40,184 53,864 20468  
share of States own-revenue to 
national revenue 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.20  
Share  of Federal subsidy to 
total States’ revenue  0.77 0.69 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.69 0.70 0.73 
Source:  Author’s compilation from MoFED data base 
  Note that figures are rounded to nearest whole number 
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Appendix 5.2. Public spending of Federal Government and States by category, 1997/8-2009/10, in million Birr 
 
Gov. 
level 
Budget 
allocation 
expenditure 
category 1
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20
07
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08
/9
 
20
09
/1
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average 
 
Federal 
Gov’t  
Capital 
budget 
ED  592  650  699  699  1170  2057  4478  6048  7208  9724  11028  15319  4973 
SD 223  120  49  233  474  1296  1274  1574  2452  2381  2902  5323  1525 
GD 140  113  193  276  128  129  112  167  505  319  263  350  225 
Total expenditure 955  883  941  1209  1771  3482  5864  7788  10164  12424  14192  20992  6722 
Recurrent 
budget 
 
Economic service 256  273  367  360  558  378  275  316  373  578  775  812     443 
Social service 414  622  471  806  787  625  695  886  1171  1696  2181  2885  1103 
General service 4811  7444  4953  3450  3260  3326  3934  4133  4248  4941  5704  6589  4733 
Total expenditure 5766 8339 5790 4616 4605 4328 4905 5335 5792 7215 8660 10287 6279 
  
Total Fed.Exp. 6436 9222  6731  5825  6376  7810  10769  13123  15956  19639  22852  31279  13001 
State 
Gov’t  
Capital 
budget 
ED 972  687  1033  1048  999  1070  1887  2162  2615  4338  5595  5129  2295 
SD  361  202  448  270  276  360  408  594  640  962  1550  2218  691 
GD 204  146  165  213  196  488  206  241  413  553  1375  2345  545 
total capital  exp. 1538  1035  1646  1532  1470  1918  2501  2997  3668  5853  8520  9693  3531 
Recurrent  
budget 
  
Economic service 545  536 594  694 779 983 1472 1621 1828 2533 3054 3274 1493 
Social service 1504  1480  1933  1995  2396  2628  3144  4110  5027  6966  8068  9702  4079 
General service 905  878  912  1180  1418  1722  1882  2389  2825  4188  5557  6198  2505 
total state rec. exp. 2954  2894  3439  3868  4593  5333  6498  8120  9680  13686  16679  19175  8077 
States' total  expenditures 4554  4002  5165  5444  6235  7718  9079  11234  13386  19886  25389  29714  11608 
 Grant (national) Expenditure  9390 12116 10170 9693 10969 13143 17267 21243 25636 33325 39531 50454 21078 
 Share of  Fed.exp.to national exp 0.69 0.76 0.66 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.62 
 Fed cap. exp /to  capital exp. 0.38  0.46  0.36  0.44  0.55  0.64  0.70  0.72  0.73  0.68  0.62  0.68  0.58 
Source:  Author’s compilation from MoFED data base. Note total Federal and State expenditures do not include expenditures from external loans and  
assistances. ED = Economic Development; SD= Social Development; GD= General development 
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Appendix 7.1. Concurrent tax transferred to the States in Birr 
 
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
States 
Concurrent 
Revenue withholding total 
Concurrent 
Revenue withhold tax total 
Concurrent 
Revenue 
Withhold 
tax total 
Tigrai 54,550,000 224,591 54,774,591 71,824,381 389,836 72,214,217 82,125,530 593,543 82,719,073 
Afar 1,410,000 10,995 1,420,995 4,162,207* 9,314 4,171,521 3,233,667* 21,420 3,255,087 
Amhara 37,300,000 402,691 37,702,691 39,395,378 779,130 40,174,508 48,237,749 1,248,500 49,486,249 
Oromia 96,700,000 572,255 97,272,255 181,981,158 670,331 182,651,489 119,014,867 2,018,779 121,033,646 
Somali 190,000 11,700 201,700 516,869* 10,804 527,673 606,886* 14,483 621,369 
B-G 230,000 59,023 289,023 4,130* 76,892 81,022 587,445* 66,962 654,407 
SNNP 16,580,000 18,622,855 35,202,855 29,120,865 552,150 29,673,015 55,186,321 898,751 56,085,072 
Gambela 670,000 5,400 675,400 1,608,590* 11,425 1,620,015 1,221,157* 28,763 1,249,920 
Harari 1,070,000 17,331 1,087,331 3,301,059 23,078 3,324,137 2,052,976 46,868 2,099,844 
AA 177,500,000 276,330 177,776,330 274,231,745* 23,244,874 297,476,619 73,295,965* 38,029,677 111,325,642 
DD  4,890,000 329,261 5,219,261 7,535,878 143,999 7,679,877 4,899,471 297,039 5,196,510 
total 391,090,000 20,532,432 411,622,432 613,718,261 25,911,833 639,630,094 390,462,034 43,264,786 433,726,820 
Source: Federal Revenue and Custom Authority 
Note: Concurrent revenue includes business income profit, dividend, excise tax and VAT 
*include only VAT 
  
 394 
 
Appendix 8.1 Federal subsidy utilization rate, allocation and actual transfers of external sources among the States1998/9- 
2002/03, in ‘000 Birr 
  States Descript-
ion 
1998/99(1991EC) 1999/00 (1992EC) 2000/01(1993) 2001/02(1994) 2002/03(1995) 1998/9-2002/03 
Federal 
treasury 
External 
source 
Federal 
treasury 
External 
source 
Federal 
treasury 
External 
source 
Federal 
treasury 
External 
source 
Federal 
treasury 
External 
source 
Federal 
treasury 
External  
source 
share of 
ext. source  
Tigrai   allocation  255,655 37,521  248,168 62,857 182,310  30,100  232,349 59,590 377,650  59.900 1,296,132 299498 23 
actual 262,020 7,387 236,921 6,321 188,873 23,065 299,001 23,065 383,850 38,259 1,370,665 92,396 6.7 
 ratio  1.02 19.7  0.95 10.01  1.03 0.77   1.28 38.7 1.02  0.65 1.05 30.8   
  allocation  225,794 11,694   237809 16047  175,970 17,920   183,323 23,620  248,980  39.500 1,071,876 128,951 12 
Afar actual 178,211 5,790 219,092 740 165,490 2,589 205,007 2,663 245,190 12,365 1,012,990 27,833 2.7 
   ratio  0.79 49.5  0.92 4.61 0.94  0.14  1.12  11.3 0.98 0.31  95 22   
  allocation  725,046 49,002  786,719 63,151  536,530 84,210  662,092 153000  974,930  154,500 3,685,317 612,573 16.6 
Amhara actual 695,286 17,531 694,576 46,730 498,606 28,854 790,007 44,390 973,270 37,525 3,651,745 196,476 5.4 
  ratio 0.96 35.8 0.88 74 0.93 0.34 1.19 29 0.99 0.24 99 32   
 allocation  826,191 83,101  910,180 81,603  612,550 111,790  909,713 154510 1274080  201,900 4,532,714 744,324 16.4 
Oromia actual 839,202 57,317 823,180 25,609 598,107 29,288 1048740 30,952 1278480 1,000 4,587,709 196,878 4.3 
  ratio 1.02 68.9 0.9 31.4 0.98 0.26 1.15 20 1 0 101 26   
  allocation  282,213 44,537  304,875 56,322  234,400 46,830  268,803  50,790  370,100  58,700 1,460,391 275,459 18.9 
Somali actual 203,854 24,423 198,774 18,528 206,410 20,126 305,158 20,126 371,704 13,066 1,285,900 76,443 5.9 
  ratio 0.72 54.8 0.65 32.9 0.88 0.43 1.14 39.6 1 0.22 88 28   
  allocation  161,115 11,002  164,418 20,568  120,380 12,950  137,053  14,630  187,700  29,700 770666 106,090 13.8 
BG actual 151,213 5,661 149,110 3,569 108,712 11,877 151,015 12,458 185,146 25,103 745,196 48,791 6.5 
 ratio 0.94 51.5 0.91 17.4 0.9 0.92 1.1 85.2 0.99 0.85 97 46 ratio 
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SNNP 
  
allocation  554,145 88,701  629,064 74315  440,000 93,660  497,628  132420  818,620  129,700 2939457 616,036 21 
actual 558,784 11,422 570,151 51,847 447,739 42,247 591,216 43,689 834,225 9,472 3,002,115 154,530 5.1 
ratio 1.01 12.9 0.91 69.3 1.02 0.45 1.19 33 1.02 0.08 102 25   
 
Gambe
la 
allocation 126,090 6,019 130,570 12,614 97,580 10,570 109,044 11,500 144,064 22,800 607,344 73,763 12.1 
actual 74,162 6,983 133,616 1,810 94,583 1,215 115,653 1,442 136,797 3,304 554,811 22,944 4.1 
ratio 0.59 16 1.02 14.3 0.97 0.11 1.06 12.5 0.95 0.14 91 31   
Hareri allocation  77,012 3,347  80,311 6,342  58,600  6,580  50,996 6,730  70,350  11,100 337269 39,779 11.8 
actual 67,648 1,310 52,854 101 54,646 658 59,051 658 69,751 10,125 303,950 17,194 5.7 
ratio 0.88 39.1 0.66 1.6 0.93 0.1 0.98 9.8 0.99 0.91 90 43   
Addis 
Ababa 
allocation  0 55,019  0 38,569 0  38,000  0 55,800 0  36,300       
actual 2,223 24,584 1,012 0 0 23,500 1,056 24,411 760 0 77,146 48,844 63.3 
ratio   44.7   0   0.62   43.7           
Dire 
Dawa  
allocation  32,000 3461  43,960 975030   16,640 3,010   70,000 4450  89,440  14,200 252,040 1,008,761 400 
actual 31,934 932 32,921 1,162 16,007 7,212 34,007 7,212 88,286 205 203,155 12,961 6.4 
ratio 1 26.9 0.75 0.11 0.96 2.4 0.48 1.62 0.99 0.01 81 1.3   
Total allocation 3,265,262 393,40
3 
3,536 1408857 2474960 455,620 3121400 660,01 4555900  758,300 16953522 4149460 24.5 
actual 3,064,53
7 
163,34
1 
2,771 156,050 2379172 11,674 2551171 32,113 4507458 150,42
5 
15273338 765,623 5 
 ratio   0.94 41.5 0.78 11.1  0.96 0.03  0.82  4.9 0.99  0.20  90 18.5   
Sources: Federal Subsidy allocation and actual transfers were collected from MoFED data base and rations are own calculation 
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Appendix 8.2 Revenue and expenditures of the Federal and the States, 1993/4- 2009/10, in ‘000 Birr 
 
 Federal 
Revenue 
total Federal 
expenditure 
State 
revenue 
States 
recurrent 
Exp. 
States 
Capital 
expenditure 
Total States 
expenditure 
National 
revenue 
National 
expenditure  
(3+7) 
Share 
of 4 
to 5 
Share 
of 4 
to 7 
Share 
of 4 to 
8 
Share 
of 6 to 
9 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7=5+6 8=2+4 9=3+7 10 11 12 13 
1995/6 5,836,800 5,657,750 1,129,290  2,470,550 1,326,490 3,797,040 6, 966,090 9,454,790 0.46 0.30 0.16 0.16 
1996/7 8,977,870 6,105,990 1,360,650  2,511,470 1,811,970 4,323,440 10,338,520 10,429,430 0.54 0.31 0.13 0.18 
1997/8 8,807,687 6,740,180 1,593,410  2,807,530 1,826,340 4,633,870 10,480,570 11,374,050 0.57 0.34 0.15 0.16 
1998/9 11,917,300 10,479,730 1,539,670  3,014,640 1,749,290 4,763,930 13,456,970 15,243,660 0.51 0.32 0.11 0.13 
1999/00 10,894,330 13,893,280 1,874,700  3,017,840 1,496,660 4,514,500 12,769,030 18,407,780 0.62 0.42 0.15 0.16 
2000/01 14,587,690 15,324,464 1,876,210 3,624,540 1,886,000 5,510,540 16,463,900 20,835,004 0.52 0.34 0.11 0.17 
2001/02 14,671,470 12,238,550 2,032,380  4,181,080 1,760,520 5,941,600 16,703,850 18,180,150 0.49 0.34 0.12 0.18 
2002/03 14,,127,540 7,367,971 2,871,070  5,122,340 1,810,280 6,932,620 16,998,610 14,300,591 0.56 0.41 0.17 0.31 
2003/04 17,828,730 9,088,236 3,449,620  5,535,810 2,280,290 7,816,100 21,278,350 16,904,336 0.62 0.44 0.16 0.26 
2004/05 19,345,550 12,756,100 3,220,890 6,313,850 11,002,660 17,316,510 22,566,440 30,072,610 0.51 0.19 0.14 0.18 
2005/06 13,970,010 14,785,200 4,385,800  8,399,550 12,846,000 21,245,550 18,353,810 36,030,750 0.52 0.21 0.24 0.23 
2006/07 17,412,700 15,957,000 4,384,700 9,680,000 13,668,000 23,348,000 21,798,000 39,305,000 0.45 0.19 0.20 0.25 
2007/08 15,826,770 25,455,400 5,487,420  9,717,910 15,311,850 25,029,760 21,314,190 50,485,160 0.56 0.22 0.26 1.06 
2008/09 24,306,700 21,185,000 8,250,000  14,027,820 20,087,290 34,115,110 32,556,700 55,300,110 
0.59 0.24 0.25 0.06 
2009/10 31,922,800 24,499,000 9,835,000  16,868,700 13,038,900 29,907,600 41,757,800 54,406,600 0.58 0.33 0.24 0.18 
Average 15,362,263 13,435,590 3,552,721 6,486,242 6,793,503 13,279,745 18,920,189 26,715,335 0.54 0.31 0.17 0.24 
Source: Columns 2 to 9, MoFED data base wwwMoFED.org.et visited April 2009,  
*pre-actual data Column 10 -12 and own calculation Bir4385, 5487, and 8261 
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Appendix 8.3Comparison of Federal Subsidy Entitlement percentage share to the States, 1994/5-2011/12 
   1994/5a  1995/6-1996/7a 1997/8-1999/00 a  2000/01-2002/3b  2003/4-2006/7c 2007/8-2008/9 d  2009/0-2011/2e 
States 
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Po
p
Sh
ar
e 
(2
00
2-
20
06
) 
Federal subsidy 
Entitlement 
Ave.Pop. 
share 
(2005-
2207) 
Excludsol
idarity 
fund  
Including 
solidarity 
fund 
Tigrai 9.0 5.91 8.3 6.0 7.7 5.83 8.29 6.04 7.18 6.0 6.38 6.04 7.11 7.04 6.1 
Afar 3.9 1.97 3.6 2.1 5.0 1.94 5.47 1.97 3.75 2.0 2.51 1.96 3.18 3.34 2.0 
Amhara 20.2 25.85 20.7 26.5 19.2 25.74 21.40 26.65 23.65 26.7 26.49 26.59 23.57 23.33 24.2 
Oromia 28.3 35.06 27.5 35.8 25.3 35.14 27.96 36.70 33.28 36.7 33.72 36.76 32.86 32.53 38.2 
Somali 4.5 5.94 4.2 3.5 7.6 5.86 8.12 6.04 7.27 6.0 6.68 6.02 8.09 8.43 6.2 
B-G 2.9 0.86 2.6 0.90 3.6 0.85 4.12 0.88 2.00 0.9 1.42 0.87 1.68 1.96 0.9 
SNNP 16.6 19.44 16.6 19.9 15.9 19.62 17.97 20.58 18.61 20.6 20.72 20.62 20.10 19.90 21.2 
Gambela 2.5 0.33 2.2 0.4 2.8 0.33 3.16 0.34 1.45 0.3 0.92 0.34 1.47 1.57 0.4 
Harari 1.1 0.24 1.0 0.3 1.8 0.25 1.54 0.26 1.12 0.3 0.50 0.26 0.90 0.89 0.3 
Dire Dawa 1.0 0.47 0.9 0.5 3.8 0.4 1.96 0.53 1.69 0.5 0.05 0.54 1.02 1.0 0.5 
 Addis Ababa 10.1  12.3 4.2 7.3 - - - - -     -- 
Mean 9.1  9.1  10  10  10  10  10 10  
Variance 73.54  74.29    76.06  114.19  137.50  117.3 112.16  
SD 8.58  8.62  8.88  8.72  10.69  11.73  10.83 10.59  
Sources: a-c =Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, 2000 The Federal Budget Grant Formula in Ethiopia (unpublished) 
d =MoFED, 2004, A New Approach to the Distribution of Federal Budget Grant to the Regional States, AA, Unpublished 
e=HoF, 2007, The New Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
f  =HoF, 2009,  The Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula to Regional States, Addis Ababa,  
Variance and Standard deviation are own computation 
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